Tag Archives: ARB Benghazi

Snapshot: Special Program for Embassy Augmentation and Response (SPEAR)

May 17, 2021 By in Diplomatic Security, Foreign Service, Functional Bureaus, Hotspots, Security, Snapshots, State Department, Terrorism, U.S. Missions Tags: , , , , , ,
13 Going on 14 — GFM: https://gofund.me/32671a27
Via State/OIG:

The Bureau of Diplomatic Security (DS) established the Special Program for Embassy Augmentation and Response (SPEAR) in 2014 to address post-Benghazi Accountability Review Board-identified weaknesses in host nation capacity to protect U.S. personnel and facilities at high-threat posts. SPEAR falls under the Specialized Programs Division (SPD) of the DS Training Directorate, Office of Antiterrorism Assistance (DS/T/ATA).

SPEAR is designed to enhance the security of high-threat, high-risk posts by providing training and loaning equipment to host nation law enforcement security units assigned to respond to emergencies at U.S. diplomatic facilities.

The annual SPEAR budget is approximately $33 million. The SPEAR Office has 20 domestic personnel (5 U.S. direct-hire staff and 15 third-party contractors) in Dunn Loring, VA, that support broader SPEAR operations as well as 13 third-party contractors who serve as SPEAR mentors overseas. Regional Security Officers (RSOs) at post supervise the overseas contract mentors.

SPEAR is funded through the Worldwide Security Programs-Overseas Contingency Operations account. There are 29 Department employees and contractors supporting SPEAR; 20 work solely on SPEAR while the remaining 9 also handle other SPD-supported programs.

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State/OIG’s Upcoming Reports to Include Evaluation of Sexual Harassment, Hiring Authority

April 30, 2018 By in Courage, Functional Bureaus, Govt Documents, Org Life, Oversight, Realities of the FS, State Department Tags: , , , , ,

Posted: 12:50 am  ET

 

The State Department’s Inspector General started work on some subjects of note since last February. For those with stories to share about sexual harassment (and sexual assault), please contact the OIG Hotline or call 1-800-409-9926 and  1-202-647-3320.

We recognize that sexual harassment and sexual assaults are difficult to talk about, and all who we have been in contact with were deeply concerned of career repercussions. But we can all agree that these offenders – particularly high ranking individuals who abused their positions — will not stop until people stand up to them.

We’ve blogged about harassment and assaults for a while now.  Back in August 2016 , State/OIG told us that while they take allegations of sexual harassment “very seriously” as a general matter, “OIG refers allegations of sexual harassment, equal employment opportunity, and/or potential hostile work environment to the Department’s Office of Civil Rights (S/OCR), consistent with the FAM.”

State/OIG also informed us then that “if such matters appear systemic, then OIG may investigate. Indeed, in its report “Review of Selected Internal Investigations Conducted by the Bureau of Diplomatic Security” (ESP-15-01) OIG examined the case of a Diplomatic Security manager with a long history of sexual harassment and misconduct allegations dating back 10 years.”

Also this: “Department employees who believe they have been subjected to whistleblower retaliation may contact OIG or the Office of Special Counsel (OSC). OIG can help the individual in understanding their rights and may investigate the retaliation, as well as alert the Department to any illegal reprisal.”

It took awhile but it looks like the IG is looking into this now. We hope that people will find the courage to speak up and consider sharing their stories. We don’t know when this moment will come again.

    • Evaluation of the Department’s Treatment of Reports of Sexual Harassment
    • Evaluation of the Department of State’s Use of Schedule B Hiring Authority
    • Inspection of the Bureau of Administration, Office of Critical Environment Contracting Analytics, Risk Analysis and Management
    • Inspection of the Status of Benghazi Accountability Review Board Recommendations

In April 2018, the following work were also started:

  • Audit of the Information Security Program for Sensitive Compartmented Information Systems at the Department of State
  • Inspection of the Bureau of Consular Affairs, Office of Fraud Prevention Programs

Note that this is not an exhaustive list of all the OIG work started.

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#Benghazi News: What did the ARB and Benghazi Committee know about Alamir, Eclipse and Xpand?

October 12, 2016 By in Congress, Contractors, Controversies, Diplomatic Attacks, Diplomatic Security, Functional Bureaus, Hearings, Hillary Clinton, Media, Politics, Realities of the FS, Security, U.S. Missions Tags: , , , , , , , ,

Posted: 3:53 am ET
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Via HuffPo:

A middleman the State Department relied on to hire unarmed guards at the U.S. facility in Benghazi, Libya, previously worked with a company that’s now at the center of a massive international bribery scandal.

The FBI and law enforcement agencies in at least four other countries are investigating allegations ― first published by The Huffington Post and Fairfax Media ― that a Monaco-based company called Unaoil bribed public officials to secure contracts for major corporations in corruption-prone regions. In Libya, Unaoil partnered with a Tripoli-based businessman named Muhannad Alamir. A former Unaoil employee who served as a confidential source for the FBI told investigators that Unaoil and Alamir bribed Libyan officials. Unaoil and Alamir deny they bribed anyone.

Alamir started working with the State Department in early 2012, less than three years after cutting ties with Unaoil. He provided Blue Mountain Group, the small British security firm that won the Benghazi guard contract, with the license it needed to legally operate in Libya.
[…]

Despite the damning internal review and seven prior congressional probes, House Republicans voted overwhelmingly in 2014 to establish a special committee to further investigate the 2012 attack. Two years and $7 million later, the committee released an 800-page report. Democrats dismissed it as a partisan attack on Clinton, by then their expected presidential nominee.

The report echoed earlier criticisms of security lapses, but revealed little substantive information about the contracting process that contributed to the problem. The Benghazi committee report mentioned Blue Mountain 12 times. Alamir, Eclipse and Xpand weren’t mentioned once.

 

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Ops Center Watch Logs From Night of Benghazi – Say, Who Was Running @StateDept?

November 10, 2015 By in Ambassadors, Americans Abroad, Controversies, Diplomatic Security, Foreign Service, FSOs, Govt Documents, Hillary Clinton, NEA|Near East Asia, Realities of the FS, Secretary of State, Security, State Department, U.S. Missions Tags: , , , , , , , 1 Comment

Posted: 12:24 am EDT
Updated: 10:14 pm EDT
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[N]ewly disclosed documents, obtained by Veterans for a Strong America through a Freedom of Information Act lawsuit, include 24 pages of watch logs from the State Department operations center recording the logistics of the back-and-forth over the deadly assault in a sterile, just-the-facts manner.

[…]

The watch logs do not show all the calls Clinton made that night, but a State spokesman said many calls are not routed through the operations center. The logs also do not appear to reflect an interagency secure video teleconference in which Clinton took part that evening.

A spokesman for the House Benghazi Committee said the panel had access to other State Department chronologies and call records but received copies of the watch logs only on Friday. That’s a week after they were released to the veterans group on Oct. 30.

Read the logs: Ops Center Watch Logs, Sept 11- 12, 2012.

While the logs may not present the complete chronology of events (if somebody made calls or sent emails outside the Watch, it would not be listed in the logs), this is probably the closest tick tock we could see on what occurred at HQ  on the night Ambassador Stevens and three other Americans were killed in Benghazi.

— At 5:38 p.m. , Sept 11, the Watch patched HRC with CIA Petraeus

— At 7:05 p.m., Sept 11, at the request of HRC, the Watched convened a conference call participated  by D/S Nides, U/S Kennedy (M), U/S Sherman (P), Counselor Mills, S/P Sullivan, PA Nuland, ExecSec Mull, NEA A/S Jones, Tripoli DCM Hicks with HRC

— At 10:27 p.m., Sept 11, the Watch patched President Obama with HRC

— Ambassador Stevens’ death appears to have been reported to the Ops Center at 2:55 a.m. on September 12.

— Secretary Clinton made no visit to the Watch, but called the Watch at 7:15 a.m. with a request, on September 12.

— At 7:31 a.m. the Watch patched WH Chief of Staff Jack Lew to HRC

— At 9:20 a.m., the Watch patched HRC to Embassy Tripoli

— D/S Burns was in Baghdad

— Counselor Mills makes multiple appearances on these logs, more than the Secretary.

— Ambassador T. Pickering makes a couple of appearances.

— Senators Kerry and Graham appears on the logs

— — Except for the mass alert from the Watch directed at multiple bureaus of the State Department, the Assistant Secretary for Diplomatic Security Eric Boswell does not appear to make any appearance in these logs. Which is odd considering that DS A/S is apparently the main guy on State Department security. One exception is at 0320 (further to item 0255, concerning the death of Amb. Stevens, the Watch called multiple individuals in State’s top ranks, as well as OBO, FLO, MED, DGHR, PA. The name of the individual called on behalf of Diplomatic Security was REDACTED. There is a separate call where the Watch patched U/S Kennedy and Diplomatic Security’s Charlene Lamb, the deputy assistant secretary in charge of international programs.

We do not think that there was a conspiracy not to save our people under attack in Benghazi but we are curious on who was running the State Department as events unfolded in Benghazi.  And why was the main official handling diplomatic security not shown in these logs? Is that indicative of just how little influence diplomatic security professionals actually have in a crisis like this? No? What’s that? Yes, I do know that DS has its own command center.

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Mills’ Transcript Features FSO Ray Maxwell: 35 Years Working For Uncle Sam, and Yo! What the Frak?

October 22, 2015 By in Congress, Controversies, Courage, Diplomatic Attacks, Foreign Service, FSOs, Hall of Shame, Huh? News, Secretary of State, State Department Tags: , , , , , , , , 1 Comment

Posted: 3:52 am EDT
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On October 21, the Benghazi Democrats released the full transcript of Cheryl Mills interview with the Select Benghazi Committee (click here to read the full transcript).

One of the questions asked Ms. Mills, Secretary Clinton’s former chief of staff was the allegation made by former NEA Deputy Assistant Secretary Raymond Maxwell about a document scrub (see Former State Dept DAS Raymond Maxwell Alleges Benghazi Document Scrub Pre-ARB Investigation).

Ms. Mills says this (per transcript):

“I might have had an encounter with him when he was being hired. I don’t know. Meaning, ensuring that he was in a place where he could be appointed or hired. I don’t know. But I don’t — I never had an encounter with Ray Maxwell around Benghazi.”

In a follow-up question, clipped below, Ms. Mills basically gave a word salad about the “hiring” of Mr. Maxwell. What the frak? We should note that Mr. Maxwell, at the time he was thrown under the Benghazi bus, had served 21 years in the career Foreign Service in addition to 6 years enlistment in the Navy Nuclear Power program. He earned a Naval Reserved commission then completed two division officer tours in the guided missile destroyer, the USS Luce (DDG-38); a total of about 14 years in the Navy, before joining the Foreign Service.

Screen Shot 2015-10-21

We have extracted the parts where Ms. Mills talked about Mr. Maxwell with the Committee.  Available to read here: Mills Transcript-RayMaxwell Extract.

Last year, we wrote The Cautionary Tale of Raymond Maxwell: When the Bureaucracy Bites, Who Gets The Blame?).

Sometime after that, we were able to read for the first time, the original grievance Ray Maxwell wrote on April 3, 2013 (pdf) addressed to State Department HR official Linda Taglialatela. Maxwell writes:

On December 18, 2012, the ARB Report was released. When I returned to my office after lunch, A/S Beth Jones’ OMS told me to meet with her at 2 pm. At 2:20 A/ S Jones returned to the office and summoned me. She invited me in and closed the door. She told me the ARB report had been released and that it was not complimentary to the Department, to NEA, or to me. She said PDAS Elizabeth Dibble was reading the classified report in the SCIF, and that she had not yet seen it. Then she said she had been instructed by Cheryl Mills to relieve me of the DAS position, that I was fired, and that I should have all my personal belongings out of the office be close of business that same day. She said PDAS Dibble would identify a place where I could keep my belongings, and that I would remain in the Bureau as a senior adviser. She said the Bureau was going to take care of me and that I didn’t need to “lawyer up.”

Just like that.

Former FSO Peter Van Buren wrote about this previously here:

Maxwell impresses as a State Department archetype, dedicated to the insular institution, apolitical to the point of frustration to an outsider, but shocked when he found his loyalty was not returned.

He has revealed what he knows only two years after the fact. People will say he is out for revenge. But I don’t think that’s the case. As a State Department whistleblower who experienced how the Department treats such people, I know it’s not a position anyone wants to be in.
[…]
You don’t just wake up one morning and decide to turn your own life, and that of your family, upside down, risking financial ruin, public shaming, and possibly jail time. It is a process, not an event.

According to NEA officials interviewed by the House Oversight Committee, decisions about security  policy and security resources rested firmly within the Bureau of Diplomatic Security, not  NEA.   PDAS Elizabeth Dibble, told the Committee that Maxwell had no responsibility for security measures and should not have been held accountable by the ARB.  Lee Lohman, the Executive Director for NEA told the Committee, “When I looked at Ray Maxwell’s situation, I had a much better sense of how much he was or was not involved in this, and it struck me as being unfair.“
Below is an excerpt from the House Oversight Committee majority report:
Therefore, the ARB’s finding that Maxwell lacked “leadership and engagement on staffing and security issues in Benghazi” is puzzling. Maxwell himself denied having any formal role in determining the appropriate security posture or evaluating security requests by the U.S. mission in Libya.


The ARB’s approach to assigning accountability within NEA for the failures that led to the Benghazi tragedy is puzzling. The ARB identified “systemic failures and leadership and management deficiencies at senior levels” within NEA. It seems obvious that a “systemic failure” within a large organization such as NEA could only result from a widespread failure throughout the system, either to recognize the challenges posed by the inadequate security  posture of the Benghazi mission in a deteriorating environment, or else to take the appropriate steps to rectify it in order to safeguard American lives. Yet within the entire NEA Bureau, the ARB singled out only Raymond Maxwell, for conduct his own supervisor contended was not “material” to what happened in Benghazi. 

If Ambassador Jones and others are right, and the intelligence Maxwell stopped reading was not material because NEA was essentially powerless to affect the actions of DS in Benghazi, it is unclear why the ARB blamed Maxwell for not reading it. If the intelligence did provide some kind of insight which could have prevented the failures of Benghazi, it is further unclear why Maxwell was held accountable for not reading it, but Ambassador Jones and others within  NEA were not held accountable for having read it and taken no effective steps to remedy the shortcomings of the Benghazi compound’s security posture before it led to a loss of life?

So about 31 35 years working for Uncle Sam, and one day, one is conveniently fired. And expected to lay back and play dead until the Benghazi train passes by.

Playing dead is needed for the proper functioning of the Service?

Excuse me, I need to throw up. Again.

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OIG Compliance Review: Minimum Security Standards For Overseas Facilities Remain a Hard Nut to Crack

August 23, 2015 By in Congress, Defense Department, Diplomatic Attacks, Diplomatic Security, Foreign Service, FSOs, Functional Bureaus, Govt Documents, Interagency Cooperation, Realities of the FS, Regulations, Security, State Department, U.S. Missions Tags: , , , , , , , , , , ,

Posted: 2:00 pm EDT
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Three ARB-related IG reports were issued this past week, two of them, the Audit of the DOS Implementation of the Vital Presence Validation Process and the Review of the Implementation of the Benghazi Accountability Review Board Recommendation have been designated as Classified. The third one, the Compliance Followup Review of the 2013 Special Review of the Accountability Review Board Process is available in full online.

On September 25, 2013, State/OIG released its Special Review of the Accountability Review Board (ARB) Process. That report contains 20 formal and 8 informal recommendations. For the status of the 20 formal recommendations, see Appendix B of the report.  For the status of the informal recommendations, see Appendix C of the report. The OIG notes that the action taken by State at some Benghazi ARB recommendations “did not appear to align with the intent of the recommendations and some Benghazi ARB recommendations did not appear to address the underlying security issues adequately.”

Thirteen of the formal recommendations and five of the informal recommendations are related to the ARB process. The remaining seven formal and three informal recommendations mirror or are closely related to the Benghazi ARB recommendations. As stated in the ARB process review report, the ARB process team’s rationale for issuing these recommendations was that the action taken to date on some of the Benghazi ARB recommendations did not appear to align with the intent of the recommendations and some Benghazi ARB recommendations did not appear to address the underlying security issues adequately. The classified annex to the report provides an assessment of the Department’s implementation of the recommendations of the Benghazi ARB as of the date of the review. Its focus is on the implementation of the 64 tasks S/ES issued in response to the Benghazi ARB recommendations. It contains no OIG recommendations.

In the Compliance Followup Review or CFR dated August 2015, State/OIG reissued one recommendation from the 2013 inspection report, that the Under Secretary of State for Management, in coordination with the Bureau of Diplomatic Security and the Bureau of Overseas Buildings Operations, develop minimum security standards that must be met prior to occupying facilities located in designated high-risk, high-threat locations and include these minimum standards for occupancy in the Foreign Affairs Handbook as appropriate. The report also include a little nugget about DOD cooperation with investigative reports of security-related incidents that involve State Department personnel, specifically mentioning “the incident in Zabul Province, Afghanistan.” That’s the incident where FSO Anne Smedinghoff and four others were killed in Zabul, Afghanistan in April 2013.

Outstanding Recommendation on Minimum Security Standards 

Recommendation 17 of the ARB process review report recommended that the Department develop minimum security standards that must be met prior to occupying facilities in HRHT locations. The Department rejected this recommendation, stating that existing Overseas Security Policy Board standards apply to all posts and that separate security standards for HRHT posts would not provide better or more secure operating environments. Furthermore, recognizing that Overseas Security Policy Board standards cannot be met at all locations, the Department has a high threshold for exceptions to these standards and the waiver and exceptions process requires “tailored mitigation strategies in order to achieve the intent of the standards.”5

Although OIG acknowledges the Department’s assertion of a “high threshold for exceptions,” the Department’s response does not meet the recommendation’s requirement for standards that must be met prior to occupancy. As was noted in the ARB process review report, “…occupying temporary facilities that require waivers and exceptions to security standards is dangerous, especially considering that the Department occupies these facilities long before permanent security improvements are completed.”6 As the Department has not identified minimum security standards that must be met prior to occupancy, Recommendation 17 is being reissued.

Recommendation CFR 1: The Office of the Under Secretary of State for Management, in coordination with the Bureau of Diplomatic Security and the Bureau of Overseas Buildings Operations, should develop minimum security standards that must be met prior to occupying facilities located in Department of State-designated high-risk, high-threat environments and include new minimum security standards of occupancy in the Foreign Affairs Handbook as appropriate. (Action: M, in coordination with DS and OBO)

So, basically back to where it was before Benghazi, when there were no minimum security standards prior to occupying temporary facilities.

How high is this “high threshold of exceptions” that’s being asserted?

Risk management process now called “tailored mitigation strategies” — resulting in waivers of Inman standards?

So waivers will continue to be executed?

And temporary facilities will continue to be occupied?

Key Findings:

  • The Department of State has complied with all the formal and informal recommendations of the 2013 Special Review of the Accountability Review Board Process, except one, which has been reissued in this report.
  • The Department of State has implemented regulatory and procedural changes to delineate clearly who is responsible for implementation, and oversight of implementation, of Accountability Review Board recommendations. The Under Secretary for Management, in coordination with the Under Secretary for Political Affairs, is responsible for implementation of Accountability Review Board recommendations. The Deputy Secretary for Management and Resources is responsible for overseeing the Department’s progress in Accountability Review Board implementation, which places accountability for implementation at an appropriately high level in the Department of State.
  • The Office of Management Policy, Rightsizing, and Innovation manages the Accountability Review Board function. The Accountability Review Board process review report was critical of the Office of Management Policy, Rightsizing, and Innovation’s recordkeeping and files of past Accountability Review Boards. The Office of Management Policy, Rightsizing, and Innovation has since revised its Accountability Review Board recordkeeping guidelines. These revised guidelines have yet to be tested, as no Accountability Review Board has met since the Benghazi Accountability Review Board, which issued its report in December 2012.

More details excerpted from the IG report

Flow of Information

Formal Recommendations 1, 2, 3, and 9—as well as Informal Recommendations 1 and 3—concern the flow of information within the Department and from the Department to Congress. The recommendations introduce additional reporting requirements for all incidents that might meet the criteria to convene an ARB, as well as a more clearly defined list of congressional recipients for the Secretary’s Report to Congress. Recommendation 9 tasks S/ES with creating a baseline list of congressional recipients for the Secretary’s report to Congress. That list is now more clearly specified and included in regulations governing the ARB process.

Informal Recommendation 3 requires broader circulation of ARB reports as well as the Secretary’s report to Congress. The M/PRI position is that these reports belong to the Secretary and their dissemination should be at the Secretary’s discretion. OIG continues to believe that the Secretary should exercise discretion and circulate ARB reports and subsequent reports to Congress more widely within the Department.

ARB Recordkeeping

In December 2014, M/PRI revised its ARB recordkeeping guidelines regarding those records to be retained and safeguarded. However, because no ARB has convened since Benghazi, these revised guidelines remain untested. Although these guidelines require recording and transcribing telephone interviews, they do not mandate verbatim transcripts of all interviews, including in-person meetings, as the Inspector General suggested in his May 29, 2014, memorandum to the D/MR.

Action Memo for the Secretary

In compliance with Recommendation 1, the OIG CFR team found that M/PRI now drafts an action memo for the Secretary after every Permanent Coordinating Committee (PCC) meeting detailing the PCC decision, even if the PCC does not recommend convening an ARB.

In response to Recommendation 4, the Under Secretary for Management amended 12 FAM 030 to require vetting and reporting security-related incidents, which do not result in convening a PCC. Those cases will be communicated to the Secretary.

Alternative Review

To meet the intent of Recommendation 2, M/PRI has included in its instructions to the PCC chair a reminder to PCC members that if the PCC votes not to convene an ARB, the PCC should decide whether to recommend that the Secretary request an alternative review.

Terminology

Recommendation 5 recommends establishing written criteria to define the key terms “serious injury,” “significant destruction of property,” and “at or related to a U.S. mission abroad.” The 2013 OIG inspection team found that ambiguity in the terminology had led to their inconsistent application as criteria in decisions to convene ARBs.

ARB Implementation

Recommendations 10 and 11 recommend institutionalizing the oversight of the implementation of ARB recommendations as a responsibility of D/MR. M/PRI’s revision of 12 FAM 030 and addition of 12 Foreign Affairs Handbook (FAH)-12 now clearly delineate who is responsible for managing the ARB process and who is responsible for oversight of implementation of ARB recommendations. The Deputy Secretary’s responsibility for overseeing implementation of ARB recommendations places accountability for implementation at an appropriately high level in the Department.

Personnel Performance 

Recommendation 19 tasks M/PRI, in coordination with the Bureau of Human Resources and the Office of the Legal Adviser, to prepare clear guidelines for ARBs on recommendations dealing with issues of poor personnel performance. M/PRI has revised its standing guidance to ARB members, referring them to the Department’s new leadership principles in 3 FAM 1214, 4138, and 4532 when documenting instances of unsatisfactory performance or poor leadership. The Department further codified this ARB authority by expanding the list of grounds for taking disciplinary or separation action against an employee, including “conduct by a senior official that demonstrates unsatisfactory leadership in relation to a security incident under review by an [ARB] convened pursuant to 22 U.S.C. 4831.” In addition, in January 2013 the Department began seeking an amendment to the ARB statute (22 U.S.C. 4834(c)) to provide explicitly that unsatisfactory leadership may be a basis for disciplinary action and that the ARB would have the appropriate authority to recommend such action. No change to the statute has yet been made.

Strengthening Security at High-Risk, High-Threat Posts

New courses:  Guided by a panel of senior DS special agents and outside organizations, DS updated its former High Threat Tactical Course to create a suite of mandatory courses for DS agents assigned to HRHT locations, drawing on lessons learned from the attacks in Benghazi, Libya, and Herat, Afghanistan. The cornerstone of these courses is the “High Threat Operations Course” (HT-310), which, as of October 1, 2013, was made mandatory for all DS agents at grades FS 04 through 06 who are assigned to HRHT locations. Similar, but shorter duration courses (HT-310E and HT-315) are required for senior and mid-level DS agents assigned to such locations.

Marine Detachments

The Department, in coordination with DOD, has added 20 new MSG detachments, and Marine Corps Headquarters has created the Marine Security Augmentation Unit. Although some HRHT posts still lack MSG detachments, for example, because of the lack of host government approval, the Department has made progress in deploying new detachments and increasing the size of existing detachments.[…] The June 2013 revision of the memorandum of agreement also includes a revision of the MSG mission. In the previous version, the MSG’s primary mission was to prevent the compromise of classified information. Their secondary mission was the protection of personnel and facilities. In the revised memorandum of agreement, the mission of the MSG is to protect mission personnel and prevent the compromise of national security information.

DS Agents Embed With DOD Forces

An additional area of security improvement beyond reliance on the host government has been the Department’s closer relationship with DOD, whose personnel have been involved in every Department contingency operation at an HRHT post since the Benghazi attack. Furthermore, DS agents are now embedded in DOD expeditionary forces.

About That Zabul Incident

Recommendation 6 recommends that the Department seek greater assurances from the Department of Defense (DOD) in providing investigative reports of security-related incidents that involve Department personnel. The Department makes its requests via Executive Secretary memorandum to the equivalent DOD addressee, in accordance with 5 FAH-1 H-120. The DOD counterpart has been responsive in delivering requested materials in all the recent instances, including the incident in Zabul Province, Afghanistan. M/PRI will continue to monitor DOD responses to requests for reports in the future.

That means, the State Department now has the Army investigation report into the death of FSO Anne Smedinghoff and four others in Zabul, Afghanistan in April 2013.  See Zabul Attack: Spox Says State Dept Did Its Own Review, It’s Classified, and There’s Now a Checklist! ; Zabul Attack: Walking But Not Lost, More Details But Not Official; Plus Update on Kelly Hunt; Army Report: Poor planning led to FSO Anne Smedinghoff and troops’ death in Afghanistan.

The Chicago Tribune FOIA’ed that Army report but did not make the document public. The State Department internal report of the incident as far as we are aware, remains Classified. Then State Department spox, Jennifer Psaki referred to “multiple investigations” in April 2014;  none publicly released.

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Related item:

ISP-C-15-33 | Compliance Followup Review of the Special Review of the Accountability Review Board Process | August 2015

 

Not Going Benghazimazi But Let’s Revisit the ARB’s “Full & Unfettered Access” to State Dept Documents

March 7, 2015 By in Ambassadors, Congress, Govt Documents, Hillary Clinton, Huh? News, Leadership and Management, Legacy, Secretary of State, Spectacular, State Department Tags: , , , , , , , 2 Comments

Posted: 7:42 pm EST
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Last fall, Ray Maxwell alleged that there was a Foggy Bottom operation to “separate” damaging State Department documents before they were turned over to the Accountability Review Board investigating security lapses surrounding the Sept. 11, 2012, terrorist attacks on the U.S. mission in Benghazi, Libya. (see Former State Dept DAS Raymond Maxwell Alleges Benghazi Document Scrub Pre-ARB Investigation).

At that time, the State Department deputy spox, Marie Harf  called the allegations “a crazy conspiracy theory about people squirreling away things in some basement office and keeping them secret.” She also said this:

QUESTION: Did people involved in preparing the documents for the ARB separate documents into stuff that was just whatever and then things that they thought were – made people on the seventh floor, including the Secretary, look bad?

MS. HARF: Not to my knowledge, Matt, at all. The ARB had full and unfettered access and direct access to State Department employees and documents. The ARB’s co-chairs, Ambassador Pickering and Admiral Mullen, have both repeated several times that they had unfettered access to all the information they needed. So the ARB had complete authority to reach out independently and directly to people. Employees had complete authority to reach out directly to the ARB. And they’ve said themselves they had unfettered access, so I have no idea what prompted this somewhat interesting accounting of what someone thinks they may have seen or is now saying they saw.

But the ARB has been clear, the ARB’s co-chairs have been clear that they had unfettered access, and I am saying that they did have full and direct access to State Department employees and documents.

Read more: State Dept on Former DAS Raymond Maxwell’s Allegations: Crazy. Conspiracy Theory. What Else?

The State Department spokesman Alec Gerlach also denied the allegations (see State Department Denies Raymond Maxwell’s Document Scrub Allegations. Peeeeriod!!!!).

“That allegation is totally without merit. It doesn’t remotely reflect the way the ARB actually obtained information,” he said in an email. He explained that an “all-points bulletin”-type request went out department-wide instructing “full and prompt cooperation” for anyone contacted by the ARB, and urging anyone with “relevant information” to contact the board. 

“So individuals with information were reaching out proactively to the Board. And, the ARB was also directly engaged with individuals and the Department’s bureaus and offices to request information and pull on whichever threads it chose to. The range of sources that the ARB’s investigation drew on would have made it impossible for anyone outside of the ARB to control its access to information,” Gerlach said. He further noted that the leaders of the ARB have claimed they had unfettered access to information and people. 

In both cases, these government officials emphasized one thing: that the Pickering-Mullen Accountability Review Board “had full and unfettered access and direct access to State Department employees and documents.”

In the September 2013 congressional hearing, the Benghazi ARB co-chair also told Congress, “We had unfettered access to State Department personnel and documents. There were no limitations.” 

Shouldn’t we now consider the absent clintonemail.com server as one such limitation?

In light of reports that Secretary Clinton exclusively used a personal email account to conduct government business as secretary of state, and that her private emails were never reportedly actual residents of Foggy Bottom, would these current and former government officials now revisit their statements on the ARB’s “unfettered” access to documents?

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Senate Intel Committee Benghazi Report — “Additional Views” Make Special Mentions

January 24, 2014 By in Congress, Controversies, Diplomatic Security, FSOs, Govt Documents, Politics, Secretary of State, State Department, U.S. Missions Tags: , , , , , , ,

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— Domani Spero

On January 15, the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence (SSCI) released its 85-page report on Benghazi.  As we noted previously, the report itself is 42 pages long with its findings and recommendations. As well, there are “Additional Views” attached to the report:  a 5-page one from the Democrats on the SSIC (Senators Feinstein, Rockefeller IV, Wyden, Mikulski, Udall, Warner, Heinrich and Maine Senator Angus King);  a 16-page one from the GOP members of the Committee namely, Vice-Chairman Chambliss and Senators Burr, Risch, Coats, Rubio and Coburn and a 4-page statement by Maine Senator Susan Collins who co-authored with then Senator Joe Lieberman the HSGAC 2012 report, “Flashing Red: A Special Report on the Terrorist Attack at Benghazi.”

The appended 5-page “additional views” from the Democrats talks about — talking points, terrorists vs. extremists, dropping the term “Al-Qa ‘ida”,  no protest, and talking points, again going through the interagency process. It concludes with this:

“The Majority agrees that the process to create the talking points was not without problems, so we join our Republican colleagues in recommending-as we do in the report-that in responding to future requests for unclassified talking points from Congress, the IC should simply tell Congress which facts are unclassified and let Members of Congress provide additional context for the public. However, we sincerely hope that the public release of the emails on May 15, 2013, that describe the creation of the talking points, and the evidence presented in this report, will end the misinformed and unhelpful talking points controversy once and for all.”

The appended “additional views” from the Republicans is 16-page long, almost a report in itself. It complains of “Disturbing Lack of Cooperation by the State Department”

“As the Committee attempted to piece together key events before, during, and after the attacks, we faced the most significant and sustained resistance from the State Department in obtaining documents, access to witnesses, and responses to questions.”

We’re sure the State Department sees it differently. The same day the SSCI report came out, it released its Fact Sheet on the Benghazi ARB Implementation.

The GOP’s “additional views” mentions former Secretary Clinton just once, saying  that “Ultimately, however, the final responsibility for security at diplomatic facilities lies with the former Secretary of State, Hillary Clinton.”  It also point fingers at senior officials at the State Department. Who gets a special mention?

Under Secretary for Management Patrick Kennedy

“We believe the background of one senior State Department official made him uniquely situated to anticipate the potential for a terrorist attack on the Benghazi facilities. Prior to the 1998 East Africa Embassy bombings which killed 12 Americans, Under Secretary Kennedy was serving as the Assistant Secretary of State for Administration, and concurrently served as the Acting Assistant Secretary of State for Diplomatic Security. Coincidentally, some of the same failures identified by the report of the Accountability Review Board following the 1998 Embassy bombings were noted by the Benghazi Accountability Review Board. Mr. Kennedy later served in key positions in Iraq, in the immediate aftermath of the toppling of Saddam Hussein, and in the IC. The threat of terrorism, including against U.S. facilities, was not new to him, and given the security situation in Benghazi, the attacks could have been foreseen. Given the threat environment, Mr. Kennedy should have used better judgment and should be held accountable.”

Deputy Assistant Secretary for International Programs – Charlene Lamb

“While many individuals with information relevant to our review were more than forthcoming with the Committee, we are particularly disappointed that Charlene Lamb, who was the Deputy Assistant Secretary for International Programs, has refused to explain to the Committee why certain decisions were made concerning enhanced security at the Temporary Mission Facility and who ultimately was responsible for those decisions. The Committee extended invitations to Ms. Lamb on three occasions prior to and after her reinstatement each time, she refused to meet with the Committee.154 Unfortunately, even after Ms. Lamb was returned to full duty, the State Department did not make her available to the Committee, something we believe should have been a priority for both Ms. Lamb and the State Department. Based on what we have learned during the Committee’s review, we believe Ms. Lamb’s testimony is critical to determining why the leadership failures in the State Department occurred and the specific extent to which these failures reached into its highest levels.”

If the Committee really “believe” that Ms. Lamb’s testimony is “critical to determining why the leadership failures in the State Department occurred” how come it did not subpoena her to appear before the Committee?  Well, maybe just half the Committee believe that? Or maybe they had other issues to squabble about? Or like most of the American public, did they all get Benghazi’ed out?

GOP Senator Susan Collins, not noted for her extreme views or for presidential ambition, also appended a 4-page statement to the SSCI report:

The SSCI report, while adding considerably to our knowledge, would have been strengthened if it had placed greater emphasis on the lack of accountability for the broader management failures at the State Department. It would have been premature for earlier reports published in the months immediately following the attack, such as the Accountability Review Board and the “Flashing Red” report, to reach final judgments with respect to the State Department’s personnel actions because the contributing factors to the vulnerability of the facility were still being pieced together. This report could have more fully evaluated the accountability issues because sufficient time had elapsed for the State Department to demonstrate whether or not decision-makers would be held accountable for poor judgments, refusals to tighten security, and misinformation.
[…]
A broken system overseen by senior leadership contributed to the vulnerability of U.S. diplomats and other American personnel in one of the most dangerous cities in the world. This is unacceptable, and yet the Secretary of State has not held anyone responsible for the system’s failings. This leads to a perception that senior State Department officials are exempt from accountability because the Secretary of State has failed to hold anyone accountable for the systemic failures and management deficiencies that contributed to the grossly inadequate security for the Benghazi facility.
[…]
While I support the SSCI report and appreciate its thorough analysis of much of what went wrong, I believe that more emphasis should have been placed on the three issues I have discussed: (1) the Administration’s initial misleading of the American people about the terrorist nature of the attack, (2) the failure of the Administration to hold anyone at the State Department, particularly Under Secretary Kennedy, fully accountable for the security lapses, and (3) the unfulfilled promises of President Obama that he would bring the terrorists to justice.

The SSCI report does not include details about the Benghazi fallout at the State Department. Except for one mention of Charlene Lamb, none of the other three officials put on administrative leave by the State Department made it to the report.

And life goes on. Perhaps in time, history.state.gov will afford us a view of the memcons during the internal deliberations at Foggy Bottom during and after this crisis — who said what and when, and who did what, where and when.  We still haven’t seen all the Kissinger telcons so, this may take a few decades, too.

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Read and Weep: Congressional Committee Releases Report Questioning Benghazi ARB Investigation

September 16, 2013 By in Congress, Controversies, Diplomatic Security, Foreign Service, FSOs, Govt Documents, Org Culture, Org Life, Realities of the FS, State Department Tags: , , , , , , ,

— By Domani Spero

We know folks are kind of Benghazi’ed out.  We’ve lost count how many hearings Congress has done this past year on Benghazi.  The Republicans can be accused of being on persistent offense, but the Democrats can also be accused of persistent defense.  Meanwhile, our people are out there. Folks are still not talking much about the fact that over 50 personnel rescued out of Benghazi, only 7 were State Department personnel and the rest are OGA people.   How many of them have appeared before Congress to answer some questions?  By the way, for those interested, the Congressional Research Service has a couple of DS-related reports: Securing U.S. Diplomatic Facilities and Personnel Abroad: Legislative and Executive Branch Initiatives, September 12, 2013 and Securing U.S. Diplomatic Facilities and Personnel Abroad: Background and Policy Issues, September 12, 2013.

In any case, you might be Benghazi’ed out, and the House Oversight Committee could easily be accused of partisan witchhunt — because 2016 — but that does not mean that this report has no meat. While this might not be the entire story of what happened inside the State Department in the Benghazi fallout, this tells part of that story.  Mr. Issa’s report used the term “accountability theater” and we can’t say we disagree. It is also not surprising that who you know makes a difference inside the bureaucracy.  While Ambassador Boswell was given access to the classified portion of the ARB, Mr. Bultrowicz did not see the classified ARB until shortly before he appeared before the Committee. Mr. Maxwell did not see the classified ARB until about 6 months later. The classified portion referencing his performance was subsequently declassified. More than a couple of officials indicate confusion as to why Mr. Maxwell was put on administrative leave.  Lee Lohman, the Executive Director for NEA described as “unfair” the treatment received by Mr. Maxwell.

We’re sure senior people would claim they were just doing their jobs in a complicated situation. Or that they were doing the best they could under the circumstances. That maybe, but their best were not/not good enough.  When somebody orders you to do something you know is inherently wrong, would you follow that order or would you rather quit?  One senior official is on the record saying she did not believe Mr. Maxwell’s actions warranted removal as Deputy Assistant Secretary but when asked if she questioned anybody about that, the answer was “no.” So people simply did their jobs and did not ask questions.  That’s that.  Welcome to a lobotomized bureaucracy where smart people do stuff and no longer ask questions.  Quotes below excerpted form the report:

 

Eric Boswell | Assistant Secretary for Diplomatic Security — 

“To answer your question, there’s no appeal process that I know of. I’m a bit disappointed that I didn’t have a chance during the ARB, if they were coming to a conclusion, the conclusion that they did, to ask me about it and ask my views about that judgment. That would happen if you were being — in any other kind of review done by inspectors or GAO or whatever, you get an opportunity to comment. I didn’t get an opportunity to comment; I just saw the conclusion, surprised to see the conclusion.”

Scott Bultrowicz | Director, Diplomatic Security Service — 

“No, look. Here is my thing. I will take responsibility for the decisions I made based on the information I had at hand, okay. I mean, and I’m not looking to point the finger, you know. Accountability cuts a wide swath, I think. So I’m not saying I had nothing to do with this. I mean, it would be shame on me if I said I was completely oblivious to everything. I’m willing to take responsibility for the decisions I made based on the information I had. But, you know, to say, well, you should have managed person A more closely, or you should have been more proactive, that’s pretty general to me. And I mean, you know, it is what it is. I respect the members of that panel. They are all very distinguished officials. But yeah, I have a problem with it. I do. I don’t think it’s something that defines me after 27 years of doing everything I’m asked, or at least to say be more direct in the questioning with me when they had the opportunity.”

Raymond Maxwell | Deputy Assistant Secretary for Maghreb Affairs —

“There are people who will say that because they’ll say you’re still getting paid, and because you’re still getting paid, you don’t have any reason to complain. But you know, it’s not about the money. It’s about your reason for being, if you will. And, you know, frankly, I would have been better off had they said you are fired from the State Department. You go today. Your pay stops, and you’re out of here. I would have been better off because I could have contested that or–I mean, I would have contested it. It would have also been behind. It would have all been behind me and I could have started with the next thing. But as things now stand, I’m still employed. There’s still a possibility that I could come back, so it’s not like I can start something new.

I was scheduled to retire on April 30th, and I made the decision to withdraw my retirement request because I didn’t want to go out under this cloud of suspicion that maybe I had done something, that’s the cloud that–my fear of the cloud of suspicion no longer exists because I have embraced my administrative leave-ness, if you will, and it’s no longer a source of shame for me. It’s now–almost–it’s increasingly becoming a source of pride for me. So, it’s not that big a deal anymore. But now there’s a principle. Now there’s a principle that they did something improperly, immorally, maybe even illegally, and if I just take it laying down, guess what, they’ll do it to somebody else again.”

The House Oversight Committee report includes the following cast of characters in addition to the ARB Four, some with direct quotes from the congressional transcript. There appears to be no quotes from Ms. Lamb and Mr. Kennedy; a quick reading of the 100 99-page report did not indicate how many State Department employees appeared before the Committee, or who were requested to appear but did not.

Elizabeth Dibble

Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary, Bureau of Near Eastern Affairs

Elizabeth Dibble is the Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary for Near Eastern Affairs. She is Elizabeth Jones’ deputy, and the second most senior official in the Bureau of Near Eastern Affairs.

Jeffrey Feltman

Assistant Secretary, Bureau of Near Eastern Affairs

Jeffrey Feltman was the Assistant Secretary for the Bureau of Near Eastern Affairs from August 18, 2009 until May 31, 2012. In December 2011, Feltman requested that Under Secretary for Management Patrick Kennedy approve a continued ad hoc U.S. presence in Benghazi through the end of calendar year 2012. Kennedy approved.

Gregory Hicks

Deputy Chief of Mission, Libya

Gregory Hicks is the former Deputy Chief of Mission in Libya. He testified before the Committee on May 8, 2013, describing in detail the events on the ground and his interactions with Ambassador Chris Stevens on September 11, 2012. The State Department assigned him to a desk job while he awaits an onward assignment.

Elizabeth Jones

Acting Assistant Secretary, Bureau of Near Eastern Affairs

Elizabeth Jones is the Acting Assistant Secretary for Near Eastern Affairs, the most senior official in the Bureau of Near Eastern Affairs. Jones was the direct supervisor of Raymond Maxwell, the former Deputy Assistant Secretary for Maghreb Affairs.

Patrick F. Kennedy

Under Secretary of State for Management

Patrick Kennedy, a Career Minister in the Foreign Service, has served as the Under Secretary of State since 2007. Kennedy approved a memorandum that requested to continue the ad hoc U.S. presence in Benghazi through the end of calendar year 2012.

Charlene Lamb

Deputy Assistant Secretary for International Programs

The ARB cited Charlene Lamb for failing to provide the requested number of diplomatic security agents at the Benghazi mission and ignoring efforts by her subordinates to improve the staffing challenges at the mission. Lamb was placed on administrative leave in December 2012.

Lee Lohman

Executive Director, Bureau of Near Eastern Affairs

Lee Lohman was the Executive Director of the Bureau of Near Eastern Affairs. Lohman testified that Raymond Maxwell was not involved in any decisions pertaining to the security at Benghazi, and that Patrick Kennedy was highly involved with security decisions that affected Benghazi.

Raymond Maxwell

Deputy Assistant Secretary for Maghreb Affairs

Raymond Maxwell was the only individual in the Bureau of Near Eastern Affairs with whom the ARB found fault for the Benghazi attacks. Several witnesses testified that both the ARB and the State Department treated Maxwell unfairly. Maxwell was placed on administrative leave in December 2012.

Brian Papanu

Desk Officer, Libya

Brian Papanu served as the Desk Officer for Libya. He was responsible for obtaining temporary duty staff for Libya and served as a liaison between Washington, D.C. and Tripoli.

William Roebuck

Director, Office of Maghreb Affairs

William Roebuck is the Deputy Assistant Secretary for Maghreb Affairs—the position previously held by Raymond Maxwell. He served as the Chargé d’Affaires to Libya from January to June 2013. Prior to that post, he served as the Director of the Office of Maghreb Affairs, where he was one of the most knowledgeable policymakers on Libya in the State Department. Roebuck considered shutting down the Benghazi mission due to lack of security.

State Dept Now Has 27 High-Threat, High-Risk Posts — Are You In One of Them?

July 17, 2013 By in Congress, Controversies, Foreign Service, Functional Bureaus, John F. Kerry, Questions, Realities of the FS, Security, SFRC, State Department, Top Ranks, U.S. Missions Tags: , , , , , , , , , ,

◉ By Domani Spero

 

Two top Diplomatic Security officials went before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee for the July 16 hearing on S.980, The Embassy Security and Personnel Protection Act of 2013:  The guy who currently holds three jobs, Gregory B. Starr (Acting Assistant Secretary for Diplomatic Security, Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary for Diplomatic Security, and Director of the Diplomatic Security Service) and Bill Miller, the Deputy Assistant Secretary of High Threat Posts.

McClatchy reports that the officials told the Senate that fifteen diplomatic posts in high-threat areas fail to meet safety standards 10 months after the Benghazi attacks.  Mr. Starr was quoted saying, “We cannot retrofit many of our buildings to withstand blasts or direct attacks without the ability to move to a new location . . . and build a new facility.”

The Starr testimony is here, and the Miller testimony is here.

AA/S Star’s testimony includes this:

DS is hiring 151 new security professionals this and the next fiscal year, many of whom will directly serve at or provide support to our high-threat, high- risk posts. We are also working very closely with the Department of Defense (DOD) to expand the Marine Security Guard program, as well as to enhance the availability of forces to respond in extremis to threatened U.S. personnel and facilities. We recently worked with DOD and the U.S. Marine Corps to elevate personnel security as a primary mission of the Marine Security Guards. Each of these efforts enhances the Department’s ability to supplement, as necessary, the host government’s measures in fulfilling its obligations under international law to protect U.S. diplomatic and consular property and personnel.

Missions overseas with some exceptions typically get one RSO and one ARSO. According to a March 2013 statistics, Diplomatic Security has 1,951 Security Officers (diplomatic couriers, engineers and techs excepted). It is slated to grow by 151 in FY2013 and another 151 in FY2014 to a total of 2,253. This is the crew that staff eight field offices in the United States, most of 284 posts overseas, the expanded DS offices in Afghanistan, Iraq and Pakistan and the newly designated high-threat, high-risk posts that now numbers 27. These are the same folks that provide security to the Secretary of State seven days a week, 24 hours a day, everywhere he travels in the world, as well as protective security details for cabinet-level foreign dignitaries who visit the United States.

We have some two months left in the fiscal year. Whoever is hired or will be hired for the remainder of this fiscal year and next year still has to undergo required training.  At this point, can we really count on those additional 151 new security professionals to serve or provide support to these 27 high threat posts?

In May 2013, in its announcement of the ARB Benghazi recommendation implementation, the Department said this:

“All high threat posts now have a minimum of a one-year tour of duty. We are planning to ensure overlap between incumbent and incoming positions to facilitate continuity of operations at high threat posts. Temporary duty assignments are set at a minimum of 120 days.”

That looks good on paper but you can’t do overlap if you can’t staff positions with incoming personnel. There is a limited pool of available agents with high-threat tactical training, and a good number of them are probably deployed to AIP posts. Some have also done back to back one-year postings between Iraq and Afghanistan. Then there’s Pakistan, Libya, Yemen and all that …

From our burn bag: “Another round of TDY requests for high-threat posts went unfilled with exactly ZERO DS agents volunteering. DS is now at the point where they’re threatening to direct agents to these high-threat locations for periods of 45 to 60 days.”

Even if DS is successful in ordering TDY directed assignments to high threat locations for 45-60 days, that is only half the duration State had previously cited as a minimum TDY length on its the Benghazi ARB implementation. And it would be exactly the same as the Libya TDYs, which, according to RSO Eric Nordstrom were 8-weeks duration or 56-day temporary duty assignments.

The Department also said that it “established a High Threat Board to review our presence at High Threat, High Risk posts; the Board will review these posts every 6 months.”

May 20, 2013 see State Dept Announces Implementation of 24 Out of 29 ARB Benghazi Recommendations

Fast-forward to July 2013, there are now 27 posts which fall under the high- threat, high-risk designation. And the DAS for the High Threat bureau just told Congress that the list will be reviewed annually, at a minimum, and more frequently as needed.

After the September 2012 attacks on our facilities in Libya, Yemen, Tunisia, Sudan, and Egypt, the Department reviewed its security posture and created my position, the Diplomatic Security Deputy Assistant Secretary of High Threat Posts, also known as HTP, along with a staff of security professional to support high-threat, high-risk posts. The Department assessed our diplomatic missions worldwide and weighed criteria to determine which posts are designated as high- threat, high-risk – there are now 27 posts which fall under this designation. This designation is not a static process and the list will be reviewed annually, at a minimum, and more frequently as needed. As emergent conditions substantially change, for better or for worse, at any post worldwide, high-threat, high-risk designations will shift, and missions will be added or deleted from this category. The HTP Directorate I oversee will lead the security operations in these high- threat, high-risk posts around the world, coordinate strategic and operational planning, and drive innovation across the broad spectrum of DS missions and responsibilities. We continue to work closely with the Regional Bureaus to ensure that everyone has visibility of the security threats at our posts.

We do not have a complete list of the high threat posts except the 17 posts already reported by the National Review Online in November 2012 from a State Department announcement, and CBS News here in December 2012 with a “senior State Department official” as source. See New Diplomatic Security Office to Monitor 17 High Threat Diplomatic Missions (With ARB Update) Dec 8, 2012 and State Dept’s New High Threat Posts Are Not All Danger Posts Dec 9, 2012.

As of this writing, the positions of Assistant Secretary of State for Diplomatic Security (formerly held by Eric Boswell), Deputy Assistant Secretary for International Programs (formerly held by Charlene Lamb) and Director for the Office of Foreign Missions (formerly held by Eric Boswell) remain vacant.

During the same hearing, Mr. Starr, according to McClatchy told senators that Secretary Kerry was reviewing those on administrative leave, as well as the circumstances of the attack but went on to praise the reprimanded officers.

“These are people that have given their careers to diplomatic security as well and the security of the Department of State, and I have a great deal of admiration for them,” Starr said. “It does not excuse the fact that we had a terrible tragedy in Benghazi . . . (but) all through the years that we’ve had multiple attacks in Yemen and in Afghanistan and in Iraq, those people performed admirably.”

It’s been almost seven months to the day three DS and NEA officials were put “on administrative leave pending further action.” Are these positions open because these officials will potentially return to these jobs after their administrative investigations conclude or is it because the government’s case is not going anywhere? Also, Secretary Kerry has been on the job for about six months now and on travel for over two months (68 days on travel since assuming post), visiting 27 countries, logging 134,691 miles along the way.

When does he even get the time?

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