MikeyPo Shows Once More His Smallness as Secretary of State #ByePompeo

We’re not sure why people expects anything better from the 70th secretary of state. If you were shocked, you have not been paying attention. This secretary of state has shown repeatedly, despite a much touted swagger, that he was not the man for this job. Why do you think he needed that swagger?  But swagger can only take one so far. Reality eventually catches up with you. He will go down in history not only as the most political secretary of state in modern times, but also the worst one by far.
No, we haven’t forgotten about Rex Tillerson, but the 69th secretary of state was not an  ideologue nor an opportunistic hack like his successor. SecState 69th was also his own man, and he recognized a moron when he saw one. Unfortunately, this is something we cannot say about the soon to be former secretary of state otherwise known as ‘a heat-seeking missile’ for … oh, golly, you undiplomatic, you!
Folks may complain in the future about other secretaries of state, but we expect it will always come down to the threshold question — is he or she Pompeo-bad?
The leadership behavior at State appears to be trickling down. A senior security official at the US Embassy in Kabul recently called the U.S. election on social media, a “fraudulent election”, called President-Elect Joe Biden, a “senile idiot” and Vice President-Elect Kamala Harris, “a woman that claims to be black, but she’s not.” As if that’s not offensive enough, this senior career official also writes, “Oh and did I mention, so much for the economy, when this stupid fucking moron appoints Bernie Sanders and Elizabeth Warren to his cabinet. Watch it all collapse and then you’ll wonder what happened to our country. Obama fucked it all up and Trump turned it around. Now it all goes to shit again.”  Meltdown at the Kabul aisle!
This is not only unacceptable and outstandingly bad behavior for a senior official overseas, this is also against the Department’s Foreign Affairs Manual, see 3 FAM 4123.3  for Political Activities for starters. But given the tolerance for bad behavior in Foggy Bottom, will US Embassy Kabul, DGHR, or the State Department clean up or just look away with a sigh?
There are some good news though; come January 20, Mr. Pompeo (and his buddies), whether he accepts the Biden reality or not, will have to step down from his job. And oh, my gosh!  He also must leave the USG-provided housing he now occupies (one flag officer says yay!) and return to … well, we’re not sure exactly where that might be. Maybe Kansas where he almost run for the Senate and could have won a six-year term.  It doesn’t matter, really, does it?  He’ll be working on his 2024 project unless somebody crashes it.  Somewhere, we imagine, he will be grilling a journalist or two with blank world maps. And he needs to walk and scoop after Sherman and Mercer.
Also on January 20, please fumigate swagger from Foggy Bottom and get moving. There is much work to be done. We hope folks will pour their energies in the rebuilding and strengthening of our institutions. But we also hope they won’t forget to write down their memos to file documenting their last four years of organizational life. May y’all remember because the world will not go back to what it was as the Kabul incident shows.  Something broke here. And it will take many long years to repair. But it’s important to remember, and uphold — as Sheila S. Coronel of the Columbia University Graduate School of Journalism wrote in “A warning from the Philippines on how a demagogue can haunt politics for decades” — uphold “a truthful record of history” even as some of these people swagger into the sunset.

 

Amb. P. Michael McKinley on the Politicization of the State Department

Via The Atlantic: The Politicization of the State Department Is Almost Complete by P. Michael McKinley, a former senior adviser to Secretary of State Mike Pompeo and a former U.S. Ambassador to Brazil, Afghanistan, Peru, and Colombia.
I worked at the State Department for nearly four decades, in the later years as a four-time ambassador overseas and as a senior adviser to Secretary of State Mike Pompeo. I have watched as Pompeo and his predecessor, Rex Tillerson, have weaponized the institution for the Trump administration’s domestic political objectives. On October 9, just weeks away from the presidential election, Pompeo announced that he would authorize, apparently at President Donald Trump’s urging, the release of more of Hillary Clinton’s emails. In doing so, Pompeo will have all but completed the politicization of the State Department, arguably bringing it to its lowest point since the 1950s. The damage may be generational.
[…]
This transformation started with Tillerson, who came in with the goal of “redesigning” the State Department and with what appears to have been a political agenda to weed out anyone who had served in leadership positions during prior presidential administrations.
[…]
As a result, more than 100 out of some 900 senior Foreign Service officers—including the most visible high-ranking Hispanic, African American, South Asian, and female career officers—were fired, pushed out, or chose to leave the State Department during the first year of the Trump administration.
[…]
The track record since my departure shows that suspicious mindset. No career official has been nominated to fill an assistant-secretary position. Political ambassadorial nominations are at an all-time high; more than 40 percent have gone to political appointees, as compared with a historical average of 30 percent. The political attendees at Pompeo’s “Madison Dinners,” and the audiences he meets with in his domestic travel, demonstrate the blurring of professional and political lines. In May, Trump fired Steve Linick, the State Department’s inspector general, who was looking into Pompeo’s activities, underscoring how the legal adviser and IG offices are being drawn into political partisanship.
[…]
The transformation is not irreversible. Career civil servants have raised the alarm about the deep damage that the Trump administration has inflicted on U.S. institutions, including the State Department. The American people will soon make a decision about whether they want to continue down this path. Come Election Day, voters will not be able to say that they did not know.
Read in full here:

Mike Pompeo Grabs Title as Worst Secretary of State “in History”, “in Modern Times”, “Ever”

 

Rex Tillerson Talks to Congress About the Not So Shadow Secretary of State, and Stuff

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Secretary Pompeo Issues a Statement on SOTU #ButWhosFirst?

Big mystery.

On February 5, 2019 10:32 pm, the State Department’s Press Office released  an official statement from the 70th Secretary of State Mike Pompeo “On President Trump’s State of the Union Address”:

In his first two years, President Trump has strengthened America at home and abroad by putting the interests of the American people first and reasserting American leadership around the world. History will remember this period not only for what America has achieved on its own, but for the partnerships we have built with strong, sovereign, and independent nations and the contributions we have inspired from our partners. From making historic progress with North Korea, to confronting the regime in Iran, to supporting the Venezuelan people against tyranny, and more, President Trump’s diplomatic agenda has made America safer, more respected, and more prosperous.

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“History will remember this period …for the partnerships…” kind of does not really work when … what’s that? Recent bureau departures are attributed  to fears  that Trump will pull us out of NATO? Pardon me? Top ranking folks really did not want to be associated with that? But … but.. he said history …. okay, never mind.

Anyway, we had a hard time recalling any secretary of state releasing an official statement on the SOTU. Except it turned out, T-Rex also did a statement when Trump delivered his first SOTU on February 28, 2017.  On March 1, Tillerson released a 100-word statement.

Trump delivered his second SOTU on January 30, 2018. Then Secretary of State Rex Tillerson did not appear to release any statement prior to the SOTU but delivered a Remarks at the High-Level Opening Session of the Inaugural U.S.-Qatar Strategic Dialogue on the same day.

By the way, former Secretary of State John Kerry did not issue statements on President Obama’s SOTUs. We’ve looked.

So we should note that while Pompeo maybe one of the firsts to be out with the statement, he got some company (see DHS Secretary Nielsen’s statement, Treasury Secretary Mnuchin’s statement , Labor Secretary Acosta’s statement, Agriculture Secretary Perdue’s statement, and who knows who else?  Cabinet secretaries and public affairs people burning their late night oil to come up with these statements on the night of February 5.

But you know, folks really need to get these statement night-stamped, otherwise, how will Trump know which statement went out first or last?

It’s probably worth mentioning that Energy Secretary Perry released his state of the union statement on February 6!  February 6. He was the “designated survivor” and he is a day late with his statement?! That’s unforgivable. Yeah, so no cookies for him or his his PA people.

2018 Goodbyes and Resignations

Jim Mattis Quits in Protest Over Trump’s Chaos Strategery
Brett McGurk, U.S. Envoy in ISIS Fight, Quits Over Trump’s Syria Withdrawal
Ex-Amb. to Estonia James D. Melville Writes Why He Quit
Russia Expels U.S. Diplomats, Closes Consulate General @USinStPete
Foggy Bottom Bids Goodbye to Secretary of State Rex Tillerson
U.S. Ambassador to Panama John Feeley Resigns From the Foreign Service Over Trump Policies

Secretary of State Statistics: Trump, Obama, Bush, Clinton, Bush, Reagan, Carter

Prior to Rex Tillerson, Senate votes confirming the secretary of state have been bipartisan. Vance, Christopher, and Powell all had voice votes. Baker and Albright had 99-0 votes. Rice had 85-13. All the rest had at least 90+ votes in the Senate until Tillerson who got 56-43, the lowest confirmation vote recorded going back to the Carter years. The current Secretary of State Mike Pompeo made the rank with the second lowest votes at 57-42. On January 23, 2017, he was previously confirmed CIA Director by the Senate by Yea-Nay Vote. 66 – 32

 
Nomination Announced Hearings Received Confirmed Votes
TRUMP          
Michael
Pompeo

March 13,
2018

April 12,
2018 
 March 20,
2018
April 26,
2018 
 57-42
No. 84

Rex
Tillerson

December
13, 2016
January 11, 2017 January 20,
2017
February 1, 2017 56-43 
No. 36
OBAMA          
John
Kerry
December
21, 2012
January 24, 2013 January 22, 2013 January 29, 2013 94-3 
No. 5
Hillary
Clinton
December 1, 2008 January 13, 2009 January 20, 2009 January 21, 2009 94-2 
No. 6
BUSH          
Condi
Rice
November
16, 2004 
 January
18-19, 2005
January 4,
2005
January 26, 2005 85-13 
No. 2
Colin
Powell
 December
16, 2000
January 17, 2001 January 20, 2001 January 20, 2001 Voice Vote
           

Source: U.S. Senate Cabinet Statistics (click on image for larger view)

This clip of the secretary of state talking about the “rapture” is not new (though we’ve just seen it). It has been around prior to his confirmation earlier this year. Although 10 more senators refused to confirm him as SecState than the year earlier as CIA director, he got one more vote than Tillerson (including seven Democratic votes) and was confirmed as 70th Secretary of State (with the second lowest votes at confirmation).

This video appears to be from his 2015 appearance at the “God and Country Rally” at Wichita’s Summit Church in June 2015.

Snapshot: The Tillerson Effect on Foreign Service Family Member Employment (2017-2018)

Via State/FLO:

Rex Tillerson was confirmed and assumed charged of the State Department on February 1, 2017 as the 69th Secretary of State. He was fired on March 13, 2018 and left Foggy Bottom for the last time on March 22, 2018. Below is the comparative look of Foreign Service family member employment numbers inside overseas missions from Spring 2014 to Spring 2018. Overseas missions include over 275 diplomatic and consular posts overseas located in 191 countries.

Related posts:

Department of Swagger? Where All Things Are Happening, My Sweetness!

Excuse me, is this the same department responsible for an updated September 7 guidance regarding the correct use of commas in paper for the Secretary and other agency principals? An update to guidance on the same topic (comma inclusion and omission) issued in June? Who knows? The folks who did the comma guidance … are they the same ones who did the updated department seal? Are there plans for updating all embassy and consulate seals with Embassy of Swagger? How about business cards? Should we roll out new t-shirts and uh, swags?

We really do think they should tone down on that swaggering bit but um … not a trick question, the swagger guy vs. the cold guy?

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USAID/OIG Takes First Stab in Autopsy of Tillerson’s State/USAID Redesign

Posted: 1:45 am ET

 

In response to last year’s congressional request, USAID/OIG reviewed “USAID’s process in developing its reform plans and its compliance with congressional notification requirements.” We believe this is the first official accounting available on what transpired during Tillerson’s Redesign project, but primarily on the USAID side. We’re looking forward to State/OIG’s review of the project on its side.

The March 8, 2018 USAID/OIG report titled “USAID’s Redesign Efforts Have Shifted Over Time” was publicly posted on March 9, 2018. This report was originally marked “Sensitive But Unclassified (SBU)” and when publicly released, some of the appendices were redacted apparently at the assertion of the State Department and USAID that these be withheld from public view (see Appendix D, E and F. “USAID and the State Department have asserted that these appendixes should be withheld from public release in their entirety under exemption (b)(5) of the Freedom of Information Act, 5 U.S.C. 552(b)(5). OIG has marked this material SBU in accordance with 22 CFR 212.7(c)(2), which states that the originator of a record is best able to make a determination regarding whether information in that record should be withheld”).

USAID/OIG’s task was to determine (1) how USAID developed its redesign plans pursuant to Executive Order 13781, which were addressed by describing both the events and actions taken by USAID to develop its reform plans and the assessments of USAID’s actions by those involved in the process, and (2) whether USAID complied to date with fiscal year 2017 appropriation requirements.

USAID/OIG  interviewed 42 officials from across USAID. Interviewees included USAID employees from the Administrator’s Office, members of the Transformation Task Team, employees across every bureau and independent office, and overseas mission directors. The report says that these individuals were selected because of their knowledge of specific portions of the redesign process. There was also a survey that includes all 83 USAID mission directors worldwide (27 of whom responded). USAID/OIG also interviewed six senior officials from the State Department involved in the joint redesign process “to corroborate USAID testimony and portray a more balanced, objective sequence of events leading to the reform plan submissions.”

USAID/OIG’s conclusion:

“Results of our point-in-time review indicate good intentions by USAID as well as the State Department. However, USAID’s limited involvement in the design of the listening survey, uncertainty about redesign direction and end goals, and disagreement and limited transparency on decisions related to the consolidation of functions and services raise questions about what has been achieved thus far and what is deemed actionable. Given the concerns raised by USAID personnel, transparency—as well as compliance with congressional notification requirements—could prove challenging as redesign plans turn into actions.”

The details below are excerpted from the report:

Redesign process was resource-intensive and ad hoc

  • During this nearly 3-month process, USAID reported contributing around 100 employees (mostly senior officials) spanning 21 of its 24 bureaus and independent offices. Ten employees were detailed full-time to the effort. These participants were 48 percent Civil Service employees, 28 percent Foreign Service employees, 7 percent political appointees, and 5 percent contractors.
  • The State Department was reported to have brought around 200 people into the process.
  • According to work stream leaders, the State Department’s initial guidance for the teams was to “think big” with “no guardrails,” but the lack of boundaries and explicit goals hindered progress. The looming question of whether USAID would merge into the State Department not only distracted teams but further confused the direction of the redesign process.
  • The initial lack of direction was viewed as a hindrance by representatives from all work streams.
  • Participants described the joint redesign process as “ad hoc.” Interviewees from both the State Department and USAID noted instances when leaders of the joint process seemed unsure of the next steps. For example, a senior State Department official involved in coleading a work stream said there was not a lot of preparation, and the work streams did not know what the final products would be.

Joint disjointed efforts and disagreements

  • USAID shared its supplemental plan with the State Department days before the OMB deadline. A senior State Department official stated that the State Department was not pleased with the supplemental plan, noting that some of USAID’s proposals should have been developed through the joint process. The State Department asked USAID to remove some of its proposals relating to humanitarian assistance, foreign policy, and strategic international financing because State Department’s decisions regarding these areas had not been finalized. In the end, the supplemental plan USAID submitted to OMB contained 15 proposals (appendix E), while the version previously submitted to the State Department had 21. The six removed supplemental proposals are shown in appendix F. A senior USAID official noted, however, that USAID let OMB know what the filtered and unfiltered supplemental plan looked like.
  • Interviewees from the work streams and various leadership positions noted disagreement on decisions related to consolidation of USAID and State Department functions and services. Members from the work streams at all levels stated that the ESC—tasked to resolve disagreements within the work streams—rarely did so and was often unable to reach consensus on major issues such as the consolidation of IT and management services, or how to divide humanitarian assistance and funding decisions between the State Department and USAID.
  • Even after some decisions were thought to have been made, USAID officials reported instances when the State Department would revisit the decisions, forcing USAID to defend what was already considered resolved. This rethinking of decisions led a number of interviewees from both USAID and the State Department to wonder whether there were strong advocates for consolidation of services within the State Department.
  • Officials familiar with ESC [Executive Steering Committee] also noted that the committee lacked a formal process to resolve disagreements, and opinions were often split along State Department and USAID lines. As a result, some decisions on consolidation were left on hold and remain undecided.

USAID not part of listening survey decision

  • According to a top USAID official, the decision to administer a survey was made by the State Department alone, and USAID had little say as to whether it should participate or how the survey would be administered. USAID was not part of the contracting process with Insigniam and was brought in after most of the details were decided. The week following the issuance of OMB’s memorandum guidance, Insigniam engaged State Department and USAID officials to provide input into developing the listening survey questions but gave them less than 2 business days to provide feedback. A small group of senior USAID officials worked over the weekend to compile suggestions and submitted it by the requested deadline. Despite this effort, USAID officials did not feel their input was sufficiently incorporated into the survey. 

Questions about data integrity

  • Questions of data integrity were raised, including projected cost savings of $5 billion that would be realized with the proposed reforms—projections several USAID officials characterized as unrealistic. For example, one senior USAID official stated that the contractor responsible for compiling work stream data did not adequately understand USAID and State Department processes before applying assumptions.

 

  • The data and analysis behind the listening survey were also closely held. USAID officials reported requesting and being denied access to the complete, “raw” survey data, which is owned by the State Department. Some interviewees noted that without access to data, it would be difficult to interpret the magnitude of some of the issues identified in the listening survey.
  • This concern with data integrity was consistent throughout our interviews. For example, a senior USAID official stated that Deloitte—who was compiling data for work stream decision making—did not obtain an adequate understanding of processes before applying assumptions to them. Other work stream participants said that because data came from different systems in USAID and the State Department, it was difficult to accurately compare scenarios between agencies. According to several interviewees familiar with the data, the process had poor quality assurance. For example, documents were kept on a shared server with no version control. Moreover, interviewees noted that much of the decision-making information for the work streams was “experiential”—based on the backgrounds of people in the subgroup rather than hard data.
  • In addition, interviewees from both the State Department and USAID questioned Insigniam’s recommendation to move the State Department’s Bureau of Consular Affairs to the Department of Homeland Security—a recommendation some claimed was unlikely to have been based on data from the listening survey. This prompted a number of those involved in the reform process to question how survey input had been processed and the validity of the rest of Insigniam’s takeaways.

(NOTE: A source previously informed us that only 5-6 individuals have access to the raw data; and that the survey data is in a proprietary system run by Insigniam. Data collected paid for by taxpayer money is in a proprietary system. We were also told that if we want the data, we have to make an FOIA request to the Transformation Management Office, but our source doubts that State will just hand over the data).

Concerns about inclusiveness and transparency

  • A number of interviewees, including some mission directors and heads of bureaus and independent offices, felt the redesign process was not only exclusive, but also lacked transparency. According to senior USAID staff, OMB instructed the Agency to keep a close hold on the details of the redesign. While some mission directors noted that biweekly calls with bureau leadership, agency announcements, and direct outreach kept them informed of the redesign process as it occurred, field-based officials expressed dismay and disillusionment with what seemed to be a headquarters-focused process.

Mission closures and congressional notifications

  • [W]hile mission closings remain under consideration, some actions taken by USAID raised questions about compliance with notification requirements to Congress. To meet the congressional notification requirement, USAID must notify the Committees on Appropriations before closing a mission or reorganizing an office. The Consolidated Appropriations Act of 2017, Section 7034, requires congressional notification “prior to implementing any reorganization of the Department of State or the United States Agency for International Development, including any action taken pursuant to the March 31, 2017, Executive Order 13781.”
  • Specific mention of USAID’s offices in Albania, India, and Jamaica as candidates for the chopping block.

Non-notification and violation of FY2017 appropriations legislation

  • In the case of USAID/RDMA [Regional Development Mission for Asia], our analyses of USAID’s actions were less conclusive and raised questions about compliance with notification requirements to Congress. On August 17, 2017, the Acting Deputy Administrator requested from the Asia Bureau and USAID/RDMA a closure plan for the regional mission. The closure plan would outline the timing, funding, and staff reductions for a 2019 closure date. It was noted that the closure plan was for discussion purposes only, and USAID leadership would consult with the State Department to ensure that any future decisions would be in line with overall U.S. foreign assistance and foreign policy strategy.
  • [O]n August 18, 2017, the Agency removed six Foreign Service Officer Bangkok positions from a previously announced bid list. The Agency also informed the U.S. Embassy Bangkok, counterparts in the State Department’s East Asia/Pacific Bureau, and USAID leadership in the Bureaus of Democracy, Conflict, and Humanitarian Assistance and Global Health of a planned closure of USAID/RDMA’s activities. USAID leadership noted that they were given until the end of 2019 to complete the actual phaseout. Our best assessment is that the totality of the Agency’s actions relating to USAID/RDMA— without notifying Congress—violated the spirit of the FY 2017 appropriations legislation. 13

Aspirational savings of $5 to $10 Billion: not based on analysis, “came out of nowhere”

  • According to the joint plan, the proposed reforms would yield $5 billion in savings (link inserted) over a 5-year period; however, this amount did not factor the investment costs of $2.8 billion over that same period, which would result in net savings of $2.2 billion. These projections were characterized as unrealistic by several USAID officials. A senior USAID official involved in reviewing data stated that the $5 billion projection was unrealistic given the process used by the State Department and USAID to gather and analyze information. The official stated that the State Department’s reported aspirational savings of $10 billion was not based on analysis, but rather “came out of nowhere.”

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