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Diplomatic Security’s Basic Special Agent (BSAC) Training: Sexual Harassment Alert!

Posted: 2:21 pm PT

 

In August 2016, the Bureau of Diplomatic Security’s Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary for Diplomatic Security and Director of the Diplomatic Security Service (DSS) Bill Miller sent a message on sexual harassment to bureau employees.  We published the entire message here, Below is an excerpt of that 2016 statement:

Diplomatic Security takes sexual harassment extremely seriously – not only as an issue in the State Department, but also especially within our Bureau. 

In our response to questions from Diplopundit on this issue July 27, we noted that we find unacceptable any behavior that threatens people’s well-being in the workplace, or in any way diminishes someone’s professional capacity. 

Sexual harassment is an attack on the values this organization seeks to protect every day.  It compromises our charge to protect the workplace rights and ensure a safe environment for all Department employees.
[…]
As a law enforcement organization, we must hold ourselves to the highest standards of ethical conduct. As the leader of this organization, I hold every employee accountable to that standard and will not accept any less of them.

Sexual harassment and sexual assault are serious issues that affect both men and women. We condemn any comment that seeks to trivialize these activities or their impact on victims. 

Diplomatic Security personnel are made aware of their responsibilities as law enforcement officers and federal employees from the beginning of their employment with the Department.  DS employees receive recurring training on equal employment opportunity guidelines, prohibiting discriminatory practices, harassment in all its forms, and promotion of diversity and inclusiveness throughout their career. 

During the Basic Special Agent Course, Basic Regional Security Officer (RSO) and RSO advanced courses, individuals from the DS Victim’s Resource Advocacy Program provide classes on responding to sexual assault.

I am disappointed and disturbed to hear that anyone in our organization would be concerned about being stigmatized for coming forward to report sexual harassment or sexual assault.  It is unacceptable that we have employees of any gender who may not feel comfortable reporting such activities.

This week, we received an email from a new Diplomatic Security Service (DSS) agent detailing sexual language that female student-agents had to endure during Diplomatic Security’s Basic Special Agent Course (BSAC) training. The writer expressed concern over the “worrisome behavior by senior agents conducting the training” and the apparent tolerance by others witnessing such behavior.  The writer also wrote: “One senior female agent advised me that upon receipt of this complaint, DSS Management’s first response will likely be to try to figure out who the “complainer” is . . rather than dealing with the senior agents responsible for damaging the department’s reputation.”  Our corespondent suggests that if investigators outside of Diplomatic Security want to look into this, all they need to do is talk to the female agents in BSAC’s 137, 136, and 135.

The report below is what we can share publicly.  This writer like our other correspondents in the past, is also wary of retaliation.  We’ve referred to Special Agent #1 as SA#1 although we can certainly imagine a more colorful name. Special Agent #2 is also referred below as SA#2.

ALERT! ALERT! ALEEEEERT!

Received via email from a DSS Special Agent

-START-

Here is what I witnessed:

1) During protective training, I was assigned to a follow car that was “coached” by [Special Agent #1]. During our time with [SA#1], myself and the other females in the group had to listen to [SA#1] describe in detail how during his time in Baghdad he shaved his “balls” and had problems with them “sticking.” [SA#1] then felt it appropriate to detail a trip to his doctor where he had a consultation about erectile medication. [SA#1] also made repeated derogatory comments about his wife. My memory is a little fuzzy on those comments, but they were along the line of, “the old ball and chain, etc.”

I should mention that one of the female agents present is only 22 years old. So this young agent, in her first real job out of college had to sit (literally right next to [SA#1] in the back seat / physically touching him) and listen to [SA#1] , her supervisor, go on and on about his sticky balls in Baghdad and his erectile disfunction . . .i.e. he was discussing his penis.

2) The protection portion of the training was run by unit chief [Special Agent #2]. I personally was “creeped” out by [SA#2] during the entire training as he would try to flirt with the female students in a very unprofessional manner. [SA#2] really crossed the line, however, when for some reason he decided to ask one of the female students (now an agent) for their phone and proceeded to look through it. [SA#2] found the phone number or a text message in the female student-agent’s phone for one of the male contractors working on our final exercise, and texted “I miss you” to the contractor (from the female student/agent’s phone). The female student/agent was of course mortified as it appeared she was texting “I miss you” to the contractor. Is this appropriate behavior from a Unit Supervisor in the training division?!

[SA#2’s] inappropriate behavior continued when, during a re-test he decided to switch out a male student-agent from the position sitting next to him in the exercise to the above mentioned female student-agent. [SA#2] advised the entire BSAC that he was making the switch so he could have someone to “talk to.” He was supposed to be grading the re-test, but instead decided to use the time to creepily attempt to flirt with the female student-agent.

I am sure the above behavior by [SAs #1 and #2] has been repeated in multiple BSAC’s and I hope the department conducts a thorough investigation. Honestly, however, I am not so optimistic that things will change. I know Diplopundit has documented several such sexual harassment claims in the not so distant past, and yet, the above Supervisory SAs seemed to have no compunction in openly behaving this way in front of the 20 plus student-agents!

Where are the Director and the other senior members of DSS management?!! If they cannot protect/prevent a 21 year female agent from having to listen to Supervisory SAs like [SA#1 and SA#2] while she sits in training, how can DSS Senior Management be trusted to protect that same agent from harassment while she is serving in a high threat post in a 98% male RSO shop?!

The Director came to speak to our BSAC, and within 3 minutes of our “pep” talk he told us that if we had joined DSS to use it as a stepping stone we should “get the hell out.” That is a direct quote. One day on the job, and the Director comes in and says “get the hell out” in a pep talk. I would like to turn that around on the Director. If the senior leadership in DSS cannot prevent Supervisory Agents from “creeping out” all females in a BSAC class. Or prevent female student-agents from having to listen to Supervisory SA’s conducting BSAC training discuss their “shaved balls,” maybe it is time for the Director and others to “get the hell out” and leave the bureau in more capable hands?

-END-

The Eleventh Circuit’s decision in Henson v. City of Dundee, 682 F.2d 897, 902, 29 EPD ¶ 32,993 (11th Cir. 1982) notes the following:

Sexual harassment which creates a hostile or offensive environment for members of one sex is every bit the arbitrary barrier to sexual equality at the workplace that racial harassment is to racial equality. Surely, a requirement that a man or woman run a gauntlet of sexual abuse in return for the privilege of being allowed to work and made a living can be as demeaning and disconcerting as the harshest of racial epithets.

Female agents should not have to bear and tolerate this kind of language and offensive behavior for the privilege of being allowed to work at Diplomatic Security.

Why would anyone think this is appropriate, acceptable behavior?

And when this is done by individuals in supervisory ranks during training, how do you expect new employees to step up and report this to these same supervisors? The same supervisors, by the way, who can pass/fail employees during basic training. The same supervisors, by the way, who ought to be modeling the highest standards of ethical and professional conduct for agents-in-training.

While the EEOC policy guidance on sexual harassment notes that “sexual flirtation or innuendo, even vulgar language that is trivial or merely annoying, would probably not establish a hostile environment,” it also talks about the pervasiveness and pattern of behavior.

Putting aside our previous reports on harassment at Diplomatic Security for a moment — if we’re talking about three classes to start with here, what is that if not a pattern? And if this behavior was witnessed and tolerated by people and contractors who should know better, then Diplomatic Security has a systemic problem that no broadcast message from bureau officials can fix.

The Supreme Court said in Vinson that for sexual harassment to violate Title VII, it must be “sufficiently severe or pervasive ‘to alter the conditions of [the victim’s] employment and create an abusive working environment.'” 106 S. Ct. at 2406 (quoting Henson v. City of Dundee, 682 F.2d at 904. Since “hostile environment’ harassment takes a variety of forms, many factors may affect this determination, including: (1) whether the conduct was verbal or physical, or both; (2) how frequently it was repeated; (3) whether the conduct was hostile and patently offensive; (4) whether the alleged harasser was a co-worker or a supervisor; (5) whether the others joined in perpetrating the harassment; and (6) whether the harassment was directed at more than one individual.

In determining whether unwelcome sexual conduct rises to the level of a “hostile environment” in violation of Title VII, the central inquiry is whether the conduct “unreasonably interfer[es] with an individual’s work performance” or creates “an intimidating, hostile, or offensive working environment.” 29 C.F.R. § 1604.11(a)(3). Thus, sexual flirtation or innuendo, even vulgar language that is trivial or merely annoying, would probably not establish a hostile environment.

Preventive actions per EEOC‘S Guidelines encourage employers to: “take all steps necessary to prevent sexual harassment from occurring, such as affirmatively raising the subject, expressing strong disapproval, developing appropriate sanctions, informing employees of their right to raise and how to raise the issue of harassment under Title VII, and developing methods to sensitize all concerned.”

Also 29 C.F.R. § 1604.11(f): An effective preventive program should include an explicit policy against sexual harassment that is clearly and regularly communicated to employees and effectively implemented. The employer should affirmatively raise the subject with all supervisory and non- supervisory employees, express strong disapproval, and explain the sanctions for harassment. The employer should also have a procedure for resolving sexual harassment complaints. The procedure should be designed to “encourage victims of harassment to come forward” and should not require a victim to complain first to the offending supervisor. See Vinson, 106 S. Ct. at 2408. It should ensure confidentiality as much as possible and provide effective remedies, including protection of victims and witnesses against retaliation.

All well and good, but in the real world we have these: Chien v. Kerry: DS Agent Files Suit For Race/Sex Discrimination, Hostile Work Environment, and RetaliationInbox: Female Diplomatic Security Agent Pens a Note on Sexual Harassment and Career SuicideAnother Concerned DS Agent Pens Response to Diplomatic Security’s Broadcast Message on Sexual Harassment.

The State Department’s sexual harassment policy is memorialized here.

Related posts:

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New Ambassador to NZ Scott Brown to Arrive at Post With Some Ready Made Headaches in Waiting

We have been a reader-supported blog since 2014. We want to keep this blog as open as possible and that’s the reason we don’t have a subscription fee. You know best whether our work is of value to you or not. If it is, and if your circumstances allow it, we could use your help to carry on for another year: Help Diplopundit Get to Year 10 ⚡️
Posted: 12:25 am ET

 

In January, we heard several concerns about the ongoing construction project at the U.S. Embassy in Wellington, New Zealand related to safety issues, structural and health concerns and communication issues in the work disruption that followed the Kaikoura earthquake in November 2016 (see US Embassy New Zealand’s Chancery Rehab Project: Safety and Health Concerns With Ongoing Construction).  In State/OBO’s response to our prior inquiry, we were told that rehabilitation project of the existing chancery in Wellington to meet seismic and security requirements is scheduled for completion in early 2018.

The new Ambassador to New Zealand and Samoa Scott Brown is reportedly expected to arrive in Wellington this week (also see New Ambassador to New Zealand and Samoa Scott Brown Introduces Self in Home Video). Below is from a new howler we got which shows the new ambassador has ready made headaches to welcome him at his new gig.

“Regarding Embassy Wellington’s seismic upgrade, the latest completion date is now “mid-2019”.

“No deaths on site so far, although there have been a few more injuries, fires, power outages and evacuations.”

“Staff members are now back at the British High Commission with their workspaces scheduled to be consumed by the project again, because we didn’t learn from our mistake last time.”

On a positive note, OBO built post a beautiful new kitchen…which we can’t use during business hours because the only entrance is through the Embassy’s *one* meeting room.

“Will incoming Ambassador Brown be able to make any sense of this mess when he arrives this week?”

“It’d be lovely to have a town hall to welcome him, except that the multi-purpose room is scheduled for teardown this week, too.”

via replygifs.net

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U.S. Embassy Bamako: Gunmen Storm Le Campement Kangaba Tourist Resort in Mali

We have been a reader-supported blog since 2014. We want to keep this blog as open as possible and that’s the reason we don’t have a subscription fee. You know best whether our work is of value to you or not. If it is, and if your circumstances allow it, we could use your help to carry on for another year: Help Diplopundit Get to Year 10 ⚡️
Posted: 3:52 pm PT

 

Last week, the U.S. Embassy in Bamako issued a security message concerning “a possible increased threat of attacks against Western diplomatic missions, places of worship, and other locations in Bamako where Westerners frequent.” (See Security Message for U.S. Citizens: Increased Threat of Attacks in Bamako (9 June, 2017).

On Sunday, June 18, gunmen reportedly attacked a tourist resort in Mali popular with Westerners.  According to BBC News, the gunmen have stormed the luxury resort Le Campement Kangaba, east of the capital Bamako.  The report citing the country’s security minister says that two people are dead, and that the hostages have been released. Two other people had reportedly been injured including a civilian, and that 32 guests had been rescued from the resort.

The U.S. Embassy in Mali says that the resort is 30 minutes southeast of the capital city. We understand that all our embassy folks are fine. State/OSAC is urging travelers in Mali to check in with their families and friends. See related posts below for previous security reports on this hotspot.

Related posts:

U.S. Embassy Ukraine Confirms Security Incident at Mission Compound on June 8

Posted: 1:49 am ET

 

Shortly after 12 AM on June 8, an unknown person reportedly threw an explosive device at the US Embassy in Kyiv.  This was originally reported as an act of terrorism, but local authorities later reclassified the incident as an act of malicious hooliganism.” The US Embassy in Kyiv confirmed the security incident but noting that there was no damage to the property and no personnel were injured.

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US Embassy Kabul: 9 Afghan Guards Killed, 11 American Contractors Wounded

Posted: 2:06 am ET

 

A sewage truck reportedly loaded with 1,500 kgs of explosives was used in the deadly attack in Kabul that killed 90 people and wounded over 400 individuals. The State Department told CBS news that nine Afghan guards at the U.S. Embassy in Kabul were killed and 11 American contractors wounded in the massive suicide truck bomb attack that rocked the diplomatic quarter.  This might be the largest casualty of local guards in recent memory.  In 2008, seven local guards and local law enforcement personnel were killed during an assault of the U.S. Embassy in Yemen.

The U.S. Embassy in Kabul announced the closure of routine services:

The Consular Section of the U.S. Embassy in Kabul will be closed for routine visa and American Citizen Services on Thursday, June 1 and will resume normal operations on Sunday, June 4, 2017.  U.S. citizens needing emergency assistance can call the American Citizen Services section at 070-011-4000 or send an email to KabulACS@state.gov.

In accordance with the Travel Warning for Afghanistan, the Department of State continues to warn U.S. citizens against travel to Afghanistan.  The U.S. Embassy in Kabul urges all U.S. citizens in Afghanistan to review your personal security plans, take appropriate steps to enhance your personal safety, remain aware of your surroundings, monitor local news for updates, and maintain a high level of vigilance.

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@StateDept’s Foreign Affairs Security Training Center (FASTC): Status Update

Posted: 1:20 am ET

 

The State Department recently posted a video update of its Foreign Affairs Security Training Center (FASTC) at Fort Pickett in Virginia.

FASTC will provide hard-skills security training to State Department personnel and the foreign affairs community.  In 2015, GSA purchased property and secured land use agreements for approximately 1,400 acres of publicly held land. On February 25, 2016, construction began for the FASTC project.  According to the State Department, the Master Construction Schedule for the FASTC construction is being completed through three construction contracts. Contractors began construction activities on February 25, 2016 and overall project substantial completion is anticipated for July 2019.

Related posts

Screen Shot

click here for video update

The FASTC Site Plan below shows the general areas where the hard-skills training venues are currently being built for Contract 01 and Contract 02.  According to state.gov, AECOM of Virginia Beach, VA has provided Construction Management as Agent and Commissioning Services since the Design Phase for the FASTC Ft. Pickett, VA site and is responsible for the numerous comprehensive facets of the construction process, including ongoing site communication, safety, security, and circulation of deliveries and construction vehicles on site.

CONTRACT 1: 2015 – April 2017

Jan. 2017 – Build out of Live Fire Shoot House interior
Feb. 2017 – Rappel Tower wood and rock wall installation
Mar. 2017 – Permanent power to all venues

  • Mock-Urban Tactical Training Area
  • Rappel Tower
  • Smoke House
  • Static Training Device Pad
  • Tactical Maze as well as Interior of the High Bay, Classroom and Breakroom
  • Explosives Demonstration Range
  • Viewing Shelter and Storage Building
  • Live Fire Shoot House as well as Interiors

CONTRACT 2: 2016 – September 2018

Jan. 2017 – Tree clearing and grading continues
Feb. 2017 – Ductbank complete and A01 Foundations begun
Mar. 2017 – Slab on Grade placement at A01, tree clearing finishes

  • A01 (Administrative Office Building 01) and T01 (Training Classroom Building 01)
  • Vehicle Maintenance Shop
  • Ring Road Bridge C-300 and C-307
  • Central Ammo and Explosives Storage
  • High-Speed Driving Track
  • High-Speed Track
  • High-Speed Driving Track Bridge
  • Tank Trail
  • Post-Blast Training Range

CONTRACT 3: 2017 – July 2019

August 2017 – Award
July 2019 – Estimated substantial completion

Screen Shot

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Diplomatic Security Help Return Fugitive Involved in Stealing Identities of Disabled Children

Posted: 2:05 am ET

 

In June 2014, USDOJ indicted six people in an identity theft and tax fraud scheme in which the identities of disabled children and foster care children were stolen.  The indictment charges Ahmed Kamara, 38, and Ibrahim Kamara, 48, both of Yeadon, PA, Musa Turay, 41, and Foday Mansaray, 38, both of Darby, PA, Gebah Kamara, 46, of Sharon Hill, PA, and Dauda Koroma, 43, of Philadelphia, PA, with conspiracy, aiding and assisting in the preparation of false tax returns, wire fraud, aggravated identity theft, and filing false individual income tax returns.

Defendants Ahmed Kamara, Musa Turay, Ibrahim Kamara, Dauda Koroma, and Foday Mansaray worked as tax preparers at Medmans Financial Services, a tax preparation business located in South West Philadelphia. According to the indictment, Ahmed Kamara, Musa Turay, Ibrahim Kamara, Dauda Koroma, and Foday Mansaray defrauded the Internal Revenue Service by repeatedly falsifying information on tax returns. The indictment alleges that Gebah Kamara, then a social worker at Catholic Social Services, sold the defendant tax preparers the names and Social Security numbers of foster children for the purpose of creating fraudulent dependents on client tax returns. By including the false dependents, the tax preparers falsely claimed a number of credits and exemptions for their clients, which generated large fraudulent refunds, some in excess of $9,000. The tax preparer defendants charged clients up to $800 to fraudulently add a dependent on their income tax return.

If convicted, each of the defendants faces a mandatory two year prison term for aggravated identity theft consecutive to the following maximum possible sentences: Ahmed Kamara – 55 years in prison, three years of supervised release, a $1.75 million fine, and a $1,300 special assessment; Musa Turay – 61 years in prison, three years of supervised release, a $1.95 million fine, and a $1,500 special assessment; Gebah Kamara – 43 years in prison, three years of supervised release, a $1.35 million fine, and a $900 special assessment; Ibrahim Kamara – 52 years in prison, three years of supervised release, a $1.65 million fine, and a $1,200 special assessment; Dauda Koroma – 52 years in prison, three years of supervised release, a $1.65 million fine, and a $1,200 special assessment; Foday Mansaray – 43 years in prison, three years of supervised release, a $1.35 million fine, and a $900 special assessment.

Musa Turay, a U.S. citizen who was born in Freetown, Sierra Leone was one of those charged in 2014.  Diplomatic Security’s Criminal Investigative Liaison tracked Turay to Sierra Leone and alerted Sean Nedd, the Regional Security Officer (RSO) at the U.S. Embassy in Freetown. Below via State/DS:

Freetown, Sierra Leone, did not turn out to be a refuge for Musa Benson Turay. Turay, a U.S. citizen, fled to his place of birth, Freetown, after the United States indicted him in June 2014 for participating in a $43 million tax fraud scheme that involved stealing identities of disabled children and youth in foster care.

But Turay could not escape DSS’ global reach. The DSS Criminal Investigative Liaison branch tracked Turay to Sierra Leone and alerted Sean Nedd, the Regional Security Officer (RSO) at the U.S. Embassy in Freetown, that Turay was using a local cell phone number. Nedd notified the local police, who put a trace on the phone, allowing Sierra Leonean investigators to identify Turay’s general vicinity. Using an online ruse, the officials pinpointed his exact location.

On November 3, 2016, local law enforcement officials arrested Turay, and detained him while the U.S. Department of Justice (DOJ) filed a formal extradition request. Turay fought hard against the request, but lost his appeal on March 9, 2017. The U.S. Marshals, who typically escort fugitives back to the United States, were unable to send deputies to Sierra Leone due to logistical obstacles.

Nedd stepped in to complete the mission. He coordinated with local police, DOJ, U.S. Marshals, Brussels Airlines, and DSS colleagues posted at U.S. embassies in Accra, Ghana, and Brussels, Belgium, to complete the fugitive transfer. Nedd, U.S. Embassy Freetown Assistant RSO Noran Tealakh, and Assistant RSO from Embassy Accra Justin Garofalo boarded the plane and escorted Turay to Brussels. They met the U.S. Marshals in Brussels and transferred Turay to their custody March 21, 2017.

Turay currently awaits trial in the United States for his original tax fraud charge.

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Click here to view the indictment | An Indictment, Information or Criminal Complaint is an accusation. A defendant is presumed innocent unless and until proven guilty.

 

Turkish Security Personnel Beats Up Protesters in Washington, D.C. — Just Like Back in Turkey

Posted: 1:13 am ET

 

In March 2016, Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan visited Washington to attend the 2016 Nuclear Security Summit. His security detail made news for its actions toward protesters and journalists covering the visit (see Turkish President Erdoğan Visits DC, His Guards Make News, and Oh, the Turkish Army Says No Coup).

On May 16, President Trump hosted President Erdoğan at the @WhiteHouse where the Turkish president congratulated POTUS for his “legendary triumph.”  Later when protesters demonstrated in front of the Turkish Embassy in Washington, D.C., they were beaten by Turkish security personnel. Just like back in Turkey where peaceful protesters are routinely attacked, even jailed. The attack was captured on videos and beamed around the world.  This time though, President Erdogan appeared to watched from inside his car while the brutal attack unfolded on the street of his host country’s capital city. The State Department and the DC Mayor’s office released statements on the attack against peaceful demonstrators. The White House offers no statement concerning the attack.

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Burn Bag: Diplomat Writes About “The Slog of Leadership” and Misses Attack Date By a Year+

Via Burn Bag:

What’s this? The worst day of Gina Abercrombie-Winstanley’s life isn’t the day five of her staff were killed in Saudi Arabia? How did she get the date so wrong in this NYTimes Op-Ed? The attack was December 6, 2004, not/not December 4, 2005.

Like every chief of mission around the world, then and now, I began and ended each day with the question: “What can I do to increase safety for my staff?” I had reason to worry because for several years, the security situation in Saudi Arabia had been perilous, with terrorists attacking and murdering Saudis, other Arabs and Westerners. Diplomatic missions were favorite targets and ours, the Consulate General in Jeddah, made up of approximately 50 Americans and 150 locally-hired employees, was particularly attractive. With the advice of my security team, we raised the height of our walls, topped them with glass shards and barbed wire and imposed travel restrictions on the staff. We armed our guards and, unlike most diplomatic compounds, allowed military patrols inside our walls.
[…]
One proposal, however, threatened to tear our community apart. My security chief wanted to require all non-American staff to pass through metal detectors to enter the compound. I understood the imperative for a careful screening. But for a community under siege, the feeling that “we were all in it together” was critical to getting us through each day. Disparate treatment was sure to corrode our cohesiveness and send a signal to the local staff that we distrusted them despite the fact that they, too, put their lives on the line every day by walking through our gates.
[…]
After it was installed, I made sure that I was the very first staff member to walk through the metal detector. I can’t say that we had a Kumbaya moment or that resentment of my decision ended immediately among my American staff.  I had to lead by example and trust that they respected my integrity even if they didn’t like my position.

Despite all our measures, on December 4, 2005, one of the worst days of my life, terrorists attacked the U.S. Consulate in Jeddah. After a long standoff, 10 of my staff members were injured, some terribly, and five were killed. These were colleagues with whom we worked alongside every day, and socialized with after work. And each and every one of them was a local staff member.

Read: http://nytlive.nytimes.com/womenintheworld/2017/05/15/diplomat-to-saudi-arabia-opens-up-about-what-got-her-through-one-of-the-worst-days-of-my-life/

Related posts:

Related item:

Review of Department of State Implementation of Jeddah Accountability Review Board of Recommendation to Consider Remote Safe Areas at Missions Worldwide (pdf)

 

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Spending Agreement FY2017 – Notable Elements For @StateDept and Foreign Ops Funding

Posted: 2:48 am ET

 

In March, we blogged about the proposed funding cuts by the Trump Administration on the FY2017 budget. The fiscal year ends on September 30, 2017 (see Trump Seeks Further Funding Cuts From @StateDept/@USAID, This Time From 2017 Budget). WaPo reports that  an agreement was reached last night for a spending package to fund the federal government through the end of the fiscal year. “The House and Senate are expected to vote on the package early this week. The bipartisan agreement includes $12.5 billion in new military spending and $1.5 billion more for border security, a major priority for Republican leaders in Congress.”

Below are some of the notable elements included in the bill. We have not compared this with the Trump wish list for cuts in FY17 but we note that Trump’s proposal included reduction in Educational and Cultural Exchanges and in this spending agreement the Committees on Appropriations specifically recognize the unique role of educational and cultural exchanges, and provided additional funding for certain educational and cultural exchange programs. Power of the purse. Excerpted from DIVISION J – STATEFOPs SOM OCR FY17:

Diplomatic and Consular Programs: The Act provides $6,147,254,000 for Diplomatie and Consular Programs in this title, and an additional $2,410,386,000 in title VIII under this heading is designated for OCO/GWOT pursuant to BBEDCA. Within the total provided under this heading in this title, up to $1,899,479,000 is for Worldwide Security Protection (WSP) and may remain available until expended; and $4,247,775,000 is for operations, ofwhich $637,166,000 may remain available until September 30, 2018. Not later than September 1, 2017, the Secretary of State is directed to report to the Committees on Appropriations on projected amounts available for operations beyond fiscal year 2017 by category and bureau. Title VIII ofthis Act includes funds for embassy operations in Afghanistan, Pakistan, and Iraq and other areas of unrest.

No funding for new, non-security positions:  Act does not include funding for any new, non-security positions, unless specifically noted herein. The Secretary of State may fill existing positions that become vacant due to attrition, as needed. If the Secretary intends to create and fill new positions, 15 days prior to posting such positions or filling such positions with internai candidates the Secretary shall submit to the Committees on Appropriations a reprogramming request which shall inelude for each new position: a justification; a description of the job duties; the estimated fiscal years 20 17 and 2018 costs; and the funding sources to be used for such costs, including funds to be reallocated from savings due to the elimination of other positions, contract services, and other reductions or cost saving measures.

The agreement includes sufficient funds to support the authorized positions for the Bureau of Intelligence and Research in fiscal year 2017.

Training Requirements: The Secretary of State shall ensure that all security-cleared employees comply with training requirements for the classifying, safeguarding, and declassifying of national security information in accordance with Executive Order 13526: Classified National Security Information, as appropriate.

What’s with this? The Secretary of State is directed to identify the embassies or consulates that did not regularly utilize the Department of State’s model visa denialletter in fiscal year 2016, and include such information in the report required by the House report under the heading Border Security Program, Visa processing and training.

FASTC Reporting Requirement: Not later than 45 days after enactment of this Act, the Secretary of State shall submit to the Committees on Appropriations a progress report on the Foreign Affairs Security Training Center project. Such report shall be updated and submitted to such Committees semi-annually until completion ofthe project. The report shall include the requirements described under this heading in the House and Senate reports.

Holocaust Issues: The Secretary of State is directed to implement directives under this heading in the House report and the Introduction to the Senate report concerning atrocity prevention, including continued support for the Atrocities Prevention Board and the Office of the Special Envoy for Holocaust Issues.

Anti-Semitism: The Secretary of State is directed to fill the position of Special Envoy to Monitor and Combat Anti-Semitism authorized by Public Law 108-332 in a timely manner.

Trafficking in Persons: The agreement includes $12,500,000 for the Office to Monitor and Combat Trafficking in Persons for support of activities and directives described in the House and Senate reports.

Workforce Diversity: The Secretary of State is directed to continue the workforce diversity initiatives described under this heading in the House and Senate reports.

Public Diplomacy: The agreement includes sufficient funds to support public diplomacy programs at not less than the fiscal year 2016 level. In addition, the Secretary of State is directed to inelude projected funding levels for public diplomacy in the operating plan required by section 7076(a) ofthis Act.

WHTI Surcharge: Section 7034(k)(1) ofthis Act extends for one year the Western Hemisphere Travel Initiative surcharge authority, which is the same extension of authority included in prior fiscal years.

OCP: Section 7034(k)(4) of this Act continues the Foreign Service overseas pay comparability authority, but, as in prior fiscal years, prohibits implementation of the third phase ofthe authority.

Discrimination/Abuse Prevention: The Secretary of State is directed to implement the recommendations in the Senate report regarding prevention of discrimination and abuse under this heading and the Operating Expenses heading.

Additional Funds for Educational and Cultural Exchanges: Committees on Appropriations recognize the unique role of educational and cultural exchanges for advancing American leadership and ideals abroad. Department of State funded exchanges are an important instrument of United States foreign policy and diplomacy efforts, and promote United States security interests. To that end, the agreement includes additional funding for certain educational and cultural exchange programs.  Funds made available for the Citizen Exchange Program that are above the fiscal year 2016 program plan are intended for the purposes described under this heading in the House and Senate reports.

Embassy Security, Construction, Maintenance, and NEC Vietnam: The Act provides $1,117,859,000 for Embassy Security, Construction, and Maintenance in this title, ofwhich $358,698,000 is for Worldwide Security Upgrades (WSU) and $759,161,000 is for other construction, operations, and maintenance. An additional $1,238,800,000 is provided in title VIII under this heading that is designated for OCO/GWOT pursuant to BBEDCA, ofwhich $1,228,000,000 is available for WSU.

Not later than 45 days after enactment of this Act, the Secretary of State shall report to the Committees on Appropriations on plans to construct a New Embassy Compound in Vietnam, including options for the purchase of appropriate land for such construction.

 USAID: The Act provides $1,204,609,000 for Operating Expenses in this title, ofwhich

$180,691,000 may remain available until September 30, 2018, and an additional $152,080,000 in title VIII under this heading is designated for OCO/GWOT pursuant to BBEDCA.

The USAID Administrator shall ensure that all security-cleared employees comply with training requirements for the classifying, safeguarding, and declassifying of national security information in accordance with Executive Order 13526: Classified National Security Information, as appropriate.

The agreement includes $250,000 under this heading to train USAID personnel in genocide and mass atrocity prevention.

The USAID Administrator is directed to consult with the appropriate congressional committees prior to any decision to begin discussions with a foreign government regarding the closure of a USAID Mission.

Section 7081. Consular and Border Security Programs (new): The Act establishes in the Treasury a Consular and Border Security Programs account into which authorized border security program fees shall be deposited for the authorized purposesofsuchprogram. Subsection(c)doesnotincludetheexpandedauthoritycontained in the Appendix, Budget ofthe United States Govemment, Fiscal Year 2017.

Section 7083. Afghan Allies (new): The Act provides for an additional 2,500 visas for the Afghan Special Immigrant Visa program. The Secretary of State shall ensure that such visas are only issued to individuals who meet the strict qualifications ofthe program for assisting the United States Govemment in Afghanistan, and that vetting processes remain rigorous and thorough.

The Act includes funds for various countries.

Israel: The Act makes available $75,000,000 under Foreign Military Financing Program for Israel from the Security Assistance Appropriations Act, 2017 (division Bof Public Law 114-254), which is in addition to funds made available under such heading in title IV ofthis Act. The total amount provided under Foreign Military Financing Program for assistance for Israel in fiscal year 2017 is $3,175,000,000.

Burma (where no one has yet been nominated to be chief of mission): The Act provides responsibility for democracy and human rights programs in Burma to the United States Chief of Mission in Burma, in consultation with the Assistant Secretary for Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor, Department of State. Such responsibility shall include final approval for the specific uses of funds regardless of the bureau or agency managing such funds. […]Not later than 45 days after the enactment of this Act and prior to the initial obligation of funds made available for assistance for Burma, the Secretary of State shall submit a report detailing steps taken by the Government of Burma to address human rights abuses committed by the armed forces ofBurma against ethnic minorities, including the use of rape as a weapon of war.

People ‘s Republic of China: The Secretary of State and USAID Administrator are directed to provide no assistance to the central Govemment ofthe People’s Republic of China under Global Health Programs, Development Assistance, and Economie Support Fund, except for assistance to detect, prevent, and treat infectious diseases.

Philippines (whose President has been invited to the White House): Extrajudicial killings in the Philippines, particularly those committed in the conduct ofthe anti-drug campaign, call into question the commitment ofthe central Government ofthe Philippines to human rights, due process and the rule of law. The Secretary of State shall inform the Committees on Appropriations in a timely manner of the United States policy toward the Philippines, including the response to such killings.  The report required in subsection (f) shall include an assessment of the following information: (1) the status of diplomatie relations between the United States and the Philippines, and significant changes in the policy ofthe Government ofthe Philippines on matters of of national interest to the Govemment ofthe United States; (2) the degree to which the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP) benefits from United States assistance, armaments, equipment, systems, and training; (3) the impact ofUnited States assistance on AFP modemization, maritime domain awareness, and operational capabilities ofthe Philippines Coast Guard, including to maintain an effective presence in Philippine territorial waters; (4) the impact of United States assistance on economie growth in the Philippines, including through United States-Philippines Partnership for Growth programs; (5) the importance of United States markets for Philippine exports, such as computer components, automobile parts, electrical machinery, and textiles; (6) the importance of United States foreign direct investment in the Philippines, and the influence of the United States as an investor and market for the Philippine business process outsourcing industry; (7) the economie benefit of annual remittances to the Philippines from the United States; (8) the adherence of the Govemment ofthe Philippines to the rule of law, including due process, particularly in efforts to counter illicit narcotics; (9) efforts by the Govemment ofthe Philippines to credibly investigate and prosecute individuals or organizations responsible for inciting, directing, or carrying out extra-judicial killings in the Philippines; and (10) the threat of Islamist terrorist groups in Mindanao and elsewhere in the southem region of the Philippines, and the impact of the United States military in supporting counterterrorism efforts. The Secretary of State shall also comply with the reporting requirement in the Senate report under Foreign Military Financing Program with respect to certain actions by the Govemment of the Philippines.

Countering Russian Influence Fund: The Act provides not less than $100,000,000 for the Countering Russian Influence Fund (CRIF). Funds should be made available to civil society and other organizations that seek to mitigate the expansion of such influence and aggression, including through public awareness campaigns and exchange activities. The Secretary of State and the USAID Administrator, as appropriate, shall ensure that CRIF programs are coordinated among Federal agencies and program implementers, and that information and lessons-learned are shared. The Secretary of State shall make public!y available the report required by subsection (c)(4), except that such report may include a classified annex.

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