@StateDept Cites 10 Cases Where Employees Were Placed on Admin Leave, See #10

Posted: 12:41 ET

 

3 FAM 3464 defines “Excuse Absence” (commonly known as administrative leave) as absence from duty administratively authorized or approved by the leave-approving officer and does not result in a charge in leave of any kind or in loss of basic salary. 3 FAM 3464.102 also provides for Conduct-Related Excused Absence “Excused absence may be directed in rare circumstances and when authorized as provided by 3 FAH-1 H-3461.2 when an investigation, inquiry, or disciplinary action regarding the employee’s conduct is pending, has been requested, or will be requested within 2 workdays, and the continued presence of the employee in the workplace may pose a threat to the employee or to others, or may result in loss of, or damage to, U.S. Government property, or may otherwise jeopardize legitimate U.S. Government interests.”

According to grievance records, during the discovery phase of FSGB No. 2015-029, the State Department provided grievant with a spread sheet identifying 10 cases in which employees were placed on administrative leave pursuant to 3 FAM 3464.1.-2.

Via FSGB:  We quote the stated reasons for the administrative leave as follows (with numbering added):

  • 1) Ongoing investigation. Employee admitted to taking extra passport applications from courier beyond allowed quota. . . . (3 separate cases);
  • 2) Arrest based on violation of protective order;
  • 3) Allegations of misconduct and alcohol consumption while at US Embassy;
  • 4) Employee’s clearance suspended – reasons unknown. Employee failed to meet DS for compelled interview;
  • 5) By letter dated 11/14/13, PSS notified her of suspension of clearance. . . . ;
  • 6) Security Clearance suspended by DS. . . . ;
  • 7) DS investigating employee fraud/impersonating supervisor to obtain federal housing benefits;
  • 8) Arrested on child pornography charges. (no indication employee used USG equipment);
  • 9) Incident resulting in death of Ambassador and others. Admin leave while office evaluates appropriate action (3 separate cases);
  • 10) Employee investigated based on allegations of the rape of 2 women.

Grievant lacks any basis for asserting that the AL granted in these other cases did not serve USG “interests.” Those interests are broad, going far beyond the obvious trauma and safety issues as to other employees. Realistically, all 10 cases (based on the brief descriptions given in the record) invoked some type of governmental interest that was rather self-evident, e.g., stopping an employee from impersonating a supervisor or investigating the actual suspension of someone’s security clearance.21 The bottom line is that the Department’s decisions to grant AL to other persons who were subject to various investigations is not even pertinent to the grievant, [REDACTED].

The FSGB finds that “administrative leave is not an entitlement that would provide the grievant with certain safeguards, but is instead a prerogative administered by management to meet the needs of the Service.”

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Sexual Assault Related posts:

 

Administrative Leave: A Prerogative to Meet the Needs of the Service, Not/Not an Entitlement

Posted: 12:37  pm RT

 

Unlike the MSPB, the Foreign Service Grievance Board does not identify its precedential decisions but the case below on administrative leave is worth noting whether this is precedent setting or not. In this case, FSGB says that administrative leave is 1) not an entitlement, 2) that it is a prerogative administered by management to meet the needs of the Service, 3) and that Department was not obligated to provide grievant with an explanation for its decision to deny admin leave.

Via FSGB:

Grievant is a Diplomatic Security Service Special Agent who became involved in an altercation with a local civilian while off duty during a temporary duty (TDY) assignment in Honolulu. This incident resulted in the discharge of his service weapon and the death of the civilian. The State of Hawaii brought criminal charges against grievant, and the Department of Justice (DOJ) declined to represent him, finding that the incident was not the consequence of an official act or performance of his official duties.

For unspecified reasons, the Department placed grievant on administrative leave twice: first, in the aftermath of the shooting, when he was under judicial order not to leave Honolulu, and second, during the pendency of his first trial in 2013 (which resulted in a hung jury). Facing a second trial in 2014, grievant asked the Department to place him on administrative leave again. The Department ultimately denied this latter request and upheld its decision in an agency-level grievance.

Grievant acknowledged that under regulation (3 FAM 3464) the Department has discretionary authority to grant or deny administrative leave. He argued that although the Department is not compelled to grant his request, the weight of both equity and precedent suggest that it should do so. He asserted that the circumstances under which the Department earlier took the initiative to place him on administrative leave are substantially the same as those for which he later requested administrative leave (i.e., for his second trial) and arise from the same incident. He contended that if the Department is to “change” its decision regarding whether to grant him administrative leave, it must provide him an explanation of why it did so.

As the instant appeal does not concern discipline, grievant bears the burden of demonstrating that his grievance is meritorious. We found that grievant had failed to demonstrate that the Department had any obligation to approve his request for administrative leave or that it had violated any law or regulation in not doing so. Finally, we found that the facts of this case do not establish that the Department “changed” its decision; rather, the various decisions it made regarding whether to place grievant on administrative leave were separate, independent decisions. The Board concluded that the Department was not obligated to provide grievant with an explanation for its decision to deny AL. The appeal was denied in its entirety.

Read in full below:

 

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US Embassy Kinshasa Now on ‘Authorized Departure’ For Non-Emergency Personnel in the DRC

Posted: 6:13  pm PT

 

On September 30, 2016, the State Department placed family members of USG employees in the Democratic Republic of Congo on mandatory evacuation (see US Embassy Kinshasa Now on ‘Ordered Departure’ For Family Members of USG Employees). On December 2, the State Department issued a new Travel Warning and announced the “authorized departure” or voluntary departure of non-emergency personnel by December 10 due to the deteriorating security situation in the country. The Travel Warning also urged U.S. citizens to depart the country before December 19.  Excerpt Below:

The U.S. Embassy in Kinshasa warns U.S. citizens of the potential for large-scale demonstrations and civil unrest on/around December 19, the date on which President Kabila’s term in office was due to end before elections were delayed.

U.S. citizens in the DRC should seriously consider leaving the country in advance of this date. As a result of the deteriorating security situation, the Department of State has ordered family members of U.S. government personnel and authorized non-emergency personnel to depart the country as of December 10, 2016. This replaces the Travel Warning dated October 7, 2016.
U.S. citizens should consider taking advantage of departing commercial flights and other transportation options now.  All U.S. citizens should have evacuation plans that do not rely solely on U.S. government assistance.  U.S. citizens should ensure that travel documents (passports and visas) are valid and up-to-date.  Consular services, already limited throughout the country due to very poor transportation infrastructure and security conditions, may be further limited even in Kinshasa.

U.S. citizens who decide to remain in DRC through December 19 should prepare for the possible deterioration of security:

  • Exercise caution and remain abreast of the security situation.
  • Follow the instructions of local authorities.
  • Stay home or at another safe location.
  • Have emergency supplies of food, water, and medications.
  • Let friends and family know that there might be communication disruptions.

Additional recommendations on emergency preparedness are available on the Travel.State.gov web page “What Can You Do in a Crisis Abroad?

In addition, ongoing instability and sporadic violence continue in parts of the DRC. Armed groups, bandits, and some elements of the Congolese armed forces operate in:

  • North Kivu
  • South Kivu
  • Bas-Uele
  • Haut-Uele
  • Ituri
  • Tanganyika
  • Haut-Lomami.

These groups kill, rape, kidnap, pillage, steal vehicles, and carry out military or paramilitary operations in which civilians can be indiscriminately targeted.  Kidnapping for ransom is common, particularly in areas north and west of Goma, North Kivu.  Congolese military and United Nations forces continue to operate throughout North and South Kivu and near the DRC’s borders with the Central African Republic and the Republic of South Sudan, particularly in and around Garamba National Park. Travelers in the region may encounter troop movements, armored vehicles and attack helicopters.

Travelers are frequently detained and questioned by poorly trained security forces at official and unofficial roadblocks and border crossings throughout the country, especially near government buildings and installations in Kinshasa.  Be cautious when stopped by security forces.  Requests for bribes are extremely common, and security forces have occasionally injured or killed people who refuse to pay.  In the past year, several U.S. citizens have been illegally detained by government forces or robbed of their valuables while being searched.

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Trump Chats With Taiwan’s President, a First? Since Diplomatic Relations Cut in 1979. Uh-oh! #OneChina

Posted: 4:21  pm PT

 

Via history.state.gov:

During Jimmy Carter’s presidency, the most dramatic moment in Sino-American relations occurred on December 15, 1978, when, following months of secret negotiations, the United States and the People’s Republic of China (PRC) announced that they would recognize one another and establish official diplomatic relations. As part of the agreement, the United States recognized the Government of the People’s Republic of China as the sole legal government of China, and declared it would withdraw diplomatic recognition from Taiwan (also known as the Republic of China [ROC]).
[…]
A new era began with a rapprochement during Richard Nixon’s presidency. Nixon and his aide, Henry Kissinger, found ready partners in Mao Zedong, the Chairman of the Chinese Communist Party, and Zhou Enlai, the Chinese Premier, who also wanted to improve Sino-U.S. relations. Their efforts resulted in the Shanghai Communiqué, which laid the basis for future cooperation between the two countries even while acknowledging continuing disagreements on the subject of Taiwan. As part of this rapprochement, the two countries opened liaison offices in one another’s capitals in 1973, a time when Taiwan still had an Embassy in Washington. The liaison offices, which in many ways operated as de facto embassies, represented a significant concession by the People’s Republic of China, which opposed the acceptance of “two Chinas” because that implied both were legitimate governments.
[…]
PRC leaders repeatedly expressed displeasure with the Taiwan Relations Act (TRA), which became law on April 10, 1979. The TRA was influenced by Congressional supporters of Taiwan and stated that it is the policy of the United States “to provide Taiwan with arms of a defensive character; and to maintain the capacity of the United States to resist any resort to force or other forms of coercion that would jeopardize the security, or the social or economic system, of the people on Taiwan.” In his signing statement, Carter declared that he would use the discretion granted to him by Congress to interpret the TRA “in a manner consistent with our interest in the well-being of the people on Taiwan and with the understandings we reached on the normalization of relations with the People’s Republic of China.”
[…]
On January 1, 1979, the United States recognized the PRC and established diplomatic relations with it as the sole legitimate government of China. On the same day, the United States withdrew its recognition of, and terminated diplomatic relations with, the Republic of China as the government of China.  The U.S. embassy in Taipei was closed on February 28, 1979. The U.S. Liaison Office in Beijing was converted to an Embassy on March 1, 1979, and Leonard F. Woodcock, who had been head of the Liaison Office, was appointed Ambassador.

 

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FBI to Veteran Diplomat Robin Raphel: “Do you know any foreigners?” #criminalizingdiplomacy

Posted: 1:29  pm ET

 

We’ve posted previously about Ambassador Robin Raphel in this blog. See Case Against Veteran Diplomat Robin Raphel Ends Without Charges, Who’s Gonna Say Sorry?. Also below:

Today, the Wall Street Journal runs an extensive account of what happened and why this case is a concerning one for American diplomats:

The NSA regularly swept up Pakistani communications “to, from or about” senior U.S. officials working in the country. Some American officials would appear in Pakistani intercepts as often as once a week. What Raphel didn’t realize was that her desire to engage with foreign officials, the very skill set her supervisors encouraged, had put a target on her back.

The FBI didn’t have a clear picture of where Raphel fit on the State Department organizational chart. She was a political adviser with the rank of ambassador but she wasn’t a key policy maker anymore. She seemed to have informal contacts with everyone who mattered in Islamabad—more, even, than the sitting ambassador and the CIA station chief.

[…]
State Department officials said that when they spoke to the FBI agents, they had the feeling they were explaining the basics of how diplomats worked.

At times, Raphel’s colleagues pushed back—warning the FBI that their investigation risked “criminalizing diplomacy,” according to a former official who was briefed on the interviews.

In one interview, the agents asked James Dobbins, who served as SRAP from 2013 to 2014, whether it was OK for Raphel to talk to a Pakistani source about information that wasn’t restricted at the time, but would later be deemed classified.

“If somebody tells you something in one conversation, you might write that up and it becomes classified,” he said. “But that doesn’t mean the next time you see them that you can’t talk about what you’d already talked about.”

[…]

Over the past two years, diplomats in Pakistan and the U.S. have scaled back contacts, according to officials in both countries. U.S. diplomats say they are afraid of what the NSA and the FBI might hear about them.

“What happened to Raphel could happen to any of us,” said Ryan Crocker, one of the State Department’s most highly decorated career ambassadors. Given the empowerment of law enforcement after 9/11 and the U.S.’s growing reliance on signals intelligence in place of diplomatic reporting, he said, “we will know less and we will be less secure.”

“Look what happened to the one person who was out talking to people,” said Dan Feldman, Raphel’s former boss at State. “Does that not become a cautionary tale?”

[…]

Diplomatic Security had yet to restore her security clearance. Some of her friends at the State Department said they believed the FBI opposed the idea.

Kerry and Raphel stood close together for only a couple of minutes. On the sidelines of the noisy gathering, Kerry leaned over and whispered into Raphel’s ear: “I am sorry about what has happened to you.”

Read in full below:

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US Embassy Accra’s “Operation Spartan Vanguard” Shuts Down Fake U.S. Embassy in Ghana

Posted: 12:23 am ET

 

Via state.gov/DS

In Accra, Ghana, there was a building that flew an American flag outside every Monday, Tuesday, and Friday, 7:30 a.m.-12:00 p.m. Inside hung a photo of President Barack Obama, and signs indicated that you were in the U.S. Embassy in Ghana. However, you were not. This embassy was a sham.

It was not operated by the United States government, but by figures from both Ghanaian and Turkish organized crime rings and a Ghanaian attorney practicing immigration and criminal law. The “consular officers” were Turkish citizens who spoke English and Dutch.

For about a decade it operated unhindered; the criminals running the operation were able to pay off corrupt officials to look the other way, as well as obtain legitimate blank documents to be doctored.

This past summer the assistant regional security officer investigator (ARSO-I) at the real U.S. Embassy in Accra, in cooperation with the Ghana Police Force, Ghana Detectives Bureau, and other international partners, shut down this fake embassy.

This investigation is a small part of the broader “Operation Spartan Vanguard” initiative. “Operation Spartan Vanguard” was developed by Diplomatic Security agents in the Regional Security Office (RSO) at U.S. Embassy Ghana in order to address trafficking and fraud plaguing the U.S. Embassy and the region.

During the course of another fraud investigation in “Operation Spartan Vanguard” an informant tipped off the ARSO-I about the fake U.S. embassy, as well as a fake Netherlands embassy operating in Accra.

After receiving the tip, the ARSO-I, who is the point person in the RSO shop for “Operation Spartan Vanguard” investigations, verified the information with partners within the Ghanaian Police Force. The ARSO-I then created an international task force composed of the aforementioned Ghana Police Force, as well as the Ghana Detective Bureau, Ghana SWAT, and officials from the Canadian Embassy to investigate further.

The investigation identified the main architects of the criminal operation, and two satellite locations (a dress shop and an apartment building) used for operations. The fake embassy did not accept walk-in visa appointments; instead, they drove to the most remote parts of West Africa to find customers. They would shuttle the customers to Accra, and rent them a room at a hotel nearby. The Ghanaian organized crime ring would shuttle the victims to and from the fake embassies. Locating the document vendor within the group led investigators to uncover the satellite locations and key players.

The sham embassy advertised their services through flyers and billboards to cultivate customers from Ghana, Cote d’Ivoire, and Togo. Some of the services the embassy provided for these customers included issuance of fraudulently obtained, legitimate U.S. visas, counterfeit visas, false identification documents (including bank records, education records, birth certificates, and others) for a cost of $6,000.

The exterior of the fake embassy in Accra, Ghana. (U.S. Department of State photo)

The exterior of the fake embassy in Accra, Ghana. (U.S. Department of State photo)

Exterior of the legitimate U.S. Embassy in Accra, Ghana (U.S. Department of State photo)

Exterior of the legitimate U.S. Embassy in Accra, Ghana (U.S. Department of State photo)

Read in full here: http://www.state.gov/m/ds/rls/263916.htm.

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FSGB and MSPB: Majority of the Grievance Cases Do Not Prevail

Posted: 12:21 am ET

 

Via State/OIG’s archive: Review of the Department of State Disciplinary Process:

Foreign Service and Civil Service employees have the right to file a grievance to contest the penalty in the letter from the deciding official. Initially, the Grievance Staff reviews grievances for the Department and reexamines all case materials. The Grievance Staff reviews about 130 Foreign Service and 20 Civil Service grievances of all types each year. A deputy assistant secretary for DGHR makes a determination on each grievance. That agency-level decision can be further appealed through separate Foreign Service and Civil Service processes. Under 3 Foreign Affairs Manual (FAM) 4430, “upon request of the grievant, the agency shall suspend its action” in cases involving suspension, separation, or termination during the review process. This provision applies only to the Foreign Service.
[…]

Foreign Service Appeals Process

A Foreign Service employee may appeal an agency-level decision to the Foreign Service Grievance Board (FSGB), an independent grievance appeals forum established through the Foreign Service Act of 1980. Foreign Service employees facing separation on grounds of misconduct have a right to an automatic hearing before the FSGB. Attorneys or American Foreign Service Association representatives may represent the employee. The FSGB may uphold the agency-level decision, mandate a lesser penalty, or dismiss the case entirely. In 2013, it took an average of 43 weeks for the FSGB to process a case from filing date to final decision.

Foreign Service employees may request and the FSGB may grant “interim relief” (sometimes called “prescriptive relief”) to suspend disciplinary action while an appeal is in process.

The 1995 OIG audit of the FSGB, in addressing the perception that the FSGB routinely overturns the Department’s disciplinary actions, found that “the grievance system is used by a relatively small number of employees, the majority of whom do not prevail.”10 Data from the 2008–2013 FSGB annual reports indicate that this conclusion remains valid. During this 6-year period, the FSGB adjudicated 63 appeals of disciplinary actions. The FSGB partially upheld and partially reversed the Department in 15 cases and fully reversed the Department in only 4 cases. In eight cases, the nature of the FSGB’s decision is not reported in the annual report.

Civil Service Appeals Process

Civil Service employees suspended for more than 14 calendar days or removed or reduced in grade or pay may appeal to the Merit Systems Protection Board (MSPB), an independent quasi-judicial agency established in 1979 to protect Civil Service employees. Employees covered by a collective bargaining agreement with the American Federation of Government Employees or the National Federation of Federal Employees may file a grievance under the agreement or appeal to the MSPB, but not both. The Civil Service appeals process has no mechanism for interim relief.

MSPB data concerning cases originating in the Department do not disaggregate appeals related to disciplinary matters from appeals of all types. However, relatively few Civil Service cases of all types originating in the Department reach the MSPB. In FY 2012, the MSPB received 29 appeals from Department Civil Service employees: 21 were dismissed for lack of jurisdiction or timeliness, and 4 were settled. The MSPB adjudicated only four and upheld the Department in all cases.

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New Executive Order Provides Limited Non-Career Appointees a Pathway to the Competitive Service

Posted: 2:23 pm ET

 

On November 29, President Obama signed an executive order that allows the appointment of certain limited non-career appointees into the competitive service.  The E.O says “the head of any agency in the executive branch may appoint in the competitive service an individual who served for at least 48 months of continuous service in the Foreign Service of the Department of State under a Limited Non-Career Appointment under section 309 of the Foreign Service Act of 1980, and who passes such examination as the Office of Personnel Management (OPM) may prescribe.”  It looks like LNAs can be appointed to any civil service position at any agency but does not provide for their appointment into the Foreign Service.

Republished below in full, the original text is available here.

PROVIDING FOR THE APPOINTMENT IN THE COMPETITIVE SERVICE OF CERTAIN EMPLOYEES OF THE FOREIGN SERVICE
BARACK OBAMA
THE WHITE HOUSE
November 29, 2016.

By the authority vested in me as President by the Constitution and the laws of the United States of America, including sections 3301 and 3302 of title 5, United States Code, and section 301 of title 3, United States Code, it is hereby ordered as follows:

Section 1. Policy. The Federal Government benefits from a workforce that can be recruited from the broadest and deepest pools of qualified candidates for our highly competitive, merit-based positions. The recruitment and retention of workforce participants who serve in the Foreign Service of the Department of State under a Limited Non-Career Appointment under section 309 of the Foreign Service Act of 1980, Public Law 96-465 (22 U.S.C. 3949), as amended, are critical to our ability to meet consular staffing levels (now in substantial deficit) and thereby enhance our capacity to meet high national security standards and efficiently process visas in accordance with our policy of “open doors, safe borders.” Program participants undergo a rigorous merit-based evaluation process, which includes a written test and an oral assessment and to which a veteran preference applies, and develop advanced- to superior-level skills in languages and in cultural competence in particular regions, skills that are essential for mission-critical positions throughout the entire Federal workforce.

Accordingly, pursuant to my authority under 5 U.S.C. 3302(1), and in order to achieve a workforce that represents all segments of society as provided in 5 U.S.C. 2301(b)(1), I find that conditions of good administration make necessary an exception to the competitive hiring rules for certain positions in the Federal civil service.

Sec. 2. The head of any agency in the executive branch may appoint in the competitive service an individual who served for at least 48 months of continuous service in the Foreign Service of the Department of State under a Limited Non-Career Appointment under section 309 of the Foreign Service Act of 1980, and who passes such examination as the Office of Personnel Management (OPM) may prescribe.

Sec. 3. In order to be eligible for noncompetitive appointment to positions under section 2 of this order, such an individual must:

(a) have received a satisfactory or better performance rating (or equivalent) for service under the qualifying Limited Non-Career Appointment; and

(b) exercise the eligibility for noncompetitive appointment within a period of 1 year after completion of the qualifying Limited Non-Career Appointment. Such period may be extended to not more than 3 years in the case of persons who, following such service, are engaged in military service, in the pursuit of studies at an institution of higher learning, or in other activities that, in the view of the appointing authority, warrant an extension of such period. Such period may also be extended to permit the adjudication of a background investigation.

Sec. 4. A person appointed under section 2 of this order shall become a career conditional employee.

Sec. 5. Any law, Executive Order, or regulation that would disqualify an applicant for appointment in the competitive service shall also disqualify a person for appointment under section 2 of this order. Examples of disqualifying criteria include restrictions on employing persons who are not U.S. citizens or nationals, who have violated the anti-nepotism provisions of the Civil Service Reform Act, 5 U.S.C. 2302(b)(7), 3110, who have knowingly and willfully failed to register for Selective Service when required to do so, 5 U.S.C. 3328(a)(2), who do not meet occupational qualifying standards prescribed by OPM, or who do not meet suitability factors prescribed by OPM.

Sec. 6. The Office of Personnel Management is authorized to issue such additional regulations as may be necessary to implement this order. Any individual who meets the terms of this order, however, is eligible for noncompetitive eligibility with or without additional regulations.

Sec. 7. General Provisions. (a) Nothing in this order shall be construed to impair or otherwise affect:

(i) the authority granted by law to an executive department, agency, or the head thereof, or the status of that department or agency within the Federal Government; or

(ii) the functions of the Director of the Office of Management and Budget relating to budgetary, administrative, or legislative proposals.

(b) This order shall be implemented consistent with applicable law and subject to the availability of appropriations.

(c) This order is not intended to, and does not, create any right or benefit, substantive or procedural, enforceable at law or in equity by any party against the United States, its departments, agencies, or entities, its officers, employees, or agents, or any other person.

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Giving Thanks 2016: Around the Foreign Service

Posted:1:14 am ET

 

 

 

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From Someone Who Has Unfortunately Been There: Sexual Assault Trauma Triage in the Foreign Service

Posted: 1:51 am ET

 

In response to our post — First Person: I am a ✂️ FSO who was ✂️ raped in ✂️… Continuing on has been ✂️ incredibly difficult…, we received the following from a Foreign Service member who does not want to be identified but sent a note that says “here are some suggestions for sexual assault trauma triage in the FS, from someone who has unfortunately been there.”  

1. Reach out to someone outside of DOS for support, like friends and family back home whose discretion you trust. There is so much shame involved in sexual assault, but you do not have to go through this alone.

2. Find a therapist (PhD preferable). Sexual assault survivors report the most improvement with Cognitive Processing Therapy (CPT) and EMDR (you’ll likely have to do this domestically). If you can’t find a CPT sexual assault specialist, try going to your closest VA hospital’s website and look for one there. Reach out to her and ask for a private practice referral for sexual assault in a military-like service. Since you’re overseas, you may be able to find a private CPT specialist who does Skype/telephone. Be prepared to pay out-of-pocket, and it won’t be cheap. And speaking of costs: CPT for sexual assault may be the most psychologically taxing thing you’ve ever done, but it is worth it. I promise.

3. Consider a medical curtailment to get yourself out of the situation immediately. The only department that I trust at DOS is MED. Fill out a MED update form, and note the questions on what should be the second page (related to PTSD). Check whichever boxes are relevant to you. You can also write down there what happened to you—something as simple as “Sexual assault at Post” will suffice. They will have a psychiatrist reach out to you—and you can request a female psychiatrist. If they don’t immediately contact you, start calling twice a day until you get what you need. Depending on your symptoms, you may qualify for a Limited Class 2, but if you need to be back in the U.S. for intensive counseling (and there is no shame in doing so, your well-being is the priority), they can work with you on getting you a Class 4 so that therapy can happen domestically.

4. FSO Friend who wrote in: I know that curtailment can seem like he wins. But this is emergency triage, and you may need to retreat to a place of safety (far away from him) until you have healed enough to decide your next steps. This is a “put on your oxygen mask before attempting to help others” level-situation. Please don’t be ashamed of curtailment if that is what you need to do for you. You are the priority right now. Please don’t tough it out and expose yourself to further harm–including the psychological trauma of being around him regularly. And please don’t suffer in silence. Out of all of the organizations at DOS that claim that they can help, I believe that MED actually can help you. Please use MED if it’s appropriate for you.

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This is one person’s suggestions based on her experience and perspective and we’re passing this along for consideration. Since the sender did not provide a return email, we have not been able to ask follow-up questions. We have to respect that this is all that she is able to share at this time. She reached out to this blog out of concern for the FSO who was raped.  We will leave this up to you to consider which of her suggestions may be worth exploring depending on what feels appropriate in your case.

Read more about Cognitive Processing Therapy (CPT) (PDF).

Read here on the Eye Movement Desensitization and Reprocessing (EMDR).

Curtailment is the shortening an employee’s tour of duty from his or her assignment.  It may include the employee’s immediate departure from a bureau or post, or from assignments in the U.S.  3 FAM 2440 says that curtailment is an assignment action, not a disciplinary one. Folks, of course, know that in real life that’s not always true.

Please note that 3 FAM 2444 allows an employee assigned within the United States to request voluntary curtailment of his or her tour of duty for any reason “by submitting the request and an explanatory memorandum to the assignments panel via his or her counseling and assignments officer. The bureau of assignment must state its support for or opposition to the employee’s request.”  What happens if one is a sexual assault victim in a domestic assignment or while on extended TDY or on training and have to go through this to get curtailed from an assignment where the perpetrator is also located? Imagine this happening to an untenured employee. What  does one write in the explanatory memo — I was raped, and I need to curtail my assignment because my attacker is right next door? How many folks will get to see that memo? Something for the new State Department task force to think about.

We should add that another FS member’s medical clearance was downgraded to a Domestic only (Class 5)  after reporting to MED.  12 FAM 210 notes that Class 5 is issued to all who have a medical condition which is incapacitating or for which specialized medical care is best obtained in the United States.  Employees or eligible family members with a Class 5 medical clearance may not be assigned outside the United States.  So right there, that’s really scary stuff for Foreign Service folks.

On November 22, the State Department directed a task force to create a new Foreign Service Manual section for sexual assault (see U/S For Management Directs Task Force to Create New Sexual Assault FAM Guidance).

 

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