Dear @JohnKerry: One of Your Foggy Bottom Folks Is Asking — Is This Diversity?

Posted: 1:25 pm ET
Note: In an ideal, healthy organization, this letter would be signed by the author and you’d be reading this and discussing creative solutions on the Secretary’s Sounding Board.  What is clear to us is that the fears of reprisal/retaliation are real. This anonymous letter is one more proof of that.  Except for the four active hyperlinks we’ve added to help readers, the text and photo below are published below as received — [twitter-follow screen_name=’Diplopundit’ ]

 

From an anonymous DS Employee: Is This Diversity?

A poignant piece in the President’s Memorandum on Promoting Diversity and Inclusion in the National Security Workforce was the conclusion that “In broad comparison with the wider Federal Government, the federal workforce dedicated to our national security and foreign policy is – on average – less diverse, including at the highest levels.”  Unfortunately, when it comes to the highest levels of the Bureau of Diplomatic Security (DS) diversity is not only less than the average – – it is nonexistent!

ds-top-ranks

A review of the facts.

DS senior leadership is composed of an Assistant Secretary, a Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary, seven Deputy Assistant Secretaries, an Executive Director, and a Coordinator for Security Infrastructure.  Four years ago all of these positions with the exception of the AS were held by active Senior Foreign Service and Senior Executive Service officers.  Two positions were held by female officers and one by a African-American officer.  In the past three years, all three minority members either retired or moved into other positions outside of DS.  Eight of the ten senior leadership positions have become vacant during that time, some more than once, and the current PDAS – Bill Miller, who became subject to Time-in-Class (TIC) restrictions and left active service – was appointed into the PDAS role.

Of the ten opportunities that DS has had to select officers to fill vacancies at the Bureau’s senior-most positions it has consistently selected Caucasian male officers. DS went from a Bureau that from a diversity standpoint was about where the rest of the government is now – less diverse than the average – to one that is now all white, all male, all the time.

We have witnessed the cleansing of DS over the past three years.  It is troubling, and, it should be raising alarm bells throughout the Department.

But is it not.

Instead, the Department is preparing to reward DSS Director Miller with a third appointment year as PDAS of DS.  Furthermore, DS is now expanding the practice of appointing officers subject to TIC up or out restrictions into positions formerly held exclusively by active SFS officers with the appointment of the outgoing Overseas Security Advisory Council Office Director into his own position, as an appointee. This was accomplished quietly, with the Department’s concurrence, devoid of any semblance of transparency.

The lack diversity is not limited to the FE-MC/OC and SES level officers who make up DS’s Senior Leadership.  It also extends to the subordinate staffs.  Unlike the Assistant Secretary’s DS Front Office, which to Gregory Starr’s credit has consistent been composed of a highly qualified and richly diverse staff, the PDAS’ DSS FO has been anything but.  To this day, the DSS FO staff with the exception of the Office Manager consists of…all white males.  One DS Senior sets a model for the Bureau to emulate, the other projects a do as I say not as I do standard.

In May, PDAS Miller brought most of the DS leadership from around the globe to the Department for a two-day leadership forum.  On day two he showcased his all-white, all-male team of seniors on the dais for a full day of Q&As. The one area the PDAS and the rest in the dais were unprepared to discuss were the stream of questions on the topic of diversity that were raised throughout the day and which went largely unaddressed.

It is difficult to reconcile Director General Arnold Chacon’s statements about Department values and principles, and ensuring that the Department’s workforce reflect the nation’s richness and diversity, when matched against the reality of the past three years within DS.  Even more difficult considering that all senior-most assignments in DS require the approval of Department Seniors.

In response, the Department should:

  • first and foremost, acknowledge that there is an appalling lack of diversity in the senior-most ranks of DS that should jar the Department’s Leadership into action to identity immediate steps to rectify the issue;
  • either instill a sense of urgency in current DS Leadership on the topic or allow the next set of leaders to rise to the top positions, with a renewed sense of purpose and focus that truly embraces the ideals that the Department publishes;
  • if the current PDAS is to remain in place for another year, an officer from the Office of Civil Rights should be permanently assigned to his Front Office to help guide him on matters of inclusivity and diversity;
  • mandate that DS develop and publicly publish a comprehensive diversity strategy;
  • understand that it shares in the responsibility for the current state within DS;
  • also, understand the likelihood that this letter will evoke a backlash from those who have been criticized and take steps to guard against the potential for retribution.
A series of conscious decisions led to the current state of DS. This is written in part as a call for accountability. It is also written in the hope that it will trigger action and a sense among the increasingly disenfranchised segment of DS that it is ok to voice concern even when aimed at our most senior leadership.
#
Related items:

 

 

 

Advertisements

Attacks on Grand-Bassam Beach Resorts Kill 16 People in Côte d’Ivoire

Posted: 7:17 pm EDT
Updated: March 14, 2:46 am EDT
[twitter-follow screen_name=’Diplopundit’ ]

 

BBC News reports that Al-Qaeda-linked militants have killed at least 16 people in gun attacks on beach resorts in southern Ivory Coast. “The attackers fired on beach-goers in Grand Bassam, about 40km (25 miles) from the commercial capital Abidjan. The resort is popular with both locals and foreigners. Four of the dead were Westerners, including a French and a German national, officials say.”

 

The U.S. Embassy in Abidjan issued a couple of security messages. The first one dated March 13 with no timestamp says that the U.S. Embassy has received reports of gun shots in Grand Bassam and “advises American citizens in Côte d’Ivoire to defer travel to Grand Bassam and if you are there to shelter in place.”

The second security message also without a timestamp was issued subsequently saying that the embassy “is aware of an ‎attack in Grand-Bassam. ‎We refer you to the Cote d’Ivoire authorities for the most up-to-date information.” It also says that the embassy “advises U.S. citizens in Côte d’Ivoire to avoid any unnecessary travel until further notice.”

These messages are not on Twitter or Facebook. At 1:05 pm on March 13, Embassy Abidjan tweeted the following message, mirrored on its FB page:

 

Related items:

 

#

Car Bomb Targets Turkish Capital, Ankara: Explosion Kills 32, Injures 100+ in Kizilay Area

Posted: 5:40 pm EDT
Updated: 6:58 pm EDT
[twitter-follow screen_name=’Diplopundit’ ]

 

Media reports says that a huge explosion hit the Turkish capital of Ankara on March 13, killing 27 people and wounding at least 75 others. The blast happened just before 6.45 pm local time at Kizilay Square near Guven Park.   Latest reports put those killed at 32 people and the wounded at over a hundred individuals. Several vehicles were also reportedly destroyed or damaged in the explosion, which took place in the Kizilay area of Ankara, about 25 minutes walk from the U.S. embassy.  This is the third bombing in the country, and the second one in Ankara this year alone. On February 27, 2016, a car bomb targeting the Turkish military in Ankara also killed 29 people.

The U.S. Embassy in Ankara has sent out an emergency message informing all U.S. citizens of “a bombing near Kizilay Square.”  It says it is working to gather more details and urged citizens “to avoid the Kizilay/Ulus area and follow media reports for the latest developments.” Embassy Ankara previously issued a security message to Americans in Turkey warning of a potential terrorist threat in the Bahcelievler area of Ankara.

 

.

And an important note, given speculations about the prior warning issued by the embassy:

 

#

 

 

USCG Monterrey: USG Personnel Banned From Driving Between Post-U.S. Border, Also Extortions Up by 24%

Posted: 2:58 am EDT
[twitter-follow screen_name=’Diplopundit’ ]

 

In the new Crime and Safety Report for Monterrey, Mexico, Diplomatic Security notes that U.S. government personnel are not permitted to drive between Monterrey and the U.S. border.

Violent crime (kidnappings, extortions, homicides, sexual assaults, personal robberies, residential break-ins), and non-violent crimes (financial scams, vehicle thefts, petty drug crimes) continue to be a serious concern for those living or working in Monterrey’s Consular District.

USCG Monterrey’s consular district covers the following states: Nuevo Leon, San Luis Potosi, Durango, Zacatecas, and the southern two-thirds of Coahuila. The consular district has nearly 13 million inhabitants and almost the size of Texas.  There are an estimated estimated 85,000 American Citizens who are permanent resident in the consular district. Although reported homicides in 2015 declined in all states of Monterrey’s consular district, except Zacatecas, compared to the same time periods in 2013 and 2014. In Zacatecas, 420 homicides occurred in 2015, up from 294 in 2014.

Due to drug-related violence associated with Transnational Criminal Organizations (TCO), U.S. government personnel are not permitted to drive between Monterrey and the U.S. border. U.S. government personnel in Monterrey may travel by land to the states of San Luis Potosi, Zacatecas, and Durango, utilizing toll roads and may overnight in their capitals. Travel is permitted within the state of Nuevo Leon via toll roads. Travel to Coahuila must be done in an armored vehicle, and overnight lodging is restricted. U.S. government personnel must remain in San Pedro Garza Garcia from 0100-0600 (0500 if traveling to the airport).

The January 19 Travel Warning notes that the Department imposes restrictions on U.S. government employees’ travel in Mexico. At least since July 2010, USG employees are prohibited from driving on non-official travel from the U.S.-Mexico border to or from the interior of Mexico or Central America. Personal travel by motor vehicle is permitted during daylight hours on Highway 15 toll road between Hermosillo and Nogales, on Highway 45 between Ciudad Juarez and Chihuahua City, and on the main roads between Palomas, Chihuahua and Nuevo Casas Grandes, Chihuahua.

USCG Monterrey is a 15% hardship pay post with zero COLA, and zero danger pay.

 

#

@StateDept Terminates ‘Authorized Departure’ Status for Adana (Turkey) and Bamako (Mali)

Posted: 3:37 am EDT
[twitter-follow screen_name=’Diplopundit’ ]

 

Via Diplomatic Security’s Overseas  Advisory Council:

The termination of the Authorized Departure status for Consulate Adana in Turkey and Embassy Bamako in Mali allows the return of non-emergency personnel and dependents who had previously departed posts.

Note that the State Department has updated its Mali Travel Warning and its Turkey Travel Warning the last few days.

#