Whistleblower in @StateDept “CIVPOL” Contract Gets $875K in False Claims Act Settlement

Posted: 12:30 am ET
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On September 13, USDOJ announced that Pacific Architects and Engineers, LLC has agreed to pay $5 million in False Claims Act allegations related to “PAE’s Civilian Police “CIVPOL” contract in support of State Department missions in Afghanistan, Haiti, Lebanon, Liberia, South Sudan, and elsewhere. The announcement includes a note that “The claims settled by this agreement are allegations only, and there has been no determination of liability.” It also adds that the $5 million settlement also resolves a lawsuit filed in the U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia by former PAE manager Robert J. Palombo under the qui tam, or whistleblower provisions, of the False Claims Act and that Mr. Palombo will receive $875,000 as his share of the government’s recovery.

Below is an excerpt from the announcement:

WASHINGTON – Pacific Architects and Engineers, LLC (“PAE”) has agreed to pay the United States $5 million to resolve allegations that it knowingly failed to follow vetting requirements for personnel working in Afghanistan under a State Department contract for labor services. PAE is a Virginia-based contractor that provides personnel and other support to various federal government agencies.

The settlement was announced today by U.S. Attorney Channing D. Phillips and Steve A. Linick, Inspector General for the U.S. Department of State.

The agreement resolves claims relating to PAE’s Civilian Police “CIVPOL” contract in support of State Department missions in Afghanistan, Haiti, Lebanon, Liberia, South Sudan, and elsewhere.  In 2007, the State Department awarded PAE a task order under the CIVPOL contract to provide training and mentoring personnel to counter-narcotics and drug interdiction police and investigators in Afghanistan. The task order required PAE to conduct extensive background checks on U.S. personnel that were in high risk or armed positions, including independently developed reference checks. For local, national, and third party national employees working on the task order, PAE was obligated to submit their names to the State Department’s Regional Security Office in Afghanistan for additional security clearance. According to the government’s evidence, PAE was aware of these contractual requirements but did not comply with them for extended periods. The United States asserts that invoices PAE submitted to the State Department for the labor services of improperly vetted personnel were false.

“This settlement affirms our commitment to hold government contractors accountable for properly screening employees, particularly those who work alongside our government’s personnel in fragile areas of the world,” said U.S. Attorney Phillips. “In this particular matter, it is alleged that PAE failed to conduct the appropriate vetting for personnel working in Afghanistan under a State Department contract for labor services for which invoices were later submitted. Our Office will continue to investigate and seek appropriate recoveries from contractors who do not meet their obligations.”

“The OIG special agents and staff assigned to this case should be commended for their excellent investigative work,” said Inspector General Linick. “Rooting out waste, fraud, and abuse is at the heart of any OIG mission, as is ensuring that contractors are accountable for every taxpayer dollar they receive.”

The settlement also resolves a lawsuit filed in the U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia by former PAE manager Robert J. Palombo under the qui tam, or whistleblower provisions, of the False Claims Act. Under the False Claims Act, private citizens may bring suit on behalf of the United States and share in any recovery obtained by the government. Mr. Palombo will receive $875,000 as his share of the government’s recovery. The case is captioned United States ex rel. Robert J. Palombo v. PAE, Inc., et al. 

The claims settled by this agreement are allegations only, and there has been no determination of liability.

This settlement was the result of an investigation into Mr. Palombo’s allegations by the United States Attorney’s Office for the District of Columbia and the Department of State, Office of Inspector General.

The full statement is available here.

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Former Condi Rice Protector Michael T. Evanoff to be Assistant Secretary for Diplomatic Security

Posted: 12:18 am  ET
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On August 25, President Trump announced his intent to nominate former DSS agent Michael T. Evanoff to be the Assistant Secretary of State for the Bureau of Diplomatic Security. The WH released the following brief bio:

Michael T. Evanoff of Arkansas to be an Assistant Secretary of State, Diplomatic Security.  Mr. Evanoff is the Vice President for Asset Protection & Security at International Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. in Arkansas, a position he has held since 2014.  Previously he served as Chief Security Officer at Coca-Cola in Zug, Switzerland and Athens, Greece and as Global Director of Security at Och-Ziff Capital Management Group in New York.  He served as a special agent in the Department of State Bureau of Diplomatic Security from 1985 to 2011, holding senior posts with Overseas Security Advisory Council, NATO Office of Security, Secretary of State Protection Detail, and eight U.S. Missions overseas.  He was also diplomatic security liaison officer to the U.S. European Command in Stuttgart, Germany.  Mr. Evanoff earned a B.S. at Eastern Kentucky University.  He and his wife, Kate Milner Evanoff, have a two-year old son, Luke.

If confirmed, Mr. Evanoff would succeed Greg Starr who retired a week before inauguration (see Patrick Kennedy, Other Officials Step Down – Yo! That’s Not the “Entire” Senior Management, also see Top Diplomatic Security and Consular Affairs Officials to Step Down: Bill Miller, Kurt Rice, David Donahue, John Brennan).

WaPo profiled Mr. Evanoff in 2007 (see Rice’s Protector Plans a Move to NATO).   Below from his official NATO bio prior to his move to Walmart:

Prior to serving on NATO’s senior staff, Mr. Evanoff was the principal security advisor and Special Agent-in-Charge for the 100 plus protection team for the US Secretary of State, Condoleezza Rice.

Results driven senior executive with more than 24 years with the United States Department of State, Mr. Evanoff has served in a variety of overseas and domestic assignments that have focused on worldwide major events, overseas security program management, international and US military liaisons, criminal and counter-intelligence investigations, and dignitary protection. His overseas assignments include Islamabad, Pakistan(2001-2003), where he served as Counselor for Regional Security, including responsibility for U.S.interests in Afghanistan.

Mr. Evanoff was the Executive Director of the State Department’s Overseas Security Advisory Council (OSAC), a public-private partnership created to foster cooperation and promote the exchange of vital overseas security information between the U.S. Government and the U.S.private sector. As Executive Director, Mr. Evanoff more than doubled the number of OSAC Country Councils from 49 to 103 councils worldwide.

Mr. Evanoff was the first Diplomatic Security Service officer to establish a permanent liaison office with the U.S. European Command (EUCOM/NATO) in Stuttgart, Germany(1999-2001). Prior to that, he was the Senior Regional Security Officer in Rabat, Morocco, and the Regional Security Officer at the U.S. Embassy in Copenhagen, Denmark/Reykjavik, Iceland. He also opened the new Regional Security Office at the U.S. Embassy in Zagreb, Croatia, and the new U.S. Embassy in Sarajevo, Bosnia-Herzegovina, where he worked with NATO and UN forces during the Bosnian conflict. Mr. Evanoff began his overseas career in 1990 as an Assistant Regional Security Officer at the U.S. Embassy in the Philippines.

Mr. Evanoff’s domestic assignments include Deputy Chief of the Protective Liaison Division, and Agent-in-Charge with the Office of Dignitary Protection. Mr. Evanoff also served as an instructor and team leader to DS’ Mobile Counter-Terrorism training unit. Mr. Evanoff’s first assignment was as an investigator in the Washington Field Office.

Mr. Evanoff was named the 2003 Diplomatic Security Employee of the Year for his exceptional work in Pakistanand Afghanistan. He is also the recipient of numerous Department of State awards, including four Senior Foreign Service Performance awards and three Superior Honor Awards. He was promoted into the Senior Foreign Service in 2003 and a graduate of the United States’ Senior Foreign Service Leadership Training School.

Mr. Evanoff received a Bachelor’s degree in Police Science from Eastern Kentucky University with a minor in Corporate Security. He was the recipient of an athletic scholarship and an active member of the school’s NCAA Division 1AA National Champion football team. Mr. Evanoff is a member of the International Organization of Chiefs of Police and the Federal Law Enforcement Officers Association. He is an honorary member of the International Security Management Association.

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Significant Attacks Against U.S. Diplomatic Facilities and Personnel (2016)

Posted: 1:21 am ET
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Via Diplomatic Security:

January 4, 2016 – Kabul, Afghanistan (1): A vehicle-borne improvised explosive device detonated between Camp Sullivan and Camp Camelot, causing extensive structural damage to nearby buildings. Final casualty counts remain unclear; however, available reporting indicates at least three people were killed and 60 U.S. Embassy contractors injured, 11 of whom were U.S. citizens. The Taliban claimed responsibility for the attack.

January 11, 2016 – Tangier, Morocco: A man broke a small sign situated on the wall of the Tangier American Legation Institute for Moroccan Studies. He also punched a sign warning of the building’s security camera before running away.

January 16, 2016 – Baghdad, Iraq: Unidentified militia members kidnapped three American contractors in the Dora neighborhood of Baghdad. The motive for the kidnapping remains unknown. The three U.S. citizens were subsequently freed.

January 25, 2016 – Sana’a, Yemen (1): Two men on a motorcycle fired several shots at Yemeni security forces protecting the U.S. Embassy. No one was injured in the attack, and the motive for the incident is unclear.

February 6, 2016 Port au Prince, Haiti (1): A group of armed men fired at a vehicle carrying five U.S. Embassy personnel during a period of ongoing political unrest. None of the passengers were injured, though the vehicle sustained minor damage.

February 17, 2016Ankara, Turkey (1): A vehicle-borne improvised explosive device targeting three Turkish military shuttle buses killed 28 people and injured 61 others. The explosion shattered several windows at the nearby U.S. Office of Defense Cooperation (ODC) and slightly injured one American ODC member.

February 20, 2016Hong Kong, China: A Chinese citizen struck the main entry doors of the U.S. Consulate General with a brick, causing minor damage, and was detained by local police. The individual claimed he wanted to join the U.S. military.

March 1, 2016 – Mohmand Agency, Federally Administered Tribal Areas, Pakistan: Two U.S. Consulate General Peshawar (1) locally employed staff members were killed when an improvised explosive device detonated next to the convoy in which they were traveling. Jamaat ul-Ahrar claimed responsibility for the attack.

June 24, 2016Port au Prince, Haiti (2): Six men on motorcycles opened fire on the Marriott Hotel. Several rounds impacted rooms occupied by U.S. citizens, including one occupied by a U.S. Embassy employee. No one was injured in the attack.

June 29, 2016 – Karachi, Pakistan (2): A U.S. Embassy locally employed staff member was temporarily detained and assaulted by unidentified assailants. The staff member, who sustained minor injuries, was able to flee when the group was approached by a local police vehicle.

July 4, 2016 Jeddah, Saudi Arabia: A suicide bomber detonated his explosives in the parking lot of a hospital across the street from the U.S. Consulate General, injuring one member of the Saudi Diplomatic Police. No U.S. personnel were injured in the incident, and no Consulate facilities were damaged.

July 7, 2016 – Juba, South Sudan: Sudan People’s Liberation Army soldiers attempted to stop two U.S. Embassy vehicles at a checkpoint and opened fire on them when the passengers refused to open their doors. The vehicles were damaged by bullets, and one vehicle was disabled following a collision with another car while leaving the area. No personnel were injured.

July 14, 2016 – Shanghai, China: A Chinese citizen threw bottles at a guard at the U.S. Consulate General and threatened to kill him. Local police took the individual into custody; no one was injured in the incident.

September 12, 2016 – Kabul, Afghanistan (2): A projectile, believed to be a 107 mm rocket, struck an apartment building on the grounds of the U.S. Embassy, causing minor damage. The building was under construction and unoccupied at the time; there were no reported injuries.

September 30, 2016 – Kyiv, Ukraine: Two women illegally attempting to enter the U.S. Embassy’s vehicle entrance assaulted an Embassy guard when he attempted to stop them from impeding the exit of an Embassy vehicle. One of the women later assaulted an assistant regional security officer (ARSO) when the ARSO restrained her as she attempted to enter the Embassy’s main entrance.

October 3, 2016Srebrenica, Bosnia- Herzegovina: Protesters threw bottles and other objects at a U.S. Embassy vehicle carrying election monitors. No one was injured in the incident, and the vehicle safely left the area of the demonstration.

October 19, 2016 – Manila, Philippines (1): Protesters outside the U.S. Embassy clashed with police and defaced the Embassy seal with red paint. Police attempted to disperse the crowd using batons and tear gas, but ultimately drove through the protest with a police truck. Four police officers and up to 10 protesters were injured.

October 24, 2016 – Buenos Aires, Argentina: A U.S. citizen threw a small incendiary device over the perimeter fence of the U.S. Embassy. The object did minor damage to Embassy facilities, but no one was injured. The same individual threw a similar device over the perimeter wall in April 2015.

October 25, 2016 – Moscow, Russia: Demonstrators gathered at the U.S. Ambassador’s residence to protest against the U.S. military presence in Europe. Ten protesters launched fireworks and dropped leaflets, while one individual handcuffed himself to the gate and had to be freed with bolt cutters. Local police detained three individuals in conjunction with the incident, which they believe was an attempt by the group to gain national attention.

October 27, 2016 – Nairobi, Kenya: An individual armed with a knife and yelling “Allahu Akbar” attacked a Kenyan General Services Unit police officer stationed on the perimeter of the U.S. Embassy. The officer shot and killed the assailant.

November 5, 2016Amsterdam, Netherlands: During a “flash” demonstration outside the U.S. Consulate General, “Anonymous Masks” members spray-painted a Consular bulletin board and the facility’s windows.

November 7, 2016 – Santo Domingo, Dominican Republic: Two university students scuffled with local police when asked to move away from the U.S. Embassy during a protest over the U.S. Ambassador’s support of same-sex marriage. One protester attempted to strike a police officer with a large wooden cross and was subsequently arrested.

November 15, 2016 – Melbourne, Australia: Four individuals protesting the Dakota Access Pipeline wrote on the entry doors, blocked the entrance, and poured an unidentified substance resembling cooking oil in the public lobby of the commercial building housing the U.S. Consulate General.

November 18, 2016 – Strasbourg, France: An unidentified individual spray-painted the pillars connecting the gates of the U.S. Consulate General with anti-U.S. graffiti and an anarchy symbol. Based on a review of the slogans used, the perpetrator was likely a member of the leftist anarchist movement in France.

November 28, 2016 – Manila, Philippines (2): Philippine National Police rendered safe an improvised explosive device found in a trash can approximately 250 meters from the U.S. Embassy. The intentions and motivations of the perpetrators remain unclear.

November 30, 2016 – N’Djamena, Chad: A man armed with a pistol and shouting “Allahu Akbar” opened fire at the local police guard stationed outside the U.S. Embassy’s main entrance. The police took the shooter into custody. No one was injured during the incident.

December 2, 2016 Yaoundé, Cameroon: An individual brandishing a knife and claiming to be an Islamic State soldier approached the U.S. Embassy and asked to speak with the ambassador. Local gendarmes subdued the individual after he rushed toward them.

December 19, 2016 – Ankara, Turkey (2): An individual fired one shotgun round at the U.S. Embassy’s vehicle gate and then fired multiple shots into the air before being arrested by Turkish National Police. No U.S. Embassy personnel were injured in the incident, though the vehicle gate sustained minor damage. The incident occurred hours after the Russian Ambassador to Turkey was assassinated at an arts center across the street from the Embassy.

December 21, 2016 – Kabul, Afghanistan (3): A 40 mm grenade exploded at Camp Duskin, a U.S. military camp, while a U.S. Embassy protective security team was conducting a site review in advance of a visit by the U.S. chargé d’affaires. No one was injured in the incident, and it is unclear whether the explosion was the result of a negligent discharge or a deliberate action.

December 24, 2016 – Sana’a, Yemen (2) A Houthi-affiliated group detained a U.S. Embassy guard at a checkpoint in Taiz. There are conflicting reports as to the reason for the detention. The guard remains detained.

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Bureau of Diplomatic Security’s “Naughty List” — What’s That All About?

Posted: 3:48 am ET
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On August 8, we blogged about a woman who reported that she was raped and stalked by a supervisory Diplomatic Security agent assigned to one of the bureau’s field offices in the United States. The blogpost includes the State Department recently issued guidance on sexual assaults covering personnel and facilities in the United States (See A Woman Reported to Diplomatic Security That She Was Raped and Stalked by a DS Agent, So What Happened?).

We have since been been told that if we keep digging, we will “find much more” and that we should be looking for the “Naughty List” also known as the Adverse Action list.

When we asked what kind of numbers we’re talking about, we were informed that “the numbers are enough to say this is a systemic issue within the department.”  In the course of looking into this one case, we discovered a second case similar to the one we blogged about last week.  But the allegation was related to a different employee.

We’ve asked Diplomatic Security about the List but to-date we have not heard anything back.  We have two sources who confirmed the existence of the list.

What is the “Naught List”?

The list is formally called the Adverse Action list. We understand that this is a list of Diplomatic Security employees who are under investigation or declared “unfit for duty“.  Among the allegations we’ve got so far:

  • Investigations where agents were not disciplined but suspected of similar offenses
  • Investigations that languished on somebody’s desk for a decision
  • Agents curtail from post due to their “inappropriate behavior” and then just get reassigned somewhere else to become someone else’s problem (or nightmare if you are the victim).
  • Most agents are sent back to work with a slap on the wrist, regardless of how egregious the allegation against them were.
  • That this blog is only aware of two cases while “there are many more than that that exists.”
  • The system is highly flawed when you have coworkers/buddies investigating you.
  • That the Sexual Assault Policy is all smoke and mirrors without a mechanism to ensure the alleged perpetrator does not reoffend by discipline, removal, or treatment once its been established that the allegation has merit.

We’ve seen this movie before, haven’t we?

In October 2014, State/OIG published its Review of Selected Internal Investigations Conducted by the Bureau of Diplomatic Security.  That report includes a case where the OIG found an appearance of undue influence and favoritism concerning a DS Regional Security Officer (RSO) posted overseas, who, in 2011, allegedly engaged in sexual misconduct and harassment.  DS commenced an internal investigation of those allegations in September 2011.  The report notes that at the time the investigation began, the RSO already had a long history of similar misconduct allegations dating back 10 years at seven other posts where he worked.

The report also notes that “notwithstanding the serious nature of the alleged misconduct, the Department never attempted to remove the RSO from Department work environments where the RSO could potentially harm other employees, an option available under the FAM.”  The OIG reports that in November 2013, based on evidence collected by DS and the Department’s Office of Civil Rights, the Department commenced termination of employment proceedings against the RSO. The RSO’s employment in the Department did not end until mid-2014, approximately 3 years after DS initially learned of the 2011 allegations.

Now three years after that employee’s departure, and six years after that 2011 allegations, here we are once again. Similar cases, different characters.

The questions we’ve been asked

Of which we have no answer — but we’re hoping that Diplomatic Security or the State Department would be asked by congressional overseers — are as follows:

√ Why would DS want to keep an agent or agents on that reflects so poorly on the Agency? Does DS not find this to be a liability?

√ Is Diplomatic Security (DS) prepared to deal with the aftermath if this agent continues to commit the same offenses that he has allegedly been accused of, especially if there is a track record for this agent?

√ There is an internal group that meets monthly to discuss these cases; they include representatives from at least six offices across bureaus, so what happened to these cases? Why are these actions tolerated?

√ If DS is so proactive based on its new Sexual Assault Policy, why are they not seeking a quicker timeline from investigation to discipline, to demonstrate to alleged victims that the agency does indeed take these allegations seriously?

We have to add a few questions of our own. Why do DS agents continue to investigate misconduct of other DS agents that they will likely serve with in the future, or that they may rely on for future assignments?

According to the Spring 2017 Report to Congress, the Bureau of Diplomatic Security (DS) has limited and continues to limit OIG’s permanent worldwide access to specific DS systems that OIG requires to conduct its oversight activities. Why? (see @StateDept Now Required to Report Allegations and Investigations to OIG Within 5 Days).

What are we going to see when we (or other reporters) FOIA this “Naughty List”?

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Top Diplomatic Security and Consular Affairs Officials to Step Down: Bill Miller, Kurt Rice, David Donahue, John Brennan

Posted: 3:25 am ET
Updated: 2:33 pm PT
Updated: July 25, 3:03 pm PT
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Sources informed us that Acting Assistant Secretary for Diplomatic Security Bill A. Miller announced his intention to step down from his post late last week. A/S Miller will reportedly retire next month.  Until his appointment as Acting A/S for Diplomatic Security in January 20, he was the bureau’s Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary for Diplomatic Security and Director of the Diplomatic Security Service (DSS) from April 14, 2014.  Previous to that, he was the Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for High Threat Posts.

A member of the State Department’s Diplomatic Security Service since 1987, Bill Miller is a career member of the Senior Foreign Service. His last overseas assignment was a three-year posting as Regional Security Officer at the U.S. Mission in Cairo, Egypt.  Preceding his assignment to Cairo, Mr. Miller was the Chief of the Security and Law Enforcement Training Division at the Diplomatic Security Training Center in Dunn Loring, Virginia.

Prior to entering duty in 1987 with the Department of State as a Diplomatic Security Service Special Agent, Mr. Miller served as a U.S. Marine Infantry Officer. Mr. Miller was honored as the 2004 Diplomatic Security Service Employee of the Year in recognition for his service in Iraq. In addition, Mr. Miller is a recipient of the Department of State’s Award for Valor, several Superior Honor Awards, the Department of Defense Joint Civilian Service Commendation Award and the Marine Security Guard Battalion’s award as RSO of the Year.

To-date, President Trump has not put forward a nominee to succeed Gregory Starr as Assistant Secretary of State for Diplomatic Security.  Mr. Starr retired a week before inauguration day, and Mr. Miller has been in an acting capacity since January 20. Without a newly appointed successor, we were informed that the next senior official, Christian J. Schurman, will be the Acting Assistant Secretary for Diplomatic Security.  Mr. Schurman is currently the Acting Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary for Diplomatic Security/Director of Diplomatic Security Service (DSS) and responsible for the Bureau of Diplomatic Security’s international and domestic operations and training programs. Beyond his name and title, State/DS does not have an extensive biography for Mr. Schurman.  We don’t know yet who among the seven top bureau officials would be acting PDAS during this time.

Kurt R. Rice, the Deputy Assistant Secretary and Assistant Director for Threat Investigations and Analysis (DS/TIA) will not be one of those officials.  Mr. Rice is also retiring.  Mr. Rice who was appointed to his position in May 2016 was in charge of all threat management programs within Diplomatic Security that analyze, assess, investigate, and disseminate information on threats directed against U.S. facilities and personnel overseas and domestically.

He was also responsible for the Overseas Security Advisory Council (OSAC), a public-private partnership that promotes the sharing of security information between the U.S. Department of State and American private sector organizations with operations and personnel abroad. We rely on OSAC for security guidance when there are breaking news overseas.  His office also provides oversight for the Reward for Justice program, the U.S. Government’s premier public anti-terrorism rewards program.

Mr. Rice joined Diplomatic Security in May 1987 and is a career member of the Senior Foreign Service. As DAS/TIA, he was the senior Diplomatic Security Service (DSS) advisor regarding intelligence and counterterrorism matters. He is also the DSS organizational representative to the U.S. Intelligence and Counterterrorism communities. He previously served as Regional Security Officer for the Russian Federation, and Special Agent in Charge (SAC) of all DS activities in the embassy and three subordinate consulates. He is a recipient of several State Department Meritorious and Superior Honor Awards, as well as interagency Intelligence Community awards.

There are five office directors under TIA, so anyone of those directors could potentially be appointed as Acting DAS for Threat Investigations and Analysis (DS/TIA) until a nominee is officially announced. Given that there is no nominee for the assistant secretary position, it is possible that the principal deputy assistant secretary (PDAS) position and deputy assistant secretaries (DASes) could get filled before the top bureau appointment is officially identified, nominated and confirmed by the U.S. Senate.

At the Consular Affairs Bureau, the Acting Assistant Secretary of Consular Affairs David Donahue is also set to step down the end of this week.  We understand that AA/S Donahue’s retirement has been long planned but he will still be missed. The Acting Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Consular Affairs is Ed Ramotowski, who was previously the DAS for Visa Services. Our assumption is that Mr. Ramotowski will now step up as Acting Assistant Secretary for Consular Affairs pending the confirmation of Mr. Risch to the Consular Bureau. The CA bureau has three four DASes: Overseas Citizens Services DAS Karen L. Christensen, Passport Services DAS Brenda Sprague, Acting DAS for Visa Services Karin King, and DAS for Resources, John Brennan. We understand that the  Deputy Assistant Secretary for Resources (DAS/R) position was created in 2015 to coordinate CA/EX, the Comptroller, the IT systems people, and the 1CA management initiative. Mr. Brennan is also retiring. One of them will most probably step us as PDAS, so one more office in CA will have a new acting name on its door.  So one of the three remaining DASes (Brennan excepted) will probably become the PDAS, and two more offices in CA will have a new acting name on its door. 

We’ve endeavored to look for Mr. Donahue’s official biography but state.gov does not appear to carry any biographies for senior officials for  the Bureau of Consular Affairs. The public facing CA website travel.state.gov also does not include biographies of its senior officials.  We were able to get hold of Mr. Donahue’s official biography since we originally put up this blogpost (thank you J!). 

David T. Donahue has been Acting Assistant Secretary in the Bureau of Consular Affairs since January 2017. He served as Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary from September 2015 after serving as Senior Advisor to the Bureau from April 2014.

Prior to this assignment he was Division Director for the Bureau of Human Resources Office of Career Development and Assignment, Senior Level Division. From 2012 to 2013 he served as Coordinator for Interagency Provincial Affairs (IPA) at the U.S. Embassy in Kabul, Afghanistan with oversight of all U.S. Civilian Provincial Reconstruction Teams throughout Afghanistan.

Mr. Donahue was Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Visa Services in the Bureau of Consular Affairs from 2008 to 2012, where he managed visa operations for our 225 visa-issuing posts overseas and directed visa policy for the State Department. He has also served as the Director of Policy Coordination and Public Affairs for the Bureau of Consular Affairs, 2007 – 2008, and Minister Counselor for Consular Affairs in Mexico City, Mexico from 2005 – 2007.

Mr. Donahue also served tours in the Philippines, Pakistan, Singapore, and Trinidad and Tobago. Other domestic assignments include serving as Watch Officer in the State Department Operations Center, Bangladesh Desk Officer, and Consular Training instructor at the Foreign Service Institute. Mr. Donahue joined the Foreign Service in 1983 and is the recipient of numerous awards including the Presidential Meritorious Service Award.  While assigned in Islamabad, Mr. Donahue went to Afghanistan in 2001 to secure the release of two Americans held by the Taliban. Read more of that here.

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@StateDept Now Required to Report Allegations and Investigations to OIG Within 5 Days

Once a year, we ask for your support to keep this blog going. We’re running our fundraising campaign until Saturday, July 15.  Help Us Get to Year 10!

Posted: 1:53 am ET
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In the Spring 2017 OIG Report to Congress, State/OIG informed Congress of the following:

OIG did not encounter any attempts to interfere with IG independence—whether through budgetary constraints designed to limit its capabilities or otherwise—for the reporting period from October 1, 2016, through March 31, 2017.

During this reporting period, OIG identified the following incidents where the Department resisted or objected to oversight activities or restricted or significantly delayed access to information. The incidents either arose during or persisted into this reporting period. As to each item, OIG has addressed the issue as described below:

The Bureau of Diplomatic Security (DS) has limited and continues to limit OIG’s permanent worldwide access to specific DS systems that OIG requires to conduct its oversight activities. OIG has and continues to make repeated requests for access, and DS has denied or revoked access without notice. At this time, OIG is working with the Department to correct this situation.

The Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs (INL) delayed OIG access to requested information. OIG worked with the Department and sub- sequently obtained the required information. OIG continues to work with the Department to ensure that, in the future, INL provides requested information in a timely manner.

OIG previously explained in response to other requests from Congress that it had faced challenges investigating allegations of criminal or serious misconduct by Department employees. This limitation was addressed in recent legislation— enacted in December 2016—that requires the Department to submit to OIG within 5 days a report of certain allegations of misconduct, waste, fraud, and abuse. OIG and the Department are actively working to ensure that these reports are provided in a timely manner and that OIG receives all necessary information as required by the statute.

Related items to read:

On or about this time, the State Department has also updated 1 FAM 050 of the Foreign Affairs Manual as the reporting requirement was included in the Department of State Authorities Act for Fiscal Year 2017:

1 FAM 053.2-6  Required Reporting of Allegations to the OIG
(CT:ORG-411;   04-13-2017)

a. Effective December 16, 2016, section 209(c)(6) of the Foreign Service Act of 1980, as added by section 203 of the Department of State Authorities Act, Fiscal Year 2017 (22 U.S.C. 3929(c)(6)), provides:

REQUIRED REPORTING OF ALLEGATIONS AND INVESTIGATIONS AND INSPECTOR GENERAL AUTHORITY.—

(A) IN GENERAL.—The head of a bureau, post, or other office of the Department of State (in this paragraph referred to as a ‘Department entity’) shall submit to the Inspector General a report of any allegation of—

(i) waste, fraud, or abuse in a Department program or operation;

(ii) criminal or serious misconduct on the part of a Department employee at the FS–1, GS–15, or GM–15 level or higher;

(iii) criminal misconduct on the part of a Department employee; and

(iv) serious, noncriminal misconduct on the part of any Department employee who is authorized to carry a weapon, make arrests, or conduct searches, such as conduct that, if proved, would constitute perjury or material dishonesty, warrant suspension as discipline for a first offense, or result in loss of law enforcement authority.

(B) DEADLINE.—The head of a Department entity shall submit to the Inspector General a report of an allegation described in subparagraph (A) not later than 5 business days after the date on which the head of such Department entity is made aware of such allegation.

b. Any allegation meeting the criteria reflected in the statute should immediately be brought to the attention of the relevant head of a bureau, post, or bureau-level office. (Bureau-level offices are entities on the Department’s organizational chart as revised from time to time, see Department Organizational Chart.)

c.  The first report by any Department entity should cover the period beginning December 16, 2016 (the day the law went into effect), and ending not later than five business days before the date of that report. Thereafter, any additional reportable information is due not later than the five-business day deadline stated in the statute. 

d. Questions regarding this reporting requirement may be directed to the Office of the Legal Adviser for Management (L/M), or the OIG’s General Counsel or Deputy General Counsel.

e. As outlined in 1 FAM 053.2-5, any Department employee or other personnel may continue to raise any allegations directly to OIG, via the OIG Hotline, internalhotline@stateoig.gov, or 1-800-409-9926, or the other methods listed elsewhere in the FAM.  All Employees, Locally Employed Staff, Foreign National Employees, individuals providing services via Personal Service Agreements (PSAs), Personal Service Contractors (PSCs), third party contractors, subcontractors, and grantees at all levels are also reminded of the existing reporting requirement contained in 1 FAM 053.2-5 paragraph d and the existing reporting requirements regarding criminal activity, employee misconduct, allegations of harassment, or any other reportable offenses to the relevant action office in Washington.

f.  Below is a reporting template, which may be modified pursuant to the situation or needs of the reporting entity.  

The FAM reporting template notes the following:

The information provided in this report is preliminary and may be unsubstantiated.  Any records or information provided to the OIG in the preliminary report are compiled for law enforcement purposes under the meaning of the Freedom of Information Act, 5 U.S.C. 552.  The information in this preliminary report may constitute Personally Identifiable Information.  The unauthorized disclosure of information contained in this preliminary report could reasonably be expected to constitute a violation of the Privacy Act of 1974, 5 U.S.C. 552a.  To the extent the information pertains to an open investigation, the release of such preliminary information could reasonably be expected to interfere with enforcement proceedings.

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Inbox: Female Contractor at DS Training Center Fired 3 Hours After Filing Harassment Complaint

Posted: 3:19 am ET
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In response to our June 20 post Diplomatic Security’s Basic Special Agent (BSAC) Training: Sexual Harassment Alert!, we received the following:

To add:

There are only two female DS Agents assigned to the DS Training Center.

There is currently an EEO suit being brought by a contract female instructor who was fired from the DS Training Center three hours after she submitted a harassment complaint. In the complaint, a male PSC co-worker frequently harassed the female instructor, and, given the timing of the termination, this is an egregious violation of whistleblower/EEO diversity/harassment free workplace regulations and policies. The male PSC employee is still employed and complaints about his dealings with female students and employees persist.

 

via reactiongifs.com’

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Inbox: A belief that there’s no place for a female in Diplomatic Security agent ranks especially at HTPs?

Posted: 3:24 am ET
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We recently posted a report out of Diplomatic Security’s BSAC training (see Diplomatic Security’s Basic Special Agent (BSAC) Training: Sexual Harassment Alert!, We received the following comment in our mailbox that we think many will find just as troubling:

“In response to the DS BSAC Sexual Harassment allegations, the  ‘militarization’ of DS post-Benghazi, such as with high threat training requirements (duplicated from U.S. military training), has made many mid and senior-level male agents believe that there is no place for a female in DS agent ranks, especially at high threat posts. These same male agents are the future DS leadership unfortunately. The vast majority of DSS male agents are professional and respectful in the workplace however the chauvinistic attitude is prevalent, and is actually coming from the attitude from the mid and senior level guys (01s to OCs) who are managers and not DS leadership.  DS leadership is responsible to stop it, and that can only be done by setting the offenders publicly accountable and placing professional agents in senior leadership positions.”

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A Global Force: Agent Profile brochure says that “For women who choose Diplomatic Security as a career, there are no limits to how far you can go.”  Also that “Diversity is one of the greatest strengths of Diplomatic Security.”  

Related posts:

Burn Bag: 2017 S-III Selection Board – Who Volunteers … Who Volunteers as Tribute?

Via Burn Bag:

“Given the lack of action by either the DG, HR/PE or AFSA, it is evident all support cronyism and undue influence on the 2017 S-III Selection Board given that a single individual has been chosen by HR/PE to represent DS 50% of the time over the past 6 years. This, despite other qualified candidates volunteering time & again. This wreaks of favoritism, undue influence and undermines the credibility of the Foreign Service promotion process.”

via giphy

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Related item:

3 FAM 2326.1 Selection Boards
3 FAM 2326.1-1 Composition:
f. All selection board members must be approved by the Director General and must not serve on a selection board for two consecutive years.

 

 

Diplomatic Security’s Basic Special Agent (BSAC) Training: Sexual Harassment Alert!

Posted: 2:21 pm PT
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In August 2016, the Bureau of Diplomatic Security’s Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary for Diplomatic Security and Director of the Diplomatic Security Service (DSS) Bill Miller sent a message on sexual harassment to bureau employees.  We published the entire message here, Below is an excerpt of that 2016 statement:

Diplomatic Security takes sexual harassment extremely seriously – not only as an issue in the State Department, but also especially within our Bureau. 

In our response to questions from Diplopundit on this issue July 27, we noted that we find unacceptable any behavior that threatens people’s well-being in the workplace, or in any way diminishes someone’s professional capacity. 

Sexual harassment is an attack on the values this organization seeks to protect every day.  It compromises our charge to protect the workplace rights and ensure a safe environment for all Department employees.
[…]
As a law enforcement organization, we must hold ourselves to the highest standards of ethical conduct. As the leader of this organization, I hold every employee accountable to that standard and will not accept any less of them.

Sexual harassment and sexual assault are serious issues that affect both men and women. We condemn any comment that seeks to trivialize these activities or their impact on victims. 

Diplomatic Security personnel are made aware of their responsibilities as law enforcement officers and federal employees from the beginning of their employment with the Department.  DS employees receive recurring training on equal employment opportunity guidelines, prohibiting discriminatory practices, harassment in all its forms, and promotion of diversity and inclusiveness throughout their career. 

During the Basic Special Agent Course, Basic Regional Security Officer (RSO) and RSO advanced courses, individuals from the DS Victim’s Resource Advocacy Program provide classes on responding to sexual assault.

I am disappointed and disturbed to hear that anyone in our organization would be concerned about being stigmatized for coming forward to report sexual harassment or sexual assault.  It is unacceptable that we have employees of any gender who may not feel comfortable reporting such activities.

This week, we received an email from a new Diplomatic Security Service (DSS) agent detailing sexual language that female student-agents had to endure during Diplomatic Security’s Basic Special Agent Course (BSAC) training. The writer expressed concern over the “worrisome behavior by senior agents conducting the training” and the apparent tolerance by others witnessing such behavior.  The writer also wrote: “One senior female agent advised me that upon receipt of this complaint, DSS Management’s first response will likely be to try to figure out who the “complainer” is . . rather than dealing with the senior agents responsible for damaging the department’s reputation.”  Our corespondent suggests that if investigators outside of Diplomatic Security want to look into this, all they need to do is talk to the female agents in BSAC’s 137, 136, and 135.

The report below is what we can share publicly.  This writer like our other correspondents in the past, is also wary of retaliation.  We’ve referred to Special Agent #1 as SA#1 although we can certainly imagine a more colorful name. Special Agent #2 is also referred below as SA#2.

ALERT! ALERT! ALEEEEERT!

Received via email from a DSS Special Agent

-START-

Here is what I witnessed:

1) During protective training, I was assigned to a follow car that was “coached” by [Special Agent #1]. During our time with [SA#1], myself and the other females in the group had to listen to [SA#1] describe in detail how during his time in Baghdad he shaved his “balls” and had problems with them “sticking.” [SA#1] then felt it appropriate to detail a trip to his doctor where he had a consultation about erectile medication. [SA#1] also made repeated derogatory comments about his wife. My memory is a little fuzzy on those comments, but they were along the line of, “the old ball and chain, etc.”

I should mention that one of the female agents present is only 22 years old. So this young agent, in her first real job out of college had to sit (literally right next to [SA#1] in the back seat / physically touching him) and listen to [SA#1] , her supervisor, go on and on about his sticky balls in Baghdad and his erectile disfunction . . .i.e. he was discussing his penis.

2) The protection portion of the training was run by unit chief [Special Agent #2]. I personally was “creeped” out by [SA#2] during the entire training as he would try to flirt with the female students in a very unprofessional manner. [SA#2] really crossed the line, however, when for some reason he decided to ask one of the female students (now an agent) for their phone and proceeded to look through it. [SA#2] found the phone number or a text message in the female student-agent’s phone for one of the male contractors working on our final exercise, and texted “I miss you” to the contractor (from the female student/agent’s phone). The female student/agent was of course mortified as it appeared she was texting “I miss you” to the contractor. Is this appropriate behavior from a Unit Supervisor in the training division?!

[SA#2’s] inappropriate behavior continued when, during a re-test he decided to switch out a male student-agent from the position sitting next to him in the exercise to the above mentioned female student-agent. [SA#2] advised the entire BSAC that he was making the switch so he could have someone to “talk to.” He was supposed to be grading the re-test, but instead decided to use the time to creepily attempt to flirt with the female student-agent.

I am sure the above behavior by [SAs #1 and #2] has been repeated in multiple BSAC’s and I hope the department conducts a thorough investigation. Honestly, however, I am not so optimistic that things will change. I know Diplopundit has documented several such sexual harassment claims in the not so distant past, and yet, the above Supervisory SAs seemed to have no compunction in openly behaving this way in front of the 20 plus student-agents!

Where are the Director and the other senior members of DSS management?!! If they cannot protect/prevent a 21 year female agent from having to listen to Supervisory SAs like [SA#1 and SA#2] while she sits in training, how can DSS Senior Management be trusted to protect that same agent from harassment while she is serving in a high threat post in a 98% male RSO shop?!

The Director came to speak to our BSAC, and within 3 minutes of our “pep” talk he told us that if we had joined DSS to use it as a stepping stone we should “get the hell out.” That is a direct quote. One day on the job, and the Director comes in and says “get the hell out” in a pep talk. I would like to turn that around on the Director. If the senior leadership in DSS cannot prevent Supervisory Agents from “creeping out” all females in a BSAC class. Or prevent female student-agents from having to listen to Supervisory SA’s conducting BSAC training discuss their “shaved balls,” maybe it is time for the Director and others to “get the hell out” and leave the bureau in more capable hands?

-END-

The Eleventh Circuit’s decision in Henson v. City of Dundee, 682 F.2d 897, 902, 29 EPD ¶ 32,993 (11th Cir. 1982) notes the following:

Sexual harassment which creates a hostile or offensive environment for members of one sex is every bit the arbitrary barrier to sexual equality at the workplace that racial harassment is to racial equality. Surely, a requirement that a man or woman run a gauntlet of sexual abuse in return for the privilege of being allowed to work and made a living can be as demeaning and disconcerting as the harshest of racial epithets.

Female agents should not have to bear and tolerate this kind of language and offensive behavior for the privilege of being allowed to work at Diplomatic Security.

Why would anyone think this is appropriate, acceptable behavior?

And when this is done by individuals in supervisory ranks during training, how do you expect new employees to step up and report this to these same supervisors? The same supervisors, by the way, who can pass/fail employees during basic training. The same supervisors, by the way, who ought to be modeling the highest standards of ethical and professional conduct for agents-in-training.

While the EEOC policy guidance on sexual harassment notes that “sexual flirtation or innuendo, even vulgar language that is trivial or merely annoying, would probably not establish a hostile environment,” it also talks about the pervasiveness and pattern of behavior.

Putting aside our previous reports on harassment at Diplomatic Security for a moment — if we’re talking about three classes to start with here, what is that if not a pattern? And if this behavior was witnessed and tolerated by people and contractors who should know better, then Diplomatic Security has a systemic problem that no broadcast message from bureau officials can fix.

The Supreme Court said in Vinson that for sexual harassment to violate Title VII, it must be “sufficiently severe or pervasive ‘to alter the conditions of [the victim’s] employment and create an abusive working environment.'” 106 S. Ct. at 2406 (quoting Henson v. City of Dundee, 682 F.2d at 904. Since “hostile environment’ harassment takes a variety of forms, many factors may affect this determination, including: (1) whether the conduct was verbal or physical, or both; (2) how frequently it was repeated; (3) whether the conduct was hostile and patently offensive; (4) whether the alleged harasser was a co-worker or a supervisor; (5) whether the others joined in perpetrating the harassment; and (6) whether the harassment was directed at more than one individual.

In determining whether unwelcome sexual conduct rises to the level of a “hostile environment” in violation of Title VII, the central inquiry is whether the conduct “unreasonably interfer[es] with an individual’s work performance” or creates “an intimidating, hostile, or offensive working environment.” 29 C.F.R. § 1604.11(a)(3). Thus, sexual flirtation or innuendo, even vulgar language that is trivial or merely annoying, would probably not establish a hostile environment.

Preventive actions per EEOC‘S Guidelines encourage employers to: “take all steps necessary to prevent sexual harassment from occurring, such as affirmatively raising the subject, expressing strong disapproval, developing appropriate sanctions, informing employees of their right to raise and how to raise the issue of harassment under Title VII, and developing methods to sensitize all concerned.”

Also 29 C.F.R. § 1604.11(f): An effective preventive program should include an explicit policy against sexual harassment that is clearly and regularly communicated to employees and effectively implemented. The employer should affirmatively raise the subject with all supervisory and non- supervisory employees, express strong disapproval, and explain the sanctions for harassment. The employer should also have a procedure for resolving sexual harassment complaints. The procedure should be designed to “encourage victims of harassment to come forward” and should not require a victim to complain first to the offending supervisor. See Vinson, 106 S. Ct. at 2408. It should ensure confidentiality as much as possible and provide effective remedies, including protection of victims and witnesses against retaliation.

All well and good, but in the real world we have these: Chien v. Kerry: DS Agent Files Suit For Race/Sex Discrimination, Hostile Work Environment, and RetaliationInbox: Female Diplomatic Security Agent Pens a Note on Sexual Harassment and Career SuicideAnother Concerned DS Agent Pens Response to Diplomatic Security’s Broadcast Message on Sexual Harassment.

The State Department’s sexual harassment policy is memorialized here.

Related posts:

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