US Embassy Kinshasa Now on ‘Authorized Departure’ For Non-Emergency Personnel in the DRC

Posted: 6:13  pm PT

 

On September 30, 2016, the State Department placed family members of USG employees in the Democratic Republic of Congo on mandatory evacuation (see US Embassy Kinshasa Now on ‘Ordered Departure’ For Family Members of USG Employees). On December 2, the State Department issued a new Travel Warning and announced the “authorized departure” or voluntary departure of non-emergency personnel by December 10 due to the deteriorating security situation in the country. The Travel Warning also urged U.S. citizens to depart the country before December 19.  Excerpt Below:

The U.S. Embassy in Kinshasa warns U.S. citizens of the potential for large-scale demonstrations and civil unrest on/around December 19, the date on which President Kabila’s term in office was due to end before elections were delayed.

U.S. citizens in the DRC should seriously consider leaving the country in advance of this date. As a result of the deteriorating security situation, the Department of State has ordered family members of U.S. government personnel and authorized non-emergency personnel to depart the country as of December 10, 2016. This replaces the Travel Warning dated October 7, 2016.
U.S. citizens should consider taking advantage of departing commercial flights and other transportation options now.  All U.S. citizens should have evacuation plans that do not rely solely on U.S. government assistance.  U.S. citizens should ensure that travel documents (passports and visas) are valid and up-to-date.  Consular services, already limited throughout the country due to very poor transportation infrastructure and security conditions, may be further limited even in Kinshasa.

U.S. citizens who decide to remain in DRC through December 19 should prepare for the possible deterioration of security:

  • Exercise caution and remain abreast of the security situation.
  • Follow the instructions of local authorities.
  • Stay home or at another safe location.
  • Have emergency supplies of food, water, and medications.
  • Let friends and family know that there might be communication disruptions.

Additional recommendations on emergency preparedness are available on the Travel.State.gov web page “What Can You Do in a Crisis Abroad?

In addition, ongoing instability and sporadic violence continue in parts of the DRC. Armed groups, bandits, and some elements of the Congolese armed forces operate in:

  • North Kivu
  • South Kivu
  • Bas-Uele
  • Haut-Uele
  • Ituri
  • Tanganyika
  • Haut-Lomami.

These groups kill, rape, kidnap, pillage, steal vehicles, and carry out military or paramilitary operations in which civilians can be indiscriminately targeted.  Kidnapping for ransom is common, particularly in areas north and west of Goma, North Kivu.  Congolese military and United Nations forces continue to operate throughout North and South Kivu and near the DRC’s borders with the Central African Republic and the Republic of South Sudan, particularly in and around Garamba National Park. Travelers in the region may encounter troop movements, armored vehicles and attack helicopters.

Travelers are frequently detained and questioned by poorly trained security forces at official and unofficial roadblocks and border crossings throughout the country, especially near government buildings and installations in Kinshasa.  Be cautious when stopped by security forces.  Requests for bribes are extremely common, and security forces have occasionally injured or killed people who refuse to pay.  In the past year, several U.S. citizens have been illegally detained by government forces or robbed of their valuables while being searched.

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Trump Chats With Taiwan’s President, a First? Since Diplomatic Relations Cut in 1979. Uh-oh! #OneChina

Posted: 4:21  pm PT

 

Via history.state.gov:

During Jimmy Carter’s presidency, the most dramatic moment in Sino-American relations occurred on December 15, 1978, when, following months of secret negotiations, the United States and the People’s Republic of China (PRC) announced that they would recognize one another and establish official diplomatic relations. As part of the agreement, the United States recognized the Government of the People’s Republic of China as the sole legal government of China, and declared it would withdraw diplomatic recognition from Taiwan (also known as the Republic of China [ROC]).
[…]
A new era began with a rapprochement during Richard Nixon’s presidency. Nixon and his aide, Henry Kissinger, found ready partners in Mao Zedong, the Chairman of the Chinese Communist Party, and Zhou Enlai, the Chinese Premier, who also wanted to improve Sino-U.S. relations. Their efforts resulted in the Shanghai Communiqué, which laid the basis for future cooperation between the two countries even while acknowledging continuing disagreements on the subject of Taiwan. As part of this rapprochement, the two countries opened liaison offices in one another’s capitals in 1973, a time when Taiwan still had an Embassy in Washington. The liaison offices, which in many ways operated as de facto embassies, represented a significant concession by the People’s Republic of China, which opposed the acceptance of “two Chinas” because that implied both were legitimate governments.
[…]
PRC leaders repeatedly expressed displeasure with the Taiwan Relations Act (TRA), which became law on April 10, 1979. The TRA was influenced by Congressional supporters of Taiwan and stated that it is the policy of the United States “to provide Taiwan with arms of a defensive character; and to maintain the capacity of the United States to resist any resort to force or other forms of coercion that would jeopardize the security, or the social or economic system, of the people on Taiwan.” In his signing statement, Carter declared that he would use the discretion granted to him by Congress to interpret the TRA “in a manner consistent with our interest in the well-being of the people on Taiwan and with the understandings we reached on the normalization of relations with the People’s Republic of China.”
[…]
On January 1, 1979, the United States recognized the PRC and established diplomatic relations with it as the sole legitimate government of China. On the same day, the United States withdrew its recognition of, and terminated diplomatic relations with, the Republic of China as the government of China.  The U.S. embassy in Taipei was closed on February 28, 1979. The U.S. Liaison Office in Beijing was converted to an Embassy on March 1, 1979, and Leonard F. Woodcock, who had been head of the Liaison Office, was appointed Ambassador.

 

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Ex-Security Guard #AdamaBarrow Defeats Gambian Dictator #YahyaJammeh

Posted: 4:04  pm ET

 

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FBI to Veteran Diplomat Robin Raphel: “Do you know any foreigners?” #criminalizingdiplomacy

Posted: 1:29  pm ET

 

We’ve posted previously about Ambassador Robin Raphel in this blog. See Case Against Veteran Diplomat Robin Raphel Ends Without Charges, Who’s Gonna Say Sorry?. Also below:

Today, the Wall Street Journal runs an extensive account of what happened and why this case is a concerning one for American diplomats:

The NSA regularly swept up Pakistani communications “to, from or about” senior U.S. officials working in the country. Some American officials would appear in Pakistani intercepts as often as once a week. What Raphel didn’t realize was that her desire to engage with foreign officials, the very skill set her supervisors encouraged, had put a target on her back.

The FBI didn’t have a clear picture of where Raphel fit on the State Department organizational chart. She was a political adviser with the rank of ambassador but she wasn’t a key policy maker anymore. She seemed to have informal contacts with everyone who mattered in Islamabad—more, even, than the sitting ambassador and the CIA station chief.

[…]
State Department officials said that when they spoke to the FBI agents, they had the feeling they were explaining the basics of how diplomats worked.

At times, Raphel’s colleagues pushed back—warning the FBI that their investigation risked “criminalizing diplomacy,” according to a former official who was briefed on the interviews.

In one interview, the agents asked James Dobbins, who served as SRAP from 2013 to 2014, whether it was OK for Raphel to talk to a Pakistani source about information that wasn’t restricted at the time, but would later be deemed classified.

“If somebody tells you something in one conversation, you might write that up and it becomes classified,” he said. “But that doesn’t mean the next time you see them that you can’t talk about what you’d already talked about.”

[…]

Over the past two years, diplomats in Pakistan and the U.S. have scaled back contacts, according to officials in both countries. U.S. diplomats say they are afraid of what the NSA and the FBI might hear about them.

“What happened to Raphel could happen to any of us,” said Ryan Crocker, one of the State Department’s most highly decorated career ambassadors. Given the empowerment of law enforcement after 9/11 and the U.S.’s growing reliance on signals intelligence in place of diplomatic reporting, he said, “we will know less and we will be less secure.”

“Look what happened to the one person who was out talking to people,” said Dan Feldman, Raphel’s former boss at State. “Does that not become a cautionary tale?”

[…]

Diplomatic Security had yet to restore her security clearance. Some of her friends at the State Department said they believed the FBI opposed the idea.

Kerry and Raphel stood close together for only a couple of minutes. On the sidelines of the noisy gathering, Kerry leaned over and whispered into Raphel’s ear: “I am sorry about what has happened to you.”

Read in full below:

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US Embassy Accra’s “Operation Spartan Vanguard” Shuts Down Fake U.S. Embassy in Ghana

Posted: 12:23 am ET

 

Via state.gov/DS

In Accra, Ghana, there was a building that flew an American flag outside every Monday, Tuesday, and Friday, 7:30 a.m.-12:00 p.m. Inside hung a photo of President Barack Obama, and signs indicated that you were in the U.S. Embassy in Ghana. However, you were not. This embassy was a sham.

It was not operated by the United States government, but by figures from both Ghanaian and Turkish organized crime rings and a Ghanaian attorney practicing immigration and criminal law. The “consular officers” were Turkish citizens who spoke English and Dutch.

For about a decade it operated unhindered; the criminals running the operation were able to pay off corrupt officials to look the other way, as well as obtain legitimate blank documents to be doctored.

This past summer the assistant regional security officer investigator (ARSO-I) at the real U.S. Embassy in Accra, in cooperation with the Ghana Police Force, Ghana Detectives Bureau, and other international partners, shut down this fake embassy.

This investigation is a small part of the broader “Operation Spartan Vanguard” initiative. “Operation Spartan Vanguard” was developed by Diplomatic Security agents in the Regional Security Office (RSO) at U.S. Embassy Ghana in order to address trafficking and fraud plaguing the U.S. Embassy and the region.

During the course of another fraud investigation in “Operation Spartan Vanguard” an informant tipped off the ARSO-I about the fake U.S. embassy, as well as a fake Netherlands embassy operating in Accra.

After receiving the tip, the ARSO-I, who is the point person in the RSO shop for “Operation Spartan Vanguard” investigations, verified the information with partners within the Ghanaian Police Force. The ARSO-I then created an international task force composed of the aforementioned Ghana Police Force, as well as the Ghana Detective Bureau, Ghana SWAT, and officials from the Canadian Embassy to investigate further.

The investigation identified the main architects of the criminal operation, and two satellite locations (a dress shop and an apartment building) used for operations. The fake embassy did not accept walk-in visa appointments; instead, they drove to the most remote parts of West Africa to find customers. They would shuttle the customers to Accra, and rent them a room at a hotel nearby. The Ghanaian organized crime ring would shuttle the victims to and from the fake embassies. Locating the document vendor within the group led investigators to uncover the satellite locations and key players.

The sham embassy advertised their services through flyers and billboards to cultivate customers from Ghana, Cote d’Ivoire, and Togo. Some of the services the embassy provided for these customers included issuance of fraudulently obtained, legitimate U.S. visas, counterfeit visas, false identification documents (including bank records, education records, birth certificates, and others) for a cost of $6,000.

The exterior of the fake embassy in Accra, Ghana. (U.S. Department of State photo)

The exterior of the fake embassy in Accra, Ghana. (U.S. Department of State photo)

Exterior of the legitimate U.S. Embassy in Accra, Ghana (U.S. Department of State photo)

Exterior of the legitimate U.S. Embassy in Accra, Ghana (U.S. Department of State photo)

Read in full here: http://www.state.gov/m/ds/rls/263916.htm.

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Giving Thanks 2016: Around the Foreign Service

Posted:1:14 am ET

 

 

 

Related posts:

From Someone Who Has Unfortunately Been There: Sexual Assault Trauma Triage in the Foreign Service

Posted: 1:51 am ET

 

In response to our post — First Person: I am a ✂️ FSO who was ✂️ raped in ✂️… Continuing on has been ✂️ incredibly difficult…, we received the following from a Foreign Service member who does not want to be identified but sent a note that says “here are some suggestions for sexual assault trauma triage in the FS, from someone who has unfortunately been there.”  

1. Reach out to someone outside of DOS for support, like friends and family back home whose discretion you trust. There is so much shame involved in sexual assault, but you do not have to go through this alone.

2. Find a therapist (PhD preferable). Sexual assault survivors report the most improvement with Cognitive Processing Therapy (CPT) and EMDR (you’ll likely have to do this domestically). If you can’t find a CPT sexual assault specialist, try going to your closest VA hospital’s website and look for one there. Reach out to her and ask for a private practice referral for sexual assault in a military-like service. Since you’re overseas, you may be able to find a private CPT specialist who does Skype/telephone. Be prepared to pay out-of-pocket, and it won’t be cheap. And speaking of costs: CPT for sexual assault may be the most psychologically taxing thing you’ve ever done, but it is worth it. I promise.

3. Consider a medical curtailment to get yourself out of the situation immediately. The only department that I trust at DOS is MED. Fill out a MED update form, and note the questions on what should be the second page (related to PTSD). Check whichever boxes are relevant to you. You can also write down there what happened to you—something as simple as “Sexual assault at Post” will suffice. They will have a psychiatrist reach out to you—and you can request a female psychiatrist. If they don’t immediately contact you, start calling twice a day until you get what you need. Depending on your symptoms, you may qualify for a Limited Class 2, but if you need to be back in the U.S. for intensive counseling (and there is no shame in doing so, your well-being is the priority), they can work with you on getting you a Class 4 so that therapy can happen domestically.

4. FSO Friend who wrote in: I know that curtailment can seem like he wins. But this is emergency triage, and you may need to retreat to a place of safety (far away from him) until you have healed enough to decide your next steps. This is a “put on your oxygen mask before attempting to help others” level-situation. Please don’t be ashamed of curtailment if that is what you need to do for you. You are the priority right now. Please don’t tough it out and expose yourself to further harm–including the psychological trauma of being around him regularly. And please don’t suffer in silence. Out of all of the organizations at DOS that claim that they can help, I believe that MED actually can help you. Please use MED if it’s appropriate for you.

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This is one person’s suggestions based on her experience and perspective and we’re passing this along for consideration. Since the sender did not provide a return email, we have not been able to ask follow-up questions. We have to respect that this is all that she is able to share at this time. She reached out to this blog out of concern for the FSO who was raped.  We will leave this up to you to consider which of her suggestions may be worth exploring depending on what feels appropriate in your case.

Read more about Cognitive Processing Therapy (CPT) (PDF).

Read here on the Eye Movement Desensitization and Reprocessing (EMDR).

Curtailment is the shortening an employee’s tour of duty from his or her assignment.  It may include the employee’s immediate departure from a bureau or post, or from assignments in the U.S.  3 FAM 2440 says that curtailment is an assignment action, not a disciplinary one. Folks, of course, know that in real life that’s not always true.

Please note that 3 FAM 2444 allows an employee assigned within the United States to request voluntary curtailment of his or her tour of duty for any reason “by submitting the request and an explanatory memorandum to the assignments panel via his or her counseling and assignments officer. The bureau of assignment must state its support for or opposition to the employee’s request.”  What happens if one is a sexual assault victim in a domestic assignment or while on extended TDY or on training and have to go through this to get curtailed from an assignment where the perpetrator is also located? Imagine this happening to an untenured employee. What  does one write in the explanatory memo — I was raped, and I need to curtail my assignment because my attacker is right next door? How many folks will get to see that memo? Something for the new State Department task force to think about.

We should add that another FS member’s medical clearance was downgraded to a Domestic only (Class 5)  after reporting to MED.  12 FAM 210 notes that Class 5 is issued to all who have a medical condition which is incapacitating or for which specialized medical care is best obtained in the United States.  Employees or eligible family members with a Class 5 medical clearance may not be assigned outside the United States.  So right there, that’s really scary stuff for Foreign Service folks.

On November 22, the State Department directed a task force to create a new Foreign Service Manual section for sexual assault (see U/S For Management Directs Task Force to Create New Sexual Assault FAM Guidance).

 

Sexual Assault Related posts:

 

 

U/S For Management Directs Task Force to Create New Sexual Assault FAM Guidance

Posted: 5:08 pm PT

 

The message below addressing sexual assault was sent to all State Department employees on November 22, 2016.  Several copies landed in our inbox.  The State Department sent us a note that says they want to make absolutely sure that we have seen this, and gave us an “officially provided” copy.

 

A Message from Under Secretary Pat Kennedy
November 22, 2016

Sexual assault is a serious crime.  It can traumatize victims and have a corrosive effect on the workplace.  The Department is determined to do all it can to prevent sexual assault, and, if it does occur, to support victims and bring the perpetrators to justice.  We are committed to effectively and sensitively responding to reports of sexual assault and to ensuring victims are treated with the care and respect they deserve.

The Department has policies and procedures relating to sexual harassment and workplace violence.  We recognize these policies may not address all issues specific to sexual assault and that sexual assault is more appropriately dealt with in its own FAM section.  At my direction, an inter-bureau taskforce is in the process of creating this new FAM section.  Among the issues the taskforce will take up are reporting processes, confidentiality, sexual assault response training, and potential conflict of interest issues.

As we work to complete a stand-alone sexual assault FAM section, it’s important to note that there are and have been policies and procedures in place to help employees and their family members who are sexually assaulted get the medical care they need and to bring perpetrators to justice.

Medical services are available at post, and personnel from the Bureau of Medical Services (MED) can also provide advice from Washington, DC.  Post’s Health Unit healthcare providers are the first responders for medical evaluation and treatment overseas and will abide by strict patient/provider confidentiality.  An employee or member of the Department community who has been sexually assaulted may also report the incident to MED’s Clinical Director (currently Dr. Behzad Shahbazian) at 202-663-2976 during business hours.  After hours and on weekends/holidays, victims may contact the MED Duty Officer at 202-262-9013 or via the Operations Center at 202-647-1512.

For reported sexual assaults that are committed by or against members of the Department community or occur within a COM facility or residence, RSOs serve as the law enforcement first responders.  Every reported sexual assault is handled as a criminal matter that may be prosecuted in the United States under federal extraterritorial laws.  For more guidance on the handling of such cases, see 16 STATE 56478.

If a victim overseas wants to report a sexual assault to law enforcement authorities, but prefers not to report it at post, he or she can contact the Office of Special Investigations (DS/DO/OSI), via telephone at 571-345-3146 or via email at DS-OSIDutyAgent@state.gov<mailto:DS-OSIDutyAgent@state.gov>.  The DS/DO/OSI duty agents are available 24 hours a day, seven days a week and can investigate an allegation independent of post management.  OSI agents have been trained to handle such cases and will work with the victim and can also provide information about the Victims’ Resource Advocacy Program available at vrap@state.gov<mailto:vrap@state.gov>.

Victims may also report sexual harassment directly to the Office of Civil Rights<http://socr.state.sbu/OCR/Default.aspx?ContentId=6666> (S/OCR) at http://snip.state.gov/f5h or via phone at 202-647-9295 and ask to speak with an Attorney-Adviser.  Pursuant to 3 FAM 1525, S/OCR oversees the Department’s compliance with anti-harassment laws and policies and conducts harassment inquiries.

The working group developing the new FAM section is consulting with other agencies about best practices in such areas as communication, training, and post-attack medical and mental health support and will integrate appropriate elements of these programs to ensure that the Department’s policies on sexual assault are victim centered and effective.

The Department’s position is clear: there is zero tolerance for any form of violence, including sexual assault, within our Department community. We understand these are sensitive and difficult situations, but we strongly encourage victims to come forward so the Department can take the appropriate steps to ensure the victim’s safety and bring the perpetrator to justice.

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Sexual Assault Related posts:

A Sexual Assault Reporting Process Foreign Service Members Deserve: If Not Now, When? Attn: @JohnKerry #16days

Posted: 2:13 am ET
Updated: 11:47 am PT

 

For victims/survivors of sexual assault, please see Sexual Assault in the Foreign Service — What To Do?  Consider below as a follow-up post to The State Dept’s Sexual Assault Reporting Procedure Appears to Be a Black Hole of Grief.

The following is provided for general information that is intended, but not guaranteed, to be correct and up-to-date. Please do not consider the following legal advice as we are not lawyers; read the full necessary disclaimer below.

The Rape, Abuse & Incest National Network (RAINN) has the following sexual violence statistics:

  • On average, there are 288,820 victims (age 12 or older) of rape and sexual assault each year in the United States
  • Ages 12-34 are the highest risk years for rape and sexual assault
  • 90% of adult rape victims are female
  • 94% of women who are raped experience post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD) symptoms during the two weeks following the rape.
  • 30% of women report PTSD symptoms 9 months after the rape.
  • 33% of women who are raped contemplate suicide.
  • The majority of perpetrators are someone known to the victim. Approximately 3 out of 4 of sexual assaults are committed by someone known to the victim

Rape notification rates differ depending on whether the victim know the perpetrator — those who knew a perpetrator were often less likely to report the crime, according to RAINN. A report (PDF) published by the National Sexual Violence Resource Center says that many survivors experience great difficulty in disclosing a sexual assault, especially when the perpetrator is known to the victim. The study is focused on rural America where “the propensity to not report may be reinforced by informal social codes that dictate privacy and maintaining family reputation. Sexual assaults in rural areas are mostly hidden crimes, hidden both intentionally and unintentionally by characteristics of a close-knit culture or an isolated lifestyle.”  Rural communities like small towns as places where “everybody knows everybody.” Sounds familiar?

A victim will have little anonymity. It means she, or a friend or family member is likely to be acquainted with or related to the perpetrator and that she may reencounter the perpetrator, even on a regular basis. Furthermore, “the closer the relationship between victim and assailant, the less likely the woman is to report the crime” (Hunter, Burns-Smith, Walsh, 1996). Studies have quite consistently pointed to the importance of the victim-offender relationship in affecting the propensity to report (Pollard, 1995; Ruback, 1993, Ruback & Ménard, 2001). In rural areas, law enforcement is likely to be part of the social network (Sims, 1988; Weisheit, Wells & Falcone, 1994; Weisheit, Wells & Falcome, 1995). This compounds the problem of reporting non-stranger sexual assaults.

We need to point out that in the Foreign Service, particularly overseas, Diplomatic Security law enforcement –as in rural communities and small towns — is part of the social network.

We should also note that a 2002 study by Lisak-Miller indicates (PDF) that a majority of the undetected rapists were repeat rapists. The repeat rapists averaged 5.8 rapes each.

According to the Callisto Project, which provides survivors with a confidential and secure way to create a time-stamped record of an assault in American campuses less than 10% of survivors will ever report their assault. Survivors wait an average of 11 months to report their assault to authorities and up to 90% of assaults are committed by repeat perpetrators.  Callisto’s CEO Jess Ladd told us that someday she would like to make available their product within other institutions (including companies and agencies) and to have a free version that anyone can use to store what happened.  But Callisto is not there yet.


Foreign Service Victims’ Concerns

Among the concerns we’ve heard so far are: 1) lack of clear reporting process, 2) confidentiality, 3) sexual assault response training, 4) potential conflict/undue pressure on investigators/managers who may be friends, colleague, or subordinates of perpetrators, and 5) lack of sexual assault data.

As we’re written here previously DOD and Peace Corps provide restricted and unrestricted reporting for victims, but that does not appear to be the case in the Foreign Service.  The State Department has over 275 posts in about 180 countries. The agency’s Diplomatic Security has Regional Security Offices in most locations but not all.  The State Department has previously told this blog that Diplomatic Security’s Office of Special Investigations  “receives and catalogues allegations and complaints. Allegations are neither categorized by location nor by alleged offense.” Which begs the question, how will the State Department know if it has sexual predators living among its various communities particularly overseas if it does not track these types of offenses?

Due to the lack of clear reporting process — except “report to RSO” or “contact OSI,” victims (as well as this blog) have no way to independently assess what reporting entails. We don’t know what kind of confidentiality is afforded the victims. Among other concerns and questions:

  • When we asked an FS assault victim if there is any good option for reporting sexual assault, we were told bluntly, “There is no good option. That’s what the predator knows.” 
  • When a victim reports to RSO overseas, we know that the RSO is supposed to contact State/OSI, but who else has access to that information?   Embassy/post leadership? Which officials in the embassy hierarchy?  Will the local Health Unit be informed? The CLO? State/MED? DS Command Center?  And will reporting victims be informed in advanced who their information will be shared with and the specific reason for sharing their information?
  • Do DS/OSI investigators travel to the location of the assault to investigate? Time and evidence collection are of the essence in sexual assault reporting.  If yes, how quickly?  Is there a have rapid response team? What should the victim do while waiting for the arrival of DS/OSI investigators? Not shower? Not go to work?
  • In countries where sexual assault victims are jailed for “promiscuity”, what is the State Department’s policy and recommendation to someone assaulted in a place where requesting a rape kit means going to jail? Would the Department work with local authorities to actually protect the victim from prosecution while DS investigates or would they just allow an already traumatized victim to get PNG’d and force them to pack up and leave?
  • How will the victim’s report be transmitted to DS/OSI? Via unclassified email? Via fax? Via phone? In the case of emails, what restricts that information from being forwarded with a click of a mouse, or the record being compromised intentionally or unintentionally?
  • How are victims’ reporting records protected?  What are the consequences for an employee/s with access to the victim’s report who shares it with an unauthorized entity or individual? What if it is shared with a colleague, or a friends, or a family member?
  • What kind of training do RSOs get to enable them to assist sexual assault victims overseas? “Does every single RSO in the world know a designated medical facility to process a rape kit?” Or for that matter, do Health Units at overseas posts even have this information available?
  • Victims who report to RSO or DS/OSI would like to know if the officers receiving their sexual assault reports represent the victims’ interests or State Department interests?
  • What support is available to victims? What can victims expect after they report their assaults?  What consequences will their reporting have on their medical clearance and assignments? What kind of work accommodation will be extended to them, if needed? Who will be their effective has the responsibility to advocate for them if they need to file workers’ comp from the Department of Labor?
  • How are perpetrators — who are not strangers — handled by the State Department?  This is not a hypothetical question.  An OIG investigation indicates that one security officer’s alleged sexual misconduct spanned 10 years and 7 posts.  In that case, the Department never attempted to remove the RSO from Department work environments where the RSO could potentially harm other employees.  DS agents investigating the 2011 allegations reported to DS management, in October 2011, that they had gathered “overwhelming evidence” of the RSO’s culpability.  These agents encountered resistance from senior Department and DS managers as they continued to investigate the RSO’s suspected misconduct in 2011. The OIG found that the managers in question had personal relationships with the RSO.  Folks who work at the State Department should ask questions like who are these senior Department and DS managers who allowed this to happen for 10 years and 7 posts?  Do they have other friends that they have similarly protected? What happened to the victims at 7 posts? What support were available to them?  What responsibility does the State Department have for not removing that employee despite overwhelming evidence of culpability?


FOIA Diplomatic Security’s sexual assault cables?

As readers here know, there is no official guidance in the FAM on reporting sexual assault in the Foreign Service (see The State Dept’s Sexual Assault Reporting Procedure Appears to Be a Black Hole of Grief). We’ve requested the unclassified cables that were released by DS/OSI in 2015 and earlier this year on sexual assault reporting (15 State 71370;  15 State 79760;  and 16 STATE 5647all reportedly available at DS/OSI intranet). Since the information is unclassified and it could be useful information, we thought we could save time and money by requesting these through regular channels without having to FOIA them. We appreciate the efforts of those who were trying to obtain these for us through regular channels; we understand some folks worked through the weekend to attend to this requests. Thanks, folks!  Late Monday, we got word from a State Department spokesperson:

“Our thanks for your patience while the Department reviewed the practice of releasing State Department internal cables to members of the public or media. At this stage, a decision has been made that we are unable to release cables in this manner.”

Unbelievable! But it is what it is.  We need, therefore, to FOIA these unclassified cables. Given State’s FOIA processing record, we don’t expect to see these cables until 1-2-3-4 years down the road. We might be dead of heartbreak by then.


State/OIG Hotline and Office of Special Counsel

State/OIG has reiterated to us that that their office takes allegations of rape and sexual harassment very seriously and repeated the response they provided us back in August here.  Note that we have already been told that cases like this should not be reported to the OIG Hotline.  Read more here: Another Note About the Burn Bag–There’s No Easy Way of Doing This, Is There?.  State/OIG told us that Department employees who believe they have been subjected to whistleblower retaliation may contact OIG or the Office of Special Counsel (OSC). OIG can help the individual in understanding their rights and may investigate the retaliation, as well as alert the Department to any illegal reprisal.  State/OIG also said: “By no means do we want to discourage anyone from contacting our Hotline, but such a serious crime as a rape needs to be dealt with immediately and that’s why we recommend a call to local law enforcement.”

Continue reading

First Person: I did everything right. I filed a report the next business day … #FSassault

Posted: 12:55 am  ET

 

I did everything right. I filed a report the next business day with RSO. The accused was removed from post shortly thereafter. 

My victimization didn’t really begin until I sought assistance 6 months later from MED when I arrived at my next post. MED sent me on a MEDEVAC to DC from my post to a facility that didn’t treat trauma and required I take a $60 taxi each way daily from Oakwood Falls Church where most of my colleagues from my unaccompanied post were staying due to long term training. 

MED refused to discharge me for weeks despite requests for relocation and a new treatment plan. I finally found my own providers online when the State Department didn’t provide a list of referrals prior to my discharge. 

Then, the MEDEVAC team advised me of their recommendation for a Class 5 medical clearance (domestic only) without ever speaking to my psychiatrist and without providing a reason. 

I filed appeals of my medical clearance without success all the way to the Director General. 

MED refused to assist with my PTSD claim for worker’s compensation despite the reported incident occurring at the U.S. Embassy in a warzone where we can’t leave the compound. 

My out of pocket medical expenses (therapist/ psychiatrist/medicine) would not be covered once my MEDEVAC ended. My housing was paid for at my post and my children were enrolled in the international school. We didn’t receive our HHE for 6 months after having someone else pack out our goods. 

Without access to the State Department system, it was nearly impossible to secure an onward assignment. I didn’t have contact information for my 360s and no access to my employee profile. I went house shopping in DC with a realtor and was advised there was no suitable housing for a family of my size at an amount I could afford. Washington, DC has bedroom occupancy regulations which made it difficult to accommodate. 

The State Department sent me to the brink of financial ruin. I took a huge pay cut, lost my paid housing, my kids lost their prestigious school, and my spouse lost job opportunities available at post all because I was a victim and sought assistance from MED.

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The account above is an unsolicited email from a Foreign Service employee who did not want us to use her name but wanted to share her story. She said she previously served in Israel, Iraq, Colombia, Venezuela, Georgia, and Afghanistan, all with a Class 1 medical clearance, meaning “worldwide available” for Foreign Service assignments. She told us she was also last promoted in 2015. 

According to her, Diplomatic Security asked if she wanted to go to the medical unit but she declined. Regarding the perpetrator, she said, “I have no verification that he is overseas with his family, but he is listed on the GAL [global address list] and so is his wife.”  She added, “He had also destroyed government property ✂️ and was highly intoxicated in the middle of the night when he was subdued by security. It apparently had no effect on his security clearance or medical clearance as he had the ability to serve overseas at his next post with his family.” 

She said that she chose to stay at her post in the warzone until the end of her tour so she would not lose her onward assignment. She arrived at her onward post in Europe and was  subsequently medically evacuated (MEDEVAC) after she contacted MED.

She told this blog, “I was never hospitalized. I was never a threat to myself or others. It is hard to believe that this is my life. The biggest issue I have is that I was never provided a reason as to why my clearance was denied other than a generic “best care is available in the U.S.” 

The post she was evacuated from is a European post with high level of medical care including English speaking therapists and psychiatrists. Post has a resident regional medical officer (RMO) and a resident regional medical officer/psychiatrist (RMO/P).

The FS employee told us she is on leave without pay and believed that her OWCP claim (Office of Workers’ Compensation Programs) for PTSD was one of the factors in the downgrading of her medical clearance.

She shared with us an OCWP letter in which “Under Accepted Event(s) That Are Factors of Employment” is this:

“– That while assigned to the US embassy in ✂️ from 2014-2015. you were sexually harassed and assaulted by a colleague who was under the influence of alcohol after checking on him at his room.” 

We hope to have a follow-up post on the MED – OCA – OCWP mess.

 

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