Tag Archives: Bureau of Diplomatic Security

Snapshot: Diplomatic Security – By the Numbers (2020)

January 20, 2022 By in Diplomatic Security, Functional Bureaus, Snapshots, State Department Tags: , , ,

 

Via State/DS:

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First Extradition From Cameroon to US: Fugitive to Serve an 80-Year Prison Sentence

December 14, 2021 By in AF |Africa, Americans Abroad, Consular Work, Court Cases, Diplomatic Security, U.S. Missions Tags: , , , , , , , , ,

 

Via USDOJ:

In the first extradition from the Republic of Cameroon to the United States, a Texas man was extradited to Houston on Friday to serve an 80-year prison sentence he received in absentia four years ago after he pleaded guilty in two separate cases to conspiracy, health care fraud, money laundering, and tax offenses.

According to court documents, in November 2016, Ebong Aloysius Tilong, 57, of Sugar Land, Texas, and his wife, Marie Neba, went to trial on the conspiracy, health care fraud, and money laundering charges. The trial evidence and court documents showed that between 2006 and 2015, Tilong, Neba, and their co-conspirators used Tilong and Neba’s company, Fiango Home Healthcare Inc. (Fiango), to corruptly obtain more than $13 million by submitting false and fraudulent claims to Medicare for home health care services that Fiango’s patients did not need or receive. The trial evidence and court documents also showed that Tilong and Neba paid illegal kickbacks to patient recruiters to refer patients to Fiango, and that Tilong falsified and directed others to falsify medical records to make it appear as though Fiango’s patients met the Medicare qualifications for home health care. Additional evidence demonstrated that Tilong attempted to destroy evidence and blackmail and suborn perjury from witnesses. After the first week of trial, Tilong pleaded guilty to one count of conspiracy to commit health care fraud, three counts of health care fraud, one count of conspiracy to pay and receive health care kickbacks, three counts of payment and receipt of health care kickbacks, and one count of conspiracy to launder monetary instruments.

In June 2017, Tilong pleaded guilty in a separate case to two counts of filing fraudulent tax returns. In connection with this guilty plea, Tilong admitted that he created a shell company called Quality Therapy Services (QTS) to limit the amount of tax that he paid to the IRS on the proceeds that he and his co-conspirators stole from Medicare. According to Tilong’s plea agreement, in 2013 and 2014, Tilong wrote almost $1 million in checks from Fiango to QTS for physical-therapy services that QTS never provided to Fiango’s patients and deducted as business expenses. Tilong admitted that his tax fraud scheme caused the IRS a tax loss of approximately $344,452.

In August 2017, Neba was sentenced to 75 years in prison the Medicare fraud scheme at Fiango. The U.S. District Court scheduled Tilong’s sentencing for Oct. 13, 2017, but court records show that on the morning of his sentencing hearing, Tilong removed an ankle bracelet monitoring his location and failed to respond to phone calls from, or appear in, the U.S. District Court for his sentencing. On Dec. 8, 2017, the U.S. District Court sentenced Tilong in absentia to 80 years in prison for his role in the Medicare and tax fraud schemes.
[…]

In September 2021, the Republic of Cameroon President Paul Biya signed a decree ordering Tilong’s removal to the United States.

On Dec. 10, 2021, U.S. Marshals escorted Tilong from Cameroon to the United States.

The United States is grateful to the Government of Cameroon for its cooperation and support of this extradition request.

Read more:

US Embassy Belize: Resident Amcit Pleads Guilty in Crypto Laundering Service, Forfeits 4,400+ Bitcoins

December 9, 2021 By in Americans Abroad, Court Cases, Federal Agencies, State Department, U.S. Missions Tags: , , , , , ,

 

This past summer, an Ohio resident who was apparently also a resident of Belize pleaded guilty to a money laundering conspiracy arising from his operation of Helix, a Darknet-based cryptocurrency laundering service. The plea deal includes the forfeiture of more than 4,400 bitcoin, valued at more than $200 million.
Via USDOJ: Ohio Resident Pleads Guilty to Operating Darknet-Based Bitcoin ‘Mixer’ That Laundered Over $300 Million

An Ohio man pleaded guilty today to a money laundering conspiracy arising from his operation of Helix, a Darknet-based cryptocurrency laundering service.

According to court documents, Larry Dean Harmon, 38, of Akron, admitted that he operated Helix from 2014 to 2017. Helix functioned as a bitcoin “mixer” or “tumbler,” allowing customers, for a fee, to send bitcoin to designated recipients in a manner that was designed to conceal the source or owner of the bitcoin. Helix was linked to and associated with “Grams,” a Darknet search engine also run by Harmon. Harmon advertised Helix to customers on the Darknet to conceal transactions from law enforcement.

“By holding Harmon accountable, the department has disrupted the unlawful money laundering practices of these dangerous criminal enterprises,” said Assistant Attorney General Kenneth A. Polite Jr. of the Justice Department’s Criminal Division. “The Justice Department, together with our law enforcement and regulatory partners, will continue to take enforcement actions to identify and impede those who use illicit means for financial gain, as well as those who use the Darknet to facilitate and obscure their criminal conduct.”

“Darknet markets and the dealers who sell opioids and other illegal drugs on them are a growing scourge,” said Acting U.S. Attorney Channing D. Phillips for the District of Columbia. “They may try to hide their identities and launder millions in sales behind technologies like Helix. But the department and its law enforcement partners will shine a light on their activities, dismantle the infrastructure such criminal marketplaces depend on, and prosecute and convict those responsible.”

“Criminals may think they can mask financial transactions by using services like Helix to conceal the source of illicit funds,” said Assistant Director Calvin A. Shivers of the FBI’s Criminal Investigative Division. “The FBI and our state, local, federal and international law enforcement partners are working together every day in a complex and ever-changing digital environment to protect the American people from sophisticated money launderers and financiers.”

“The Darknet is driven in part by the criminal marketplaces which peddle their nefarious goods and services,” said Chief James C. Lee of the IRS Criminal Investigation. “But these marketplaces thrive in large measure because of the infrastructure that supports them. Harmon profited by facilitating the back-channel support of these marketplaces and helped criminals launder money they received via illicit activities. He then hid those funds from the government. He admitted his role today in these activities and will now be held accountable.”

“Harmon admitted that he conspired with Darknet vendors to launder bitcoin generated through drug trafficking and other illegal activities,” said Assistant Director in Charge Steven M. D’Antuono of the FBI’s Washington Field Office. “Today’s guilty plea demonstrates the FBI’s commitment to infiltrate and shut down the cryptocurrency money-laundering networks that support cyber-criminal enterprises.”

Harmon admitted that Helix partnered with several Darknet markets, including AlphaBay, Evolution, Cloud 9 and others, to provide bitcoin money laundering services for market customers. In total, Helix moved over 350,000 bitcoin – valued at over $300 million at the time of the transactions – on behalf of customers, with the largest volume coming from Darknet markets. Harmon further admitted that he conspired with Darknet vendors and marketplace administrators to launder such bitcoins generated through illegal drug trafficking offenses on those Darknet marketplaces.

As part of his plea, Harmon also agreed to the forfeiture of more than 4,400 bitcoin, valued at more than $200 million at today’s prices, and other seized properties that were involved in the money laundering conspiracy. Harmon will be sentenced at a date to be determined and faces a maximum penalty of 20 years in prison, a fine of $500,000 or twice the value of the property involved in the transaction, a term of supervised release of not more than three years, and mandatory restitution. Chief Judge Beryl Howell of the U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia accepted Harmon’s guilty plea and will determine any sentence after considering the U.S. Sentencing Guidelines and other statutory factors.

The IRS-CI Cyber Crimes Unit and the FBI’s Washington Field Office investigated the case, with valuable assistance provided by the Criminal Division’s Office of International Affairs, the U.S. Attorney’s Office for the Northern District of Ohio, the IRS’s Washington, Cincinnati and Oakland Field Offices, the FBI’s Criminal Investigative Division and Cleveland, Newark and San Francisco Field Offices, and the State Department’s Diplomatic Security Service.

The Belize Ministry of the Attorney General and the Belize National Police Department provided essential support for the investigation, coordinated through U.S. Embassy Belmopan. The investigation was coordinated with the Financial Crimes Enforcement Network, which assessed a $60 million civil monetary penalty against Harmon in a parallel action.

Trial Attorneys S. Riane Harper and C. Alden Pelker of the Criminal Division’s Computer Crime and Intellectual Property Section (CCIPS) and Assistant U.S. Attorney Christopher B. Brown of the U.S. Attorney’s Office for the District of Columbia prosecuted the case. Additional assistance was provided by Trial Attorneys Emily Siedell and Brian Nicholson of the Criminal Division’s Office of International Affairs, former CCIPS Trial Attorney W. Joss Nichols and Assistant U.S. Attorney Daniel Riedl of the Northern District of Ohio.

Attachment(s):
Download Harmon Statement of Offense

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FSGB: Extra/Marital Drama With Three Women, Two Pregnancies, and a Reduced 12-Day Suspension

November 29, 2021 By in Career Employees, Diplomatic Security, Foreign Service, Grievance, Investigations, Locally Employed Staff, Realities of the FS, Staffing the FS, State Department Tags: , , , , ,

 

Via ROP/FSGB 2020-036/September 21, 2021:

Held – The Department of State (“Department”) met its burden of demonstrating by a preponderance of the evidence that grievant committed the misconduct with which he was charged; that the discipline proposal was timely and without procedural defect; and that the proposed penalty was reasonable and proportionate to the misconduct.

Case Summary – Grievant was serving as a Diplomatic Security (“DS”) Special Agent (“SA”) at an overseas post with his then-wife. He was engaged in extramarital affairs with two women employed at the embassy (both of whom became pregnant), failed to report these relationships, failed to report out of country travel with one of the two women, and threatened and intimidated the other woman, prompting two investigations and his voluntary curtailment from post. Two years later, while participating in a meeting concerning the medical evacuation (“medevac”) of his new wife, grievant was accused of bullying and intimidating behavior toward personnel from the Bureau of Medical Services (“MED”), prompting a third investigation. On December 8, 2017, the Department proposed a 30-day suspension without pay, on five charges with 22 specifications. On January 23, 2019, the Department sustained the proposed 30-day suspension. Grievant filed a grievance, challenging the validity of the charges and the severity of the penalty. In the agency-level grievance decision, the Department sustained four charges with 13 specifications and reduced the suspension to 12 days.

Grievant alleged that much of the conduct reflected misunderstandings. He stated that his first marriage was failing when he arrived at post and he eventually married, and remains married to, one of the two women with whom he had affairs. He contended that the investigations into his alleged misconduct were marred by the bias and unprofessional conduct of post’s Regional Security Office as well as being unduly delayed, causing him personal and professional harm. He argued that the alleged misconduct at the MED meeting resulted from mistreatment of his family by MED and should be dismissed. Grievant also alleged that the discipline was untimely, coming almost six years after the first alleged act of misconduct until the Department’s agency-level decision, an unreasonable period of time that impacted his ability to grieve a flawed process and manage his career. Grievant also argued that the Department did not meet its burden of proving the charges, appropriately weigh mitigating factors, or offer timely or proportionate discipline. Grievant argued that the charges should be dropped, or the penalty substantially reduced.

The Department responded that the complexity of the case and number of incidents leading to successive investigations, justified the time necessary to propose discipline. The agency also rebutted allegations that the discipline process was procedurally flawed, asserting that it properly assessed the charges and grievant’s misconduct, considered all mitigating factors, and levied a penalty that was both fair and proportionate.

The Foreign Service Grievance Board (“Board”) found that the Department met its burden of proving all charges and specifications. The Board found no procedural errors and concluded that the charges were not stale and the delay not prejudicial. The Board upheld the Department’s penalty determination process, including an assessment of all mitigating factors and review of appropriate comparator cases. The grievance was denied in full.

According to the ROP, the grievant was advised on January 25, 2017, “This case is still ongoing pending additional information.”8 Notwithstanding this notice, in February 2017, grievant was promoted to FS-03, still as an ARSO, retroactive to November 2016.9″
The small prints:
1 Although grievant was once tenured as a DS SA and promoted to FS-03 in that capacity, he subsequently changed careers to FSO generalist at a reduced grade of FS-04 and he remains untenured in that capacity.
9 The Department reported that grievant’s name was “temporarily removed from the rank order list of employees recommended for promotion by his 2016 FS Selection Board pending a standard vetting check …. [D]ue to his then-pending discipline cases, [he] should have been continually reported [as ineligible for promotion] in the ensuing vetting checks …. [I]t appears that [grievant’s] name was not properly reported [in early 2017] … resulting in the erroneous reinstatement of his name to the promotion list.” See Agency Amended Response to Board Request for Information, at 3-4.
ROPs available to read via FSGB.
Note: Depending on the browser you’re using, the FSGB cases may not be available to read online; each record may need to be downloaded to be accessible. With Firefox browser, however, you may select “open with Firefox” if you want to read the case file, or save the file to your computer. Please use the search button here to locate specific FSGB records.

 

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Via Politico: Mark Lenzi Accuses @StateDept’s Leadership, Diplomatic Security of Retaliation #HavanaSyndrome

October 26, 2021 By in Americans Abroad, Blinken, Diplomatic Security, Functional Bureaus, Govt Documents, Investigations, MEDical, Realities of the FS, Security, State Department, U.S. Missions Tags: , , , , , , ,

 

Via Politico:

“One of those victims, current State Department official Mark Lenzi, sustained traumatic brain injuries while on assignment in Guangzhou, China, in late 2017, when he was working as a security engineering officer in the Bureau of Diplomatic Security.
[…]
Lenzi provided documents to POLITICO that detail his claims that State’s leadership has retaliated against him for speaking out publicly and for working with the members of Congress who have been investigating the matter.”
[…]
“On his first day as secretary of State, Secretary Blinken — who I know and have the utmost respect for — told the Department of State workforce that he ‘would not tolerate retaliation against whistleblowers,’” Lenzi said. “However, under his tenure, retaliation against me by the State Department’s Diplomatic Security Bureau for my whistleblowing activities with the U.S. Office of Special Counsel and with Congress has actually increased.”
[…]
Since then, Lenzi says, the State Department has retaliated against him in a number of ways. Documents viewed by POLITICO show that the department most recently yanked his administrative leave last month — forcing him to use sick leave or leave-without-pay to participate in medical studies and attend therapy sessions — and has denied him access to his classified computer system, even though he retains his top-secret security clearance.
[..]
The federal agency that handles whistleblower claims previously found “a substantial likelihood of wrongdoing” in the case of Lenzi and his claims of retaliation, according to an April 2020 Office of Special Counsel memo. That retaliation probe is ongoing.

Related posts:

@StateDept Updates Guidance For Recovery and Seizure of Passports 3 Years After OIG Review

October 26, 2021 By in Consular Work, Court Cases, Diplomatic Security, Functional Bureaus, Govt Documents, Oversight, Regulations, Security, State Department, U.S. Missions Tags: , , , , , , , , ,

 

 

In October 2018, State/OIG issued a Review of Allegations of Improper Passport Seizures at Embassy Sana’a, Yemen. The report indicates that the “Department did not follow relevant standards” and that ” officials did not comply fully with required procedures.”  OIG said that “Department also failed to comply with relevant standards when it ultimately revoked the passports in all but one of the cases OIG examined:

The Department does not have a central system to track passport confiscations or retentions. As a result, OIG could not determine the number of passport seizures that occurred at Embassy Sana’a from 2012 to 2014, and the total number remains uncertain. However, because one document provided by the Department contained a list of 31 names with dates on which the passports were taken, OIG focused on these cases.

There are two bases in Department regulations that govern its authority to take passports from U.S. citizens: “retention” and “confiscation.” Regardless of the authority by which the Department took the passports at issue here, the Department did not follow relevant standards. If the Department “retained” the passports, officials did not comply fully with required procedures. Furthermore, although the Department acknowledged that retentions are temporary measures, it held many of the passports in question for months (and in some cases, over a year), suggesting that the Department effectively confiscated these documents. Confiscation is permitted only after revocation or pursuant to an arrest. Revocation is the formal process by which the Department invalidates an individual’s passport. Neither an arrest nor revocation occurred before any of the passports were taken.

The Department also failed to comply with relevant standards when it ultimately revoked the passports in all but one of the cases OIG examined. Although the Department must notify the holders in writing of the reason for revocation and their right to appeal, OIG could not confirm that these notices were sent in every case. Even if notices were sent, the affected individuals remained uninformed about the status of their passports for lengthy periods (in one case, almost 2 years). OIG also identified instances where individuals contacted the Department with questions and received limited information or no response at all.

OIG also identified other concerns. First, the lack of a single legal authority within the Department led to significant difficulties in resolving key legal issues. Second, although the Department has updated its policies, issues remain unresolved, including conflicting interpretations of the Department’s authority to seize passports and uncertainty regarding eligibility for limited validity passports.

On October 20, 2021 — that’s right, three years later this month — the State Department/Diplomatic Security finally updated 12 FAM 220 of the Foreign Affairs Manual on the  recovery and seizure of U.S. passports. The notation on the change transmittal says “Updated as a result of the Office of the Inspector General report on Yemen Passport Seizures”.  The bold parts are highlighted in the FAM.

12 FAM 224.1-5  Recovery and Seizure of Passports
(CT:DS-368;   10-20-2021)
a. 22 CFR 51.7 (a) states that a passport at all times remains the property of the United States and must be returned to the U.S. Government upon demand.
b. CA/FPP or CA/PPT may request DS confiscate a passport that CA/PPT issued.  See 12 FAH-4 H-124.2.  The Department’s authorized representative (usually the case agent) is authorized to confiscate a revoked passport.  If the bearer refuses to do so, CA/PPT may invalidate the passport by notifying the bearer in writing of the invalidation (22 CFR 51.4).4
c.  Only CA/PPT/S/A may revoke U.S. passports.  DS agents may lawfully seize a U.S. passport pursuant to:
(1)  A search warrant;
(2)  An arrest warrant;
(3)  A lawful, warrantless seizure pursuant to a warrant exception when robable cause exists that the U.S. passport itself is evidence of a crime;
(4)  The express consent of the subject; or
(5)  A court order.
If CA intends to revoke the passport of a subject of a DS investigation, and DS has presented the case to DOJ for prosecution, the DS special agent must inform the prosecutor about the passport revocation.
d. All property acquired by DS will be collected and treated as though it were evidence to ensure proper handling until such determination is made.  Special agents may only acquire property in accordance with the law as it relates to searches and seizures, judicial forfeiture, and by voluntary delivery by the owner.  Occasionally, items may be seized or taken into custody for safekeeping (i.e., high value items, illegal drugs, firearms and weapons, etc.).  Special agents are not authorized to acquire property in any other manner other than by direction of CA to recover U.S. passports.
e. The procedural aspects of passport seizure by a DS special agent are contained in 12 FAH-4 H-120. That section contains important information as well as relevant timelines for notification to the Department of the seizure.
f.  For more information on passport revocations, see 8 FAM 804, Revocation.
g. DS may receive recovered U.S. passports from different sources, such as local law enforcement, local governments, airlines, and transportation centers.  To maintain the integrity of the U.S. passport as a secure travel document, CA/PPT makes every effort to account for the final disposition of all U.S. passports.  Therefore, DS should mail all found or recovered (not seized or confiscated) U.S. passports to CA/PPT at …

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Related item:

12 FAM 220 Investigations

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Diplomatic Security Gets Career DSS Special Agent Carlos F. Matus as New DS/PDAS and DSS Director

October 18, 2021 By in 71st Secretary of State, Appointments, Career Employees, Diplomatic Security, Diversity, Foreign Service, Functional Bureaus, Harassment, Leadership and Management, Realities of the FS, Staffing the FS, Top Ranks, Trends Tags: , , , , , ,

 

Last month, the State Department named career DSS agent Carlos F. Matus as PDAS for Diplomatic Security  (DS) and director of the Diplomatic Security Service (DSS). Below is his official bio:

Carlos F. Matus, a career Diplomatic Security Service (DSS) special agent and DSS senior official, was named principal deputy assistant secretary (PDAS) of the Bureau of Diplomatic Security and director of the Diplomatic Security Service (DSS), U.S. Department of State, on September 13, 2021. He previously served as acting DSS director.

As PDAS and DSS director, Matus is responsible for the operations of the most widely represented law enforcement and security organization in the world, with offices in 33 U.S. cities and 275 U.S. diplomatic posts overseas. DSS is the law enforcement and security arm of the U.S. Department of State and is responsible for protecting U.S. diplomacy and the integrity of U.S. travel documents.

Matus, a career member of the Senior Foreign Service, joined DSS as a special agent in 1987. Throughout his 34 years of service, Matus has served around the world at U.S. embassies in Honduras, Panama, Afghanistan, Austria, Haiti, Pakistan, Brazil; DSS field offices in Washington, D.C., and Miami; and at DSS headquarters.

Among his most recent career highlights, Matus served as director of protective intelligence investigations, 2016; senior regional security officer, U.S. Embassy Kabul, Afghanistan, 2016-17; deputy assistant secretary for the high threat programs directorate, 2017-19; and acting deputy assistant secretary for threat investigations and analysis until he assumed the position of acting DSS director in 2020.

Matus is an individual recipient of multiple State Department meritorious and superior honor awards. The U.S. Marine Corps recognized him twice as Regional Security Officer of the Year for D Company. Most recently, he received the Presidential Rank Award for Meritorious Executive.

Before joining DSS, Matus graduated from the University of Maryland and the Inter-American Defense College. He holds a Master’s degree in Security and Hemispheric Defense from the University of Salvador, Buenos Aires, Argentina. More information about Carlos Matus is available at: https://www.state.gov/biographies/carlos-f-matus/

In 2016, we published  an submitted letter from a Diplomatic Security employee about the lack of diversity in the top ranks of the bureau leadership (see Dear @JohnKerry: One of Your Foggy Bottom Folks Is Asking — Is This Diversity?).   At that time, there were two senior positions held by female officers and one by an African-American at the bureau.
Today, the leadership at Diplomatic Security remains overwhelmingly male and white, with but ONE senior female official occupying the Deputy Assistant Secretary and Assistant Director Training Directorate. There are currently , three African Americans in its leadership positions including the assistant secretary. Given that Diplomatic Security is one of the top five bureaus with the highest number of sexual harassment complaints, you’d think that the bureau would work harder in growing the ranks of senior female officials in its leadership ranks.
It looks like that’s not happening anytime soon. So will Diplomatic Security ever appoint a senior female agent anywhere besides the International Programs Directorate or the Training Directorate? (see Inbox: A belief that there’s no place for a female in Diplomatic Security agent ranks especially at HTPs?).  As DSS Director? Or as a Principal Deputy? No?
Well, now, we’d like to know why. Why are female officials hard to find in the bureau’s senior leadership ranks?

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Non-Update on the Swastika Investigation in Foggy Bottom

August 11, 2021 By in 71st Secretary of State, Blinken, Diplomatic Security, Huh? News, Investigations, Security, State Department, Trends Tags: , , , ,

 

Related: @StateDept Opens Swastika Incident Investigation in Foggy Bottom
An insider previously pointed out to us that there are very few visitors in Foggy Bottom these days and those few are always accompanied by someone from State. There are also cameras everywhere.  So unless a gremlin etched the Nazi symbol in the elevator and somehow escaped the cameras, we should know the culprit soon, shouldn’t we? It is true that the HST building is a large place; it has 1,400,000 square feet of floor space but the Pentagon has 6,500,000 square feet of office space and their door to door sweep almost found Yuri! So, c’mon!
By the way, Diplomatic Security just got a new assistant secretary. The Senate, just this week, confirmed Gentry O. Smith as Assistant Secretary of State for Diplomatic Security.  We’re sure his plate will get full pretty quickly as soon as he is sworn-in but this is not just a simple case of vandalism.  Did somebody just walked in and etched a hateful sign inside the building then walked out? No? Given the reaction of the State Department leadership and the WH on this incident, our assumption is that this investigation would be on top of Mr. Smith’s list as he assumes charge of the diplomatic security bureau.
Below via State Department Briefing | August 10, 2021:

QUESTION: Just in time. I have a – one housekeeping item that I want to start with and then go to Afghanistan. It’s now been a little bit over two weeks – 15 days, I think – since the swastika was discovered in the elevator. Secretary came out, obviously condemned it, said there would be an investigation into it. What’s the result of the investigation?

MR PRICE: Well, Matt, as you know, shortly after the swastika was discovered, the Secretary sent a note to the entire workforce. And he made clear in that note that hate has no home here. And nowhere is that tolerated, everywhere is it abhorrent, but here in this department, the – a department that stands for defending human rights, human dignity, the values of pluralism and inclusion around the world, that symbol is especially repugnant, and repugnant to the women and men of the department and to everyone who works here.

In the days after – and you heard directly from Secretary Blinken, I guess it was a week ago yesterday, on this – of course, President Biden has put forward a nominee for a special envoy to combat anti-Semitism, put forward a nominee for – to be an envoy for international religious freedom. And as Secretary Blinken noted in his message to the workforce, there is an investigation underway. I know this is a priority on the part of the investigators who are looking closely into this. I don’t have an update that I’m able to provide at the time, but if and when we do, I will certainly be able give you that.

QUESTION: Well, far be it from me to say that something is taking a long time or not taking a long time, because I – but an elevator is a pretty small place, right? This building has got controlled access. It would seem to me that two weeks is more than enough to come up with a – to come up with some kind of explanation. And while you’re correct in saying that this kind of hate has no place and that the Secretary said that, this building also stands for accountability and transparency. So —

MR PRICE: Absolutely. Absolutely. And —

QUESTION: So are you really telling me that two weeks after the fact, they can’t – they got no leads —

MR PRICE: The elevator is a small place. This building, as you know, is a large place.

QUESTION: I —

MR PRICE: So —

QUESTION: Yeah, but it’s not that big, Ned. Come on. It’s not that big. All right. If you don’t have anything, you don’t have anything.

MR PRICE: I don’t have anything to offer now, but we —

QUESTION: All right, let’s go on —

MR PRICE: — of course, do believe in the value of transparency. That’s why we’re out here every day.

QUESTION: Yes.

MR PRICE: And, of course, as soon as we have an update, we’ll be able to share that.

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Snapshot: Special Program for Embassy Augmentation and Response (SPEAR)

May 17, 2021 By in Diplomatic Security, Foreign Service, Functional Bureaus, Hotspots, Security, Snapshots, State Department, Terrorism, U.S. Missions Tags: , , , , , ,
13 Going on 14 — GFM: https://gofund.me/32671a27
Via State/OIG:

The Bureau of Diplomatic Security (DS) established the Special Program for Embassy Augmentation and Response (SPEAR) in 2014 to address post-Benghazi Accountability Review Board-identified weaknesses in host nation capacity to protect U.S. personnel and facilities at high-threat posts. SPEAR falls under the Specialized Programs Division (SPD) of the DS Training Directorate, Office of Antiterrorism Assistance (DS/T/ATA).

SPEAR is designed to enhance the security of high-threat, high-risk posts by providing training and loaning equipment to host nation law enforcement security units assigned to respond to emergencies at U.S. diplomatic facilities.

The annual SPEAR budget is approximately $33 million. The SPEAR Office has 20 domestic personnel (5 U.S. direct-hire staff and 15 third-party contractors) in Dunn Loring, VA, that support broader SPEAR operations as well as 13 third-party contractors who serve as SPEAR mentors overseas. Regional Security Officers (RSOs) at post supervise the overseas contract mentors.

SPEAR is funded through the Worldwide Security Programs-Overseas Contingency Operations account. There are 29 Department employees and contractors supporting SPEAR; 20 work solely on SPEAR while the remaining 9 also handle other SPD-supported programs.

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Burn Bag: Foreign Affairs Security Training Center (FASTC), a Logistical Nightmare For Students

October 5, 2020 By in Coronavirus, Diplomatic Security, Functional Bureaus, MEDical, State Department, Training Tags: , , , , , ,
Grumpy Agent writes:

“The Diplomatic Security Service’s brand new Foreign Affairs Security Training Center (FASTC) on Fort Pickett, near Blackstone, Virginia is a disaster for those attending the academy. Incoming agents and those who have to attend advanced training should buckle up for a very rough ride due to a lack of planning, poor accommodations, and general haywire.

Most incoming students are housed at the Holiday Inn Express in Farmville, Virginia. Due to Covid-19, everyone is forced to remain at this little gem, conveniently located in the middle of an open field, for exactly two weeks. State calls it a “quarantine,” but no restrictions are enforced. So, the two-week lockdown is really just a waste of time and money for all parties involved. Since there is no way to keep anyone in their rooms, there is still the possibility that students could arrive at FASTC infected with Covid-19, begging the question: why bother with a fake isolation period?

Additionally, adults who are cooped up in a hotel for weeks on end with nothing to do seem to revert back to their college years of binge drinking and general debauchery. Class advisors at FASTC have openly complained that they have really gotten to know police officials in the rural one-cop town of Farmville.

Those who choose not to engage in such antics remain in their rooms with little to do but scan the 9 channels on the hotel-provided basic cable system. For an organization that purports to have a renewed focus on mental health and morale, this feels like a crisis in the making, particularly for those RSOs who are arriving from overseas posts and do not have personal transportation readily available. Walking anywhere from the hotel is not ideal unless you’re comfortable going for a stroll on the shoulder of a major highway.

As for food, take-out is really the only option, unless you’re comfortable visiting one of a few bar/restaurants that are no better than Applebees. The hotel provides no meal accommodations. If you’ll be there for a few months, expect to gain a little more than the “quarantine 15.” Also, if you have dietary restrictions, this place is not for you, unless fried chicken fingers are part of your preferred menu items.

Once your two-weeks of faux-quarantine are over, you’ll commute 45 – 60 minutes (one way) to FASTC. Students are required to shuttle themselves in government-issued vans each morning and evening. No more than five to a van (for Covid-19 safety reasons). However, many have reported cramming up to 10 in a van simply for convenience and split training locations.

The Foreign Affairs Security Training Center is a state of the art facility. The technology, instruction, resources, and training quality are unmatched by any agency and the Department should be commended for that. However, the logistical nightmare for the students must be addressed. This is unacceptable for those new to State but is probably tolerated because they don’t know any better. However, for those seasoned employees, this is categorically unsatisfactory. State and more specifically DS needs to get its act together soon and focus more on the employee rather than touting the perks of a brand new facility that may be more trouble than it’s worth.

DS already has retention and quality of life problems. Do we want to make it worse?”

The Bureau of Diplomatic Security is one of the 13 bureaus and offices under the direct oversight and supervision of the Under Secretary for Management Brian Bulatao. 
The Senate-confirmed Assistant Secretary for Diplomatic Security, Michael Evanoff resigned from his post in July 2020. It doesn’t look like a nominee has been announced to succeed Evanoff. According to state.gov, Todd J. Brown, a special agent and a career member of the Senior Foreign Service with the rank of Minister Counselor was appointed to serve as Acting DS Assistant Secretary on August 1, 2020.  
 

FASTC Map

Map of the high-speed driving track at the Foreign Affairs Security Training Center, Blackstone, Va. (Department of State Photo)