State/OIG Audits Local Guard Force Contractors at Critical/High-Threat Posts

Posted: 12:50  am ET
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Via State/OIG:

OIG conducted an audit of Local Guard Force Contractors at Critical- and High-Threat Posts  to determine whether (1) local guard force (LGF) contractors at selected critical- and high-threat overseas posts are complying with general and post orders included in the contract; (2) LGF contractors at selected critical- and high- threat overseas posts provide invoices that comply with contract requirements; and (3) regional security officers at selected critical- and high-threat overseas posts perform oversight of the LGF contract in accordance with their Contracting Officer’s Representative (COR) delegation memoranda.

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Summary of Findings:

OIG found that the guards working for the four LGF contractors at eight overseas posts (in four missions) complied with, on average, greater than 90 percent of security-related guard post orders observed. However, OIG identified deficiencies that were common across two or more missions related to access control procedures, equipment, unofficial reassignment of post orders, delivery and mail screening procedures, and reporting and investigating procedures. OIG also found that some guards were not receiving a proper number of breaks. Deficiencies generally occurred due to human error, lack of refresher training, and unavailable equipment. These deficiencies, if not addressed, could negatively impact the performance of security procedures that are intended to maintain post security and are required by the LGF contract.

OIG also reviewed whether contractor invoices complied with contract terms and conditions and found that three of the four LGF contractors properly submitted invoices that included appropriate supporting documentation. However, the Mission REDACTED LGF contractor did not adhere to the contractually required invoice format or to the schedule for submitting invoices.

Finally, OIG found that assistant regional security officers (acting as CORs, alternate CORs, and Government Technical Monitors) generally conducted LGF oversight in accordance with requirements, which are to monitor, inspect, and document the contractor’s performance and, when necessary, apply negative incentives for not meeting performance standards. However, OIG found that not all assistant regional security officers (1) documented the contractors’ performance or (2) maintained complete COR files. As a result, oversight was not properly documented. Without a complete COR file, the Government may not have the necessary documentation to defend its position of contractor nonconformance with contract terms, potentially resulting in paying for services that do not meet contract requirements.

A few details:

Local guard force performance deficiencies, if not addressed, could negatively impact the performance of procedures that are intended to maintain post security and are required by the LGF contract. For example, the guards’ failure to conduct access control, delivery, and mail screening procedures in accordance with post orders may result in unauthorized personnel accessing the compound or visitors bringing prohibited items into the compound. Further, if guards do not carry equipment in accordance with post orders, REDACTED, leading to a delayed response to a possible threat. In addition, guards may not be able to react quickly to provide notice to the compound of imminent danger. Similarly, failure to investigate or report suspicious or unusual occurrences to all required parties could delay necessary officials from receiving proper warning, which in turn could delay post officials’ reaction time. Regarding the unofficial reassignment of post orders, guards who are assigned to perform the duties of others may be overwhelmed and unable to complete all reassigned duties. Finally, guards who do not receive regular breaks may be tired, which may lead to impaired judgment in the event a security situation occurs.
[…]
At the new consulate compound in REDACTED, guard post orders stated that guards should instruct contractors to have their irises scanned prior to receiving access badges. However, OIG observed that contractors were receiving badges before having their irises scanned. The LGF Commander stated that logistically, after employees pass through the WTMD [walk-through metal detector], the closest station is the badging station. Thus, it is understandable that guards may stop there first rather than at their scanning stations required.According to the Consulate General REDACTED Senior RSO, once a badge has been issued, contractors are granted official access to the new consulate compound. Thus, it is important that guards verify contractors via the iris scanner prior to issuing access badges.

Read the full report here (PDF).

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Burn Bag: We aren’t even trying to hide this stuff anymore? Bwaaah!

Via Burn Bag:

Job Title:    Visa Analyst    
Job Category:     Non-Exempt
Location:    Washington, DC    
Travel:    N/A
Level/Salary Range:    NEGOTIABLE    
Position Type:    Full Time
Date posted:    April 29, 2016

Job Description: Summary: Immediate full time requirement – CA/VO Visa Analyst – in support of the U.S. Department of State (DOS), Counselor Affairs/Visa Office. Final Top Secret Security Clearance required and candidate must meet eligibility criteria to be granted access to Sensitive Compartmented Information when/if required. The Visa Analyst provides support to the Government staff and prepares letters, reports, and specialized correspondence. A Government manager will provide day-to-day oversight and direction.   

“We aren’t even trying to hide anymore that we plan to supervise the employees of third party contractors [TPCs].  This insidious practice ultimately denies opportunities to government employees who miss out on training and conference experiences when the employees of third party contractors attend instead.  Why do we offer training to these employees of TPCs when they were supposed to already be trained?”

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Via media.riffsy.com

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Snapshot: U.S. Security- Related Assistance for Egypt, FY2011-2015, as of 9/30/15

Posted: 12:05  am ET
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Via gao.gov (PDF):

 

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Via gao.gov

 

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Ex-Fox News Commentator Pleads Guilty to Fraud, Dents Benghazi Cottage Industry

Posted: 12:05  am ET
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On April 29, 2016, DOJ announced that Wayne Shelby Simmons, 62, of Annapolis, Maryland, a former Fox News commentator who has falsely claimed he spent 27 years working for the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), pleaded guilty today to major fraud against the government, wire fraud, and a firearms offense.  This individual reportedly made an unsuccessful attempt in 2009 to obtain work with the State Department’s Worldwide Protective Service.

Via Department of Justice | USAO – Virginia, Eastern

Wayne Shelby Simmons, 62, of Annapolis, Maryland, a former Fox News commentator who has falsely claimed he spent 27 years working for the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), pleaded guilty today to major fraud against the government, wire fraud, and a firearms offense.

“Wayne Simmons is a convicted felon with no military or intelligence experience,” said Dana J. Boente, U.S. Attorney for the Eastern District of Virginia. “Simmons admitted he attempted to con his way into a position where he would have been called on to give real intelligence advice in a war zone.  His fraud cost the government money, could have put American lives at risk, and was an insult to the real men and women of the intelligence community who provide tireless service to this country.  This case is a prime example of this office’s ongoing commitment to vigorously prosecute government fraud and threats to national security.”

“Mr. Simmons lied about his criminal history and CIA employment in order to fraudulently obtain government contracts, and separately, defrauded a victim through a phony real estate investment deal,” said Paul M. Abbate, Assistant Director in Charge of the FBI’s Washington Field Office.  “With these criminal actions, Mr. Simmons abused the trust of others, both in and outside of government, for his own personal financial gain.  I commend the work of the talented FBI personnel and prosecutors who vigorously pursued this case and brought about today’s guilty plea.”

In a statement of facts filed with his plea agreement, Simmons admitted he defrauded the government in 2008 when he obtained work as a team leader in the U.S. Army’s Human Terrain Systems program, and again in 2010 when he was deployed to Afghanistan as a senior intelligence advisor on the International Security Assistance Force’s Counterinsurgency Advisory and Assistance Team.  Simmons admitted making false statements about his financial and criminal history, and admitted that there are no records or any other evidence that he was ever employed by or worked with the CIA, or ever applied for or was granted a security clearance by that agency.  Simmons also admitted that in order to obtain the senior intelligence advisor position, he lied about work he had done a year earlier as a team leader on the Human Terrain Systems program.  Simmons admitted to making similar false statements in 2009 as well, in an unsuccessful attempt to obtain work with the State Department’s Worldwide Protective Service.

As to the wire fraud charge, Simmons admitted to defrauding an individual victim, identified as E.L., out of $125,000 in connection with a bogus real estate investment.  Simmons admitted to sending E.L. promised monthly disbursements to make it appear as if her funds had been invested as promised, and to repeatedly lying to her about the whereabouts of her money in order to perpetuate the fraud.  As Simmons admitted, he simply spent the funds on personal purposes and there was never any actual real estate investment project.

As to the firearms charge, Simmons admitted that at the time he was arrested in this case, he was unlawfully in possession of two firearms, which he was prohibited from possessing on account of his prior felony convictions, including a prior Maryland felony conviction and two prior federal felony firearms convictions.

Simmons was indicted by a federal grand jury on Oct. 14, 2015, and faces a maximum penalty of 10 years in prison on the major fraud against the government count, a maximum penalty of 20 years in prison on the wire fraud count, and a maximum penalty of 10 years in prison on the felon-in-possession of a firearm count when sentenced on July 15.  The maximum statutory sentences are prescribed by Congress and are provided here for informational purposes, as the sentencing of the defendant will be determined by the court based on the advisory Sentencing Guidelines and other statutory factors.

This announcement is available on the website of the U.S. Attorney’s Office for the Eastern District of Virginia.  Related court documents and information may be found on the website of the District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia or on PACER by searching for Case No. 1: 15-cr-293.

 

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Photo of the Day: Former President Bush Chats With Secretary Kerry and Former Secretary Baker

Posted: 12:02  am ET
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Former President George H.W. Bush chats with U.S. Secretary of State John Kerry and former Secretary of State James A. Baker III in Baker's private office at Rice University’s Baker Institute in Houston, Texas, after Secretary Kerry arrived on April 26, 2016, to deliver a speech at Secretary Baker's namesake institution about religion and foreign policy. [State Department photo/ Public Domain]

Former President George H.W. Bush chats with U.S. Secretary of State John Kerry and former Secretary of State James A. Baker III in Baker’s private office at Rice University’s Baker Institute in Houston, Texas, after Secretary Kerry arrived on April 26, 2016, to deliver a speech at Secretary Baker’s namesake institution about religion and foreign policy. [State Department photo/ Public Domain]

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