Category Archives: Govt Documents

US Embassy Manila: USINDOPACOM Employee Pleads Guilty For Removal of Classified Material

November 29, 2021 By in Court Cases, Defense Department, EAP|East Asia, Govt Documents, Security, U.S. Missions Tags: , , , , ,

 

Via USDOJ:  Woman Pleads Guilty to Unauthorized Removal and Retention of Classified Material

A Hawaii woman pleaded guilty today to one count of knowingly removing classified information concerning the national defense or foreign relations of the United States and retaining it at an unauthorized location.

According to court documents, Asia Janay Lavarello, 31, of Honolulu, admitted to having removed and retained numerous classified documents, writings and notes relating to the national defense or foreign relations of the United States without authority. While working as an Executive Assistant for the U.S. Indo-Pacific Command in Hawaii, Lavarello accepted a temporary assignment working at the U.S. Embassy in the Philippines. There, she had access to classified computers and documents, and attended classified meetings as part of her official duties. Court documents list several specific instances in which Lavarello mishandled classified material of the United States.

According to her plea, on March 20, 2020, Lavarello removed classified documents from the U.S. Embassy in Manila. She took the classified documents to her hotel room where she hosted a dinner party later that evening. Among the guests were two foreign nationals. During the party, a co-worker discovered the documents, which included documents classified at the SECRET level. Lavarello’s temporary assignment in the Philippines was ultimately terminated due to her mishandling of SECRET classified documents.

After Lavarello returned to Hawaii, investigators executed a search warrant at her government workplace. In her desk, investigators found a notebook containing Lavarello’s handwritten notes of meetings she attended while working at the U.S. Embassy in Manila. The notes contained facts and information classified at the CONFIDENTIAL and SECRET levels. Investigators determined that Lavarello personally transported the documents to Hawaii, unsecured, and kept the classified notebook at an unsecure location until at least April 13, 2020.

Investigators also discovered that Lavarello included information from the classified notebook in a Jan. 16, 2020, email from her personal Gmail account to her unclassified U.S. Government email account. The information she transmitted over unsecure networks was classified at the SECRET level.

Lavarello pleaded guilty to the charge of unauthorized removal and retention of classified documents or material and faces up to five years in prison, three years of supervised release and a fine of $250,000. A federal district court judge will determine any sentence after considering the U.S. Sentencing Guidelines and other statutory factors.

The FBI and Naval Criminal Investigative Service (NCIS) are investigating the case.

Assistant U.S. Attorney Mohammed Khatib of the District of Hawaii and Trial Attorney Stephen Marzen of the National Security Division’s Counterintelligence and Export Control Section are prosecuting the case.

###

 

Via Politico: Mark Lenzi Accuses @StateDept’s Leadership, Diplomatic Security of Retaliation #HavanaSyndrome

October 26, 2021 By in Americans Abroad, Blinken, Diplomatic Security, Functional Bureaus, Govt Documents, Investigations, MEDical, Realities of the FS, Security, State Department, U.S. Missions Tags: , , , , , , ,

 

Via Politico:

“One of those victims, current State Department official Mark Lenzi, sustained traumatic brain injuries while on assignment in Guangzhou, China, in late 2017, when he was working as a security engineering officer in the Bureau of Diplomatic Security.
[…]
Lenzi provided documents to POLITICO that detail his claims that State’s leadership has retaliated against him for speaking out publicly and for working with the members of Congress who have been investigating the matter.”
[…]
“On his first day as secretary of State, Secretary Blinken — who I know and have the utmost respect for — told the Department of State workforce that he ‘would not tolerate retaliation against whistleblowers,’” Lenzi said. “However, under his tenure, retaliation against me by the State Department’s Diplomatic Security Bureau for my whistleblowing activities with the U.S. Office of Special Counsel and with Congress has actually increased.”
[…]
Since then, Lenzi says, the State Department has retaliated against him in a number of ways. Documents viewed by POLITICO show that the department most recently yanked his administrative leave last month — forcing him to use sick leave or leave-without-pay to participate in medical studies and attend therapy sessions — and has denied him access to his classified computer system, even though he retains his top-secret security clearance.
[..]
The federal agency that handles whistleblower claims previously found “a substantial likelihood of wrongdoing” in the case of Lenzi and his claims of retaliation, according to an April 2020 Office of Special Counsel memo. That retaliation probe is ongoing.

Related posts:

@StateDept Updates Guidance For Recovery and Seizure of Passports 3 Years After OIG Review

October 26, 2021 By in Consular Work, Court Cases, Diplomatic Security, Functional Bureaus, Govt Documents, Oversight, Regulations, Security, State Department, U.S. Missions Tags: , , , , , , , , ,

 

 

In October 2018, State/OIG issued a Review of Allegations of Improper Passport Seizures at Embassy Sana’a, Yemen. The report indicates that the “Department did not follow relevant standards” and that ” officials did not comply fully with required procedures.”  OIG said that “Department also failed to comply with relevant standards when it ultimately revoked the passports in all but one of the cases OIG examined:

The Department does not have a central system to track passport confiscations or retentions. As a result, OIG could not determine the number of passport seizures that occurred at Embassy Sana’a from 2012 to 2014, and the total number remains uncertain. However, because one document provided by the Department contained a list of 31 names with dates on which the passports were taken, OIG focused on these cases.

There are two bases in Department regulations that govern its authority to take passports from U.S. citizens: “retention” and “confiscation.” Regardless of the authority by which the Department took the passports at issue here, the Department did not follow relevant standards. If the Department “retained” the passports, officials did not comply fully with required procedures. Furthermore, although the Department acknowledged that retentions are temporary measures, it held many of the passports in question for months (and in some cases, over a year), suggesting that the Department effectively confiscated these documents. Confiscation is permitted only after revocation or pursuant to an arrest. Revocation is the formal process by which the Department invalidates an individual’s passport. Neither an arrest nor revocation occurred before any of the passports were taken.

The Department also failed to comply with relevant standards when it ultimately revoked the passports in all but one of the cases OIG examined. Although the Department must notify the holders in writing of the reason for revocation and their right to appeal, OIG could not confirm that these notices were sent in every case. Even if notices were sent, the affected individuals remained uninformed about the status of their passports for lengthy periods (in one case, almost 2 years). OIG also identified instances where individuals contacted the Department with questions and received limited information or no response at all.

OIG also identified other concerns. First, the lack of a single legal authority within the Department led to significant difficulties in resolving key legal issues. Second, although the Department has updated its policies, issues remain unresolved, including conflicting interpretations of the Department’s authority to seize passports and uncertainty regarding eligibility for limited validity passports.

On October 20, 2021 — that’s right, three years later this month — the State Department/Diplomatic Security finally updated 12 FAM 220 of the Foreign Affairs Manual on the  recovery and seizure of U.S. passports. The notation on the change transmittal says “Updated as a result of the Office of the Inspector General report on Yemen Passport Seizures”.  The bold parts are highlighted in the FAM.

12 FAM 224.1-5  Recovery and Seizure of Passports
(CT:DS-368;   10-20-2021)
a. 22 CFR 51.7 (a) states that a passport at all times remains the property of the United States and must be returned to the U.S. Government upon demand.
b. CA/FPP or CA/PPT may request DS confiscate a passport that CA/PPT issued.  See 12 FAH-4 H-124.2.  The Department’s authorized representative (usually the case agent) is authorized to confiscate a revoked passport.  If the bearer refuses to do so, CA/PPT may invalidate the passport by notifying the bearer in writing of the invalidation (22 CFR 51.4).4
c.  Only CA/PPT/S/A may revoke U.S. passports.  DS agents may lawfully seize a U.S. passport pursuant to:
(1)  A search warrant;
(2)  An arrest warrant;
(3)  A lawful, warrantless seizure pursuant to a warrant exception when robable cause exists that the U.S. passport itself is evidence of a crime;
(4)  The express consent of the subject; or
(5)  A court order.
If CA intends to revoke the passport of a subject of a DS investigation, and DS has presented the case to DOJ for prosecution, the DS special agent must inform the prosecutor about the passport revocation.
d. All property acquired by DS will be collected and treated as though it were evidence to ensure proper handling until such determination is made.  Special agents may only acquire property in accordance with the law as it relates to searches and seizures, judicial forfeiture, and by voluntary delivery by the owner.  Occasionally, items may be seized or taken into custody for safekeeping (i.e., high value items, illegal drugs, firearms and weapons, etc.).  Special agents are not authorized to acquire property in any other manner other than by direction of CA to recover U.S. passports.
e. The procedural aspects of passport seizure by a DS special agent are contained in 12 FAH-4 H-120. That section contains important information as well as relevant timelines for notification to the Department of the seizure.
f.  For more information on passport revocations, see 8 FAM 804, Revocation.
g. DS may receive recovered U.S. passports from different sources, such as local law enforcement, local governments, airlines, and transportation centers.  To maintain the integrity of the U.S. passport as a secure travel document, CA/PPT makes every effort to account for the final disposition of all U.S. passports.  Therefore, DS should mail all found or recovered (not seized or confiscated) U.S. passports to CA/PPT at …

###

Related item:

12 FAM 220 Investigations

Related posts:

 

State/OIG Audits CA’s Official and Diplomatic Passport Records

August 30, 2021 By in Consular Work, Functional Bureaus, Govt Documents, Oversight, Security, State Department Tags: , , , , , , , , ,

 

 

Via State/OIG:
(U) Treasury Inspector General for Tax Administration Concerns

(U) In September 2020, OIG received a referral from the Treasury Inspector General for Tax Administration (TIGTA). According to the referral, in 2019, during an audit of the Internal Revenue Service’s (IRS) passport management and security controls,19 TIGTA requested from CA information associated with diplomatic and official passports issued to IRS employees and appointees for the last 20 years, as of March 31, 2019. Specifically, for each passport issued, TIGTA requested the applicant’s name, passport number, passport type, issuance date, and passport status (e.g., cancelled, lost, or stolen).

(U) According to TIGTA officials, TIGTA received three separate passport datasets from CA. However, TIGTA found that the data provided in each dataset were incomplete. For example, some passport records had blank issuance and expiration date fields. Furthermore, the data identified onlyfive passports that were issued in 2016 and indicated that no passports were issued to IRS employees from 2017 through 2019. However, IRS records indicated that more than 200 official or diplomatic passports were issued to employees between 2016 and 2019. Lastly, one dataset included only Department of Treasury employees and not IRS employees. According to TIGTA officials, CA officials could not explain why the database was providing incomplete data. Based on the missing records and data fields, TIGTA deemed CA’s information as unreliable for use in its audit.
[…]
(U) In response to TIGTA’s concerns about receiving incomplete data from CA, OIG reviewed the  847,880 official and diplomatic passport records provided to OIG by CA and found that none of  the passport records had blank issuance or expiration date fields. Furthermore, the records  showed that CA issued 652 official and diplomatic passports to IRS employees and their family  members from FY 2017 through FY 2019 as opposed to the data provided to TIGTA, which showed that no passports were issued to IRS employees from FY 2017 through FY 2019.

The Special Issuance Agency (SIA) did not review the data!

(U) When asked about TIGTA’s concerns, CA officials stated that CA’s Office of Consular Systems and Technology ran a query in TDIS using sponsor codes28 that are associated with IRS to obtain the data requested by TIGTA. CA’s Office of Legal Affairs and Law Enforcement Liaison and the  Office of Passport Integrity and Internal Controls reviewed the data before the data were  released to TIGTA. SIA did not review the data. If SIA employees had reviewed the data, they  would have recognized that it was incomplete. SIA employees would know, because of  reimbursement data, the number of passports issued to IRS employees. CA officials also stated  that, although there are processes in place for reviewing and clearing data prior to release to Federal customers, there is not a formal written policy or standard operating procedures. CA officials are formalizing procedures to address this deficiency.

(U) CA officials indicated that requests for passport information from other agencies are infrequent—there have been none since TIGTA’s request in 2019. However, it is important that CA have effective internal control activities in place to ensure that quality data are provided to other Government agencies. Internal control is a process effected by an entity’s management that provides reasonable assurance that the objectives of an entity will be achieved.29 Management should establish control activities through policies and procedures to achieve objectives.30 Because CA had not implemented effective internal control activities to ensure that the data provided to TIGTA in response to its request were properly reviewed and validated, it failed to meet its objective of delivering a high level of customer service and earning customer trust, which consequently impacted TIGTA’s ability to conduct an audit of passport management and security at the IRS. Although OIG acknowledges that CA is developing internal control activities and associated procedures to help ensure that the incident with TIGTA is not repeated, OIG is making the following recommendation and will track its implementation through the audit compliance process to confirm that the identified deficiency has been fully addressed.

(U) Prior Office of Inspector General Reports

(U) During this audit, OIG was alerted that a former Department of State employee had  allegedly not surrendered their diplomatic passport upon separation from the Department.  Department employees’ entitlement to an official or diplomatic passport, in most instances,  ends when they separate from the Department, and the passport must be surrendered for  cancellation.

(U) OIG found that CA had not electronically cancelled one of the former employee’s diplomatic  passports. Based on that information, OIG performed additional steps to determine whether CA  had cancelled other diplomatic or official passports once an employee had separated from the  Department of State. OIG found that CA had not electronically cancelled 57 of 134 (43 percent)  passports tested.5 In addition, of these 57 passports, 47 (82 percent) had not expired as of  February 1, 2021, meaning they could still be valid. One reason for the deficiencies identified is  that bureaus and offices did not always maintain proper accountability of passports and could  not confirm whether separating employees had surrendered their passports for cancellation.  OIG made one recommendation that is intended to improve the accountability of official and  diplomatic passports of separating employees. As of June 2021, OIG considers the  recommendation resolved, pending further action.

EEOC: Challenge to @StateDept’s Mandatory Retirement as Violation of the ADEA Fails

June 3, 2021 By in EEOC, Govt Documents, Realities of the FS, Retirement, State Department Tags: , , , ,
13 Going on 14 — GFM: https://gofund.me/32671a27

 

Via EEOC Appeal No. 2020000116 (PDF)
DECISION:

Complainant filed a timely appeal with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC or Commission) from the Agency’s decision dated July 31, 2019, dismissing his complaint of unlawful employment discrimination in violation of the Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967 (ADEA), as amended, 29 U.S.C. § 621 et seq.

BACKGROUND:

At the time of events giving rise to this complaint, Complainant worked as an Information Systems Security Officer, FS-03, at the Agency’s facility in Brussels, Belgium.

On July 1, 2019, Complainant filed a formal complaint alleging that the Agency subjected him to age discrimination when he was not allowed to bid for assignments in the summer 2020 job cycle, when he will reach the Agency’s mandatory retirement age. Complainant also stated, in his formal complaint, that he was being involuntarily retired in January 2020, solely on account of his age.

The Agency dismissed the complaint, pursuant to 29 C.F.R. § 1614.107(a)(1), for failure to state a claim, stating that the ADEA does not preclude mandatory retirement provisions, including the one set forth in the Foreign Service Act which covered Complainant’s position. The instant appeal followed.
[…]
We concur that the instant complaint, which in essence challenges the Agency’s mandatory retirement at age 65 as a violation of the ADEA, fails to state a claim. Since Complainant is challenging the validity of the mandatory retirement age, which was authorized by Congress as a statutory exception to the Age Discrimination in Employment Act, the Commission finds that his complaint has been appropriately dismissed for failure to state a claim. See Brumbaugh v. Department of the Army, EEOC Appeal No. 01A05531 (Mar. 29, 2001) (the mandatory retirement provisions of the Foreign Service Act must be given “full force and effect” and the ADEA cannot be read to prohibit their implementation, citing to Strawberry v. Department of State, No. 96-5221 (D.C. Cir. 1997. In commenting on Strawberry, the Commission observed that the court looked at both statutes and concluded that Congress knew what it was doing in keeping the mandatory retirement provisions in place even when it otherwise outlawed mandatory retirement for most employers under the ADEA).

Accordingly, the Agency’s final decision dismissing Complainant’s complaint is AFFIRMED.

###

 

State/OIG: Accountability of Official and Diplomatic Passports Needs Improvement

May 28, 2021 By in Govt Documents, Political Appointees, Regulations, State Department Tags: , , , , , , , , ,
13 Going on 14 — GFM: https://gofund.me/32671a27

 

State/OIG issued its Management Assistance Report: Accountability of Official and Diplomatic Passports of Separating Employees Needs Improvement this week.
According to the OIG, in December 2020, after it announced an audit of official and diplomatic passport records, the Office of Inspector General (OIG) was alerted that a former Department of State employee, a political appointee, allegedly kept their diplomatic passport after separating from the Department and wanted to use it in their new role with another U.S. Government organization.

Specifically: “A politically appointed Senior Advisor separated from the Department in November 2019. In 2020, President Trump appointed the former advisor to a role with another U.S. government organization. A representative from the new organization contacted the appointee’s former Department bureau because the political appointee was in possession of a diplomatic passport. The representative wanted to know whether the appointee could travel on behalf of the new organization using this diplomatic passport. The representative was informed by a bureau official that the appointee should not use the diplomatic passport.”

Excerpt from the MAR:

(U) During an audit of CA’s official and diplomatic passport records, OIG was alerted that a former Department employee had allegedly not surrendered their diplomatic passport upon separation from the Department and wanted to use it in a new role with another U.S. Government organization.24 According to the FAM, entitlement to an official or diplomatic passport ends when the employee separates from the Department, and the passport must be surrendered for cancellation.25

U) OIG found that the former employee’s diplomatic passport was listed as “issued” in ACRQ and had not been electronically cancelled by SIA. Based on that information, OIG performed additional steps to determine whether SIA had cancelled other employees’ official and diplomatic passports once separated from the Department. Specifically, OIG selected a sample of 134 official and diplomatic passports issued to employees who subsequently separated from the Department between November 2017 and September 2020. OIG found that 57 of 134 (43 percent) passports had not been electronically cancelled by SIA after the employee separated. Moreover, of the 57 that had not been electronically cancelled, 47 (82 percent) of the passports had not expired as of February 1, 2021, meaning they could still be valid.

(U) One reason for the deficiencies identified is that Department bureaus and offices did not always maintain proper accountability of passports and could not confirm whether separating employees had surrendered their passports for cancellation. When an employee’s entitlement to an official or diplomatic passport ends, but the passport is not surrendered or cancelled, the individual could misuse the passport, such as misrepresenting themselves as a representative of the U.S. Government. Doing so is a criminal offense.26

(U) Separated Employees’ Official and Diplomatic Passports

(U) Based upon a Bureau of Global Talent Management list of employees who had separated from the Department between November 2017 and September 2020, OIG identified 4,714 official and diplomatic passports associated with those employees. OIG selected a sample of 134 passports to test. 27 OIG found that 57 of 134 (43 percent) passports had not been electronically cancelled by SIA. In addition, of those 57 passports, 47 (82 percent) had not expired, as of February 1, 2021, meaning they could stil l be valid. 28 For example, one employee separated from the Department in December 2017, but the employee’s diplomatic passport was not scheduled to expire until April 2022- more than 4 years after separating from the Department.

OIG apparently followed up with 3 bureaus and 1 office to determine whether 17 former Department employees had surrendered their passport(s) and whether the bureaus or office had requested that SIA cancel the passports in accordance with the FAM. The follow-up revealed the following:

Two former CA employees:  “OIG identified two former CA employees who had diplomatic passports listed as “issued” in ACRQ. According to CA’s employee check-out list, employees are required to return special-issuance passports to SIA that were issued to them and to their family members upon separation and obtain the signature of an SIA staff member. SIA has no record of either of these two passports being returned for cancellation after the employees separated.”

Two former Office of the Secretary employees: “OIG identified two former Office of the Secretary employees who had diplomatic passports listed as “issued” in ACRQ. These two individuals had four passports issued to them. The Office of the Secretary’s employee check-out form requires departing employees to return their special-issuance passports and have the form initialed by the Office of the Secretary’s budget and travel office staff. An Office of the Secretary official stated that the office would have been in possession of three of the identified passports because the office maintains the diplomatic passports of people who travel with the Secretary of State. Because the three passports could not be found in the office, the official assumed that they were physically cancelled and returned to the individual. The Office of the Secretary could not provide information on the fourth passport. The Office of the Secretary official stated that a memorandum would have accompanied each passport to SIA for cancellation, but copies of the memoranda were not maintained .”(what the what? italics added).

Eleven former DS employees:  “OIG identified 11 former Bureau of Diplomatic Security (DS) employees who had diplomatic passports listed as “issued” in ACRQ. These 11 individuals had 16 passports issued to them, including 2 that were issued to a former Assistant Secretary. DS’s employee check-out form requires employees to return to the Employee Services Center or contact SIA about special-issuance passports that were issued to them and to their family members upon separation. A DS official stated that the two passports issued to the former Assistant Secretary were collected before he separated from the Department, but DS had not returned them to SIA. The DS official stated that a former employee, who returned as a PSC, claimed to have lost one passport but there was no comment on her second passport and another employee’s passport had been returned to CA. Three former DS employees had returned four passports in total to their DS offices; however, DS could not locate an additional passport for one of these individuals and an additional two passports for another of these individuals. The DS official further stated that DS did not have records for two of the people associated with two passports. DS may have facilitated the issuance of these passports, but they were not DS employees. DS did not provide information on the remaining 2 of 16 passports.”

OIG recommends that the Bureau of Consular Affairs “improve accountability over special-issuance passports by updating the Foreign Affairs Manual and any other relevant policy documents to require that (a) all Department of State bureaus and offices that participate in the Special Issuance Passport Program either (1) physically cancel special-issuance passports (including secondary passports) issued to a separating employee and email the Special Issuance Agency (SIA) a copy of the physically cancelled data page requesting that the passport(s) be electronically cancelled (along with returning the passport to SIA for destruction if not returned to the separating employee) or (2) if appropriate, file the special-issuance passport with SIA and (b) the Special Issuance Agency confirm that all special-issuance passports issued to the separating employee have been included in the cancellation request and electronically cancel all additional passport(s) as appropriate.”
Consular Affairs concurred with the recommendation, stating that it “will propose updates to the FAM and to the Special Issuance Passport Program.”  The bureau will also “update SIA’s cancellation and destruction SOP to confirm that all special-issuance passports issued to a separating employee have been included in the cancellation request and electronically cancel all additional passports as appropriate.”

###

 

@StateDept Updates 12 FAM 233.4 Suspension of Security Clearance #NoTDYs

May 21, 2021 By in Diplomatic Security, Functional Bureaus, Govt Documents, Realities of the FS, Regulations, Security, Security Clearance, State Department Tags: , , , ,
13 Going on 14 — GFM: https://gofund.me/32671a27

 

🆕 12 FAM 233.4  Suspension of Security Clearance
(CT:DS-359;   04-27-2021)
a. When derogatory information is received regarding an employee with access to classified information, the director of the Diplomatic Security Service (DS/DSS), based on a recommendation from the senior coordinator for Security Infrastructure (DS/SI), will determine whether, considering all facts available upon receipt of the initial information, it is in the interests of the national security to suspend the employee’s access to classified information on an interim basis.  A suspension is an independent administrative procedure that does not represent a final determination and does not trigger the procedures outlined in 12 FAM 234.
b. Suspension of a security clearance may be appropriate in, but may not be limited to, the following situations:
(1)  Additional time is needed to resolve adverse information that may require additional investigation or for the individual to complete certain requirements to maintain his or her clearance;
(2)  Preparations are being made to revoke an individual’s existing access to classified information and access is suspended while the review of the determination to revoke takes place;
(3)  The individual is pending removal or separation from employment under 5 U.S.C. 7532; or
(4)  The individual has failed to submit required security forms or releases in a timely manner.
c.  In all cases where access is suspended, the individual must be notified, in writing, that his/her security clearance has been suspended.  Upon notification, the individual must turn in his or her Department-issued credentials that provide logical or physical access to classified systems or designated classified spaces/facilities and any and all Special Issuance Agency-issued passport(s) to the Office of Personnel Security and Suitability (DS/SI/PSS).  DS must in turn notify the appropriate human resource personnel or the Industrial Security Division (DS/IS/IND), Defensive Equipment and Armored Vehicle Division (DS/PSP/DEAV), and regional security officer/post security officer, as appropriate, of the suspension.  The executive office within the individual’s employing bureau is responsible for collecting any and all classified devices issued to the employee.
d. Personnel whose security clearances have been suspended may not be placed on temporary duty (TDY) status.  Exceptions to this policy may be considered on a case-by-case basis by DS/DSS, but are unlikely to be granted, barring exceptional circumstances.  An exception request must be submitted in writing from the individual’s bureau executive director to DS/DSS via DS/SI/PSS.
e. Suspension of a security clearance is an interim measure, and is not a substitute for the revocation procedures described in 12 FAM 234.
f.  The length of the suspension process can vary according to the nature and complexity of the case.  If, for example the suspension of a clearance is based on preliminary facts from a DS criminal investigation, Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) counterintelligence or other law enforcement investigation, or an Inspector General investigation, in many cases, those matters must be resolved and prosecutorial decisions rendered before the Department can use the information for administrative action.  Often, relevant evidence and witnesses are located abroad, which can also add time to the investigative process.  Recognizing these constraints, DS will work to resolve suspension cases as quickly as possible.
g. Where deemed appropriate, the director (DS/DSS) may reinstate a suspended clearance subject to conditions, which may include limitations of TDY or regular assignment, or with a warning that future incidents of a similar character may result in revocation of a security clearance.

 

###

@EFF Awards “The Thin Crust, Wood-Fired Redactions Award” to @StateDept #SunshineWeek

March 22, 2021 By in Annual, Awards, Govt Documents, Huh? News, Mike Pompeo, Pompeo, Secretary of State, State Department, Transparency Tags: , , ,
13 GoingOn 14: Help Keep the Blog Going For 2021 — GFM: https://gofund.me/32671a27

 

The Electronic Frontier Foundation is the leading nonprofit organization defending civil liberties in the digital world. Founded in 1990, EFF champions user privacy, free expression, and innovation through impact litigation, policy analysis, grassroots activism, and technology development. It runs an annual Foilies meant to “name-and-shame” government agencies for being obstacles to public access to information.
The last time the State Department received this award was in 2016 with The Self-Server Award. For the 2021 Foilies, the State Department received “The Thin Crust, Wood-Fired Redactions” Award for the redactions of Pompeo’s list of pizza toppings apparently deemed by FOIA folks to be “far too saucy for public consumption?”
Holymoly macaroni, what could those toppings be? Peanut butter-banana jalopeno papusa-pizza?

 

Citation: The Thin Crust, Wood-Fired Redactions Award – U.S. State Department

Former Secretary of State Mike Pompeo hosted plenty of controversial meals during his three-year tenure. There was the indoor holiday party last December and those bizarre, lavish “Madison Dinners” that cost taxpayers tens of thousands of dollars, including more than $10k for embossed pens alone. And while we know the full menu of Pompeo’s high-class North Korea summit in 2018 in Manhattan—filet mignon with corn purée was the centerpiece—the public may never find out two searing culinary questions about Mikey: What are his pizza toppings of choice, and what’s his go-to sandwich?
On the pizza angle, the State Department let slip that Pompeo likes it thin and wood-fired, in emails released to NBC correspondent Josh Lederman. But the list of toppings was far too saucy for public consumption, apparently, and redacted on privacy grounds. Same for Pompeo’s sandwich-of-choice, which the State Department redacted from emails released to American Oversight. But we still know “plenty of dry snacks and diet coke” were on offer.
Originally posted here: The Thin Crust, Wood-Fired Redactions Award – U.S. State Department

 

 

USA v. Raymond: Court Issues Protective Order Pertaining to Classified Information

March 12, 2021 By in Americans Abroad, Court Cases, Diplomatic Security, Federal Agencies, Govt Documents, Realities of the FS, Security Clearance, U.S. Missions, WHA|Western Hemisphere Tags: , , , , , , , ,
13 GoingOn 14: Help Keep the Blog Going For 2021 — GFM: https://gofund.me/32671a27
Back in October, we blogged about ex-USG employee Brian Jeffrey Raymond who was called an “experienced sexual predator,” and ordered removed to D.C.  The Motion for Pre-Trial Detention in this case says that the government’s investigation has revealed 22 apparent victims thus far – the initial sexual assault victim plus 21 additional victims found on the defendant’s devices and in his iCloud. And this individual reportedly had taken over 10 polygraphs during his career. 
Court records of February 9 indicate that the Preliminary Hearing will  continue on 3/26/2021 at 11:30 AM in Telephonic/VTC before Magistrate Judge Zia M. Faruqui in the U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia.
On February 18, a “Protective Order setting forth procedures for handling confidential material; allowing designated material to be filed under seal as to Brian Jeffrey Raymond” was issued by the Court.
Uh-oh!
On March 1, 2021, the Court issued an order granting a consent motion for Protective Order Pursuant to Section 3 of the Classified Information Procedures Act by USA as to Brian Jeffrey Raymond. Excerpt:
The case will involve information that has been classified in the interest of national security

“The Court finds that this case will involve information that has been classified in the interest of national security. The storage, handling, and control of this information will require special security precautions mandated by statute, executive order, and regulation, and access to this information requires appropriate security clearances and need-to-know, as set forth in Executive Order 13526 (or successor order), that has been validated by the government.2 The purpose of this Order is to establish procedures that must be followed by counsel and the parties in this case. These procedures will apply to all pretrial, trial, post-trial, and appellate matters concerning classified information and may be modified from time to time by further Order of the Court acting under its inherent supervisory authority to ensure a fair and expeditious trial.”

Any classified information provided to the defense…

“Any classified information provided to the defense and the defendant by the government, or to the defense by the defendant, is to be used solely by the defense and solely for the purpose of preparing the defense. The defense and the defendant may not disclose or cause to be disclosed in connection with this case any information known or reasonably believed to be classified information except as otherwise provided herein.”

For Cleared Counsel Only

“The government may disclose some information to defense counsel only. This information shall be clearly marked “FOR CLEARED COUNSEL ONLY.” For any such information, defense counsel may not confirm or deny to the defendant any assertions made by the defendant based on knowledge the defense may have obtained from classified information, except where that classified information has been provided to the defendant pursuant to this Order. Any classified information the defense discloses to or discusses with the defendant in any way shall be handled in accordance with this Order and the attached Memorandum of Understanding, including such requirements as confining all discussions, documents, and materials to an accredited SCIF.”

Defendant’s Memorandum of Understanding

“As a former U.S. government employee who had access to classified information, the defendant has a continuing contractual obligation to the government not to disclose to any unauthorized person classified information known to him or in his possession. The government is entitled to enforce that agreement to maintain the confidentiality of classified information, and the defendant must sign the Memorandum of Understanding. The defendant is subject to this Court’s authority, contempt powers, and other authorities, and shall fully comply with the nondisclosure agreements he has signed, this Order, the Memorandum of Understanding, and applicable statutes.”

The order includes provisions for a secure area for the defense, filing of papers by the defense, filing of papers by the USG, record and maintenance of classified filings, the Classified Information Procedures Act, access to classified information, and special procedures for audio recordings.
The footnotes includes notation that “The Court understands that the government may move for a supplemental protective order depending on the nature of additional information that is determined to be discoverable” and that  “Any individual to whom classified information is disclosed pursuant to this Order shall not disclose such information to another individual unless the U.S. agency that originated that information has validated that the proposed recipient possesses an appropriate security clearance and need-to-know.”

Previously, on December 15, 2020, the FBI released the following announcement seeking potential victims in their Brian Jeffrey Raymond investigation.

Seeking Potential Victims in Brian Jeffrey Raymond Investigation

The FBI and the U.S. Department of State’s Diplomatic Security Service are asking for the public’s help in seeking potential victims of and additional information about an alleged sexual offender, Brian Jeffrey Raymond.

Raymond, 44, was formerly a U.S. government employee, and he traveled extensively overseas, including in Mexico and Peru. He speaks both Spanish and Mandarin Chinese. Raymond had been living in Mexico from August 2018 to May 2020.

Raymond was charged in connection with an instance in which he allegedly met a victim on a dating application and had videos and photographs of the victim showing her unconscious and partially undressed.

Raymond was arrested in La Mesa, California, on October 9, 2020. The investigation is ongoing and has revealed photographs and videos of additional adult women on Raymond’s devices and electronic accounts.

If you believe you have been a victim of Brian Jeffrey Raymond, the FBI requests that you fill out this secure, online questionnaire. The questionnaire will assist law enforcement with the investigation.

If you believe you or someone you know may have information regarding Brian Jeffrey Raymond, please complete this same questionnaire, or you may email ReportingBJR@fbi.gov or call 1-800-CALL-FBI.

The FBI is legally mandated to identify victims of federal crimes it investigates. Identified victims may be eligible for certain services and rights under federal and/or state law.

Questionnaire

Additional Resources

 

The FBI issued press releases in English and Spanish.
To-date, we have not/not been able  to find a press release or DSS articles from Diplomatic Security regarding this alleged sexual offender with apparently extensive overseas travel in Mexico and Peru.
Neither US Mission Mexico nor US Embassy Peru carries the FBI press release on its website in English or Spanish seeking potential victims in this case. The USG is seeking potential victims, is it not?

 

 

 

Ex-@StateDept Staffer Charged in 1/6 Insurrection to Remain in Custody Pending Trial

March 10, 2021 By in Court Cases, Govt Documents, Political Appointees, State Department, Trump Tags: , , , ,
On March 4, former political appointee at the State Department Federico Klein was arrested in connection with the January 6 insurrection (see Three Current/Former @StateDept Employees Float to the Top in Crowded Bad News Cycle).  Klein is really going to be unhappy with his continued accommodations at the D.C. jail. On March 9 the DOJ filed its memo in support of pre-trial detention and the judge agreed to keep him in custody. Excerpt below from the pre-trial detention memo:
The dangerousness of Klein’s participation in the mob that day is only heightened by the fact that, at that time, he was an employee of the Department of State, with an obligation to uphold the Constitution. By law, federal employees are required to take an oath of office, swearing to “support and defend the Constitution of the United States against all enemies, foreign and domestic…” 5 U.S.C. § 3331. Presumably, Klein took that same oath of office when he entered federal employment. Despite his oath to support and defend the Constitution, Klein demonstrated his contempt for that oath, the legitimate functions of the government, and for the Constitution itself when he assaulted officers in an attempt to stop the certification of a lawful election. By his actions on January 6, 2021, Klein abdicated his responsibilities to the country and the Constitution. Despite the trust the country and government placed in Klein’s character, stability, trustworthiness, reliability, discretion, honesty, judgment, and unquestionable loyalty to the United States,5 Klein’s behavior revealed that his true allegiance lies elsewhere. Rather, Klein’s actions established that his own personal beliefs override the rule of law and that he will use violence in an attempt to halt the legitimate functions of the United States government with which he disagrees. Such blatant disregard of the law and the authority of a lawful government, along with his indifference to keeping his own commitments – even when made under oath – weigh in favor of detention. If Klein is unwilling to obey orders while in full view of law enforcement, or to conform his behavior to the law even when he disagrees with it, despite his oath to the Constitution, it is unlikely that he would adhere to this Court’s directions and release orders.
The criminal complaint dated March 2, 2021 charged Klein with the following:
18 U.S.C. § 1752(a)(1) – Knowingly Entering or Remaining in any Restricted Building or Grounds Without Lawful Authority,
40 U.S.C. § 5104(e)(2) – Violent Entry and Disorderly Conduct on Capitol Grounds,
18 U.S.C. § 1512(c)(2) – Obstruction of Justice/Congress,
18 U.S.C. § 231(a)(3) – Obstruction of Law Enforcement During Civil Disorder,
18 U.S.C. § 111(a)(1) – Assaulting, Resisting, or Impeding Certain Officers,
18 U.S.C. § 111(b) – Assaulting, Resisting, or Impeding Certain Officers Using a Dangerous Weapon