US Embassy Iraq Contractor Gets $62 Million in @StateDept Contract Dispute Settlement

Updated 10/19/20 4:12 pm PST with the potential value for the design build construction contracts in Thailand and in Namibia. See below.

In October 2009, State/OIG issued its Audit of the Design and Construction of the New Embassy Compound in Baghdad, Iraq (PDF):

“…[W]e found that although the construction of the approximately $600 million NEC in a war zone in 34 months was a significant accomplishment, consid­erable construction deficiencies remained because designs for the facilities had not been completed and approved and quality control and commissioning procedures were inadequate.
[…]
We recommend the Department attempt to recover an estimated $43.2 million from First Kuwaiti to bring construction deficiencies to contract standards.
[…]
we estimated that approximately $33 million should attempt to be recovered from First Kuwaiti for incomplete and undocumented design work. Also, we identified that as a result of First Kuwaiti’s inadequate quality control program, it should be held accountable for additional maintenance charges of approximately $38 million that could carry over into future years. Further, we estimated recovering ap­proximately $3.8 million from First Kuwaiti because commissioning activities either were not performed or were performed incorrectly.

In it’s response, the State Department’s Bureau of Administration said:

“The Contracting Officer will prepare a letter to the Contractor, detailing each of [the OIG] recommendations and request consideration from the Contractor in each amount recommended by the OIG.” The A Bureau requested that OIG provide the Contracting Officer infor­mation detailing the basis for computing the $132 million in costs recommended for recovery from First Kuwaiti. The A Bureau also stated, “The formal process to recover any funds from the contractor will be assessed in terms of overall benefit to the government.”

At that time, State/OIG said:

“The A Bureau’s response meets the intent of OIG’s recommendations to recover $132 million from the contractor attributable to construction deficiencies; incom­plete and undocumented work; additional maintenance charges incurred because of inadequate quality control and commissioning procedures; and contract noncompli­ance, including liquidated damages and interest for an unauthorized advance. OIG and USACE will provide the contracting officer the requested support for the $132 million in questioned contract costs.”

We don’t know what happened to that recommendation for recovery of funds in 2009.
Fast forward to April 23, 2013, the Civilian Board of Contract Appeals (CBCA) issued a decision in First Kuwaiti Trading & Contracting W.L.L. v. Department of State contract dispute (CBCA 3069):
“Appellant, First Kuwaiti Trading & Contracting W.L.L. (First Kuwaiti), filed the instant appeal from a decision of a Department of State (State) contracting officer dated August 10, 2012, denying a claim by First Kuwaiti relating to two unpaid invoices for work performed for State under two contracts at the United States New Embassy Compound in Baghdad, Iraq, contract number SALMEC-06-0049, and its modifications, and contract number SALMEC-05-0020, and its modifications. The parties entered into a settlement agreement with respect to the appeal and filed with the Board a stipulation of settlement, reflecting their amicable resolution of the issues that are the subject of the appeal. The parties have jointly moved the Board to issue a judgment in favor of First Kuwaiti in the amount of $2,547,745.20, to be paid from the permanent indefinite judgment fund, 31 U.S.C. § 1304 (2006). Under their settlement agreement and stipulation, they have agreed that Contract Disputes Act (CDA) interest shall accrue on said judgment amount, beginning on March 23, 2012, and continuing until payment of the judgment is made, and that such interest shall be paid to First Kuwaiti together with payment of the judgment amount.
First Kuwaiti has waived any other claim to interest and/or for any attorney fees and expenses incurred in connection with the appeal. The parties, in their joint motion and under the terms of the stipulation, have agreed that neither party will seek reconsideration of, or relief from, this Board’s decision under Board Rules 26 and 27, respectively, and that neither party will appeal this Board’s decision.”
See the April 23, 2013 full decision (CBCA 3069) here.
Below are the New Embassy Compound Baghdad Contracts that the OIG audited in 2009. Note that the contract numbers cited by the CBCA decision are SALMEC-06-0049 and SALMEC-05-0020 for the New Embassy Compound in Baghdad. In the 2009 OIG audit, the two contracts are listed as SALMEC-06-C0049 and SALMEC-05-C0020; we note the appearance of the letter “C” in the two contracts listed in the 2009 OIG audit  of the New Embassy Compound in Baghdad. (If you know what that means, do let us know).
So that was 2013. For more litigative payments, see @StateDept’s Litigative Payments FY2018-FY2020 Via Judgment Fund-$72,634,701.57.
Five years later, on December 3, 2018, the CBCA issued a “Motion for Partial Summary Judgment Granted In Part” in the First Kuwaiti Trading & Contracting, W.L.L. v. Department of State new contract disputes  marked “CBCA 3506, 6167”:

“First Kuwaiti Trading & Contracting, W.L.L. (FKTC) appealed the denial of its claims by the Department of State (DOS) arising from the construction of the embassy compound in Baghdad, Iraq. FKTC presented approximately 200 cost claims that totaled $270 million. DOS moved for summary judgment on thirteen of those cost claims, challenging FKTC’s reliance upon the War Risks clause, the superior knowledge doctrine, the Changes clause, and the implied duty of good faith and fair dealing as the basis for these claims. DOS also asserts that actions underlying FKTC’s changes claims constitute sovereign acts, precluding liability pursuant to the sovereign acts doctrine.

We grant DOS’s motion regarding the scope of the War Risks clause and superior knowledge doctrine, thereby denying seven of FKTC’s claims that are premised solely upon these bases. We deny DOS’s motion regarding the claims that are also based upon the Changes clause or the implied duty of good faith and fair dealing, finding that there are disputed issues of fact. We also deny DOS’s motion regarding the sovereign acts doctrine, finding that DOS has not established the applicability of that doctrine on the current record. Six of the thirteen claims subject to the motion survive DOS’s challenge on this basis.”

The “Statement of Facts” include:
  • A. Contract Price and Provisions Allowing for Adjustment of Contract Price
  • B. War Risks Clause
  • C. Security Requirements and Warnings
II. FKTC’s Claims Challenged by DOS (it’s quite a read):
  • A. Duck and Cover Alarms
  • B. Rocket Attacks—Three claims
  • C. Equipment Repositioning
  • D. Extra Security
  • E. Retention Bonuses and Danger Pay
  • F. Air Transport—Labor Hours
  • G. Sand and Gravel Double-Handling
  • H. Truck Convoy Delays, Truck and Driver Protection Requirements, and Truck Convoy Support Requirements
  • I. Superior Knowledge Claims
The CBCA’s discussion includes:
  • I. War Risks Clause Does Not Provide for Recovery on the Thirteen Challenged Claims
  • II. FKTC Has Failed To Identify a Sufficient Basis for Its Superior Knowledge Claim
  • III. Disputed Issues of Fact Preclude Summary Judgment on FKTC’s Changes Claims

A. FKTC Has Shown Disputed Issues of Fact with Regard to Changes Clause on Six Claims

B. DOS Has Not Provided Evidence to Support a Sovereign Acts Defense

  • IV. Disputed Issues of Fact Preclude Summary Judgment on FKTC’s Implied Duty of Good Faith and Fair Dealing Claim
  • V. Purported Lack of Contemporaneous Documentation is not Grounds for Summary Judgment
The Board’s decision is that “Respondent’s motion for partial summary judgment is GRANTED IN PART. Appellant’s claims based solely upon the War Risks clause and the superior knowledge doctrine challenged by Respondent are denied. The hearing in this matter will commence on January 22, 2019.”
See the December 3, 2018 decision (CBCA 3506, 6167 ) here.
HOLD ON. We’re just getting to the best part.
On Monday, April 1, 2019. the Civilian Board of Contract Appeals issued “GRANTED IN PART: April 1, 2019” judgement in First Kuwaiti Trading & Contracting, W.L.L. v. Department of State (CBCA 3506, 6167) dispute:

“On March 28, 2019, the parties submitted to the Board a joint motion for judgment on a stipulated settlement. The parties requested that the Board enter judgment in the amount of $62,500,000, with payment to be made through the permanent indefinite judgment fund in accordance with 31 U.S.C. § 1304 (2012). The amount includes all the interest to which appellant is entitled under the Contract Disputes Act. 41 U.S.C. § 7109. The parties have agreed that they will not seek appeal of, reconsideration of, or relief from the Board’s decision.

Decision: The Board GRANTS IN PART these appeals. In accordance with the parties’ joint motion, the Board awards appellant, First Kuwaiti Trading & Contracting W.L.L., the stipulated judgment amount of $62,500,000.”

See the April 1, 2019 decision (CBCA 3506, 6167) here.
So the CBCA document says the contractor presented approximately 200 cost claims that totaled $270 million. It got $62,500,000.
We’re sure the government would argue that this is a win, yeah? On the other hand, $62.5 million is more than the expected US investment in the local economy for the construction of US Consulate General Chiang Mai in Thailand at $45 million plus change. Or three times the USG investment in the local economy for the construction of the US Embassy in Namibia at $17 million.
(Correction: The US Embassy Namibia design build construction contract has a potential value of $173.4million; the New Consulate Compound (NCC) design build construction contract in Chiang Mai, Thailand has a potential value of $156.8 million. Thanks A!).
Oh … what’s that?

 


Snapshot: Top Five Bureaus & Posts With the Highest Number of Sexual Harassment Complaints (2014-2017)

Via State/OIG:

Related post:
State/OIG Releases Long-Awaited Report on @StateDept Handling of Sexual Harassment Reports

 

 

 

US Mission Iraq Gets One COVID-19 Case From DOS Chartered Flight Out of Dulles

 

We recently learned that an individual who arrived at US Mission Iraq on a charter flight from Dulles, VA on July 1st has tested positive of COVID-19 and has been in quarantine since arrival.
We understand that the chartered aircraft was a 767 with 2-2-2 seating in business class and 2-3-2 seating in economy. The middle seat in economy was left open but the remaining seats were filled. The flight included over a hundred passengers who were either US direct-hire or contractors supporting Mission Iraq. We understand that some passengers purposefully did not wear their masks correctly during the flight.
Passengers were notified about the case on July 9th when all Mission personnel received an email from the Front Office. Passengers reportedly also received a call from post management to confirm they’d seen the email. The mission notification indicates that post is “in the process of contact tracing” to include at various points since the flight’s departure on June 30th. 
We also learned that post has no idea if the individual was COVID positive at the time of the flight. The CDC is advising people to “stay home for 14 days from the time you returned home from international travel” but what do you do with travel within the United States?
The passengers are subject to a 14-day quarantine upon arrival (apparently now standard procedure). However, there were understandably concerns that MED and post management did not provide details about when the infected person was tested or why there was over a week’s delay in post notification. It is also understood that post has  alerted those who were in close proximity to the infected individual but people have no idea on how wide an area of the plane was notified.    
We were wondering if employees can get a COVID-19 test if they ask for it or if tests are only available to those manifesting COVID-19 symptoms.
We learned today that those on the flight received a reminder today to check in with the MED unit before rejoining the general population on July 14. They were advised to discuss any symptoms they had during quarantine with MED and, “if we [MED Unit] feel it is necessary, we will perform a COVID-19 test”.
Does MED Iraq have the ability to process COVID-19 tests at post; and if not, where are these tests sent and what is the turn around for results? What about other posts without Embassy Baghdad’s resources?
Given that the U.S. is now a hotspot, are State Department employees and contractors tested prior to their departure to Iraq or elsewhere?
We should note that the United States is currently #1 in confirmed COVID-19 cases in the world, and with over 137,000 deaths, it is also #1 in COVID-19 deaths in the world. For detailed situation update worldwide, see the European Centre for Disease Prevention and Control.

@StateDept Orders Evacuation of Designated USG Employees From US Embassy Baghdad, USCG Erbil, and BDSC

 

On March 26, the State Department updated its Iraq Travel Advisory, a Level 4 Do Not Travel to Iraq “due to terrorism, kidnapping, armed conflict, the Global Health Advisory, and Mission Iraq’s limited capacity to provide support to U.S. citizens.”
The updated advisory announced the mandatory departure of designated U.S. government employees from the U.S. Embassy in Baghdad, the Baghdad Diplomatic Support Center (BDSC), and the U.S. Consulate General in Erbil on March 25 “due to security conditions and restricted travel options as a result of the COVID-19 pandemic.”
Excerpt below:

U.S. citizens in Iraq are at high risk for violence and kidnapping. Numerous terrorist and insurgent groups are active in Iraq and regularly attack both Iraqi security forces and civilians. Anti-U.S. sectarian militias threaten U.S. citizens and Western companies throughout Iraq. Attacks by improvised explosive devices (IEDs) occur in many areas of the country, including Baghdad.

On March 25, 2020, the Department of State ordered the departure of designated U.S. government employees from the U.S. Embassy in Baghdad, the Baghdad Diplomatic support Center, and the U.S. Consulate General in Erbil due to security conditions and restricted travel options as a result of the COVID-19 pandemic. On December 31, 2019, the Embassy suspended public consular services, until further notice, as a result of damage done by Iranian-backed terrorist attacks on the Embassy compound. U.S. Consulate General Erbil remains open and continues to provide consular services. On October 18, 2018, the Department of State ordered the suspension of operations at the U.S. Consulate General in Basrah. That institution has not reopened. Due to security concerns, U.S. Embassy personnel in Baghdad have been instructed not to use Baghdad International Airport.

U.S. citizens should not travel through Iraq to Syria to engage in armed conflict, where they would face extreme personal risks (kidnapping, injury, or death) and legal risks (arrest, fines, and expulsion). The Kurdistan Regional Government stated that it will impose prison sentences of up to ten years on individuals who illegally cross the border. Additionally, fighting on behalf of, or supporting designated terrorist organizations, is a crime that can result in penalties, including prison time and large fines in the United States.

Read in full here.

Iraqi Parliament Votes to Remove US Troops From Iraq, Trump Threatens With “Very Big Sanctions”

 

Pompeo’s New Songs Bring Back the Old Times With #BaghdadBob

 

 

Iraqi Protesters Breach U.S. Embassy Baghdad’s Compound

Media reports indicate that Iraqi protesters, identified as Iraqi Shiite militia members and their supporters, stormed the U.S. Embassy Baghdad on December 31, in protest of the deadly air strikes conducted by U.S. forces over the weekend. Reports note that the Sunday strikes killed at least 25 fighters and wounded 55.
On December 30, SecDef Mark Esper announced that “the Department of Defense took offensive actions in defense of our personnel and interests in Iraq by launching F-15 Strike Eagles against five targets associated with Kata’ib Hezbollah, which is an Iranian-sponsored Shiite militia group.  The targets we attacked included three targets in Western Iraq and two targets in Eastern Syria that were either command and control facilities or weapons caches for Kata’ib Hezbollah.”
On December 27, a rocket attack at an Iraqi base killed one U.S. contractor and wounded four U.S. troops. See 
According to the AP, the State Department has stated that all U.S. personnel at Embassy Baghdad are safe and that there are no plants to evacuate.
This morning, U.S. Embassy Baghdad issued a security alert advising “U.S. citizens not to approach the Embassy.  U.S. citizens should keep in touch with family members.  In an emergency, U.S. citizens in Iraq or those concerned about family in Iraq should contact the Department of State at +1-202-501-4444 or toll-free in the U.S. at 1-888-407-4747.”

 

@StateDept Plans 28% Staff Reduction For US Mission Iraq By May 2020

 

Via CNN:

The State Department plans to dramatically downsize the number of American personnel in Iraq, according to a memo sent to the Senate Foreign Relations Committee and obtained by CNN.

The document, dated December 6 and sent by Bureau of Legislative Affairs Assistant Secretary Mary Elizabeth Taylor to committee Chairman Jim Risch, an Idaho Republican, outlines plans to reduce staffing levels at US Mission Iraq by 28% by the end of May 2020.

The reduction would mean 114 fewer people at the US Embassy in Baghdad, 15 fewer people at the Baghdad Diplomatic Support Center and eight fewer people at Consulate General Erbil. In addition to the reduction in State Department personnel, the cuts would include Defense Department and US Agency for International Development personnel.
[…]
A senior State Department official told CNN that the decision was driven by leadership at State collectively and added that they think people at US Mission Iraq could be targeted. The official said they are already more cautious about deploying US officials into the field. The official said the Trump administration is seeking to reduce potential security concerns and increase military force with the deployment of more troops to the region.
FP has the following:

The U.S. Mission in Iraq will reduce the number of staff at its embassy, diplomatic support center, and consulate in Erbil in Northern Iraq from 486 to 349, a 28 percent decrease, by the end of May 2020. The majority of the staff leave will come from the State Department, but other government agencies, including the Defense Department and U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID), will also cut the size of their staff at the embassy, as the document shows.

Foreign Policy posted the Iraq drawdown document sent to SFRC Chair Jim Risch here. The number in the notification includes direct hire personnel, personal services contractors, and third country nationals. What it does not include is life support staff.
Back in 2010, we posted US Embassy Baghdad: The “civilianization” of the U.S. presence in Iraq and its peskiest details.  At that time, State/OIG notes:

The number of security and life support personnel required to maintain this limited substantive staff is huge: 82 management, 2,008 security, 157 aviation, and 1,085 life support personnel. In other words, depending on the definition of support staff, it takes a minimum of 15 and possibly up to 60 security and life support staff to support one substantive direct-hire position. To put this into perspective, a quick calculation of similar support ratios at three major embassies (Beijing, Cairo, and New Delhi) shows an average of four substantive officers to every three support staff (4:3) in contrast to 1:15 to 1:60 in Iraq.

So if the staff reduction is approximately 135, what does that mean in reduction of life support staffing level? CNN reports that the staff reductions was “driven by leadership at State collectively …. they think people at US Mission Iraq could be targeted”.  See OSAC – 2019 Crime and Safety Report – Iraq – Baghdad.pdf 
Related posts:

@StateDept FOIA: Trump’s January 2017 EO: Protecting the Nation From Foreign Terrorist Entry into the United States

Help Fund the Blog | Diplopundit 2019 — 60-Day Campaign from June 5, 2019 – August 5, 2019

______________________________________

 

On January 27, 2017, Trump issued an Executive Order that suspends the entry of refugees to the United States for 120 days and deny entry/issuance of visas to citizens of seven Muslim-majority countries [Iraq, Syria, Sudan, Iran, Somalia, Libya, and Yemen]. See Trump EO: Protecting the Nation From Foreign Terrorist Entry into the United States, 1.27.2017

Below is a collection of documents from the State Department via Jason Leopold’s FOIA efforts. The documents illustrate the actions and confusion following the issuance of the Executive Order. In a normal administration where the motto is not “chaos everyday”, this EO would have gone through an internal process where overseas posts learn beforehand about the new policy, how it is interpreted for operational purposes, and are provided guidance on how to address the more complicated cases, and exceptions. In this case, the EO was released and overseas posts had no answers to relevant operational questions. The agreed guidance between DHS and State did not go out until January 30, 2017. Meanwhile, US Embassy Baghdad had to deal with the EO fallout from the Iraqi government and shocked Kurdish partners.

#

Ambassador Matthew Tueller Presents His Credentials in Baghdad

Help Fund the Blog | Diplopundit 2019 — 60-Day Campaign from June 5, 2019 – August 5, 2019

______________________________________

 

New U.S. Ambassador to Iraq Matthew Tueller arrived in Baghdad in early June to assume charge of the U.S. mission in Iraq.

Ambassador Tueller, of the State of Utah, is a career member of the Senior Foreign Service.  His other overseas assignments have included Ambassador to Yemen, Ambassador to Kuwait, Deputy Chief of Mission at Embassy Cairo; Political Minister Counselor at Embassy Baghdad; Deputy Chief of Mission at Embassy Kuwait; Political Counselor at Embassy Riyadh; Chief of the U.S. Office in Aden, Yemen; Deputy Chief of Mission at Embassy Doha; Political Officer at Embassy London; and Political Officer and Consular Officer at Embassy Amman.  His Washington assignments have included Deputy Director in the Office of Northern Gulf Affairs and Egypt Desk Officer.

Ambassador Tueller holds a B.A. from Brigham Young University and a M.P.P. from Harvard University’s John F. Kennedy School of Government.  He was confirmed by the Senate to be Ambassador to Iraq on May 16 and presented his credentials to the Iraqi government on June 9, 2019. Ambassador Tueller is married to DeNeece Gurney of Provo, Utah and they are parents of five children.

Ambassador to Yemen Matthew Tueller
(photo by US Embassy Yemen/FB)

Ambassador Tueller’s arrival completes the top leadership roles in Mission Iraq.  Joey Hood is now the Deputy Chief of Mission after serving as CDA;  Timmy Davis as Consul General for Basrah (mandatory evacuated in September 2018), and  Steven Fagin as Consul General in Erbil.