EEOC Reverses @StateDept’s Dismissal of Ongoing Harassment Complaint

 

 

EEOC Appeal No. 2020004444:
Opal V. v. Dep’t of State, EEOC Appeal No. 2020004444 (Oct. 8, 2020)(Complainant’s complaint was more properly characterized as one of ongoing harassment by her supervisor and several subordinates.  Complainant alleged a series of events which created a hostile work environment over several months, including one incident involving a meeting with her supervisor that occurred within the 45 days prior to her email contact with the EEO Counselor.  The EEO Counselor’s report specifically referenced Complainant’s allegation of a hostile work environment based on her sex.  Therefore, Complainant stated a viable claim.  The Agency’s assertion that Complainant failed to show a nexus between her sex and the alleged harassment went to the merits of the claim without a proper investigation and was irrelevant to the procedural issue of whether Complainant stated a justiciable claim).
Excerpt:

At the time of events giving rise to this complaint, Complainant worked as an Information Programs Supervisor, FS-03, at an Agency facility in Brussels, Belgium.

On May 31, 2020, Complainant filed a formal EEO complaint. The Agency, in its dismissal decision, characterized the complaint as alleging that Complainant was subjected to discrimination on the basis of sex (female) when:

1. On February 25, 2020, Complainant was verbally counseled.


2. Complainant was subjected to an ongoing hostile work environment characterized by management communicating directly with Complainant’s subordinate employees without her, and management’s failure to admonish subordinates about using the term “mothering” and management’s own use, and condoning, of the use of terms and actions that Complainant found sexist and offensive.

On July 5, 2020, the Agency issued a final decision dismissing the complaint for failure to state a claim and for untimely EEO contact, reasoning that Complainant initiated EEO contact on April 28, 2020. The Agency stated that, “even if Complainant did not have actual knowledge [of the timeframes for initiating EEO counseling], she had constructive knowledge because she completed a No Fear training on March 3, 2009,” and the Agency had notices posted on the Agency’s website regarding the EEO process. The Agency dismissed the second allegation, reasoning that it did not rise to the level of an adverse action. The Agency found that referring to Complainant as “mothering” and “tasking her subordinate employees, without including her is not sufficiently severe or pervasive to rise to the level of a hostile work environment.”
[…]
On appeal, Complainant argues that when the Agency dismissed her complaint for failure to state a claim “the essence of the complaint is being ignored, that she was subjected to sex-based harassment by two employees over a six-month period, which was condoned by management.” The EEO Counselor’s Report stated that Complainant claimed that “because of sex, she was subjected to a hostile work environment characterized by, but not limited to, her supervisory position being treated as irrelevant” and that she was in a work environment that continually subjected her to “offensive gender-based comments or treatment”. Complainant also stated that management condoned the subordinate employees’ sexist attitudes. The EEO Counselor’s Report also stated that Complainant claimed that her male supervisor “has a practice of tasking her with all of the section’s trivial errands and personnel issues, while reserving the allocation of desirable, high profile projects for him to assign.”

In Harris v. Forklift Systems, Inc., 510 U.S. 17, 21 (1993), the Supreme Court reaffirmed the holding of Meritor Savings Bank v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 67 (1986), that harassment is actionable if it is sufficiently severe or pervasive to alter the conditions of the complainant’s employment. Significantly, Complainant claims that her male supervisor, on an ongoing basis, undermined her own authority with her subordinates andcondoned what she believed to be sexist comments and attitudes directed against her because of her sex. We conclude that Complainant has made sufficient allegations to state a viable claim of discriminatory harassment which requires further investigation and processing. While the Agency claims that Complainant has failed to establish a nexus between her sex and the alleged harassment, this is addressing the merits of the claim without a proper investigation and is irrelevant to the procedural issue of whether Complainant has stated a justiciable claim under Title VII. See Osborne v. Department of the Treasury, EEOC Request No. 05960111 (July 19, 1996); Lee v. United States Postal Service, EEOC Request No.
05930220 (August 12, 1993); Ferrazzoli v. United States Postal Service, EEOC Request No. 05910642 (August 15, 1991).


For the reasons stated above, we find that Complainant’s complaint was improperly dismissed, pursuant to 29 C.F.R. § 1614.107(a)(1) for failure to state a claim. We caution the Agency that, on remand, it should avoid fragmenting Complainant’s overall hostile work environment claim in a piecemeal manner.

###

 

EEOC: @StateDept Failed to Provide Legitimate, Nondiscriminatory Reason for Not Promoting Complainant

 

Via EEOC: Terrie M. v. Dep’t of State,  EEOC Appeal No. 2019002167 (Sept. 22, 2020).
Agency Failed to Provide Legitimate, Nondiscriminatory Reason for Not Promoting Complainant.
Complainant, a Consular Section Chief at a U.S. Embassy, alleged, among other things, that the Agency discriminated against her on the basis of sex when it failed to promote her.  The Commission found that Complainant established a prima facie case of sex discrimination, and the Agency failed to articulate a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for its action.  Complainant was qualified for a promotion, as evidenced by her Employee Assessment Reviews, and responding management officials acknowledged that Complainant was eligible for the promotion.  Moreover, Complainant asserted that the prior curtailments of her overseas assignments due to her high-risk pregnancy impacted the ranking she received in the promotion process.  Therefore, Complainant had raised an inference that her sex was a factor in her non-selection for promotion.  The Commission found that the Agency failed to overcome Complainant’s prima facie case because the evidence was not sufficient to provide a specific, clear, and individualized explanation as to why Complainant was not selected for promotion.  While the Agency explained the general mechanics of the promotion process, it failed to provide an individualized explanation for Complainant’s specific situation.  The Agency was ordered, among other things, to retroactively promote Complainant, with appropriate back pay and benefits, and investigate her claim for damages.  Terrie M. v. Dep’t of State,  EEOC Appeal No. 2019002167 (Sept. 22, 2020).
Excerpt:

In the instant complaint, Complainant has alleged that because she is a woman who got pregnant  twice and had to curtail her assignments as a result, she was disadvantaged in the selection for promotion process. To prevail in a disparate treatment claim, Complainant must satisfy the three-part evidentiary scheme fashioned by the Supreme Court in McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973). Complainant must initially establish a prima facie case by demonstrating that she was subjected to an adverse employment action under circumstances that would support an inference of discrimination. Furnco Constr. Corp. v. Waters, 438 U.S. 567, 576 (1978). Proof of a prima facie case will vary depending on the facts of the particular case. McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. at 802 n.13. The burden then shifts to the Agency to articulate a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for its actions. Tex. Dep’t of Cmty. Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 253 (1981). To ultimately prevail, Complainant must prove, by a preponderance of the evidence, that the Agency’s explanation is pretextual. Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Prods., Inc., 530 U.S. 133, 120 S. Ct. 2097 (2000); St. Mary’s Honor Ctr. v. Hicks, 509 U.S. 502, 519 (1993). To establish a prima facie case of sex discrimination, a complainant must show that: (1) she is a member of a protected group; (2) she is qualified for her position; (3) she suffered an adverse employment action; and (4) the circumstances give rise to an inference of discrimination.

Based on record evidence, we find that Complainant has established a prima facie case of sex discrimination. First, Complainant belongs to a protected group as she is female. Complainant is also qualified for promotion to the FSO-03 position. HDR1 also acknowledged that Complainant was eligible for the promotion; and the evidence shows that Complainant was a high-performing FSO as demonstrated by her EARs. Moreover, Complainant has asserted that she believes her prior curtailments of her assignments overseas due to her high-risk pregnancy impacted the ranking she received in the promotion process. Therefore, Complainant has raised an inference that her sex was a factor in her non-selection for promotion.3 Because Complainant established a prima facie case of sex discrimination, the Agency now has the burden of producing a legitimate, non-discriminatory explanation for not selecting Complainant for promotion.

Here, DDHR1, corroborated by DDHR2, explained that Complainant was not selected for promotion because she had been mid-ranked by the Selection Board. To support this explanation, the record only includes the same generalized information about the rules governing the selection process that the Commission had previously found insufficient, and which resulted in the complaint being remanded for a supplemental investigation. The record does not include pertinent documentation reviewed by the Selection Board and information regarding comparators. Also missing from the record are comparative data related to Complainant’s protected class or affidavits from Selection Board members; and thestatement of the Agency’s reasons for mid-ranking Complainant that led to her consequent non-selection for promotion. Moreover, the supporting testimony provided by DDHR2 does not add relevance to the instant complaint because, as Complainant stated, DDHR2 had only been in her position since June 1, 2018, nearly four years after Complainant’s non-promotion incident. DDHR2 herself indicated that she had no personal knowledge about Complainant or her non-promotion. In fact, the extent of the Agency’s explanations for its actions is that promotion decisions are based only on the documentation in the candidates’ Official Performance Folder for the most recent five years and at grades FS-02 and above, on the security incident records. The two DDHRs also stated that PE staff does not have information related to, nor will they address, personal or assignment decisions of employees, and only from the material submitted by the employee to his/her eOPF could this information be known.

We find that the evidence presented by the Agency is not sufficient to provide a specific, clear, and individualized explanation as to why Complainant was not selected for promotion in 2014. The Agency explained the general mechanics of the promotion process but failed to provide an individualized explanation for Complainant’s specific situation. See, e.g., Koudry v. Dep’t of Educ., Request No. 0520100196 (Apr. 13, 2010) (discrimination found where agency merely explained the mechanics of selection process, provided list of candidates deemed best qualified, and summarized applications of selectee and complainant, but failed to provide statements from selecting officials explaining how complainant’s qualifications were evaluated compared to selectee’s qualifications). The record does not indicate how the Agency determined which 76 candidates were selected for promotion or why Complainant was not one of the 76. Merely indicating that the Selection Boards rely only on information in candidates’ eOPF for making promotion decisions is not enough. Moreover, we add that the record also does not identify how or why the 76 candidates selected for promotion in 2014 received their scores and rankings. Simply stating that candidates who are mid-ranked do not receive scores is inadequate.

Moreover, nothing in the record provides a basis for dispelling Complainant’s belief that the staff of HR/PE had access to her curtailment memo as well as access to her personnel files which contained information about her pregnancy and presumably communicated with post leadership about the curtailment. Neither did the Agency refute Complainant’s assertion that the Board may have been aware of her pregnancy because the panel works closely with HR on promotions; and that the Board was also aware of the gaps in her tours and the shortened lengths of her tours because that was reflected in her personnel and evaluation files. As the Agency never presented any testimony from the Board members who reviewed Complainant’s promotion materials, we are left with only Complainant’s unrebutted assertions.

We note DDHR2’s statements that the Board notes are only retained for one year after dismissal of the FSSB and, therefore, were no longer available. In that regard, because Complainant filed her EEO complaint within a year of her non-selection for promotion, those statements should have been made available to the Investigator, given there was an ongoing EEO complaint being processed on this selection. See EEOC regulations at 29 C.F.R. Section 1602.14 (requiring employers to retain “all personnel records relevant to the charge or action until final disposition”

ORDER (D0617)
The Agency is ordered to take the following remedial actions:
I. The Agency will promote Complainant to FS-03 retroactively to the date she would have been promoted in 2014 absent discrimination, within thirty (30) calendar of the date this decision is issued.5 II. The Agency shall pay Complainant back pay with interest from the date in 2014 when Complainant would have started in the FS-03 position. The Agency shall determine the appropriate amount of back pay, with interest, and other benefits due Complainant, pursuant to 29 C.F.R. § 1614.501, no later than sixty (60) calendar days after the date this decision was issued. The Agency will ensure that all tax consequences are taken into account. Complainant shall cooperate in the Agency’s efforts to compute the amount of back pay and benefits due and shall provide all relevant information requested by the Agency. If there is a dispute regarding the exact amount of back pay and/or benefits, the Agency shall issue a check to Complainant for theundisputed amount within sixty (60) calendar days of the date the Agency determines the amount it believes to be due. Complainant may petition for enforcement or clarification of the amount in dispute. The petition for clarification or enforcement must be filed with the Compliance Officer, at the address referenced in the statement entitled “Implementation of the Commission’s Decision.”
III. The Agency will conduct and complete a supplemental investigation on the issue of Complainant’s entitlement to compensatory damages and will afford her an opportunity to establish a causal relationship between the Agency’s discriminatory action and her pecuniary or non-pecuniary losses, if any.  ….

The order is accompanied by a “Posting Order” which required the State Department to post the EEOC Notice signed by agency representative in DOS Washington, DC offices – in both hard copy and electronic format within 30 calendar days of the decision dated September 22, 2020, and to remain in place for 60 consecutive days in “conspicuous places”.  Anyone saw this posting order anywhere in the obscure corners of the Intranet?
Having seen the State Department  and the federal government negotiate on claims for damages like this, we would not be surprised if the negotiations for damages would run on not just for weeks, but months, even years. The goal is not really to find an agreement — the government has lawyers with limitless hours billable to Uncle Sam — the goal appears to be to negotiate up to the point where the complainant is exhausted that he/she would take whatever deal the government offers. Someday, somebody should calculate the costs when the government drag on these negotiations, as opposed to expeditious settlement when it is found to be in the wrong.
Read in full below:

Click to access 2019002167.pdf

 

EEOC: @StateDept Liable For Supervisor’s Harassment of Pregnant Subordinate at US Mission/UNVIE

Via EEOC: Cecille W. v. Dep’t of State, EEOC Appeal No. 2019001540 (Aug. 19, 2020).
Sex Discrimination & Sexual Harassment Found.  Complainant, an Assistant Public Affairs Officer, filed a formal complaint alleging that the Agency discriminated against her on the basis of sex (pregnancy) when her work responsibilities were altered; she received written performance counseling; and she was subjected to a hostile work environment, including receiving inappropriate comments and being excluded from meetings and emails.  On appeal, the Commission found that Complainant was subjected to discrimination and harassment as alleged.  The record showed that Complainant’s work duties were altered due to her pregnancy, and the Agency incorrectly concluded otherwise.  Complainant’s supervisor specifically stated that she could not supervise Complainant if Complainant was pregnant, and Complainant then ceased performing tasks that were under the supervisor’s purview.  The Agency also excluded Complainant from certain weekly meetings at the supervisor’s request.  The Agency conceded that Complainant was subjected to harassment based on sex that affected a term or condition of her employment.  The Commission found that the Agency was liable for the harassment.  The Commission noted that the Agency could not use an affirmative defense because Complainant’s changed work duties constituted a tangible employment action.  Furthermore, even if there were no tangible employment actions, the Agency failed to take prompt and effective action when it failed to fully remove the responsible management official from supervisory authority over Complainant.  The Agency was ordered, among other things, to investigate Complainant’s claim for compensatory damages, and reinstate Complainant’s assignments.  Cecille W. v. Dep’t of State, EEOC Appeal No. 2019001540 (Aug. 19, 2020).
This Assistant Public Affairs Officer’s EEO case was investigated by the State Department (that would be S/OCR).
“The Agency concluded that Complainant failed to prove that the Agency subjected her to discrimination or harassment as alleged.”
BUT.
The EEOC found that the Complainant “has proven that she was discriminated against and subjected to a hostile work environment based on her sex as alleged.”
The Commission concluded that “Based on a thorough review of the record and the contentions on appeal, including those not specifically addressed herein” and reversed the Agency’s final decision.
It also remanded the case to the State Department for further processing in accordance with its decision and remedial actions ordered to include among other things, complainant’s entitlement to compensatory damages, disciplinary actions against responsible management officials, and a requirement of “no less than eight (8) hours of appropriate in-person or interactive training to the management officials involved in this case regarding their obligations under Title VII with special emphasis on harassment and responding to claims of harassment.”‘
Note that EEOC cases have randomly assigned pseudonyms which replace Complainants’ names when decisions are published to non-parties and the Commission’s website.
Excerpts:

At the time of events giving rise to this complaint, Complainant worked as an Assistant Public Affairs Officer (APAO), FS-04, at the Agency’s U.S. Mission to International Organizations in Vienna, Austria.

Complainant identified her first-level supervisor (S1), a Public Affairs Officer (PAO), as the individual who discriminated against and subjected her to a hostile work environment.

Complainant stated that over a series of days in early October 2017, following S1’s miscarriage, S1 sent Complainant Facebook messages discussing S1’s miscarriage, desire to curtail, and disappointment with how she felt that Complainant was treating her. Complainant averred that prior to October 2017, she and S1 were friends. However, S1 informed Complainant that she could no longer supervise her following her miscarriage and Complainant’s pregnancy.
[…]
On October 30, 2017, Complainant and S1 participated in mediation. Following the mediation, the mediator expressed concern that due to personal circumstances, S1 was hypersensitive to remarks and interaction with Complainant. The mediator stated that the it was “clear that [S1] rationalized her decisions as business appropriate and not based on personal situations.” The mediator added that S1’s remarks and the timing of events made it clear that S1 wanted to minimize contact with Complainant, however, it “look[ed] on face value as an effort to remove [Complainant] from places [S1] is attending and appears to lessen the exposure of [Complainant] to people and meetings she attended for over a year and a half.”

On November 3, 2017, management officials counseled S1, stating that they did not believe that S1 could properly carry out her supervisory responsibilities if she minimized direct contact with Complainant. Management officials informed S1 that excluding Complainant from Senior Staff meetings and removing her from the Senior Staff distribution list was inappropriate. On November 6, 2017, Complainant informed Human Resources officials that she was removed from her social media duties and inquired about what options were available.

On November 15, 2017, the Chargé d’Affaires informed Complainant that she wanted Complainant to attend Senior Staff meetings but did not feel the same way about the PAS meeting. She acknowledged that Complainant was experiencing a very difficult situation, stating “we know it is a bad situation and we want to, and are trying, to find a solution.” On the following day, Complainant informed the Chargé d’Affaires and S2 that the daily situation was worsening and complained of minimal communication from S1 and uncertainty about her portfolio because S1 outsourced areas of her portfolio. Complainant added that S1 did not talk to her, make eye contact, or provide information. In response, the Chargé d’Affaires informed Complainant that “if a simple solution existed, it would have been found and acted upon immediately.” She assured Complainant that she was involved in daily meetings and discussions to find a solution.

On November 20, 2017, Agency officials informed Complainant that her rater would be changed from S1 to S2. Further, coordination between Complainant and S1 would be conducted through email. Finally, Complainant would continue to attend Senior Staff meetings.

On November 30, 2017, Complainant reported that S1 remained in a position “where she is exercising biased supervision and decision-making over my work.”

On December 13, 2017, Complainant filed an EEO complaint alleging that the Agency discriminated against her on the basis of sex (pregnancy) when:

1. On October 15, 2017, Complainant’s work responsibilities were altered;

2. In October 2017, Complainant received written performance counseling; and

3. Complainant was subjected to a hostile work environment, characterized by, but not limited to inappropriate comments and being excluded from meetings and emails.

[…]
The Agency has already conceded in its final decision that Complainant established the first four elements of her prima facie hostile work environment case. The Agency held that Complainant failed to establish that it was liable for the hostile work environment, as it had established an affirmative defense. However, with respect to vicarious liability, element (5), the affirmative defense is not available to the Agency because we have found that S1’s actions culminated in a tangible employment action, changed worked duties.

Moreover, even if there was no tangible employment action, we find that the Agency failed to take prompt and effective action when it was notified of S1’s harassment of Complainant. While we acknowledge that the Agency initiated an informal investigation, counseled S1, and instituted a “carve-out” for evaluation purposes, we find that these actions were insufficient to meet the Agency’s full responsibility to take appropriate corrective action. ROI, at 500-501, 548-549, 599- 600, 621-623. Specifically, the Agency failed to fully remove S1 from supervisory authority over Complainant. According to counseling notes, it was S1 who stated that she did not want to rate Complainant and Agency officials initially encouraged S1 to work with Complainant despite the Agency’s contention that it did so at Complainant’s request. ROI, at 538-540. For example, on November 3, 2017, the Agency counseled S1 regarding her supervision of Complainant and instructed S1 to “provide regular guidance and coaching to help her develop professionally.” Id. at 538. The record further shows that S1 still exercised some level of control over Complainant’s work beyond November 2017 when the Agency changed Complainant’s rater.

For example, S2 “counseled [S1] to let Complainant know if there was action she should be taking that she was not” in December 2017. ROI, at 554. Even in January 2018, S1 continued to email Complainant in a supervisor capacity. Id. at 313-314. The record reflects that although S1 was removed from completing Complainant’s rating, S1 continued to harass Complainant. Complainant indicated that she reported the harassment, but it continued. Taking only some remedial action does not absolve the Agency of liability where that action is ineffective. Logsdon v. Dep’t of Justice, EEOC Appeal No. 0120081287 (Apr. 23, 2009).

The Agency asserted that it further took detailed and effective action when Complainant was offered an alternative position, which she declined, as a solution to her concerns. However, remedial measures should not adversely affect the complainant and Complainant viewed the offer as punitive. Enforcement Guidance: Vicarious Liability for Unlawful Harassment by Supervisors, EEOC Notice No. 915.002 (June 18, 1999), at 28-9. If it is necessary to separate the parties, then the harasser should be transferred (unless the complainant prefers otherwise). Id. The Agency did not move S1, despite requests from Complainant and S1, until April 2018 while Complainant was on maternity leave. We find that the Agency failed to take prompt and effective action. Accordingly, we find that the Agency is liable for S1’s harassment of Complainant. For the foregoing reasons, we find that Complainant has proven that she was discriminated against and subjected to a hostile work environment based on her sex as alleged.

CONCLUSION Based on a thorough review of the record and the contentions on appeal, including those not specifically addressed herein, we REVERSE the Agency’s final decision and REMAND the matter to the Agency for further processing in accordance with this decision and the ORDER below.

ORDER The Agency is ordered to take the following remedial action:

1. Within ninety (90) calendar days from the date this decision is issued, the Agency shall conduct a supplemental investigation of Complainant’s entitlement to compensatory damages. The Agency is directed to inform Complainant about the legal standards associated with providing compensatory damages and give Complainant examples of the types of evidence used to support a claim for compensatory damages. Complainant shall be given 30 calendar days from the date she receives the Agency’s notice to provide all supporting evidence of her claim for compensatory damages. Within thirty (30) calendar days of the date the Agency receives Complainant’s submission, the Agency shall issue a new final decision determining Complainant’s entitlement to compensatory damages, together with appropriate appeal rights.

2. Within ninety (90) days of the date this decision is issued, provide no less than eight (8) hours of appropriate in-person or interactive training to the management officials involved 9 2019001540 in this case regarding their obligations under Title VII with special emphasis on harassment and responding to claims of harassment. The Commission recommends that the Agency review the following EEOC publication: Enforcement Guidance: Vicarious Liability for Unlawful Harassment by Supervisors (June 18, 1999).

3. The Agency shall consider taking disciplinary action against the responsible management officials. The Commission does not consider training to be disciplinary action. The Agency shall report its decision to the compliance officer. If the Agency decides to take disciplinary action, it shall identify the action taken. If the Agency decides not to take disciplinary action, it shall set forth the reason(s) for its decision not to impose discipline. If any of the responsible management officials have left the Agency’s employ, the Agency shall furnish documentation of their departure date(s).

4. Within thirty (30) days of the date this decision is issued, the Agency shall reinstate Complainant’s assignments changed by S1 and remove all documentation and references to the October 2017 written performance counseling from all personnel records, including Complainant’s official personnel files.

5. The Agency shall post a notice in accordance with the Posting Order below. The Agency is further directed to submit a report of compliance, as provided in the statement entitled “Implementation of the Commission’s Decision.” The report shall include supporting documentation verifying that the corrective action has been implemented.

Read the full case here: Cecille W. v. Dep’t of State, EEOC Appeal No. 2019001540 (Aug. 19, 2020).

###

FSGB 2020-008: Voluntarily Curtail Under Threat of Involuntary Curtailment or a Bad EER

 

Via FSGB 2020-008
Grievant is a tenured FP-02 Diplomatic Security Special Agent assigned as the Regional Security Officer (“RSO”) at U.S. Embassy [REDACTED] from June 2, 2017 until her involuntary curtailment on May 30, 2019. On July 3, 2019 she filed a complaint with the Department’s Office of Civil Rights (“S/OCR”) alleging sex, disability and age discrimination and reprisal for prior protected activity. In her S/OCR complaint dated July 3, 2019, she alleged 10 separate incidents of discrimination or reprisal by her rater, the Deputy Chief of Mission (“DCM”). She also alleged that at a May 8, 2019 meeting with the Ambassador (her reviewer), the rater and other senior officials, the Ambassador asked her to voluntarily curtail. When she refused, her rater informed her that her Employee Evaluation Report (“EER”) from April 16, 2018 to April 15, 2019 would contain a negative review statement. She ultimately declined to voluntarily curtail.
[…]
Grievant’s recitation of the facts – the underlying transactions – are contained in her agency filing as she has not yet filed her supplemental submission where she would have an opportunity to refine further her claims and remedies. In that filing, she provides extensive background chronicling allegations of sex and other forms of discrimination by her rater, the DCM. She also describes in detail four instances in which she invoked the displeasure of the Ambassador, her reviewer, for raising concerns that his actions or proposed actions constituted security risks. She then describes the removal of laudatory language in the draft rater’s statement and the circumstances surrounding her involuntary curtailment where she claims the DCM threatened to insert a negative reviewer’s statement into her previously drafted EER. She attributes both of these actions to retaliation for informing the DCM that she was initiating S/OCR proceedings.
From footnote, p.9:
“In stating I was going to seek EEO counsel and AFSA guidance related to discrimination I faced from the DCM, as I believe there were reprisal protections in place, I never envisioned I would face retaliation in the form of an involuntarily curtailment. It was only after I stated I was going to seek EEO counseling and AFSA guidance related to the DCM’s changes to the rater statement and then my refusal to voluntarily curtail under threat of involuntarily curtailment that a review statement which contained alleged performance issues materialized in retaliation for not acquiescing to the Front Office’s discrimination and reprisal.”
The FSGB Board issued the following order:
“… the Department’s Motion to Dismiss is denied in its entirety. Since the Department did not consider grievant’s claims on the merits, the Board remands the case to the Department for a decision on the merits. The Department should advise the Board of its decision not later than 45 days from the date of this order. Pending that decision, the Board retains jurisdiction of the case. Once the Department’s amended decision has been issued, grievant will have 60 days to amend her grievance appeal to the Board. In the meantime, the proceedings before the Board are stayed. The timeline for discovery will start anew when grievant files her amended appeal or advises the Board that no such amended appeal will be forthcoming.”
The FSGB files are not readable online; the files have to be downloaded first. Click here and locate FSGB 2020-008 from “Decision and Orders 2020” to read the full Motion to Dismiss order.

EEOC: Sex Discrimination and Reprisal Found in USAID Case

Via The Digest of Equal Employment Opportunity Law | Volume 1Fiscal Year 2019

Complainant must satisfy a three-part evidentiary scheme to prevail on a claim of disparate treatment sex and reprisal discrimination.  McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973). First, Complainant must establish a prima facie case by demonstrating that s/he was subjected to an adverse employment action under circumstances that would support an inference of discrimination.  McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. at 802; Furnco Constr. Co. v. Waters, 438 U.S. 567, 576 (1978). Second, the burden is on the Agency to articulate a legitimate, nondiscriminatory, reason for its actions. Tex. Dep’t of Cmty. Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 253 (1981).  Third, should the Agency carry its burden, Complainant must then have an opportunity to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that the legitimate reasons offered by the Agency were not its true reasons, but were a pretext for discrimination.  McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. at 804; St. Mary’s Honor Center v. Hicks, 509 U.S. 502 (1993).”

Sex Discrimination & Reprisal Found.

Complainant, a Senior Fellow, filed an EEO complaint alleging that she was discriminated against based on sex (pregnancy), and reprisal, when her supervisor (S1) made disparaging remarks about her pregnancy; subjected her to increased scrutiny and reporting requirements related to her telework; required her to apply leave retroactively to dates and times when S1 knew she worked; terminated her alternate work schedule (AWS); and did not extend her fellowship. The Commission found that Complainant established a prima facie case of sex and reprisal discrimination, and then demonstrated that the Agency’s reasons were pretext for discrimination. Regarding Complainant’s telework reports, the record showed that she submitted extensive narratives, and clearly met the reporting requirements. Additionally, emails between Complainant and S1 showed that he knew she was working more than eight hours a day, but still asked her to take leave, and did not approve all her work hours. S1 stated that he denied Complainant an AWS due to a lack of coverage. However, the record showed that Complainant was meeting her work requirements, and that she was responsive and accountable while using workplace flexibilities. The Commission found that the Agency did not articulate a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for not renewing her fellowship because S1’s assertion that Complainant had performance problems was not supported by any documentation. Further, Complainant had shown pretext because management’s responses were inconsistent. Accordingly, the Commission concluded that the preponderance of the evidence supported Complainant’s claim that she was subjected to sex and reprisal discrimination. The Agency was ordered, among other things, to provide Complainant with a fellowship, or similar position, with an opportunity to extend on a yearly basis (similar to other fellows); conduct a supplemental investigation to determine compensatory damages; and provide training to the responsible management officials. Reita M. v. Agency for Int’l Dev., EEOC Appeal No. 0120161608 (July 17, 2018).

They’re Making a List, and Checking It Twice #ManOhManOhMan

When you hear that lists sent to DCM Committees have been adjusted by gender for those appointees who are insisting on a man (!) as their Deputy Chief of Mission (DCM) or Deputy Assistant Secretary (DAS). And you’re still waiting for anyone at DGHR to inform everyone that no committee will entertain any list that promotes, assists, or enables sex discrimination in violation of Title VII.

via giphy

#


EEOC Case: Complaint Over Arranging Transportation to a Happy Hour in Baghdad

Posted: 12:35 am ET
[twitter-follow screen_name=’Diplopundit’ ]

Via eeoc.gov

DECISION | Complainant filed a timely appeal with this Commission from the Agency’s decision dated January 21, 2014, dismissing her complaint of unlawful employment discrimination in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (Title VII), as amended, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e et seq.  Upon review, the Commission finds that Complainant’s complaint was properly dismissed pursuant to 29 C.F.R. § 1614.107(a)(1) for failure to state a claim.

BACKGROUND

At the time of events giving rise to this complaint, Complainant worked as a Foreign Services Officer at the  U. S. Embassy  in Baghdad, Iraq.

On December 20, 2013, Complainant filed a formal complaint alleging that the Agency subjected her to discrimination on the basis of sex (female) when she received an email from an official outside her chain of command requesting that she arrange his transportation to a happy hour.

Information in the record shows that the  email  stated “[Complainant], since you are such an expert could you put in a request for a vehicle.”   Both Complainant and  the involved official had been invited by the Australian  Embassy to go to the event, and the official’s office and Complainant’s office  had worked together in the past. The official said that Complainant had offered to arrange transportation to a meeting in the past. When the official learned that Complainant was upset by his email, he apologized.

Analysis and Findings

Under the regulations set forth at 29 C.F.R. Part 1614, an agency shall accept a complaint from an aggrieved employee or applicant for employment who believes that he or she has been discriminated against by that agency because of race, color, religion, sex, national origin, age or disabling condition.  29 C.F.R. §§ 1614.103, .106(a).  The Commission’s federal sector case precedent has long defined an “aggrieved employee” as one who suffers a present harm or loss with respect to a term, condition, or privilege of employment for which there is a remedy.  Diaz v. Dep’t of the Air Force, EEOC Request No. 05931049 (April 21, 1994).  If complainant cannot establish that s/he is aggrieved, the agency shall dismiss a complaint for failure to state a claim.  29 C.F.R. § 1614.107(a)(1).

The Commission has held that where, as here, a complaint does not challenge an agency action or inaction regarding a specific term, condition, or privilege of employment, the claim of harassment may survive if it alleges conduct that is sufficiently severe or pervasive to alter the conditions of the complainant’s employment.  See Harris v. Forklift Systems, Inc., 510 U.S. 17, 23 (1993). We find that Complainant’s allegations, involving a one-time isolated email,  are insufficient to state a claim of a hostile work environment.

The Commission finds that the complaint fails to state a claim under the EEOC regulations because Complainant failed to show that she suffered harm or loss with respect to a term, condition, or privilege of employment for which there is a remedy.  See Diaz v. Dep’t of the Air Force, EEOC Request No. 05931049 (April 21, 1994).

Accordingly, the Agency’s final decision dismissing Complainant’s complaint is AFFIRMED.

The text of the entire decision is available to read here.

 

#

 

 

Burn Bag: Ding! Ding! Ding! This Is Your ‘More Than Just Stupid’ Warning!

Via Burn Bag:

“A director of a regional diplomatic courier office has openly expressed he does not want to hire “women of childbearing age”. He achieves this by carefully examining candidates’ resumes when hiring to fill an EFM position. BBag, can you stop this stupidity, considering it’s from an FS-1?”

#

EFM – eligible family member
FS01 – the highest rank in the regular Foreign Service, last step before the Senior Foreign Service; equivalent to a full Colonel in the military

Why this is more than just stupid? SCOTUS:

The Supreme Court decides International Union, UAW v. Johnson Controls and addresses the issue of fetal hazards. In this case, the employer barred women of childbearing age from certain jobs due to potential harm that could occur to a fetus. The Court rules that the employer’s restriction against fertile women performing “dangerous jobs” constitutes sex discrimination under Title VII. The Court further rules that the employer’s fetal protection policy could be justified only if being able to bear children was a bona fide occupational qualification (BFOQ) for the job. The fact that the job posed risk to fertile women does not justify barring all fertile women from the position.

The Supreme Court in Phillips v. Martin Marietta Corp. holds that Title VII’s prohibition against sex discrimination means that employers cannot discriminate on the basis of sex plus other factors such as having school age children. In practical terms, EEOC’s policy forbids employers from using one hiring policy for women with small children and a different policy for males with children of a similar age.

In Gibson v. West, the Supreme Court endorses EEOC’s position that it has the legal authority to require that federal agencies pay compensatory damages when EEOC has ruled during the administrative process that the federal agency has unlawfully discriminated in violation of Title VII.

#