13 Going on 14 — GFM: https://gofund.me/32671a27
Manhattan U.S. Attorney Audrey Strauss said: “As alleged, Sina Moayedi made misrepresentations about his employees’ qualifications and his company’s ownership in order to induce the State Department into awarding approximately $100 million in lucrative construction contracts to Moayedi’s company, Montage, Inc. Moayedi also allegedly cultivated a State Department insider, and paid the insider lucrative bribes in exchange for confidential State Department bidding information. Moayedi must now be held accountable for his alleged brazen fraud on the government.”
Special Agent in Charge Michael Speckhardt said: “As alleged, the defendant’s scheme to undermine the Department’s procurement process for personal gain caught up with him today and he will now be held accountable. His alleged actions not only hurt other legitimate businesses competing for awards, but also damage the public’s trust in the effective and efficient utilization of taxpayer money.”
According to allegations in the Complaint:
Montage, Inc. (“Montage”) is a U.S.-based business that is primarily involved in worldwide Government construction projects, including embassies, military posts, consulates, and similar overseas properties owned and operated by the United States Government. Montage has performed over $220 million in contracting work for the U.S. Government, including for the Department of Defense, the Department of Justice/Federal Bureau of Investigation, the State Department, the Department of the Interior, the Department of Agriculture, the National Aeronautics and Space Administration (“NASA”), the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (“EEOC”), and the Department of Veterans Affairs. Since 2014, Montage appears to have focused primarily on competing for and obtaining contracts with the State Department. During that period, the State Department has awarded Montage approximately six overseas U.S. Embassy/Consulate construction project contracts totaling $100 million, in locales such as Ecuador, Spain, Sudan, the Czech Republic, and Bermuda. The founder of Montage is SINA MOAYEDI.
Montage engaged in at least two fraud schemes. The first scheme alleges that, from approximately 2014 to September 2020, MOAYEDI and Montage lied that it was a female-owned business in order to secure unmerited advantages in the bidding process. By way of context, it is advantageous to a company, when bidding for federal government contracts, to be majority-owned by an individual from a socially or economically disadvantaged community. In fact, certain contracts (or portions of contracts) are “set aside” for – i.e., only available to – such companies. MOAYEDI and Montage repeatedly represented falsely in submissions to the State Department that Montage was female-owned, or female-owned and minority-owned, in order falsely to induce the State Department to award Montage lucrative construction contracts. In actuality, MOAYEDI repeatedly lied about Montage being a female-owned business, and indeed, MOAYEDI controls Montage and makes all material decisions on Montage’s behalf. As MOAYEDI revealed to a bank that inquired about Montage’s ownership status, “I am the sole owner and president of Montage and have always been.” Montage and MOAYEDI also repeatedly misrepresented, and significantly overstated, the qualifications of Montage employees. MOAYEDI made these misrepresentations in order to, among other things, meet State Department and contractual requirements for minimum experience in certain key positions.
The second scheme charged in the Complaint is a bribery scheme during at least 2016 and 2017. Insider-1 is employed in the State Department’s Overseas Building Operations (“OBO”), which, according to OBO’s website, “directs the worldwide overseas building program for the Department of State and the U.S. Government community serving abroad.” Specifically, Insider-1 works for the State Department’s OBO Project Development and Coordination Division, European division.
MOAYEDI, 66, of Chevy Chase, Maryland, is charged with one count of wire fraud, and one count of conspiracy to commit wire fraud, each of which carries a maximum potential prison sentence of 20 years, and one count of bribery of a public official, which carries a maximum potential prison sentence of 15 years.
 As the introductory phrase signifies, the entirety of the text of the Complaint and the description of the Complaint set forth below constitute only allegations, and every fact described should be treated as an allegation.
15. Based on my review of State Department records, I am aware that between approximately 2014 and 2017, Montage was awarded six U.S. embassy/consulate construction projects with the State Department, worth a total of approximately $100 million.
26. Based on information derived from witness interviews, I reviewed resumes submitted by Montage for various State Department projects. Department requirements referenced in the contract specify certain levels of experience in order to serve as “key personnel” (i.e., personnel whom the State Department has deemed critical to the safe, successful, and timely completion of a project).
In the course of my review, I identified numerous deficiencies regarding the resumes of key personnel submitted to the State Department for the Guayaquil, Ecuador project.
a. For example, Montage submitted an individual for the key role of Project Controls Engineer and Site Health Project Manager. In the claimed experience for this individual, it stated that he was employed at Montage since 2008 and had “inspected emergency egress and life/safety issues” and conducted “inspections of asbestos containment.” In fact, this individual had only been employed at Montage for approximately one year, and served in an office staff capacity, performing none of those duties.
[O]ne Montage employee’s resume claimed that he had earned a bachelor’s Degree in Civil Engineering and also claimed years of full-time complex work in the construction field in various capacities over several years. Neither representation was true. In fact, this individual testified at a deposition that they did not graduate; and this individual’s SF-86 security clearance application noted that this individual had actually sold meat as a door-to-door salesman, was a landscaper, and built swimming pools for several years during the period that they had claimed years of full-time complex work in the construction field.
39. I am aware, from my personal participation, that a judicially authorized search warrant was executed at the residence of Insider-1, on or about May 20, 2021. On that date, Insider-1 was informed, in substance, that she was not in custody, she was free to go, and she was not required to speak with law enforcement agents. She then participated in a voluntary interview with myself and an SDNY Special Agent on her back porch, and she made the following statements, in substance and part:
a. At first, Insider-1 claimed to have sold a large green rug to SINA MOAYEDI, the defendant, for about $60,000, but she said that the payment for the rug came from MOAYEDI’s friend.
Investigators working for the State Department’s inspector general suspect May Salehi took massive kickbacks to get out from under a mountain of debt https://t.co/9vw9oIUmpA
— The Daily Beast (@thedailybeast) May 28, 2021
Specifically: “A politically appointed Senior Advisor separated from the Department in November 2019. In 2020, President Trump appointed the former advisor to a role with another U.S. government organization. A representative from the new organization contacted the appointee’s former Department bureau because the political appointee was in possession of a diplomatic passport. The representative wanted to know whether the appointee could travel on behalf of the new organization using this diplomatic passport. The representative was informed by a bureau official that the appointee should not use the diplomatic passport.”
(U) During an audit of CA’s official and diplomatic passport records, OIG was alerted that a former Department employee had allegedly not surrendered their diplomatic passport upon separation from the Department and wanted to use it in a new role with another U.S. Government organization.24 According to the FAM, entitlement to an official or diplomatic passport ends when the employee separates from the Department, and the passport must be surrendered for cancellation.25
U) OIG found that the former employee’s diplomatic passport was listed as “issued” in ACRQ and had not been electronically cancelled by SIA. Based on that information, OIG performed additional steps to determine whether SIA had cancelled other employees’ official and diplomatic passports once separated from the Department. Specifically, OIG selected a sample of 134 official and diplomatic passports issued to employees who subsequently separated from the Department between November 2017 and September 2020. OIG found that 57 of 134 (43 percent) passports had not been electronically cancelled by SIA after the employee separated. Moreover, of the 57 that had not been electronically cancelled, 47 (82 percent) of the passports had not expired as of February 1, 2021, meaning they could still be valid.
(U) One reason for the deficiencies identified is that Department bureaus and offices did not always maintain proper accountability of passports and could not confirm whether separating employees had surrendered their passports for cancellation. When an employee’s entitlement to an official or diplomatic passport ends, but the passport is not surrendered or cancelled, the individual could misuse the passport, such as misrepresenting themselves as a representative of the U.S. Government. Doing so is a criminal offense.26
(U) Separated Employees’ Official and Diplomatic Passports
(U) Based upon a Bureau of Global Talent Management list of employees who had separated from the Department between November 2017 and September 2020, OIG identified 4,714 official and diplomatic passports associated with those employees. OIG selected a sample of 134 passports to test. 27 OIG found that 57 of 134 (43 percent) passports had not been electronically cancelled by SIA. In addition, of those 57 passports, 47 (82 percent) had not expired, as of February 1, 2021, meaning they could stil l be valid. 28 For example, one employee separated from the Department in December 2017, but the employee’s diplomatic passport was not scheduled to expire until April 2022- more than 4 years after separating from the Department.
Two former CA employees: “OIG identified two former CA employees who had diplomatic passports listed as “issued” in ACRQ. According to CA’s employee check-out list, employees are required to return special-issuance passports to SIA that were issued to them and to their family members upon separation and obtain the signature of an SIA staff member. SIA has no record of either of these two passports being returned for cancellation after the employees separated.”
Two former Office of the Secretary employees: “OIG identified two former Office of the Secretary employees who had diplomatic passports listed as “issued” in ACRQ. These two individuals had four passports issued to them. The Office of the Secretary’s employee check-out form requires departing employees to return their special-issuance passports and have the form initialed by the Office of the Secretary’s budget and travel office staff. An Office of the Secretary official stated that the office would have been in possession of three of the identified passports because the office maintains the diplomatic passports of people who travel with the Secretary of State. Because the three passports could not be found in the office, the official assumed that they were physically cancelled and returned to the individual. The Office of the Secretary could not provide information on the fourth passport. The Office of the Secretary official stated that a memorandum would have accompanied each passport to SIA for cancellation, but copies of the memoranda were not maintained .”(what the what? italics added).
Eleven former DS employees: “OIG identified 11 former Bureau of Diplomatic Security (DS) employees who had diplomatic passports listed as “issued” in ACRQ. These 11 individuals had 16 passports issued to them, including 2 that were issued to a former Assistant Secretary. DS’s employee check-out form requires employees to return to the Employee Services Center or contact SIA about special-issuance passports that were issued to them and to their family members upon separation. A DS official stated that the two passports issued to the former Assistant Secretary were collected before he separated from the Department, but DS had not returned them to SIA. The DS official stated that a former employee, who returned as a PSC, claimed to have lost one passport but there was no comment on her second passport and another employee’s passport had been returned to CA. Three former DS employees had returned four passports in total to their DS offices; however, DS could not locate an additional passport for one of these individuals and an additional two passports for another of these individuals. The DS official further stated that DS did not have records for two of the people associated with two passports. DS may have facilitated the issuance of these passports, but they were not DS employees. DS did not provide information on the remaining 2 of 16 passports.”
— State OIG (@StateOIG) May 26, 2021
An indictment returned by a federal grand jury in the Southern District of Georgia has been unsealed charging two businesses and nine of their officers and managers located across the country for their roles in an alleged conspiracy to defraud the U.S. government and commit various fraud and criminal immigration offenses for profit.
According to court documents, Regal Hospitality Solutions, LLC; Educational World, Inc.; Karen Makaryan, 42, Sargis Makaryan, 42, and Samvel Nikoghosyan, 40, of Destrehan, La.; Artur Grigoryan, 38, of Biloxi, Miss.; Armen Ayrapetyan, 37, of Duluth, Ga.; Jason Hill, 28, of Virginia Beach, Va.; Fremie Balbastro, 49, of Myrtle Beach, S.C.; and Larisa Khariton, 73, and Jon Clark, 71, of North Port, Fla., were charged in a 36-count indictment returned by a federal grand jury on April 8. Each defendant was charged with one count of conspiracy to defraud and commit offenses against the United States, including encouraging and inducing an alien to reside in the United States, alien harboring, transporting aliens, and visa fraud. Each defendant also was charged with substantive counts of encouraging and inducing an alien to reside in the United States, alien harboring, and transportation of aliens. In addition, Regal Hospitality Solutions, LLC; Karen Makaryan; Sargis Makaryan; Samvel Nikoghosyan; Artur Grigoryan; Armen Ayrapetyan; Fremie Balbastro; and Jason Hill were also charged with one count of conspiracy to commit wire fraud and 10 counts of wire fraud.
“The defendants in this case allegedly engaged in an expansive conspiracy to enrich themselves by exploiting both the immigration system and noncitizen workers,” said Acting Assistant Attorney General Nicholas L. McQuaid of the Justice Department’s Criminal Division. “Systemic fraud and abuse of U.S. visa programs and processes designed to protect American workers and businesses will not be tolerated, and offenders will be held accountable.”
“The Department’s Bureau of Educational and Cultural Affairs aims to increase mutual understanding between the people of the United States and the people of other countries by means of educational and cultural exchange,” said Acting Assistant Inspector General for Investigations Robert Smolich of the U.S. Department of State, Office of Inspector General, Office of Investigations. “When bad actors corrupt these programs for personal gain, it not only diminishes an important tool of diplomacy, it harms the thousands of individuals who participate in these programs hoping to gain skills and experience to make a better life. Today we took a step forward in restoring integrity back to those programs.”
“These defendants’ alleged scheme to game the immigration system and defraud the government has backfired and they will now be held accountable,” said Special Agent in Charge Katrina W. Berger of Homeland Security Investigations (HSI), Georgia and Alabama. “Schemes like this not only exploit the noncitizen workers involved, they also damage the other legitimate businesses in the community. Protecting the integrity of the visa program and immigration system is vital to the security of our nation.”
Individual defendants have made their initial court appearances and the arraignment of all defendants will be scheduled before U.S. Magistrate Judge Benjamin W. Cheesbro of the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of Georgia. If convicted, the individual defendants face maximum potential statutory penalties of five years in prison on the count of conspiracy to defraud and commit offenses against the United States; 10 years in prison on the counts of encouraging and inducing an alien to reside in the United States, alien harboring, and transportation of aliens; and 20 years in prison on the counts of wire fraud conspiracy and substantive wire fraud. The organizational defendants are subject to a maximum fine on each count of conviction of $500,000 or twice the gross amount of gain or loss resulting from the offense. A federal district court judge will determine any sentence after considering the U.S. Sentencing Guidelines and other statutory factors.
The U.S. Department of State Office of Inspector General is investigating the case with assistance provided by HSI and U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services.
Trial Attorneys Frank Rangoussis and John-Alex Romano of the Criminal Division’s Human Rights and Special Prosecutions Section and Assistant U.S. Attorney Alejandro V. Pascual IV of the Southern District of Georgia are prosecuting the case.
An indictment is merely an allegation and all defendants are presumed innocent until proven guilty beyond a reasonable doubt in a court of law.
The King of Swagger? No, couldn’t be.
— Tiffany Thiele (@thielefor55th) April 16, 2021
— james gibney (@jamesgibney) April 17, 2021
Is there a politician in America whose ambition more outstrips his talent than Mike Pompeo? Takes an incredible amount of arrogance to think you can get away with running the State Department like a two bit House office.
— Matthew Miller (@matthewamiller) April 17, 2021
Because it’s Saturday, I want my security detail and government employees who work for me to take care of my dog, get jewelry delivered to my home, pull my Christmas cards together, order flowers, arrange museum tours, and make restaurant reservations and hair salon appointments.
— Tim O'Brien (@TimOBrien) April 17, 2021
How does having her dog walked by state department employees serve America? https://t.co/3yksuydPil
— Molly Jong-Fast🏡 (@MollyJongFast) April 17, 2021
Yes, she was allegedly sending State Department personnel who worked for her husband on errands in her capacity as an independent woman, not the secretary of state's wife.
— Emily 🗣️ Tamkin (@emilyctamkin) April 16, 2021
— Brad Heath (@bradheath) April 16, 2021
But here's how Susan Pompeo treated her dear friend Toni, who refers to her strictly as "Mrs Pompeo," in emails @NBCNews obtained through an ongoing FOIA lawsuit. See and judge for yourself. (2/2) pic.twitter.com/UMLXWTFoYi
— Josh Lederman (@JoshNBCNews) April 16, 2021
2019 event with Kansas groups scrutinized in IG report: “For example, Mrs. Pompeo’s list noted that one attendee ‘was one of Mike’s biggest supporters during his years in Congress, hosting the single largest fundraiser held by Pompeo for Kansas'" https://t.co/sMoKZx2Gek
— Bryan Lowry (@BryanLowry3) April 16, 2021
The U.S. is a leader in championing women’s and girls’ rights around the world. Great speaking with Mrs. Pompeo about the 14th International Women of Courage Awards. We know that courageous women inspire a better world and these women certainly inspire us. pic.twitter.com/xOlEQ4Dbi9
— Ned Price (@StateDeptSpox) March 12, 2020
Paul Michael Guertin (“Guertin”), 40, of Arizona and former resident of Washington, DC, was indicted on March 29, 2021 by a federal grand jury in the District of Columbia for wire fraud and obstructing an official proceeding. The indictment was announced by Acting U.S. Attorney Channing D. Phillips and Special Agent in Charge Elisabeth Heller, of the U.S. Department of State, Office of Inspector General.
Guertin was a Foreign Service Officer who served on multiple State Department assignments, including overseas postings to U.S. diplomatic missions in Shanghai, China and Islamabad, Pakistan, and a posting to the Bureau of Intelligence and Research at State Department headquarters in Washington, DC. As a condition of his employment, Guertin was required to apply for and maintain a Top Secret security clearance. According to the indictment, Guertin intentionally concealed information on his SF-86 background investigation questionnaires and in interviews with State Department background investigators. He withheld information about several categories of conduct, including an undisclosed sexual relationship with a Chinese national, whose U.S. visa application was adjudicated by Guertin while he was serving as a consular officer in Shanghai, China; undisclosed gambling debts; and an undisclosed $225,000 loan from two Chinese nationals, who were directed by Guertin to provide $45,000 of the initial disbursement in the form of cash in $100 bills.
An indictment is a formal accusation of criminal conduct, not evidence of guilt. A defendant is presumed innocent unless proven guilty.
This matter was investigated by the U.S. Department of State, Office of Inspector General and is being prosecuted by Assistant U.S. Attorneys Christopher Brown and Thomas Gillice, with assistance from Paralegal Specialist Chad Byron.
3. During his tenure as a Foreign Service Officer, GUERTIN served on multiple State Department assignments abroad, including postings to diplomatic missions in Shanghai, China and Islamabad, Pakistan. GUERTIN also served at State Department headquarters in the District of
Columbia in the Bureau of Intelligence & Research (“INR”), the State Department’s intelligence office. GUERTIN was later assigned to language training in Taipei, Taiwan.
9. In connection with his initial employment with the State Department and periodic re-investigations, GUERTIN signed and submitted SF-86 forms on or about September 27, 2005; November 19, 2010; and April 3, 2016.
15. In or about June 2008, GUERTIN conducted a visa application interview with CHINESE NATIONAL 1 in his capacity as a consular officer at the U.S. Consulate in Shanghai, China. On or about June 11, 2008, GUERTIN favorably adjudicated CHINESE NATIONAL 1’s application for a U.S. visa.
16. Two days later, on or about June 13, 2008, GUERTIN sent CHINESE NATIONAL1 an e-mail stating: “I gave you an interview a few days ago here in Shanghai, and thought you were very cute and interesting! 🙂 Was wondering if you’d be interested in going out for dinner or a bite to eat sometime.” GUERTIN initiated a personal and sexual relationship with CHINESE NATIONAL 1 that lasted through at least in or about July 2009.
26. On or about July 13, 2015, GUERTIN sent an e-mail to an associate requesting an emergency loan of $10,000 in order to pay down his gambling debts in advance of his security clearance re-investigation. GUERTIN stated: “I desperately need 10 dimes to get my [stuff] in order and pass a security clearance review to hold onto my job.” GUERTIN further explained: “Every 5 years the State Dept. does a security clearance re-investigation, and mine is coming up in 3 months, and they’re for sure going to see that my credit score dropped hard from the last time they checked. That will cause them to get suspicious, and then they’ll search my bank account transactions and find all the gambling related [stuff]. . . . [t]hey’1l send me home from Taiwan and if they revoke my security clearance I’Il lose my job within 6 months.”
30. On or about April 15, 2015, GUERTIN directed CHINESE NATIONAL 2 and CHINESE NATIONAL 3 to meet him at a location in the District of Columbia for the purpose of withdrawing $45,000 in cash from their bank account for a further disbursement of the $225,000 loan. GUERTIN instructed them: “Also please ask the bank manager to give you as much as possible of the money in $100 bills so it’s not so ridiculously bulky to carry around and deposit, thx!”
Now available – Information Report: Review of Department of State Preparations to Return Personnel to Federal Offices During the Global Coronavirus Pandemic | https://t.co/XfFVvy85R7 pic.twitter.com/qT8N9umXSJ
— State OIG (@StateOIG) March 16, 2021
As @davidseide wrote to government watchdogs today: "This new data further attests to Michael Pack’s — and those who helped him — gross mismanagement, gross waste of taxpayer dollars, abuse of authority and violations of law, rule and regulation."
— Irvin McCullough (@mcculloughirvin) March 18, 2021
NEWS: When a tech non-profit sought to stave off a takeover by then USAGM CEO Michael Pack, it consulted a big law firm on how to sue him.
The law firm instead investigated the fund – its own ex-client – for Pack, as part of a lucrative, no-bid contract.https://t.co/C1EuldOgqT
— David Folkenflik (@davidfolkenflik) March 10, 2021
On behalf of anonymous whistleblowers, we’ve alerted Congress and federal whistleblower agencies to gross waste of over $1 million by the U.S. Agency for Global Media, parent agency of VOA, to law firm McGuireWoods for the investigation of USAGM employees. https://t.co/FWK5VQPHMh
— Government Accountability Project (@GovAcctProj) March 4, 2021
Updated 10/19/20 4:12 pm PST with the potential value for the design build construction contracts in Thailand and in Namibia. See below.
“…[W]e found that although the construction of the approximately $600 million NEC in a war zone in 34 months was a significant accomplishment, considerable construction deficiencies remained because designs for the facilities had not been completed and approved and quality control and commissioning procedures were inadequate.
We recommend the Department attempt to recover an estimated $43.2 million from First Kuwaiti to bring construction deficiencies to contract standards.
we estimated that approximately $33 million should attempt to be recovered from First Kuwaiti for incomplete and undocumented design work. Also, we identified that as a result of First Kuwaiti’s inadequate quality control program, it should be held accountable for additional maintenance charges of approximately $38 million that could carry over into future years. Further, we estimated recovering approximately $3.8 million from First Kuwaiti because commissioning activities either were not performed or were performed incorrectly.
“The Contracting Officer will prepare a letter to the Contractor, detailing each of [the OIG] recommendations and request consideration from the Contractor in each amount recommended by the OIG.” The A Bureau requested that OIG provide the Contracting Officer information detailing the basis for computing the $132 million in costs recommended for recovery from First Kuwaiti. The A Bureau also stated, “The formal process to recover any funds from the contractor will be assessed in terms of overall benefit to the government.”
“The A Bureau’s response meets the intent of OIG’s recommendations to recover $132 million from the contractor attributable to construction deficiencies; incomplete and undocumented work; additional maintenance charges incurred because of inadequate quality control and commissioning procedures; and contract noncompliance, including liquidated damages and interest for an unauthorized advance. OIG and USACE will provide the contracting officer the requested support for the $132 million in questioned contract costs.”
“First Kuwaiti Trading & Contracting, W.L.L. (FKTC) appealed the denial of its claims by the Department of State (DOS) arising from the construction of the embassy compound in Baghdad, Iraq. FKTC presented approximately 200 cost claims that totaled $270 million. DOS moved for summary judgment on thirteen of those cost claims, challenging FKTC’s reliance upon the War Risks clause, the superior knowledge doctrine, the Changes clause, and the implied duty of good faith and fair dealing as the basis for these claims. DOS also asserts that actions underlying FKTC’s changes claims constitute sovereign acts, precluding liability pursuant to the sovereign acts doctrine.
We grant DOS’s motion regarding the scope of the War Risks clause and superior knowledge doctrine, thereby denying seven of FKTC’s claims that are premised solely upon these bases. We deny DOS’s motion regarding the claims that are also based upon the Changes clause or the implied duty of good faith and fair dealing, finding that there are disputed issues of fact. We also deny DOS’s motion regarding the sovereign acts doctrine, finding that DOS has not established the applicability of that doctrine on the current record. Six of the thirteen claims subject to the motion survive DOS’s challenge on this basis.”
A. FKTC Has Shown Disputed Issues of Fact with Regard to Changes Clause on Six Claims
B. DOS Has Not Provided Evidence to Support a Sovereign Acts Defense
“On March 28, 2019, the parties submitted to the Board a joint motion for judgment on a stipulated settlement. The parties requested that the Board enter judgment in the amount of $62,500,000, with payment to be made through the permanent indefinite judgment fund in accordance with 31 U.S.C. § 1304 (2012). The amount includes all the interest to which appellant is entitled under the Contract Disputes Act. 41 U.S.C. § 7109. The parties have agreed that they will not seek appeal of, reconsideration of, or relief from the Board’s decision.
Decision: The Board GRANTS IN PART these appeals. In accordance with the parties’ joint motion, the Board awards appellant, First Kuwaiti Trading & Contracting W.L.L., the stipulated judgment amount of $62,500,000.”
Pompeo threatens to close the US Embassy in Baghdad if Iraqi leaders don’t stop Iran-backed militias from firing rockets at Americans. The Iraqi prime minister now says European diplomats are also considering leaving. w/ @jakesNYT @EricSchmittNYT. https://t.co/OfXvrnZw2H
— Edward Wong (@ewong) September 29, 2020