Microwaving U.S. Embassy Moscow: Oral History From FSOs James Schumaker and William A. Brown

Posted: 12:40 am  ET
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We recently blogged about the attacks on American diplomats in Havana (see U.S. Diplomats in Cuba Sonic Attacks: As Serious as Mild TBI/Central Nervous System Damage? 16 USG Employees in “Sonic Attack” and More on The Secret History of Diplomats and Invisible Weapons 

Via the Association for Diplomatic Studies and Training (ADST) Oral History:

U.S. relations with Moscow through the decades have been problematic at best while the embassy itself has been the subject of spy scandals, eavesdropping and other Cold War intrigue. One of the strangest episodes was revealed in the 1970s, when the U.S. confirmed that the USSR had been beaming microwaves at the embassy for the past 15 years. One concern was that the Soviets were trying to inflict physical harm on the Americans working there.

Moscow, US Embassy and Chalyapin house

Old U.S. Embassy Moscow — By NVO (Own work by the original uploader) [CC BY-SA 3.0 (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-sa/3.0) or GFDL (http://www.gnu.org/copyleft/fdl.html)], via Wikimedia Commons

Microwaving Embassy Moscow brought back a flood of memories to James Schumaker, who served most of his career in the USSR and later Russia and Ukraine. In this account, he describes how U.S. Ambassador to the USSR Walter Stoessel threatened to resign, the widespread concern many Americans posted at the embassy had regarding potential health problems, especially when two ambassadors died of cancer, and his own experience with Chronic Lymphocytic Leukemia.

James Schumaker:  The existence of the microwave problem had been kept under wraps for years, first because no one knew that there might be health consequences, and later, according to unconfirmed reports, because Henry Kissinger wanted to avoid damaging chances for détente.  When Ambassador Stoessel (seen at left) learned about the problem, he threatened to resign unless the Embassy community was told.  As a result, the microwave story was finally made public in a press conference called by the Ambassador.

In the wake of Ambassador Stoessel’s announcement, many in the Embassy community felt betrayed about being kept in the dark for so long, and still more were anxious about the effect the microwaves might be having.  Some thought that the microwaves were used by the Soviets to activate the numerous listening devices they had emplaced in the building prior to American occupancy.

Others believed that they were a jamming signal designed to foil our own electronic snooping devices (a highly classified report that came out in the 1970s leaned to this interpretation, and this is what the Soviets told us as well).  Still others thought that the Soviets, who apparently knew a lot more about microwaves than we did, were using them to affect the mental states of Embassy employees.
[…]
For the most part, I was blissfully unconcerned about the microwave controversy.  At the time, it seemed to me that it was an issue taken more seriously by Embassy spouses, who were afraid for their children, than by the Embassy leadership, which in fact was in the crosshairs of whatever the microwaves might be doing.

Periodically, I would see Soviet technicians standing side by side with American techs on the upper floors of the Chancery.  They were measuring ambient levels of microwave radiation.  Naturally, the Soviet equipment didn’t find anything, while ours did.  I thought it was funny at the time.  Screens were put up on the Chancery windows, which were said to diminish the amount of microwave emanations getting into the Embassy.  I didn’t think much about that, either.  I just continued to do my work and not think about the possible consequences.

Microwaves continued to be beamed at the Embassy throughout my tour, and, though the levels went up and down over the years, emanating first from one, and then two locations, the microwaving of the Embassy continued until at least 1988.  Over the years, thousands of Americans were exposed.

Shortly after my tour was over, I found out that my cavalier attitude toward the microwave issue was not at all justified, at least in my own personal case.  Med informed me in late 1979 that my own white cell count was much higher than normal, and advised me to continue testing.  In 1985, my white cell count got high enough for MED to recommend that I see a hematologist, so I went to a local doctor in San Clemente, Dr. Tsang P. Fong.

He did a bone marrow test (the one where they hammer a spike into the pelvic bone – very uncomfortable).  The test confirmed that I had Chronic Lymphocytic Leukemia (CLL) stage zero, but that chemotherapy was not advisable, since I had no symptoms and the cure would be worse than the disease.
[…]
I determined to fight the disease as best I could by leading a healthy lifestyle, although, paradoxically, I then volunteered for a high-risk assignment to Kabul in 1988.  Perhaps in the back of my mind I had this feeling that I could take more risks, since I didn’t have very long to live anyway — a kind of “who cares?” illogical approach that has gotten me through many crises in life.  State Medical knew about the CLL diagnosis and downgraded me to a “2” Medical clearance, but didn’t stop me from going overseas, mainly because the jobs I was volunteering for often had no takers.

Read in full James Schumaker’s account here.

William Andreas Brown discusses the widespread concern among Americans working at the embassy at the time and their anger at the State Department for its lack of transparency on the issue. Excerpted from his Oral History interview conducted by Charles Stuart Kennedy beginning in November 1998.

William Andreas Brown: I have to tell you what a shock it was in about 1972 or 1973 to wake up to the great, microwave scandal and to find that Secretary of State Henry Kissinger and his associates had kept from us the fact that for years we had been bombarded by microwave apparatuses, directed straight at the embassy in Moscow. I remember being one of a small group of officers in 1972 or 1973 when news of this development broke. We raised our voices in despair, dissent, and so forth.

We were finally ushered into a room where Larry Eagleburger, Kissinger’s Special Assistant at the time, briefed us and made some sort of presentation, assuring us that steps would be taken, and so forth. He said that medical studies were under way, and the evidence thus far was that these microwaves had not been deleterious to our health.

This was somewhat reassuring until, at the end of the meeting, Larry Eagleburger said, “Now, rip up all of your notes and give them to me. Nobody can leave with notes on this discussion.” One said to oneself: “What in the hell is going on here?”

It turned out that the Soviets had been bombarding us with microwaves, beginning in about 1964 or 1965. Why they had done this remained a mystery. How they had bombarded our embassy remained somewhat of a mystery, as well as why they had done so. Also a mystery was what was the response. We were furious. We felt betrayed by the leadership of the Department of State and by the Secretary of State himself…I’m speaking now of the microwave radiation scandal, as I would call it, of the early 1970s, which harked back to the early 1960s.

Many of us who had served in the embassy felt betrayed as people who had put so much into our efforts and who had volunteered to serve in Moscow. We probably would have volunteered anyway to serve in Moscow, even if we had known about this. However, we learned only years later that this had happened and that information on it had been kept from us. Foreign Service physical examinations routinely include a blood test.

Unbeknownst to us, the Department of State was testing our blood to see what, if anything had happened to us as a result of the microwave radiation. This was a pretty jolting realization.

Q: Before we leave that matter, was consideration ever given to our saying to the Soviets: “If you keep up this nonsense, we will close our embassy in Moscow?” 

BROWN: Or, we could say, if the Soviets kept up this nonsense, we would do exactly the same thing to the Soviet Embassy in Washington. But, oh, no, that would have been nasty, and nothing like that was done. We felt pretty strongly about this. It affected morale and assignments to positions in the embassy.

Q: What was the purpose of what has to be regarded as this campaign by Soviet authorities against the health of members of the staff of the American embassy in Moscow

BROWN: This takes you into realms that I’m really not qualified to discuss. I was aware of various theories and of measures and countermeasures that might be taken. However, the point is that microwave emissions were being beamed at us. This point came home to me particularly one day when a visiting technician from the State Department came with equipment and said, “Do you mind if I set this up in your office?”

I said, “Okay, but why here? Why in my office?” He said, “Because actually there are at least two beams being directed at the embassy. One comes in from the front of the embassy building, and one comes in from that great, white building over there, which is called the ‘White House.’  You know, where the Russian Parliament meets.”…

“One beam comes this way, and the two beams intersect right here at your desk. So I’d like to set this up.” I thought: “My God! It makes you think.” But the Soviets weren’t turning these beams off. This was a disturbing development. As I said, it affected assignments to positions in the embassy in Moscow, as well as other things.

Read in full William Andreas Brown’s interview here.

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Former Condi Rice Protector Michael T. Evanoff to be Assistant Secretary for Diplomatic Security

Posted: 12:18 am  ET
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On August 25, President Trump announced his intent to nominate former DSS agent Michael T. Evanoff to be the Assistant Secretary of State for the Bureau of Diplomatic Security. The WH released the following brief bio:

Michael T. Evanoff of Arkansas to be an Assistant Secretary of State, Diplomatic Security.  Mr. Evanoff is the Vice President for Asset Protection & Security at International Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. in Arkansas, a position he has held since 2014.  Previously he served as Chief Security Officer at Coca-Cola in Zug, Switzerland and Athens, Greece and as Global Director of Security at Och-Ziff Capital Management Group in New York.  He served as a special agent in the Department of State Bureau of Diplomatic Security from 1985 to 2011, holding senior posts with Overseas Security Advisory Council, NATO Office of Security, Secretary of State Protection Detail, and eight U.S. Missions overseas.  He was also diplomatic security liaison officer to the U.S. European Command in Stuttgart, Germany.  Mr. Evanoff earned a B.S. at Eastern Kentucky University.  He and his wife, Kate Milner Evanoff, have a two-year old son, Luke.

If confirmed, Mr. Evanoff would succeed Greg Starr who retired a week before inauguration (see Patrick Kennedy, Other Officials Step Down – Yo! That’s Not the “Entire” Senior Management, also see Top Diplomatic Security and Consular Affairs Officials to Step Down: Bill Miller, Kurt Rice, David Donahue, John Brennan).

WaPo profiled Mr. Evanoff in 2007 (see Rice’s Protector Plans a Move to NATO).   Below from his official NATO bio prior to his move to Walmart:

Prior to serving on NATO’s senior staff, Mr. Evanoff was the principal security advisor and Special Agent-in-Charge for the 100 plus protection team for the US Secretary of State, Condoleezza Rice.

Results driven senior executive with more than 24 years with the United States Department of State, Mr. Evanoff has served in a variety of overseas and domestic assignments that have focused on worldwide major events, overseas security program management, international and US military liaisons, criminal and counter-intelligence investigations, and dignitary protection. His overseas assignments include Islamabad, Pakistan(2001-2003), where he served as Counselor for Regional Security, including responsibility for U.S.interests in Afghanistan.

Mr. Evanoff was the Executive Director of the State Department’s Overseas Security Advisory Council (OSAC), a public-private partnership created to foster cooperation and promote the exchange of vital overseas security information between the U.S. Government and the U.S.private sector. As Executive Director, Mr. Evanoff more than doubled the number of OSAC Country Councils from 49 to 103 councils worldwide.

Mr. Evanoff was the first Diplomatic Security Service officer to establish a permanent liaison office with the U.S. European Command (EUCOM/NATO) in Stuttgart, Germany(1999-2001). Prior to that, he was the Senior Regional Security Officer in Rabat, Morocco, and the Regional Security Officer at the U.S. Embassy in Copenhagen, Denmark/Reykjavik, Iceland. He also opened the new Regional Security Office at the U.S. Embassy in Zagreb, Croatia, and the new U.S. Embassy in Sarajevo, Bosnia-Herzegovina, where he worked with NATO and UN forces during the Bosnian conflict. Mr. Evanoff began his overseas career in 1990 as an Assistant Regional Security Officer at the U.S. Embassy in the Philippines.

Mr. Evanoff’s domestic assignments include Deputy Chief of the Protective Liaison Division, and Agent-in-Charge with the Office of Dignitary Protection. Mr. Evanoff also served as an instructor and team leader to DS’ Mobile Counter-Terrorism training unit. Mr. Evanoff’s first assignment was as an investigator in the Washington Field Office.

Mr. Evanoff was named the 2003 Diplomatic Security Employee of the Year for his exceptional work in Pakistanand Afghanistan. He is also the recipient of numerous Department of State awards, including four Senior Foreign Service Performance awards and three Superior Honor Awards. He was promoted into the Senior Foreign Service in 2003 and a graduate of the United States’ Senior Foreign Service Leadership Training School.

Mr. Evanoff received a Bachelor’s degree in Police Science from Eastern Kentucky University with a minor in Corporate Security. He was the recipient of an athletic scholarship and an active member of the school’s NCAA Division 1AA National Champion football team. Mr. Evanoff is a member of the International Organization of Chiefs of Police and the Federal Law Enforcement Officers Association. He is an honorary member of the International Security Management Association.

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@StateDept Appoints Andrew Schofer as U.S. Co-Chair of the OSCE Minsk Group #NagornoKarabakh

Posted: 12:06 am  ET
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On August 28, the State Department announced the appointment of career diplomat Andrew Schofer to be the next U.S. Co-Chair of the OSCE Minsk Group.

The United States is pleased to announce the appointment of Mr. Andrew Schofer as the next U.S. Co-Chair of the OSCE Minsk Group for Nagorno-Karabakh. Mr. Schofer brings extensive experience in Europe and International Organizations to the position, and most recently served as Chargé d’ Affaires, a.i. for the U.S. Mission to International Organizations in Vienna (UNVIE). From August 2015 until January 2017, he served as the Deputy Chief of Mission at UNVIE. From August 2014 to August 2015, he served as the Counselor for IAEA Affairs at UNVIE. Prior to his assignments in Vienna, Mr. Schofer served as Deputy Chief of Mission at the U.S. Embassy in Nicosia, Cyprus from 2011 to 2014, and has also worked overseas at the U.S. Embassies in Kuwait City, Kuwait; Manama, Bahrain; and Moscow, Russia. Mr. Schofer’s Washington assignments included postings on the Iraq Desk in the Bureau of Near Eastern Affairs, and as Special Assistant to the Under Secretary for Political Affairs, where he was primarily responsible for the Middle East and Counterterrorism portfolios.

The United States remains firmly committed to the Minsk Group Process and helping the sides reach a lasting and peaceful settlement to the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict. As expressed in the June 19 and July 6 statements, the United States supports a just settlement that must be based on international law, which includes the Helsinki Final Act; in particular, the principles of non-use of force, territorial integrity, and self-determination. Andrew Schofer looks forward to helping the sides achieve this goal.

We have informed the governments of Armenia and Azerbaijan of Andrew Schofer’s appointment. Andrew Schofer will assume his new position effective immediately.

 

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