Category Archives: Security

US Embassy Moscow Now on “Authorized Departure” For Non-Emergency Staff and USG Family Members

March 1, 2022 By in Americans Abroad, Consular Work, EUR|Europe, Evacuations, Hotspots, Realities of the FS, Security, State Department, Trends, U.S. Missions Tags: , , , , , ,

 

On February 28, 2022, the State Department also announced the US Embassy Moscow is now under an “authorized departure” order for non-emergency staff and USG family members.

The U.S. Department of State has suspended operations at our Embassy in Minsk, Belarus and authorized the voluntary departure (“authorized departure”) of non-emergency employees and family members at our Embassy in Moscow, Russia. We took these steps due to security and safety issues stemming from the unprovoked and unjustified attack by Russian military forces in Ukraine. The Department of State continually adjusts its posture at embassies and consulates throughout the world in line with its mission, the local security environment, and the health situation. We ultimately have no higher priority than the safety and security of U.S. citizens, and that includes our U.S. government personnel and their dependents serving around the world.

Also on February 28, the State Department issued an updated Level 4-Do Not Travel Advisory for Russia citing the Russian military forces attack in Ukraine, the potential harassment of American citizens, and limited flights out of the country among other things, and urge their departure from Russia while commercial flights are still available.

Do not travel to Russia due to the unprovoked and unjustified attack by Russian military forces in Ukraine, the potential for harassment against U.S. citizens by Russian government security officials, the embassy’s limited ability to assist U.S. citizens in Russia, COVID-19 and related entry restrictions, terrorism, limited flights into and out of Russia, and the arbitrary enforcement of local law.  U.S. citizens should consider departing Russia immediately via commercial options still available.

Due to Russia’s further invasion of Ukraine, an increasing number of airlines are cancelling flights into and out of Russia, and numerous countries have closed their airspace to Russian airlines.  In addition, air space around southern Russia is restricted and a number of airports in the area have closed.  U.S. citizens located in or considering travel to the districts of the Russian Federation immediately bordering Ukraine should be aware that the situation along the border is dangerous and unpredictable. 

Given the ongoing armed conflict, U.S. citizens are strongly advised against traveling by land from Russia to Ukraine.  In addition, there is the potential throughout Russia of harassment towards foreigners, including through regulations targeted specifically against foreigners.  Given the ongoing armed conflict and the potentially significant impact on international travel options, U.S. citizens should consider departing Russia immediately via commercial options still available.

The Advisory notes that the embassy’s ability to provide routine or emergency assistance to Americans is severely limited, as well as the voluntary evacuation of non-emergency personnel and USG family members from the country:

The U.S. government’s ability to provide routine or emergency services to U.S. citizens in Russia is severely limited, particularly in areas far from the U.S. Embassy in Moscow due to Russian government limitations on U.S. staffing and travel, and the ongoing suspensions of operations, including consular services, at U.S. consulates.

On February 28, the Department of State authorized the voluntary departure of eligible family members and non-emergency personnel from U.S. Embassy Moscow.

Also on February 28, @USUN Spokesperson Olivia Dalton issued a statement on the expulsion of 12 Russians reportedly intelligence operatives at the Russian Mission at the United Nations for “engaging in espionage activities that are adverse to our national security:”

The United States has informed the United Nations and the Russian Permanent Mission to the United Nations that we are beginning the process of expelling twelve intelligence operatives from the Russian Mission who have abused their privileges of residency in the United States by engaging in espionage activities that are adverse to our national security. We are taking this action in accordance with the UN Headquarters Agreement. This action has been in development for several months.

 

A Small Post in Africa Just Fired “Several Dozen Male Employees”

February 15, 2022 By in AF |Africa, Diplomatic Security, Huh? News, Investigations, Locally Employed Staff, NEA|Near East Asia, Oversight, Realities of the FS, Security, State Department, U.S. Missions Tags: , , , , , , ,
We received the following in our inbox recently:

The Embassy held a town hall and finally disclosed that several dozen male employees had been separated from employment.

Charges included:

— improper used of government computers

— immoral conduct for posting obscene images and videos to a social media chat group

Criminal investigation is ongoing.

TDY staff have been flown in from other AF posts, NEA and Washington DC.

Outgoing ambassador departs soon; incoming ambassador to arrive in February.

Most of the job vacancies should be listed on the Embassy website in the coming weeks.

So this is a small post.  Since most jobs are expected to be advertised on the embassy website, we can assume that those separated from employment were locally hired staffers. “Several” means more than two and fewer than many.
Let’s say we have about a hundred employees at this post, with half of those male. Several dozens, say three dozens would be 36 employees. If four dozens, that would be the entire male population, half of the locally hired staff, wouldn’t it?
How would embassies ever find out what shenanigans are going on in their computer systems?
Information Systems Security Officers (ISSO) are responsible for implementing the Department’s information systems security program and for working closely with system managers on compliance with information systems security standards. The Bureau of Information Resource Management’s Office of ISSO Oversight, Regional, and Domestic Division, assists, supports, and coordinates the activities of domestic and overseas ISSOs.
In 2017, OIG inspection reports have repeatedly found deficiencies in the performance of ISSO duties. The Management Assistance Report then notes the following:

OIG reviewed information management findings in reports of overseas inspections conducted from fall FY 2014 to spring FY 2016 and found that 33 percent (17 out of 51) reported findings on the non-performance of ISSO duties. Specifically, the reports noted that information management personnel failed to perform regular reviews and analyses of information systems audits logs, user libraries, emails, workstations, servers, and hard drives for indications of inappropriate or unusual activity in accordance with Department standards.

But what if this post was previously:
— informed in 2019 that its unclassified and classified Information Systems Security Officers (ISSO) did not perform all information systems security duties, such as review and analysis of information systems audit logs for inappropriate or unusual activity, as required by 12 FAM 613.4?
— informed that its ISSOs did not brief new employees on their information security responsibilities and the Department’s policies? OIG notes that ISSO briefings are particularly important for LE staff who have never worked for the U.S. Government.
— informed that its ISSOs did not use the Department’s ISSO resources, such as standard operating procedures and checklists, to prioritize and plan their duties?
— made aware that a lack of planning and training as well as competing priorities led the embassy to neglect these duties and this has resulted in the security of the Department’s computer systems at risk?
Who should then be held accountable for this incident?
Or.
Perhaps, it took the embassy this long to finally conduct a systems audit logs and other systems security duties as required, and that’s how they found out about these obscene images?
Who should get an award?
Makes one wonder about that 17 posts who were reported for non-performance of ISSO duties.
What might they find there when they finally do perform those duties?

 

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U.S. Embassy Kyiv Suspends Consular Services, Maintains Consular Presence in Lviv

February 14, 2022 By in Americans Abroad, Consular Work, EUR|Europe, Evacuations, Realities of the FS, Security, Trends, U.S. Missions Tags: , , , , , , ,

 

On February 12, the State Department ordered the mandatory evacuation of “most U.S. direct hire employees from the US Embassy in Kyiv. Also on February 12, US Embassy Kyiv announced that U.S. citizens may enter Poland through the land border with Ukraine:

“Poland has indicated to the U.S. government that U.S. citizens may now enter Poland through the land border with Ukraine.  No advanced approval is required.  We encourage those traveling into Poland by land from Ukraine to cross at the Korczowa-Krakovets or Medyka-Shehyni border crossings.  U.S. citizens must present a valid U.S. passport and proof of COVID-19 vaccination.  Travelers are also encouraged to present a negative test result from a PCR or antigen COVID-19 test, which will facilitate entry into Poland.”

On February 13, the State Department suspended consular services in Kyiv. The Level 4/Do Not Travel advisory for Ukraine notes that the Embassy Kyiv “will maintain a small consular presence in Lviv, Ukraine to handle emergencies” but no passport, visa or routine services will be provided.

Do not travel to Ukraine due to the increased threats of Russian military action and COVID-19; those in Ukraine should depart immediately via commercial or private means. If remaining in Ukraine, exercise increased caution due to crime, civil unrest, and potential combat operations should Russia take military action. Some areas have increased risk. Read the entire Travel Advisory.

On February 12, 2022, the Department of State ordered the departure of most U.S. direct hire employees from Embassy Kyiv due to the continued threat of Russian military action. U.S. citizens should not travel to Ukraine, and those in Ukraine should depart immediately using commercial or other privately available transportation options. The Department previously authorized the voluntary departure of U.S. direct hire employees and ordered the departure of eligible family members on January 23, 2022.

As of Sunday, February 13, 2022, the Department of State will suspend consular services at the U.S. Embassy in Kyiv. The Embassy will maintain a small consular presence in Lviv, Ukraine to handle emergencies, but will not be able to provide passport, visa or routine consular services.  U.S. citizens may seek these services at U.S. Embassies in neighboring countries. U.S. citizens seeking emergency assistance in Ukraine should complete this online form and the State Department will respond.

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@StateDept Press Briefing: Oh dear, that verbal tussle should make you cranky, too!

February 4, 2022 By in EUR|Europe, Hotspots, Media, Security, State Department Tags: , , ,

 

We understand that the job of the spokesperson is not an easy one. But after four years of constant lies from numerous government podiums, this Administration should know better than to give the public this kind of allegations from the official podium while refusing to provide evidence other than we told you so.
About 2,000 U.S. troops were reportedly heading to Poland and Germany; about a thousand troops in Germany are going to Romania.
The February 3 briefing is hard to watch and it makes us very cranky. We’ve summarize the briefing very simply as follows:
Spox: Declassified intel indicates there’s a rat.
Reporter: Where’s the rat?
Spox: I just said, there’s one.
Reporter: Where’s your proof?
Spox: I just said it.
Reporter: Yes you did but what’s your evidence that there’s a rat?
Spox: Cant’ say. We’re protecting sources and methods.
Reporter: Well, that’s not good enough!
Spox: We know there’s a rat. I’m sharing that information so you can set traps and save yourselves. Just say thank you.
Reporter: I need evidence about this crisis actor rat. Is the cheese gone? Something for goodness’ sake!
Spox: Listen!  There’s a rat! Why are you questioning our intel?
Reporter: “I told you so” isn’t evidence!  What if it turns out to be a WMD rat?
Spox: Why can’t you use your damn imagination?
Reporter: Last time we had a “we don’t want the smoking gun to be a mushroom cloud” imagination, we started the long war and tons of people’s dreams died with them.
There. See? Now you and I both are properly cranky!
Stop pulling your hair or you’ll grow bald! Now watch the clip below or read the transcript under a brown paper bag.

MR PRICE: Good afternoon. We have previously noted our strong concerns regarding Russian disinformation and the likelihood that Moscow might create – seek to create a false flag operation to initiate military activity. Now, we can say that the United States has information that Russia is planning to stage fabricated attacks by Ukrainian military or intelligence forces as a pretext for a further invasion of Ukraine.

One possible option the Russians are considering, and which we made public today, involves the production of a propaganda video – a video with graphic scenes of false explosions – depicting corpses, crisis actors pretending to be mourners, and images of destroyed locations or military equipment – entirely fabricated by Russian intelligence.

To be clear, the production of this propaganda video is one of a number of options that the Russian Government is developing as a fake pretext to initiate and potentially justify military aggression against Ukraine. We don’t know if Russia will necessarily use this or another option in the coming days. We are publicizing it now, however, in order to lay bare the extent of Russia’s destabilizing actions towards Ukraine and to dissuade Russia from continuing this dangerous campaign and ultimately launching a military attack.

Russia has signaled it’s willing to continue diplomatic talks as a means to de-escalate, but actions such as these suggest otherwise. We will continue to diligently work together with our allies and partners to expose Russian disinformation and other hybrid tactics used against Ukraine. We continue to work to prevent any effort Moscow might make to justify further military action in Ukraine. We again urge Russia to stop its destructive and destabilizing disinformation campaign, to de-escalate tensions, and to engage in diplomacy and dialogue for a peaceful solution.

[…]

MR PRICE: We told you a few weeks ago that we have information indicating Russia also has already pre-positioned a group of operatives to conduct a false flag operation in eastern Ukraine. So that, Matt, to your question, is an action that Russia has already taken.

QUESTION: No, it’s an action that you say that they have taken, but you have shown no evidence to confirm that. And I’m going to get to the next question here, which is: What is the evidence that they – I mean, this is – like, crisis actors? Really? This is like Alex Jones territory you’re getting into now. What evidence do you have to support the idea that there is some propaganda film in the making?

MR PRICE: Matt, this is derived from information known to the U.S. Government, intelligence information that we have declassified. I think you know —

QUESTION: Okay, well, where is it? Where is this information?

MR PRICE: It is intelligence information that we have declassified.

QUESTION: Well, where is it? Where is the declassified information?

MR PRICE: I just delivered it.

QUESTION: No, you made a series of allegations and statements —

MR PRICE: Would you like us to print out the topper? Because you will see a transcript of this briefing that you can print out for yourself.

QUESTION: But that’s not evidence, Ned. That’s you saying it. That’s not evidence. I’m sorry.

MR PRICE: What would you like, Matt?

QUESTION: I would like to see some proof that you – that you can show that —

MR PRICE: Matt, you have been —

QUESTION: — that shows that the Russians are doing this.

MR PRICE: You —

QUESTION: Ned, I’ve been doing this for a long time, as you know.

MR PRICE: I know. That was my point. You have been doing this for quite a while.

QUESTION: I have.

MR PRICE: You know that when we declassify intelligence, we do so in a means —

QUESTION: That’s right. And I remember WMDs in Iraq, and I —

MR PRICE: — we do so with an eye to protecting sources and methods.

QUESTION: And I remember that Kabul was not going to fall. I remember a lot of things. So where is the declassified information other than you coming out here and saying it?

MR PRICE: Matt, I’m sorry you don’t like the format, but we have —

QUESTION: It’s not the format. It’s the content.

MR PRICE: I’m sorry you don’t like the content. I’m sorry you —

QUESTION: It’s not that I don’t like it or —

MR PRICE: I’m sorry you are doubting the information that is in the possession of the U.S. Government.

QUESTION: No, I —

MR PRICE: What I’m telling you is that this is information that’s available to us. We are making it available to you in order – for a couple reasons. One is to attempt to deter the Russians from going ahead with this activity. Two, in the event we’re not able to do that, in the event the Russians do go ahead with this, to make it clear as day, to lay bare the fact that this has always been an attempt on the part of the Russian Federation to fabricate a pretext.

QUESTION: Yes, but you don’t have any evidence to back it up other than what you’re saying. It’s like you’re saying, “We think – we have information the Russians may do this,” but you won’t tell us what the information is. And then when you’re asked —

MR PRICE: Well, that is the idea behind deterrence, Matt. That is the idea behind deterrence.

QUESTION: When you’re asked – and when you’re asked —

MR PRICE: It is our hope that the Russians don’t go forward with this.

QUESTION: And when you’re asked what the information is, you say, “I just gave it to you.” But that’s not what —

MR PRICE: You seem not to understand —

QUESTION: That’s not the way it works.

MR PRICE: You seem not to understand the idea of deterrence.

QUESTION: No, no, no, Ned. You don’t – you seem not to understand the idea of —

MR PRICE: We are trying to deter the Russians from moving forward with this type of activity. That is why we are making it public today. If the Russians don’t go forward with this, that is not ipso facto an indication that they never had plans to do so.

QUESTION: But then it’s unprovable. I mean, my God, what is the evidence that you have that suggests that the Russians are even planning this?

MR PRICE: Matt, you —

QUESTION: I mean, I’m not saying that they’re not. But you just come out and say this and expect us just to believe it without you showing a shred of evidence that it’s actually true – other than when I ask or when anyone else asks what’s the information, you said, well, I just gave it to you, which was just you making a statement.

MR PRICE: Matt, you said yourself you’ve been in this business for quite a long time. You know that when we make information – intelligence information public we do so in a way that protects sensitive sources and methods. You also know that we do so – we declassify information – only when we’re confident in that information.

QUESTION: But Ned, you haven’t given any information.

MR PRICE: If you doubt – if you doubt the credibility of the U.S. Government, of the British Government, of other governments, and want to find solace in information that the Russians are putting out —

QUESTION: Solace?

MR PRICE: — that is for you to do.

QUESTION: I don’t want – I’m not asking what the Russian Government is putting out. And what do you – what is that supposed to mean?

MR PRICE: Shaun.

QUESTION: Does the government have the video? Because U.S. officials are describing very specific scenes, but do they actually have a video?

MR PRICE: The fact that we are able to go into such great detail – obviously, I am not going to spell out what is in our possession, but I will leave – I will leave it to you – I will leave that to your judgment, to your imagination.

QUESTION: Ned, there are no facts that you’ve spelled out.

QUESTION: Whether they use it “in the coming days” – do you have evidence this was intended to come out in the coming days?

MR PRICE: We’ve said, Ben, for some time now that the Russians have positioned forces, they have undertaken preparations, that if Putin decides to move forward with an invasion they’re positioned to do so. They are poised to do so.

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@StateDept Revises Reporting Requirements For All Security Clearance Holders

January 31, 2022 By in Diplomatic Security, Realities of the FS, Regulations, Security, Security Clearance, State Department Tags: , , , , ,

 

The State Department recently revised the Foreign Affairs Manual (FAM) for information State Department employees are obligated to report to DS/SI/PSS per an Office of the Director of National Intelligence directive.  The change log says that this was a substantial increase in requirements from the last edition.
Also below is the reporting requirement matrix dated January 21, 2022 and the related stats from Diplomatic Security on its Insider Threat Program for 2019 and 2020.
Via 12 FAM 273  REPORTING REQUIREMENTS FOR ALL WHO HAVE ACCESS TO CLASSIFIED INFORMATION OR HOLD A SENSITIVE POSITION
12 FAM 273.1  Applicability
(CT:DS-372;   01-21-2022)

The following reporting requirements are applicable to all covered individuals, defined at 12 FAM 271.3 as individuals who perform work for or on behalf of the Department of State and has been granted access to classified information (Confidential, Secret, or Top Secret) or who occupy a sensitive position, for which the adjudicative determination for the security clearance, sensitive position, and/or access to SCI, was rendered by the Department.

12 FAM 273.2  Reportable Actions by Others
(CT:DS-372;   01-21-2022)
a. All covered individuals have an obligation to report activities of other covered individuals that may be of a potential security or counterintelligence concern.  Persons with information they believe may have a bearing on another individual’s eligibility for access to classified information or to hold a sensitive position must report that information.  This includes, but is not limited to:
(1)  An unwillingness to comply with rules and regulations or to cooperate with security requirements;
(2)  Unexplained affluence or excessive indebtedness;
(3)  Alcohol abuse;
(4)  Illegal use or misuse of drugs or drug activity;
(5)  Behavior that may suggest a mental health issue where there is reason to believe it may impact the individual’s ability to protect classified information or other information specifically prohibited by law from disclosure;
(6)  Criminal conduct;
(7)  Any activity that raises doubts as to whether another covered individual’s continued national security eligibility is clearly consistent with the interests of national security; and
(8)  Misuse of U.S. Government property or information systems.
b. This information may be submitted via the Personnel Reporting Tool, via email DSDirectorPSS@state.gov, or directly to InsiderThreatReporting@state.gov.

Read in full here.

Via State/DS

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US Embassy Abu Dhabi on Level 4/Do Not Travel Advisory Due to Threat of Missile/Drone Attacks

January 28, 2022 By in Americans Abroad, Consular Work, Hotspots, Realities of the FS, Security, State Department, U.S. Missions Tags: , , , , , ,

 

On January 24, 2022, the US Embassy in Abu Dhabi issued a security alert regarding the January 17 attack:

There have been reports of a possible missile attack and accompanying missile defense activity over Abu Dhabi early this morning. The Embassy reminds all U.S. citizens in the United Arab Emirates to maintain a high level of security awareness. The Houthi militia in Yemen has claimed responsibility for the January 17 attack on Abu Dhabi and stated an intent to attack neighboring countries, including the UAE, using missiles and unmanned aerial systems (drones).

On January 26, the State Department issued a Level 4: Do Not Travel Advisory for the United Arab Emirates  due to COVID-19 and for US citizens to reconsider travel “due to the threat of missile or drone attacks.”

USDOJ: Iraqi National Pleads Guilty to Conspiracy to Defraud U.S. Refugee Program

January 27, 2022 By in Court Cases, Federal Agencies, Locally Employed Staff, Realities of the FS, Security, U.S. Missions Tags: , , , , , , ,

 

Via USDOJ:

WASHINGTON – An Iraqi national, Aws Muwafaq Abduljabbar, pleaded guilty today to one count of conspiracy to defraud the United States related to his role in a scheme to defraud U.S. refugee programs.

The announcement was made by U.S. Attorney Matthew M. Graves, U.S. Department of Homeland Security Inspector General Dr. Joseph V. Cuffari, and U.S. Department of State’s Diplomatic Security Service (DSS) Deputy Assistant Secretary and Assistant Director for Domestic Operations Mark A. Sullo.

Abduljabbar, 43, pleaded guilty before U.S. District Court Judge Rudolph Contreras of the District of Columbia. He remains held without bond pending sentencing on June 24, 2022.

Abduljabbar is one of three defendants charged in an indictment that was unsealed on January 22, 2021. The indictment charges Abduljabbar and two other foreign nationals, Haitham Isa Saado Sad, 43, and Olesya Leonidovna Krasilova, 44, in connection with a scheme to defraud the U.S. Refugee Admissions Program (USRAP) and, in particular, the Iraq P-2 program, which allows certain Iraqis to apply directly for refugee resettlement in the United States. Sad previously pleaded guilty and remains held pending sentencing. Krasilova remains at large.

According to the indictment and statement of facts agreed to by Abduljabbar as part of his guilty plea, from approximately February 2016 until at least April 2019, the three defendants, led by Abduljabbar, conspired to steal U.S. government records related to hundreds of USRAP applications. Sad was employed in Amman, Jordan from 2007 to 2016 by U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services, and Krasilova held a similar position at the U.S. Embassy in Moscow, Russia. As part of their duties, both defendants had access to the State Department’s Worldwide Refugee Admissions Processing System (WRAPS), a database containing sensitive, non-public information about refugee applicants and their family members, as well as the results of security checks and internal assessments by U.S. officials regarding applications.

Abduljabbar organized and led the conspiracy, and he relied on and paid Sad and Krasilova to steal WRAPS records and information so that Abduljabbar could assist applicants in gaining admission to the United States through fraudulent means. As outlined in the indictment and statement of facts, the theft of USRAP records creates a number of risks to public safety and national security while imposing significant costs on the U.S. government, its taxpayers, and otherwise legitimate refugee applicants negatively impacted by the scheme.

The charges in an indictment are merely allegations, and every defendant is presumed innocent unless and until proven guilty beyond a reasonable doubt in a court of law. The maximum penalty for conspiracy to defraud the United States is five years. The maximum statutory sentence is prescribed by Congress and is provided here for informational purposes. If convicted of any offense, a defendant’s sentence will be determined by the court based on the advisory Sentencing Guidelines and other statutory factors.

The indictment is available to read here.

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US Embassy Minsk Issues Security Alert in Belarus

January 25, 2022 By in Americans Abroad, Consular Work, EUR|Europe, Hotspots, Security, Trends, U.S. Missions Tags: , , , , , ,

 

On January 23, the U.S. Embassy in Minsk issued a Security Alert reminding U.S. citizens to exercise increased awareness and vigilance regarding political and military tensions in the region.   The alert notes of concerning reports of further unusual Russian military activity near Ukraine’s borders, including the border with Belarus.  U.S. citizens are advised to avoid public demonstrations and to regularly reevaluate possible departure plans in the event of an emergency. Read in full below:

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U.S. Embassy Ouagadougou Closes on 1/24 Due to Ongoing Security Concerns

January 24, 2022 By in AF |Africa, Americans Abroad, Hotspots, Realities of the FS, Security, U.S. Missions Tags: , , , ,
On Monday, January 24, the US Embassy in Burkina Faso announced that it closed due to “the uncertainty of ongoing security concerns throughout Ouagadougou.”  American citizens in Burkina Faso were advised to monitor all methods of communication, including media reporting/sources and to contact the Embassy at (226) 25 49 53 00 if assistance is needed.  US citizens were also advised to take shelter and avoid large crowds, limit movement to emergencies and monitor local media for updates.

 

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US Embassy Abu Dhabi Issues Security Alert Following Suspected Drone Attacks in UAE

January 18, 2022 By in chargé d’affaires, Hotspots, Realities of the FS, Security, U.S. Missions Tags: , , , ,

 

On January 17, the US Embassy in Abu Dhabi issued a Security Alert following the suspected drone attacks at two locations in the country and reminded U.S. citizens to “maintain a high level of security awareness.”

Location: UAE, Abu Dhabi

    • Musaffah Industrial Area, and
    • A construction site at the new terminal of the Abu Dhabi airport.

Event: There have been reports of explosions at the Musaffah Industrial Area in Abu Dhabi and a fire at the new terminal of the Abu Dhabi airport on January 17, 2022.  Media reports indicate that both incidents were potentially caused by unmanned aerial systems (drones) in the area.  The Embassy reminds all U.S. citizens in the United Arab Emirates to maintain a high level of security awareness.  The possibility of terrorist attacks against U.S. citizens and interests in the Gulf and Arabian Peninsula remains an ongoing, serious concern.  Rebel groups operating in Yemen have stated an intent to attack neighboring countries, including the UAE, using missiles and unmanned aerial systems (drones).

The United States Embassy in Abu Dhabi is currently headed by Sean Murphy as Chargé d’Affaires. Mr. Murphy holds the rank of Minister Counselor in the United States Foreign Service. It doesn’t look like the Biden Administration has made an announcement on a nominee to be U.S. Ambassador for UAE.

 

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