Snapshot: Douglas Factors

Posted: 3:34 am ET

 

For both Civil Service and Foreign Service disciplinary cases, a proposed penalty is based on the review of similar past discipline cases and the application of the Douglas Factors.  The 12 Douglas Factors are mitigating or aggravating factors that may affect the penalty imposed:

  • The nature and seriousness of the offense, and its relation to the employee’s duties, position, and responsibilities, including whether the offense was intentional, technical, or inadvertent; was committed maliciously or for gain; or was repeated frequently.
  • The employee’s job level and type of employment, including supervisory or fiduciary role, contacts with the public, and prominence of the position.
  • The employee’s past disciplinary record.
  • The employee’s past work record, including length of service, performance on thejob, ability to get along with fellow workers, and dependability.
  • The effect of the offense upon the employee’s ability to perform at a satisfactory level and its effect upon supervisors’ confidence in the employee’s ability to perform assigned duties.
  • Consistency of the penalty with those imposed upon other employees for the same or similar offenses.
  • Consistency of the penalty with any applicable agency table of penalties.
  • The notoriety of the offense or its impact upon the reputation of the agency.
  • The clarity with which the employee was on notice of any rules that were violated in committing the offense, or had been warned about the conduct in question.
  • The potential for the employee’s rehabilitation.
  • Mitigating circumstances surrounding the offense such as unusual job tensions, personality problems, mental impairment, harassment, bad faith, or malice or provocation on the part of others involved in the matter.
  • The adequacy and effectiveness of alternative sanctions to deter such conduct in the future by the employee or others.

In Douglas v. Veterans Administration, 5 M.S.P.R. 280 (1981), the Merit Systems Protection Board established criteria that supervisors must consider in determining an appropriate penalty for misconduct. See the Office of Personnel Management Web site for a complete list (https://www.opm.gov/policy-data-oversight/employee- relations/reference-materials/douglas-factors.pdf).

#

USG Invokes Sovereign Immunity in Ex-Local Embassy Guard Case in Ireland

Posted: 12:30 am ET

Via The Irish Times:

A former US embassy security guard has been told he cannot take an employment appeals case over his dismissal as his former employer, the US government, has diplomatic immunity in Ireland.

John Greene had argued that he was unfairly dismissed from the security guard role in September 2013 following an investigation into what his superiors termed a “security breach” at the embassy in Ballsbridge, Dublin.
[…]
In hearings that touched on several Supreme Court rulings, as well as the European Convention on Human Rights, counsel for the US government successfully argued that sovereign immunity applies due to the important nature of Mr Greene’s duties.

Related posts:

 

 

#

 

 

Anonymous Letter Outs Sexual Abuse of Household Staff, Former DCM’s Husband Pleads Guilty

Posted: 3:18 am ET
Update: 5:08 pm ET

 

On October 12, the Justice Department announced that Labib Chammasthe husband of the former DCM at the US Embassy in Rabat, Morocco pleaded guilty to abusing a member of the household staff who had worked at the embassy residence for 16 years. He is set for sentencing on January 4, 2017:

Via USDOJ: Husband of Former U.S. Embassy Official in Morocco Pleads Guilty to Sexually Abusing Household Staff Member |  October 12, 2016

The husband of the former Deputy Chief of Mission in Rabat, Morocco, pleaded guilty today to sexually abusing a former household staff member from 2010 to 2013.

Assistant Attorney General Leslie R. Caldwell of the Justice Department’s Criminal Division, U.S. Attorney Channing D. Phillips of the District of Columbia and Director Bill A. Miller of the U.S. Department of State’s Diplomatic Security Service (DSS) made the announcement.

Labib Chammas, 65, of Reston, Virginia, pleaded guilty to one count of abusive sexual conduct before U.S. District Judge Christopher R. Cooper of the District of Columbia.  Sentencing was set for Jan. 4, 2017.

In pleading guilty, Chammas admitted that between August 2010 and February 2013, while living in State Department-owned housing in Rabat, he sexually abused a woman who had worked at the residence for 16 years.  According to the plea agreement, Chammas supervised the staff at the residence and repeatedly threatened to fire staff members.  Out of fear that she would lose her job, the victim complied with Chammas’s requests that she massage his legs, hip and back, and then with his subsequent demands that she “massage” his genitalia.  On at least five occasions, Chammas took the victim by her head or hair and attempted to force her to perform oral sex.

DSS investigated the case.  Assistant U.S. Attorney Andrea Hertzfeld of the District of Columbia and Special Counsel Stacey Luck and Trial Attorney Jamie Perry of the Criminal Division’s Human Rights and Special Prosecutions Section are prosecuting the case.

The original announcement is available to read here.

Affidavit in Support of Criminal Complaint

According to the May 13, 2016 Affidavit executed by DSS Agent Elizabeth Marmesh, her investigation “determined that between the dates of August 2010, and February 2013, Labib Chammas, a United States citizen, sexually assaulted a female member of his domestic staff within the confines and on the grounds of his U.S. Government-provided embassy residence in Rabat, Morocco. Chammas was married to the Deputy Chief of Mission (“DCM”) of U.S. Embassy Rabat, and resided in U.S. Govemment housing at “Villa Monterey” located at Angle Rue Memissa. No. 79, La Pinede, Rabat, Morocco (“DCM Residence”).”

The Affidavit cites SMTJ for this offense:  Title 18, United States Code, Section 7(9)(B), provides that. with respect to offenses committed by or against a national of the United States, the “Special Maritime and Territorial Jurisdiction of the United States” includes residences in foreign States and the land appurtenant or ancillary thereto, inespective of ownership. used for purposes of United States diplomatic, consular, military, or other United States Govemment missions or entities in foreign States, or used by United States personnel assigned to those missions or entities.

Anonymous letter to OIG outs sexual abuse. We’ve extracted the following main details from the Affidavit. The court document contains much more graphic descriptions of the abuse:

On February 11. 2013, DS/OSI received a referral from the U.S. Department of State’s Office of the lnspector General (OIG). ln the referral, OIG personnel informed OSI that during a routine inspection of the U.S. Embassy in Rabat, the OIG inspection team received an anonymous letter alleging that Labib Chammas, husband of the DCM was sexually assaulting a member of his domestic staff.

On February 11.2013, DS/OSI deployed Special Agents (SAs) to Rabat. DS Agents interviewed Kenneth Hillas, Deputy Team Leader of the OIG inspection team. Hillas stated that he was visiting the U.S. Embassy Rabat. Morocco in order to conduct an OIG inspection of the Embassy. Hillas stated that on Friday, February 8,2012, the OIG staff discovered an envelope addressed to “OIG eyes only” in a pile of letters containing surveys fiom Embassy employees in reference to their inspection. Hillas stated that the envelope contained an anonymous typed letter containing allegations against Labib Chammas of sexual assault. Upon discovering the allegations, Hillas notified the Regional Security office (RSO) at U.S. Embassy Rabat and OSI. Hillas provided RSO with the original letter. Hillas stated that the anonymous letter alleged that Labib Chammas was sexually assaulting one of his domestic staff. Hillas stated that the domestic staff members were not interviewed as part of the OIG’s inspection, as they were not U.S. Government employees.

Interviews and evidence collection

The victim was subsequently interviewed on several occasions by federal law enforcement agents, with the assistance of an interpreter. During the course of subsequent interviews, Victim I elaboraled on the details of the ongoing sexual abuse to which Labib Chammas subjected her to between August 2010 and February 2013.

On February 13. 2013, DS Agents conducted a voluntary interview of Labib Chammas. Labib Chammas stated that he had threatened to call the police on his domestic staff or fire the domestic staff because he believed they were stealing from him. Labib Chammas stated that he had received back and leg massages from two staff members, a male employee, witness 2, and the victim, viclim l, because he would get pain in his hip due to a medical issue. DS Agents asked Labib Chammas if the massages ever involved sexual acts, to which Chammas stated “l don’t recall.” and that it might have happened.

In light of the disclosures of Victim l, on February 19, 2013, DS Agents obtained a search warrant for the DCM’s Residence to obtain possible biological evidence. On February 20,2013. a DS agent and a RSO entered the DCM’s Residence in order to execute the search and seizure warrant.

DS Agents photographed the residence and “TV room” prior to any search. DS Agents conducted an inspection of the “TV room” with an altemative light source (ultraviolet light) and discovered possible biological evidence on two couch cushions, the front couch skirt, and locations on the carpet in front of the couch. DS Agents photographed and seized the two couch cushion covers and swabbed the other surfaces.

The FBI DNA Laboratory, Nuclear DNA Unit, conducted serological and DNA testing on the items seized in the execution of the search warrant. Semen was identifled on the swab from front right skirt of couch from the “TV room.” DNA testing confirmed that Labib Chammas was the source of the DNA obtained from the semen stain on the front right skirt of the couch. Based on a statistical probability calculation in which probability of selecting an unrelated individual at random having a matching profile to the DNA obtained was equal to or less than 1 in 6 trillion individuals.

An Arrest Warrant for Labib Chammas was issued by the U.S. District of the District of Columbia on May 13, 2016. In his State of Offense filed in court on October 12, 2016, we learned a few more details:

When the defendant and his wife moved into the DCM Residence in or about August 2010, three household employees were employed there. The defendant and his wife maintained the employ of each of these household staff members during their tenure at the DCM Residence from August 2010 until February 2013. Each of the employees was a Moroccan national who had worked at the DCM Residence and for the Embassy for well over a decade and throughout the tenure of at least the five prior DCM administrations. The defendant took on responsibility for overseeing the day—to-day work of these employees. According to the employees, the defendant was an abusive head—of—household, frequently yelling at the employees, demeaning them, and telling them that they would be fired for failing to live up to his expectations. The employees lived in constant fear that they would lose their jobs.

Among the household staff overseen by the defendant at the DCM Residence was a female cook (hereafter the “victim”), who had worked at the DCM Residence for 16 years by the time the defendant moved into the DCM Residence. The victim, an unmarried Muslim woman, was 53 years old at the time, had a third grade education, and was the sole source of support for her entire family including her elderly parents and several of her siblings and their children, who all lived together in a single residence in Rabat.

The victim did not disclose the above abuse out of fear of losing her job. The above conduct was reported by anonymous letter and came under investigation as a result.

It looks like the DCM’s tenure in Morocco concluded during this investigation in February 2013 but the affidavit and arrest warrant did not happen until May 2016.

Anybody know why there is such a lengthy gap between the investigation conducted in 2013 and filing the case in 2016?

Also a reminder to folks that we’re still searching for the guidance cables on sexual assault reporting for the FS as they are not on the FAM.

#

 

USDOJ Drops US Embassy Yemen Passport Revocation Case Sans Explanation

Posted: 2:16 am ET

 

On October 13, 2015, the U.S. District Court of the Northern District of California ordered the State Department to return the U.S. passport of Yemeni-American Mosed Shaye Omar which was revoked “based on the involuntary statement he provided at the U.S. Embassy in Sana’a on January 23, 2013.” (See Court orders @StateDept to return Yemeni-American’s improperly revoked U.S.passport). In February 2016, the U.S. District Court of the Northern District of California issued a cross motions for summary judgment: “This lawsuit presents the question of whether the United States government may revoke a United States citizen’s passport based solely on a purported “confession” that the citizen did not write, dictate, read, or have read to him, but did in fact sign. On the record before the Court, the answer is no.” (see more Omar v. Kerry, et.al: Passport Revocation “Arbitrary and Capricious,” New Hearing Ordered Within 60 Days).

On October 5, 2016, the United States Attorney for the Northern District of California asked to drop the case “without prejudice.”  We’re wondering how many more of these revocation cases would mow be dropped and sealed in court.

Via Politico:

Federal prosecutors — acting abruptly and without public explanation — have moved to drop a controversial criminal passport fraud case that critics alleged stemmed from coercive interrogations at the U.S. embassy in Yemen.

Earlier this year, a grand jury in San Francisco indicted Mosed Omar on passport fraud charges linked to a statement he signed during a 2012 visit to the U.S. diplomatic post in the unstable Middle Eastern nation.
[…]

Thursday afternoon, prosecutors submitted a brief court filing asking to drop the criminal case “without prejudice,” meaning it could be refiled. U.S. District Court Judge Charles Breyer will need to approve the dismissal of the case.

Spokesmen for the U.S. Attorney’s Office in San Francisco did not respond to messages seeking an explanation for the sudden move.
[…]
In response to a query Thursday from POLITICO, a spokesman for State Inspector General Steve Linick confirmed that an inquiry is underway into the allegations about improper passport revocations

“In June 2016, State OIG’s Office of Evaluations and Special Projects initiated a review of the Department’s processes of passport confiscations and revocations at the US Embassy Sanaa, Yemen,” spokesman Doug Welty said. He offered no additional details on the review.

If the case against Omar went forward, prosecutors might have been obligated to turn over to the defense some or all records of the IG review. That prospect may have contributed to the proposed dismissal, but there was no direct indication.

Read more:

 

Related posts:

 

 

 

Congress Overturns Obama Veto, Blames Obama For Not Telling Elected Morons of “Potential Consequences”

Posted: 3:43 pm ET

 

Back in April 2016, the NYT did a piece about Saudi Arabia warning of economic fallout if Congress passes the 9/11 bill. Secretary Kerry and top officials from State and the Pentagon warned Congress of potential legal jeopardy for Americans overseas if countries counter with retaliatory legislations:

Obama administration officials counter that weakening the sovereign immunity provisions would put the American government, along with its citizens and corporations, in legal risk abroad because other nations might retaliate with their own legislation. Secretary of State John Kerry told a Senate panel in February that the bill, in its current form, would “expose the United States of America to lawsuits and take away our sovereign immunity and create a terrible precedent.”
[…]
In a closed-door briefing on Capitol Hill on March 4, Anne W. Patterson, an assistant secretary of state, and Andrew Exum, a top Pentagon official on Middle East policy, told staff members of the Senate Armed Services Committee that American troops and civilians could be in legal jeopardy if other nations decide to retaliate and strip Americans of immunity abroad. They also discussed the Saudi threats specifically, laying out the impacts if Saudi Arabia made good on its economic threats.

President Obama wrote a letter to the Congress explaining the potential consequences of the 9/11 bill.

President Obama said that his opposition to JASTA is based primarily on its potential impact on the United States. No, it’s not because he’s a Muslim.  The sovereign immunity principles protect all nations but the United States, more than any other country in the world, is active in a lot more places. As we’ve pointed out previously, the State Department has diplomatic and consular presence in over 280 locations worldwide, and the U.S. military has 662 known military overseas bases in 38 foreign countries. In short, the sovereign immunity protection benefits the United States more than any other country in the world.

The CIA director said that “the principle of sovereign immunity protects US officials every day, and is rooted in reciprocity.”  If we don’t afford this protection to other countries, other countries will not afford this same protection to American citizens, or the U.S. government overseas.

The Embassy of Saudi Arabia in Washington D.C., understandably has the best collection of those who called on Congress warning of potential consequences of the 9/11 bill. Let’s borrow the following infographic depicting General Dunford. His letter is also appended below:

Secretary of Defense Ash Carter warned of potential consequences:

Former top government officials from both Democratic and Republican administrations warned of potential consequences:

The Senate and the House went and voted for it anyway.

Even if they know that there are serious potential consequences for our country down the road.

So 97 senators voted for the bill.  Then 28 of those senators wrote a letter saying they’ll work to “mitigate” its unintended consequences. They did not say how. Only that they’ll work on it.

Except that they’ve gone home to campaign.  The Senate will meet 15 times between now and November 15 but all those will be pro forma meetings with no business conducted.

So, the override has now angered some countries. Surprise.

But before they all left home for their break — the Republican Majority Leader in the Senate stood before the cameras to blame President Obama — who vetoed the bill — for failure to communicate the “potential consequences.”

President Obama on CNN:

The veto override was a political vote, is there any doubt? The only senator who voted “no” was the one not running for re-election.  Not only was it a political vote, it appears that they passed a bill that opened a can of worms, throw chaos to the wind, put our people and global interests at risks, and appears toothless as heck from the looks of it.

Just Security’s Steve Vladeck (@steve_vladeck) who is also a professor of law at the University of Texas School of Law writes that “even if a plaintiff could obtain a judgment against a foreign sovereign like Saudi Arabia under the Senate-passed version of JASTA (that is, if they somehow avoid a perpetual stay), they would still have a devil of a time executing that judgment (and would have to base such execution on a different waiver of attachment immunity).” Read his long primer on JASTA and his piece, The Senate Killed JASTA, Then Passed It… which discusses the changes between the original bill and the version approved by the Congress.

Why perpetual stay? Because it says so in the bill that our elected representatives  passed:

screen-shot-2016-09

 

A stay that can last 180 days, which can be renewed for addition 180 days and can be recertified to provide additional extensions to the stays.  These cases could potentially just go on forever, wouldn’t it? So the 9/11 families’ court cases could be in perpetual stay in U.S. courts but that would not preclude other countries from inacting retaliatory legislations against the United States.

Today, this happened. The case is DeSimone v. Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, 16-cv-1944, U.S. District Court, District of Columbia (Washington).

#

Chien v. Kerry: DS Agent Files Suit For Race/Sex Discrimination, Hostile Work Environment, and Retaliation

Posted: 2:41 am ET

 

According to court filings, Josephine Chien is currently assigned as an Assistant Regional Security Officer (ARSO) overseas. In early August, she filed a lawsuit against the U.S Department of State alleging race and sex discrimination under Title VII, hostile work environment & harassment, and retaliation.  The court filing says that Ms. Chien has been an employee of the U.S. Department of State since 1999. Since the case talks about her being denied tenure in 2012  and eventually obtaining tenure in 2013, we suspect that 1999 is an incorrect year.

Excerpts below from the court filing:

Josephine Chien by and through her undersigned counsel bring this action for race discrimination under Section 1981 and Title VII; a hostile work environment under Title VII and retaliation under Section 1981 and Title VII against the Defendant John F. Kerry, Secretary of State, for the U.S Department of State. Chien has been an employee of the State Department since 1999. She is an Asian female of Taiwanese-American descent. In 2011, during her assignment in Libya, her supervisors assigned tasks to her in a discriminatory manner, whereby certain tasks were given to males as opposed to females. This again occurred in 2012 during her tour in Pakistan. In late 2012 and mid 2013, when after again complaining about discriminatory behavior, she was again retaliated against when she was not selected for foreign assignments.

March 2010-January 2011 deployment in Los Angeles

In March 2010, she was employed at the Los Angeles (L.A) satellite office in West L.A. Her supervisor was Michael Lodi. Lodi would frequently communicate with her disparagingly shouting and screaming at her. Chien found this demoralizing as Lodi would not communicate in this manner with other non-Asian members of the staff or male members of the staff. Her colleague and special agent Bret Newton (Caucasian male) told her that he was aware of the prejudice from Lodi and encouraged her to file a complaint against Lodi. Her colleague and special agent John Ming Chen, also observed Lodi’s demeaning treatment of Chien and that Lodi was unprofessional towards Chien.

Lodi also refused all training requests and overseas assignments to Chien. Chien had asked Lodi for hardship assignments to Yemen, Iraq and Afghanistan, only to be told that because she was the duty agent, she could not be assigned overseas.

Consequently sometime in November 2010, Chien approached assistant special agent in charge Whitney Savageau seeking a transfer to the L.A Field Office1. Around December 1, 2010, Chien also had a meeting with Savageau whereby she stated her concerns about Lodi, in that he was treating her differently and discriminating against her. Chien also informed Savageau that Lodi had denied her training and assignments. Chien told Savageau to keep the matter private and also told her specifically to not inform Lodi of her discussions with her (Savageau). Savageau told Chien to discuss her concerns with Chief Jeff Lefter. Chien did so on the same day or on December 1, 2010. She again reiterated her conversations with Savageau with Lefter

Barely 24 hours later or on December 2, 2010, Lodi had a meeting with Chien. Lodi informed Chien that Savageau had a conversation with him about her complaint. Lodi told Chien that “it was not a smart move as I am still writing your evaluation.” He then proceeded to engage in a monologue whereby Lodi informed Chien that she “should know how the system works” and that her transfer sought to the L.A. Field office would “poison the office.”

Upon the conclusion of the conversation, Chien immediately contacted Lefter by email. She again asked for a transfer, and told Lefter that she felt that Lodi had threatened her by saying that “I am still writing your evaluation.” Lefter contacted Chien by telephone and told her that he will speak with Savageau about Lodi.

Chien then contacted the “Human Resources Career Development and Assignments” and sought advise and transfer. She was finally transferred in January 2011.

In the interim, and true to form, post December 2, 2010, or sometime on June 3, 20112, Lodi gave Chien a negative performance evaluation, accusing her of lacking in communication and interpersonal skills. There were no facts to corroborate these allegations. This negative evaluation prevented Chien from being granted tenure within the Agency.

The tenure board in turn, denied her tenure in 2012, citing to Lodi’s comments regarding her lack of interpersonal and communication skills.

In March 2013, Chien challenged/appealed this evaluation by Lodi. Her challenge was successful and in July 2013, Lodi’s 2011 evaluation of Chien was overturned. She was granted tenure soon after. (Note: we’re trying to locate the FSGB case).

Libya Assignment March – May 2011

Around May 2011, Chien was now assigned to the U.S Embassy in Libya. She was part of the protective detail to the Special Envoy to Libya, Chris Stevens. She was employed at the Tactical Operations Center (TOC) answering telephones, monitoring traffic and issuing equipment to other TOC agents on the ground.

Upon her arrival, Chien was told that all agents initially served at TOC, and after a few weeks, they would be sent to the field. All the other TOC agents in Libya were male.

After two (2) weeks of her arrival in March 2011, she asked her shift leader if she could be sent to the field, as part of the security detail for a motorcade. She was told by her supervisor, that she would remain as a TOC agent, and that there were no plans to rotate her.

Consequently sometime in March/April 2011, Chien asks the Agent in Charge, Scott Moretti that she be assigned to a field position. Moretti says, “We don’t do rotations.” Barely an hour later, Agent Joel Ortez asked Moretti, if he can be rotated from a limousine driver to another position, because Ortez had been a limousine driver for weeks and needed a new rotation/assignment. Moretti’s immediate reply to Ortez was, “Sure Buddy!”

Soonafter, Chein also learned from Mr. Khamprasong Bounkong, that when management had learned a female agent was being assigned to Libya, one of the bosses said, “Why would they send a female from headquarters to a Muslim country?”

Chien was deeply displeased by the Agency’s discriminatory assignments of tasks to male agents, as she had undergone similar firearms training, emergency and critical thinking training. She felt that the only reason she was being denied rotation to the field, was because she was a female. This was made all the more concerning to her, when as part of her single “protective detail” she was awarded a “Group Meritorious Award” for a bombing occurring on June 1, 2011.
[…]
Finally on or about August 12, 2013, after bidding on 18 overseas NOW positions and being denied for all of them, her supervisor Mr. Ollie Ellison informed Chien that he was informed by Mr. Kearns, Chien was being denied for foreign assignments because “it has to do with something out of L.A.”

February 2012-March 2013: Pakistan Assignment

As the ARSO and under the direction of Krajicek she oversaw the Surveillance Detection Program3, the Local Guard Force (LGF) Residential Program, the Residential Security Program (RSP), the Logistics / Procurement Program, and the Information / Cyber Security Program.

Chien alleges that the removal of her programs was motivated by racial or sexual animus, as the programs of other Caucasian males were not removed by either Krajicke or Thiede.

Upon her return from Pakistan to the United States, or sometime in March/April 2013, Chien learned from her colleagues George Terterian & Alexa Landreville, that the security investigators had asked them if Chien had ever complained about work place harassment, a hostile work environment, discrimination or retaliation. Chien believes that this extra scrutiny during her January 2013 clearance interview was a result of her prior EEO activities and therefore in retaliation to her protected activities.

Under Count II, the complaint says that “Defendant created a hostile work environment and/or harassed Plaintiff because of her race and sex; the offending conduct was unwelcome, was based on race and/or sex and was sufficiently severe or pervasive when it altered the conditions of her employment and created an abusive work environment and was imputable to her employer the U.S. Department of State.”

Under Count III, the complaint alleged that “As a result of her protected activity and opposition to practices made unlawful under Title VII, Plaintiff was subjected to multiple adverse employment actions, up to and including a negative performance evaluation, denial of tenure, over-scrutinization of her security clearance and/or denial of foreign assignments.”

Ms. Chien demands a jury trial and requests that the Court award economic damages.

#

 

Related posts:

 

FBI Employee Pleads Guilty to Acting in the United States as an Agent of the Chinese Government

Posted: 12:15 am ET

 

Via DOJ | Defendant Collected and Caused Sensitive FBI Information to be Provided to the Chinese Government

Kun Shan Chun, a native of the People’s Republic of China and a naturalized U.S. citizen, pleaded guilty today to a criminal information charging him with acting in the United States as an agent of China without providing prior notice to the Attorney General.

Assistant Attorney General for National Security John P. Carlin, U.S. Attorney Preet Bharara of the Southern District of New York and Assistant Director in Charge Diego P. Rodriguez of the FBI’s New York Field Office made the announcement.

Chun, aka Joey Chun, 46, pleaded guilty before U.S. Magistrate Judge James C. Francis IV of the Southern District of New York.  He was an employee of the FBI until his arrest on March 16, 2016.

“Kun Shan Chun violated our nation’s trust by exploiting his official U.S. Government position to provide restricted and sensitive FBI information to the Chinese Government,” said Assistant Attorney General Carlin.  “Holding accountable those who work as illegal foreign agents to the detriment of the United States is among the highest priorities of the National Security Division.”

“Americans who act as unauthorized foreign agents commit a federal offense that betrays our nation and threatens our security,” said U.S. Attorney Bharara.  “And when the perpetrator is an FBI employee, like Kun Shan Chun, the threat is all the more serious and the betrayal all the more duplicitous.  Thanks to the excellent investigative work of the FBI’s Counterintelligence Division, the FBI succeeded in identifying and rooting out this criminal misconduct from within its own ranks.”

“No one is above the law, to include employees of the FBI,” said Assistant Director in Charge Rodriguez.  “We understand as an agency we are trusted by the public to protect our nation’s most sensitive information, and we have to do everything in our power to uphold that trust.”

According to the complaint, the information and statements made during today’s court proceeding:

In approximately 1997, Chun began working at the FBI’s New York Field Office as an electronics technician assigned to the Computerized Central Monitoring Facility of the FBI’s Technical Branch.  In approximately 1998, and in connection with his employment, the FBI granted Chun a Top Secret security clearance and his duties included accessing sensitive, and in some instances classified, information.  In connection with a progressive recruitment process, Chun received and responded to taskings from Chinese nationals and at least one Chinese government official (Chinese Official-1), some, if not all, of whom were aware that Chun worked at the FBI.  On multiple occasions prior to his arrest in March 2016, at the direction of Chinese government officials, Chun collected sensitive FBI information and caused it to be transmitted to Chinese Official-1 and others, while at the same time engaging in a prolonged and concerted effort to conceal from the FBI his illicit relationships with these individuals.

Beginning in 2006, Chun and some of his relatives maintained relationships with Chinese nationals purporting to be affiliated with a company in China named Zhuhai Kolion Technology Company Ltd. (Kolion).  Chun maintained an indirect financial interest in Kolion, including through a previous investment by one of his parents.  In connection with these relationships, Chinese nationals asked Chun to perform research and consulting tasks in the United States, purportedly for the benefit of Kolion, in exchange for financial benefits, including partial compensation for international trips.

Between 2006 and 2010, Chun’s communications and other evidence reflect inquiries from purported employees of Kolion to Chun while he was in the United States, as well as efforts by the defendant to collect, among other things, information regarding solid-state hard drives.

In approximately 2011, during a trip to Italy and France partially paid for by the Chinese nationals, Chun was introduced to Chinese Official-1, who indicated that he worked for the Chinese government and that he knew Chun worked for the FBI.  During subsequent private meetings conducted abroad between the two, Chinese Official-1 asked questions regarding sensitive, non-public FBI information.  During those meetings, Chun disclosed, among other things, the identity and potential travel patterns of an FBI Special Agent.

In approximately 2012, the FBI conducted a routine investigation relating to Chun’s Top Secret security clearance.  In an effort to conceal his relationships with Chinese Official-1 and the other Chinese nationals purporting to be affiliated with Kolion, Chun made a series of false statements on a standardized FBI form related to the investigation.  Between 2000 and March 16, 2016, Chun was required by FBI policy to disclose anticipated and actual contact with foreign nationals during his international travel, but he lied on numerous pre- and post-trip FBI debriefing forms by omitting his contacts with Chinese Official-1, other Chinese nationals and Kolion.

On multiple occasions, Chinese Official-1 asked Chun for information regarding the FBI’s internal structure.  In approximately March 2013, Chun downloaded an FBI organizational chart from his FBI computer in Manhattan.  Chun later admitted to the FBI that, after editing the chart to remove the names of FBI personnel, he saved the document on a piece of digital media and caused it to be transported to Chinese Official-1 in China.

Chinese Official-1 also asked Chun for information regarding technology used by the FBI.  In approximately January 2015, Chun took photos of documents displayed in a restricted area of the FBI’s New York Field Office, which summarized sensitive details regarding multiple surveillance technologies used by the FBI.  Chun sent the photographs to his personal cell phone and later admitted to the FBI that he caused the photographs to be transported to Chinese Official-1 in China.

In approximately February 2015, the FBI caused an undercover employee (UCE) to be introduced to Chun.  The UCE purported to be a U.S. citizen who was born in China and working as a consultant to several firms, including an independent contractor for the Department of Defense, among other entities.

During a recorded meeting in March 2015, Chun told the UCE about his relationship with Kolion and Chinese nationals and later explained to the UCE that Kolion had “government backing,” and that approximately five years prior a relative met a “section chief” whom Chun believed was associated with the Chinese government.

In another recorded meeting in June 2015, Chun told the UCE that he had informed his Chinese associates that the UCE was a consultant who might be in a position to assist them.  Chun said that he wished to act as a “sub-consultant” to the UCE and wanted the UCE to “pay” him “a little bit.”   In July 2015, after coordinating travel to meet Chun’s Chinese associates, Chun met with the UCE in Hungary twice.  During one of the meetings, Chun stated that he knew “firsthand” that the Chinese government was actively recruiting individuals who could provide assistance and that the Chinese government was willing to provide immigration benefits and other compensation in exchange for such assistance.  The UCE told Chun that he had access to sensitive information from the U.S. government.  Chun responded that his Chinese associates would be interested in that type of information and that Chun expected a “cut” of any payment that the UCE received for providing information to the Chinese government.

The count of acting in the United States as an agent of China without providing notice to the Attorney General carries a maximum sentence of 10 years in prison.  The maximum potential sentence is prescribed by Congress and is provided here for informational purposes only, as any sentencing of the defendant will be determined by the judge.

The FBI’s Counterintelligence Division investigated the case.  The prosecution is being handled by Assistant U.S. Attorneys Emil J. Bove III and Andrea L. Surratt of the Southern District of New York’s Terrorism and International Narcotics Unit, with assistance provided by Trial Attorneys Thea D. R. Kendler and David C. Recker of the National Security Division’s Counterintelligence and Export Control Section.

Related files:

Bosnian Army Guard Convicted of War Crimes Pleads Guilty to Fraudulent 2002 U.S. Citizenship

Posted: 12:03 am ET

Via USDOJ:  Former Bosnian Army Prison Guard Pleads Guilty to Fraudulently Procuring U.S. Citizenship

A Jacksonville, Florida, man pleaded guilty today for unlawfully procuring U.S. citizenship by failing to disclose during his naturalization process his membership in the Bosnian Army and crimes that he committed in Bosnia and Herzegovina during the Bosnian Conflict in the 1990s, announced Assistant Attorney General Leslie R. Caldwell of the Justice Department’s Criminal Division and U.S. Attorney A. Lee Bentley III of the Middle District of Florida.

Slobo Maric, 56, pleaded guilty before U.S. Magistrate Judge James R. Klindt of the Middle District of Florida.  Sentencing has not yet been scheduled.

According to the plea agreement, in 1993, Maric served as a shift leader, the second in command to the warden, of a detention facility in Bosnia that housed captured Bosnian-Croat soldiers.  Many of the guards in the facility routinely subjected detainees to serious physical abuse and humiliation, including by referring to them with ethnic slurs and spitting on them.  According to the plea agreement, Maric selected detainees for other guards to abuse; directly participated in abusing several prisoners; and sent prisoners on dangerous and deadly work details on the front line of the conflict.  The Bosnian government charged Maric for his criminal conduct and, after Maric immigrated to the United States, Bosnia indicted and convicted Maric in absentia for war crimes against prisoners.  According to the plea agreement, Maric knew about the Bosnian court proceedings, yet he failed to disclose the proceedings and lied about his conduct on his application for U.S. citizenship.  Maric became a naturalized U.S. citizen on Oct. 31, 2002.

U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement’s (ICE) Homeland Security Investigations (HSI) Jacksonville Field Office investigated the case under the supervision of the HSI Tampa Field Office with support from ICE’s Human Rights Violators and War Crimes Center.

Trial Attorneys Clayton O’Connor, Sasha Rutizer and Christina Giffin and Historian David Rich of the Criminal Division’s Human Rights and Special Prosecutions Section and Assistant U.S. Attorney Dale Campion of the Middle District of Florida are prosecuting the case.

#

Fraudsters in Costa Rica VOIP Scheme Plead Guilty to $9 million “Sweepstakes Fraud”

Posted: 1:29 am ET

 

Via USDOJ: Owner of Costa Rican Call Center and Two Others Plead Guilty to Defrauding Elderly through Offshore Sweepstakes Scheme

Two U.S. citizens and a Canadian citizen have pleaded guilty for their roles in a $9 million “sweepstakes fraud” scheme to defraud hundreds of U.S. residents, many of them elderly, announced Assistant Attorney General Leslie R. Caldwell of the Justice Department’s Criminal Division and U.S. Attorney Jill Westmoreland Rose of the Western District of North Carolina.

Jeffrey Robert Bonner, 37, of Sacramento, California; Cody Trevor Burgsteiner, 33, of Houston; and Darra Lee Shephard, 57, of Calgary, Alberta, pleaded guilty this week before U.S. Magistrate Judge David Keesler of the Western District of North Carolina to various counts of conspiracy to commit wire fraud and mail fraud, wire fraud, conspiracy to commit money laundering and international money laundering, all in connection with a Costa Rican telemarketing fraud scheme.  Sentencing dates have not been set.

As part of their guilty pleas, Bonner, Burgsteiner and Shephard each admitted that from approximately 2007 through November 2012, they worked in a call center located in Costa Rica, which Bonner owned, where they placed telephone calls to U.S. residents, falsely informing them that they had won a substantial cash prize in a “sweepstakes.”  The victims, many of whom were elderly, were told that in order to receive the prize, they had to pay for a purported “refundable insurance fee,” the defendants admitted.  Bonner, Burgsteiner and Shephard admitted that once they received the money, they contacted the victims again to tell them that their prize amount had increased, due to either a clerical error or because other winners had been disqualified.  The victims were then told to send additional money to pay for new purported fees, duties and insurance to receive the now larger sweepstakes prize, the defendants admitted.  The defendants further admitted that they and their co-conspirators continued their attempts to collect additional money from the victims until an individual either ran out of money or discovered the fraudulent nature of the scheme.  To mask that they were calling from Costa Rica, the conspirators utilized voice over internet protocol (VoIP) phones that displayed a 202 area code, giving the false impression that they were calling from Washington, D.C., they admitted.  According to admissions made in connections with their pleas, the defendants and their co-conspirators often falsely claimed that they were calling on behalf of a U.S. federal agency to lure victims into a false sense of security.

Bonner, Burgsteiner, Shephard and their co-conspirators were responsible for causing approximately $9 million in losses to hundreds of U.S. citizens.

The U.S. Postal Inspection Service, FBI, Internal Revenue Service-Criminal Investigation, Federal Trade Commission and Department of Homeland Security investigated the case, and the Criminal Division’s Fraud Section supervised the investigation.  Senior Litigation Counsel Patrick Donley and Trial Attorneys William Bowne and Gustav Eyler of the Fraud Section are prosecuting the case.

#

United States v. DynCorp: Suit Alleges Submission of False Claims in Iraqi Police Force Contract

Posted: 2:42 am ET

Via USDOJ:

United States Files Suit against DynCorp International Alleging Submission of False Claims under State Department Contract

The United States filed a False Claims Act complaint against DynCorp International Inc. (DynCorp) alleging that it knowingly submitted inflated claims in connection with a State Department contract to train Iraqi police forces (CIVPOL contract), the Department of Justice announced today.  The United States filed the complaint in the U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia.  DynCorp, which is headquartered in McLean, Virginia, is a wholly-owned subsidiary of Delta Tucker Holdings Inc.

In April 2004, the State Department’s Bureau for International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs awarded the CIVPOL contract to DynCorp to provide training for civilian police forces in Iraq and other services needed to support that effort, such as trainers, guards, translators, vehicles and living quarters for contractor personnel.  In its complaint, the United States alleges that DynCorp knowingly allowed one of its main CIVPOL subcontractors to charge excessive and unsubstantiated rates for hotel lodging, translator, security guard and driving services and overhead expenses, and included these charges in the claims it submitted under the CIVPOL contract to the State Department.  The complaint also alleges that DynCorp added its own markup to its subcontractor’s excessive charges, thereby further inflating the claims it submitted to the government.

“Companies that contract with the United States have an obligation to deal fairly and openly with the government,” said Principal Deputy Assistant Attorney General Benjamin C. Mizer, head of the Justice Department’s Civil Division.  “Attempting to take advantage of the American taxpayers in times of war is a shameful abuse of this responsibility.”

“The United States relies on its contractors to be forthcoming with accurate information and to act responsibly in return for receiving the taxpayers’ money,” said U.S. Attorney Channing D. Phillips of the District of Columbia.  “Our office is committed to recovering funds from those who fail to adhere to those responsibilities and obligations.”

The civil complaint in this action is the result of an investigation by the Civil Division’s Commercial Litigation Branch, the U.S. Attorney’s Office for the District of Columbia and the State Department’s Office of Inspector General.

The case is captioned United States v. DynCorp International, Inc., No. 1:16-cv-01473 (D.D.C.).  The claims asserted in the complaint are allegations only, and there has been no determination of liability.

 

#