Foreign Service Nominations: @SenatorCardin Trying to Get the Senate to “Yes”

Posted: 12:31 am EDT
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In addition to the senior nominees stuck in the Senate, there are also 4 Foreign Service lists pending on the Executive Calendar.

PN573-4 | Nominations beginning Bradley Duane Arsenault, and ending Jamshed Zuberi, which 20 nominations were received by the Senate and appeared in the Congressional Record on June 10, 2015.

PN643 | Nominations beginning Jennifer Ann Amos, and ending Holly Rothe Wielkoszewski, which 101 nominations were received by the Senate and appeared in the Congressional Record on July 8, 2015.

PN877-1 | Nominations beginning Jason Douglas Kalbfleisch, and ending Stuart MacKenzie Hatcher, which 404 nominations were received by the Senate and appeared in the Congressional Record on September 21, 2015.

PN800 | Nominations beginning Kreshnik Alikaj, and ending Brett David Ziskie, which 127 nominations were received by the Senate and appeared in the Congressional Record on September 8, 2015.

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Snapshot: Unaccompanied Children By Country of Citizenship (FY2009-2014)

Posted: 12:25 am EDT
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Via GAO

According to the Department of Homeland Security (DHS), the number of UAC from any country apprehended at the U.S. border climbed from nearly 28,000 in fiscal year 2012 to more than 42,000 in fiscal year 2013, and to more than 73,000 in fiscal year 2014. Prior to fiscal year 2012, most UAC apprehended at the border were Mexican nationals.5 However, as figure 1 shows, starting in fiscal year 2013, the total number of UAC from El Salvador, Guatemala, and Honduras surpassed the number of UAC from Mexico and, in fiscal year 2014, far surpassed the number of UAC from Mexico.

Screen Shot 2015-10-27

Recent data and research indicate that, while fewer UAC are being apprehended in the United States in 2015, the pace of migration from Central America remains high. According to DHS, as of August 2015, apprehensions at the southwest border are down 46 percent compared with last year—with more than 35,000 UAC apprehended in fiscal year 2015 compared with about 66,000 through the same time period in fiscal year 2014. However, analyses of DHS data indicate that apprehensions in the month of August 2015 increased compared to previous months this year and exceeded by nearly 50 percent August 2014 apprehensions. Moreover, research by two nongovernmental organizations indicates that a greater number of Central Americans this year are being apprehended in Mexico. According to the Migration Policy Institute,6 Mexico has increased its enforcement capacity and is apprehending a greater number of Central American migrants, including children.

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In fiscal year 2014, USAID, State, DHS, and IAF allocated a combined $44.5 million for El Salvador, $88.1 million for Guatemala, and $78 million for Honduras. In addition, MCC signed a threshold program agreement with Honduras in fiscal year 2013 totaling $15.6 million, a compact agreement with El Salvador in fiscal year 2014 totaling $277 million, and a threshold program agreement with Guatemala in fiscal year 2015 totaling $28 million.

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Burn Bag: May we wonder about priorities at State and Congress? Totes McGotes!

Via Burn Bag:

“After the abrupt departure of the previous ambassador, a West African country – a vanguard of peaceful coexistance between religions – will finally receive a new U.S. envoy 2.5 years later.  May we wonder about priorities at State and Congress?”

James-Earl-Jones-Totes-McGotes2

via reactiongifs.com

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Snapshot: Nonimmigrant Visa (NIV) Forecast Through Fiscal Year 2019-18 Million

Posted: 12:56 am EDT
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Via GAO:

Since 2012, the Department of State (State) has undertaken several efforts to increase nonimmigrant visa (NIV) processing capacity and decrease applicant interview wait times. Specifically, it has increased consular staffing levels and implemented policy and management changes, such as contracting out administrative support services. According to State officials, these efforts have allowed State to meet the goals of Executive Order (E.O.) 13597 of increasing its NIV processing capacity by 40 percent in Brazil and China within 1 year and ensuring that 80 percent of worldwide NIV applicants are able to schedule an interview within 3 weeks of State receiving their application. Specifically, State increased the number of consular officers in Brazil and China by 122 and 46 percent, respectively, within a year of the issuance of E.O. 13597. Additionally, according to State data, since July 2012, at least 80 percent of worldwide applicants seeking a tourist visa have been able to schedule an interview within 3 weeks.

Two key challenges—rising NIV demand and problems with NIV information technology (IT) systems—could affect State’s ability to sustain the lower NIV interview wait times. First, State projects the number of NIV applicants to rise worldwide from 12.4 million in fiscal year 2014 to 18.0 million in fiscal year 2019, an increase of 45 percent (see figure).

Screen Shot 2015-10-27

Given this projected NIV demand and budgetary limits on State’s ability to hire more consular officers at posts, State must find ways to achieve additional NIV processing efficiencies or risk being unable to meet the goals of E.O. 13597 in the future. Though State’s evaluation policy stresses that it is important for bureaus to evaluate management processes to improve their effectiveness and inform planning, State has not evaluated the relative effectiveness of its various efforts to improve NIV processing. Without conducting a systematic evaluation, State cannot determine which of its efforts have had the greatest impact on NIV processing efficiency. Second, consular officers in focus groups expressed concern about their ability to efficiently conduct adjudications given State’s current IT systems. While State is currently enhancing its IT systems, it does not systematically collect information on end user (i.e., consular officer) satisfaction to help plan and guide its improvements, as leading practices would recommend. Without this information, it is unclear if these enhancements will address consular officers’ concerns, such as having to enter the same data multiple times, and enable them to achieve increased NIV processing efficiency in the future.

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@State Dept’s Danger Pay: All Through With Promises, Promises Now?

Posted: 3:10 am EDT
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On September 14, we posted about the new State Department’s danger pay posts (New Danger Pay Differential Posts: See Gainers, Plus Losers Include One Post on Evacuation Status). Previously, we’ve written about these upcoming changes including potential fallout to bidding, student loan repayment, security funding allocation, EFM employment, and first and second tour (FAST) officers’ onward assignments (see Danger Danger, Bang Bang — State Department Eyes Changes in Danger Pay). Click here for AFSA’s update to its members regarding the changes in danger pay.

This is the first time the State Department had updated its danger pay process and designation from best we could tell. Of the forty or so danger pay posts, about half lost their designation, including Monterrey and Nuevo Laredo which lost 20%, and all Saudi Arabian posts which lost 15%. Wouldn’t better planning with a longer roll out have been better for everyone? Why was there such a short fuse on this project? Was Congress snapping at somebody’s heels?

One group particularly affected (without any mitigation in place) are Eligible Family Members (EFMs) who receive danger pay but do not receive any other differentials. All EFMs in posts that lost their danger pay designation have suffered a pay cut and will not receive any hardship pay in lieu of the danger pay lost. The dual-income Foreign Service families particularly in Saudi Arabia and some in Mexico had a pay cut of at least 20%.

The changes in the danger pay designation also affected employees who went to some difficult posts to qualify for the student loan program (SLRP).  Student Loan Repayment Program (SLRP) is a recruitment and retention tool used by the Department to attract and retain Civil Service and Foreign Service employees applying for or encumbering specific positions.  The loan repayment is linked to danger/hardship only, and is for posts designated at 20% or greater. We understand that some who qualified for SLRP this year, will not qualify next year if they’re seeing danger/hardship under 20%. Despite that fact that the SLRP was used to “lure” officers to some of these challenging posts.  That section of the FAM updated in May this year, notes that “Posts may be added to or eliminated from this list as differential and danger pay rates change.”

We understand that entry level officers (ELOs, we don’t know how many) felt particularly short-changed by these changes.  These officers typically go out on their first two overseas tours on directed assignments. They go where they’re sent by the State Department. They get equity points based on danger pay and hardship differentials that help determine their next assignment.  We should add that super high equity posts  (like Iraq/Afghanistan, etc.) are not available to first tour officers. A large number of first tour officers end up in visa mill posts in Mexico, China, India, Brazil and posts in Africa. Which means that a 5-10% change in equity in the pecking order is noticeable.

Via reactiongif.com

Via reactiongif.com

I wonder if their CDOs say if you take Promisestan now with 15% danger pay and 20% hardship, you get bidding priority for say Buenos Aires or Madrid when you bid next time. Did the CDOs blink when they said that?  By the time the ELOs bid, Promisestan had been downgraded to zero danger pay with hardship still at 20%.  So ELOs who said yes to 35%, now had to make do with their 20%.

“A claim of fairness and transparency does not make it so,” one writes.

A senior government official had apparently told employees earlier that “this is not going to be such a big deal.” But for a number of employees just starting off on their careers at State, this is going to be a big deal. Somebody made them a promise, an inherent tradeoff when they started, and now they’re told they just have to suck it. We understand that despite efforts by AFSA, FSOs, and some posts themselves argued against danger pay changes or for mitigation — specifically including entry level bidding should these changes be imposed — management apparently had not been responsive.

We sent the following to DGHR on Twitter but he, too, has not been responsive.

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We estimate that this affects the bidding of a small range of A-100 classes, perhaps some members in the 174th-180th classes. And perhaps that’s the problem? A small number of entry level FSOs, though no fault of their own, are negatively impacted in their bidding options by these changes. And the somebodies at the State Department — from M, DGHR, DS, CDA, PRI — have decided that the negative impact to these newbies are acceptable.

Say — isn’t this kind of like going on a cross country A-Z train with the fares changing midway through the trip? Suddenly, here comes the conductor asking for additional fares somewhere at the P stop, even if you’ve originally paid up to get to the Z stop.

The Yoda conductor delivers the bad news:

So sorry, just doing the job, I am.  P stop not as good as Z stop. But F stop, it is not.

If throw up, you must, use bucket under coach seat, please.

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Blog Weather: Sporadic for the next couple of weeks

Posted: 2:53 am EDT
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I’m exploring funding sources for 2016 and traveling the next couple of weeks. Blogging may be sporadic for bit but I remain reachable through this blog and via email. Also testing a few ads via Amazon to see if it fits the blog.  Pardon the dust and feel free to send comments. Thanks!

Image via Imgur/zimgodo

Image via Imgur/zimgodo

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Ambassador Chas Freeman on Diplomatic Amateurism and Its Consequences

Posted: 3:02 am EDT
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Ambassador Chas Freeman did a speech on Diplomatic Amateurism and Its Consequences at Foggy Bottom’s Ralph Bunche Library earlier this month. He also recently spoke about America’s Continuing Misadventures in the Middle East.  We need more people like Ambassador Freeman telling it like it is; unfortunately that often puts people like him in the outs with people who do not want to hear what needs to be said. More often than not, the top ranks have large rooms for obedient groupies and not much room for anyone else.

Below is an excerpt from his diplomatic amateurism speech:

In other countries, diplomacy is a prestigious career in which one spends a lifetime, culminating in senior positions commensurate with one’s talents as one has demonstrated them over the years.  But, in the United States, these days more than ever, the upper reaches of diplomacy are reserved for wealthy dilettantes and celebrities with no prior experience in the conduct of relations with foreign states and peoples, national security policy, or the limitations of the use of force.  Policy positions in our government dealing with such issues are now largely staffed by individuals selected for their interest-group affiliation, identity, or sizable campaign contributions.  These diplomatic neophytes are appointed for the good of the political party with which they are affiliated and to reward their loyal service during political campaigns, not for their ability to do the jobs they are given.  It is assumed that they can learn on the job, then move on after a while to give others a chance at government employment.  But whatever they learn, they take with them when they leave, adding nothing to the diplomatic capacity of our government.

If you tried to staff and run a business or a sports team like this, you’d get creamed by the competition.  If you organized our armed forces this way, you’d be courting certain defeat.  You can judge for yourself how staffing and running a foreign policy establishment through the spoils system is working out for our country now that our margin for error has been reduced by “the rise of the rest” since the end of the Cold War.  Staffing national security policy positions and ambassadorships with people whose ambition greatly outstrips their knowledge and experience is a bit like putting teenagers in charge of risk management while entrusting lifeguard positions to people with no proven ability to swim.  Hit and run statecraft and diplomacy were never wise, but they didn’t matter much when America was isolated from the world or so powerful that it could succeed without really trying.  Neither is the case anymore

The United States is now the only great power not to have professionalized our diplomatic service.  As the trove of diplomatic reporting spewed out by WikiLeaks shows, our career people remain very bright and able. But their supervisors are less prepared to carry out their duties than their counterparts in the diplomatic services of other great and lesser powers.  One of the 20th century’s greatest diplomats, Abba Eban put it this way

“The word ‘ambassador’ would normally have a professional connotation but for the American tradition of ‘political appointees.’ The bizarre notion that any citizen, especially if he is rich, is fit for the representation of his country abroad has taken some hard blows through empirical evidence, but it has not been discarded, nor should the idea of diluting a rigid professionalism with manpower from less detached sectors of society be dismissed out of hand. Nevertheless, when the strongest nation in the world appoints a tycoon or a wealthy hostess to head an embassy, the discredit and frustration is spread throughout the entire diplomatic corps in the country concerned.”

That was in 1983. Quite a bit before that, about 130 years before that, demonstrating that this is indeed a lengthy American tradition, the New York Herald Tribune observed, “Diplomacy is the sewer through which flows the scum and refuse of the political puddle. A man not fit to stay at home is just the man to send abroad.”

These American observations, or observations about American diplomacy, contrast quite strikingly with the views expressed by the classic writer on diplomatic practice, François de Callières. Writing now almost exactly three centuries ago, in 1716, he said:

“Diplomacy is a profession by itself, which deserves the same preparation and assiduity of attention that men give to other recognized professions. The qualities of the diplomatist and the knowledge necessary to him cannot indeed all be acquired. The diplomatic genius is born, not made. But there are many qualities which may be developed with practice, and the greater part of the necessary knowledge can only be acquired by constant application to the subject.

“In this sense, diplomacy is certainly a profession, itself capable of occupying a man’s whole career, and those who think to embark upon a diplomatic mission as a pleasant diversion from their common task only prepare disappointment for themselves and disaster for the cause that they serve. The veriest fool would not entrust the command of an army to a man whose sole badge of merit was his eloquence in a court of law or his adroit practice of the courtier’s art in the palace. All are agreed that military command must be earned by long service in the army. In the same manner, it must be regarded as folly to entrust the conduct of negotiations to an untrained amateur.”

There is indeed every reason for diplomacy to be a learned profession in the United States, like the law, medicine, or the military.  But it isn’t.  When top positions are reserved for people who have not come up through the ranks, it’s difficult to sustain diplomacy as a career, let alone establish and nurture it as a profession.  Professions are human memory banks.  They are composed of individuals who profess a unique combination of specialized knowledge, experience, and technique.  They distill their expertise into doctrine – constantly refreshed – based on what their experience has taught them about what works and what doesn’t.  Their skills are inculcated through case studies, periodic training, and on-the-job mentoring.  This professional knowledge is constantly improved by the critical introspection inherent in after-action reviews.

In the course of one’s time as a foreign service officer, one acquires languages and a hodgepodge of other skills relevant to the conduct of foreign relations.  If one is inclined to reflect on one’s experience, one begins to understand the principles that undergird effective diplomacy, that is the arts of persuading others to do things our way, and to get steadily better at practicing these arts.  But, in the U.S. foreign service, by contrast with – let’s say – the military, there is no systematic professional development process, no education in grand strategy or history, no training in tactics or operational technique derived from experience, no habit of reviewing successes and failures to improve future performance, no literature devoted to the development of operational doctrine and technique, and no real program or commitment to the mentoring of new entrants to the career.  If one’s lucky, one is called to participate in the making of history.  If one is not, there is yet a great deal to learn from the success or failure of the diplomatic tasks to which one is assigned.

As an aside, I also don’t believe that, as an institution, the Department of State now understands the difference between bureaucrats and professionals.  (I’m not sure it ever did.)   Both have their place in foreign affairs but the two are quite different.  Bureaucrats are trained to assure uniform decisions and predictable outcomes through the consistent interpretation and application of laws, regulations, and administrative procedures.  Professionals, by contrast, are educated to exercise individual, ad hoc judgments, take actions, and seek outcomes autonomously on the basis of principles and canons of behavior derived from experience.  They are expected to be creative, not consistent, in their approach to the matters in their charge.

[…]

There is an obvious alternative to this bleak scenario.  That is that the secretary of state – this secretary of state, who is the son of a foreign service office and who has personally demonstrated the power of diplomacy to solve problems bequeathed to him by his predecessors – will recognize the need for the U.S. diplomatic service to match our military in professionalism and seek to make this his legacy.  In the end, this would demand enlisting the support of Congress but much could be done internally.

Read in full here:  http://chasfreeman.net/diplomatic-amateurism-and-its-consequences/

AFSA’s media digest failed to include Ambassador Freeman’s event in its daily digest for members. But AFSA members got a nice treat with the inclusion of Taylor Swift: America’s Best Public Diplomat? as reading fare.

 

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Related posts:

Too Quick on the Draw: Militarism and the Malpractice of Diplomacy in America

Lessons from America’s Continuing Misadventures in the Middle East

 

US Mission Mexico Issues Emergency Message on Hurricane Patricia

Posted: 3:12 pm PDT
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US Mission Mexico issued an emergency message for U.S. citizens in the country on October 23, 2015 at 4:00 p.m. concerning Hurricane Patricia.  It is expected to make landfall as a potentially catastrophic Category 5 hurricane.  Patricia is also expected to produce total rainfall accumulations of 8-12 inches which could produce life-threatening flash floods and mud slides. Excerpt from the announcement below:

Hurricane Patricia is now being classified as a potentially catastrophic Category 5 hurricane, and is expected to make landfall on Friday, October 23, 2015, along the coast of Michoacan, Colima (which includes Manzanillo), Jalisco (which includes Puerto Vallarta),and/or Nayarit.  It is now considered one of the most powerful and dangerous hurricanes in recorded history.  If you are in the hurricane warning area, make preparations immediately to protect life and property.

The National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA) issued an updated Hurricane Warning for the Pacific Coast of Mexico from San Blas, Nayarit, to Punta San Telmo, Michoacan (see http://www.nhc.noaa.gov/?epac).   A hurricane watch is in effect for east of Punta San Telmo to Lazaro Cardenas, Michoacan.  A Tropical Storm Warning is in effect for east of Punta San Telmo to Lazaro Cardenas and north of San Blas to El Roblito, Nayarit.

The center of Hurricane Patricia is expected to make landfall in the hurricane warning area Friday afternoon or evening.  Hurricane Patricia is expected to produce total rainfall accumulations of 8 to 12 inches, with isolated maximum amounts of 20 inches, over the states of Nayarit, Jalisco, Colima, Michoacan and Guerrero starting today into Saturday, October 24.  These rains could produce life-threatening flash floods, mud slides (especially in areas of mountainous terrain), and high winds up to 200 MPH that could result in downed power lines. Hurricane force winds extend outward up to 30 miles from the center and tropical storm force winds extend outward up to 175 miles. A dangerous storm surge is expected to produce significant coastal flooding, accompanied by large and destructive waves.  Swells may cause life-threatening surf and rip current conditions.  As Hurricane Patricia moves inland, it will continue to produce heavy rainfall, wind, and dangerous conditions.  Persons located inland in the path of Hurricane Patricia should take appropriate measures to ensure their safety, particularly those located in areas prone to flooding or mudslides. NOAA recommends that residents in low-lying areas near the coast in the hurricane warning area evacuate immediately.

We strongly encourage you to monitor media reports and the Mexican government’s civil protection (“Protección Civil”) website, http://www.proteccioncivil.gob.mx, for updated information about the storm and to follow official instructions.  Stay clear of beaches, as rough seas associated with storm conditions create severe hazards.  Stay clear of downed power lines.  Take precautions against the effects of rain, strong winds, and large and destructive waves. We strongly encourage you to take shelter as advised by Mexican authorities or at any time you feel you are in danger.

Read more here.

image from noaa.gov

image from noaa.gov

Periodic updates are also available on the websites for the U.S. Embassy in Mexico City and the U.S. Consulate General in Guadalajara.

You may alert the embassy to U.S. citizens affected by the storm, by sending an email to PatriciaEmergencyUSC@state.gov or CDJPatriciaTF@state.gov and providing as much information as possible.  You can also use the following contact numbers

  • +52-656-227-3105 (From Mexico),
  • 1-888-407-4747 (From the United States and Canada),
  • +1-202-501-4444 (From all other countries)

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Whoa! The Next Consul General in Istanbul Will Be a Political Appointee?

Posted: 3:49 am EDT
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File this under #rumint.  Some küçük dedikodu we’re hearing is that the next Consul General in Istanbul will be a political appointee.

Güzel degil, arkadaslarim.

The incumbent in Istanbul is senior career diplomat Chuck Hunter. He assumed his duties as Principal Officer at the U.S. Consulate General in Istanbul, Turkey, in September 2013. Per typical rotation in the FS, he’d be scheduled to leave post in the  summer or fall of 2016. Whoever is angling for this position will have to put in the request this year.  Is this position showing up on FSBid?

Somebody told us, “I thought only ambassadorships could go to political appointees overseas.”   Traditionally, only ambassadorships have gone to political appointees. But that may not be quite true anymore. We are starting to see chiefs of staff, for noncareer ambassadors “joined” the Foreign Service as Schedule C employees. We understand that there are approximately about a dozen of such positions currently in place. There was one at the US Embassy in Beijing at one point.  And there is one at the U.S. Embassy in Tokyo who apparently runs the mission together with the DCM (see State/OIG Inspects US Mission Japan: Oh, Heck, Where Do We Start?).

The State Department apparently made a previous attempt to appoint a senior executive service HR DAS as Consul General in Melbourne, a case resisted at that time by AFSA, according to one source. A side note, in October last year, we blogged about the rumored Iran Watcher London position potentially being eyed for a staffer in the office of the Under Secretary for Political Affairs (see Is This Iran Watcher London Position Not Bidlisted About to Go to a “P” Staffer?). After a fuss was raised, the job apparently went to a qualified Foreign Service officer who was thrilled to go to London with her family. An Iran Watcher job was then created in Amsterdam. Except that there was an Iran Watcher already on language training slated to go to Erbil, Iraq and when that position was eliminated, the individual was reassigned to Amsterdam.

It is not clear to us if the rumored candidate for the CG Istanbul position is a Civil Service employe or a political appointee of the bundler kind.

Istanbul_bridge

Istanbul (photo by USCG Istanbul/FB)

ConGen Istanbul is one of our oldest posts. The United States established diplomatic relations with the Ottoman Empire in 1831, establishiing the U.S. Legation in Constantinople (Istanbul). The legation was raised to embassy status in 1906. The two states broke diplomatic ties during World War I. Relations were reestablished in 1927 after the founding of the modern Turkish state in 1923. In the 1930s the Embassy gradually transferred to Ankara, Turkey’s new capital, leaving behind a consulate general located at the Palazzo Corpi in Istanbul. Construction of a new consulate compound in İstinye was completed in 2003.

Istanbul is rated high for political violence and rated critical for terrorism. If that’s not enough to make you sit up, the conflict in neighboring Syria has become extremely dangerous for Turkey.

So … whose dimbulb idea is this?

By coincidence, the State Department had just published its final rule on the Appointment of Foreign Service Officers. Read the full text (PDF) of the final rule document. It is formally published on Oct 23, 2015 in the Federal Register. The final rule says in part:

Other than a minor amendment in 2002 (see 67 FR 46108), part 11 has remained as it was drafted 31 years ago; whereas, the relevant provisions of the FAM were updated in 2013. This rulemaking harmonizes the two authorities. The Department believes that a revised part 11, together with the FAM, provide comprehensive guidance for both internal stakeholders and interested members of the general public on the appointment of Foreign Service Officers. The Department’s revision of part 11 is part of its Retrospective Review conducted pursuant to Executive Order 13563.

Below is the relevant section which doesn’t look new:

§ 11.60 Limited non-career appointments.

Consistent with section 303 of the Act (22 U.S.C. 3943), the Secretary of State may also appoint Civil Service employees and other individuals to the Foreign Service, and, consistent with section 309 of the Act (22 U.S.C. 3949), such appointments may include limited non-career appointments (LNAs). After meeting the job specific requirements, candidates must meet applicable medical, security, and suitability requirements. Limited non- career appointments are covered under 3 FAM 2290.

3 FAM 2290 (pdf) states that “seven categories in 3 FAM 2293, subparagraphs b(1) through b(7), are the only categories by which a Civil Service employee or other individual from outside the Foreign Service may be appointed to the Foreign Service pursuant to an LNA under Section 303 of the Foreign Service Act. The Department’s procedures for appointing Civil Service employees and other individuals from outside the Foreign Service as LNAs outside these categories are subject to negotiations between the Department and the Foreign Service’s exclusive representative, prior to institution of further categories.”

3 FAM 2293 TYPES OF LIMITED NONCAREER APPOINTMENTS UNDER SECTION 303 OF THE FOREIGN SERVICE ACT
(CT:PER-726; 04-18-2014) (State Only) (Applies to Foreign Service and Civil Service employees) 

a. Consistent with Section 502 of the Foreign Service Act (22 U.S.C. 3982), the Department’s goal is to ensure that positions designated as Foreign Service positions are filled by assignment of career and career-conditional members of the Foreign Service.

b. Pursuant to Sections 303 and 309 of the Foreign Service Act, the Department appoints Civil Service employees and other individuals from outside the Foreign Service to LNAs as:

(1) Hard-to-Fill (HTF) Candidates: Positions that have not attracted sufficient bidders through the Foreign Service assignments process and thus may be filled by Department Civil Service employees. The procedures and eligibility requirements applicable to HTF positions as well as the scope and frequency of available positions may vary from year to year. Each HTF program will be announced by an ALDAC after consultation with the Foreign Service’s exclusive representative;

(2) Expert Candidates: For these positions, bureaus are to request temporary FTE from the Office of Resource Management (HR/RMA) before presenting an Action Memorandum to the Director, HR/CDA. For example, expert LNAs include, but are not limited to, positions that cannot normally be filled with Foreign Service personnel, such as certain attorney positions at embassies and missions that are filled by lawyers from the Office of the Legal Adviser, and a nuclear physicist position that was temporarily required in Japan.

(3) Developmental Assignment Candidates: These assignments provide experience and exposure to Foreign Service operations for Civil Service personnel through two methods–bureau candidate only advertised positions, for example, A Bureau positions at ELSO and Overseas Development Program positions advertised via CS merit promotion announcements.

(4) Volunteer Cable Candidates: Volunteer cables are sent, as agreed annually with the exclusive representative in the Bidding Instructions, when there are no qualified bidders for a vacancy that has been advertised. The regional bureaus initiate the volunteer cable exercise as a request to HR/CDA to send such a cable based on Foreign Service need. If a Civil Service candidate is selected, the Director General must prepare a Certificate of Need in accordance with 3 FAM 2295 (see also 3 FAM Exhibit 2295 for an example of this certificate);

(5) Schedule C and Other Outside-Hire Candidates: These appointments include, but are not limited to, chief-of-mission office management specialists, eligible family members, and other outside hires;

(6) Exceptional Circumstance Candidates: The Department’s Director General of the Foreign Service and Director of Human Resources (Director General) may designate certain positions to be filled under an “exceptional circumstance” category (see 3 FAM 2294 below).

(7) Urgent, Limited Need: These limited non-career appointments support specific or exceptional mission-critical needs that existing Foreign Service personnel cannot meet. These needs are considered to be of limited duration, not justifying the creation of a new category of a career Foreign Service employee. HR/RMA will authorize the FTE for these positions. Every two years, the Director General or designee will review each category of LNA falling under this paragraph in consultation with the Foreign Service’s exclusive representative, to determine whether the specific need still exists and existing Foreign Service personnel cannot meet the need.

We’ve got great memories of Istanbul.  We’re interested to hear more about this rumored candidate. Is this all smoke or is there fire?

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Related posts:

Mills’ Transcript Features FSO Ray Maxwell: 35 Years Working For Uncle Sam, and Yo! What the Frak?

Posted: 3:52 am EDT
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On October 21, the Benghazi Democrats released the full transcript of Cheryl Mills interview with the Select Benghazi Committee (click here to read the full transcript).

One of the questions asked Ms. Mills, Secretary Clinton’s former chief of staff was the allegation made by former NEA Deputy Assistant Secretary Raymond Maxwell about a document scrub (see Former State Dept DAS Raymond Maxwell Alleges Benghazi Document Scrub Pre-ARB Investigation).

Ms. Mills says this (per transcript):

“I might have had an encounter with him when he was being hired. I don’t know. Meaning, ensuring that he was in a place where he could be appointed or hired. I don’t know. But I don’t — I never had an encounter with Ray Maxwell around Benghazi.”

In a follow-up question, clipped below, Ms. Mills basically gave a word salad about the “hiring” of Mr. Maxwell. What the frak? We should note that Mr. Maxwell, at the time he was thrown under the Benghazi bus, had served 21 years in the career Foreign Service in addition to 6 years enlistment in the Navy Nuclear Power program. He earned a Naval Reserved commission then completed two division officer tours in the guided missile destroyer, the USS Luce (DDG-38); a total of about 14 years in the Navy, before joining the Foreign Service.

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We have extracted the parts where Ms. Mills talked about Mr. Maxwell with the Committee.  Available to read here: Mills Transcript-RayMaxwell Extract.

Last year, we wrote The Cautionary Tale of Raymond Maxwell: When the Bureaucracy Bites, Who Gets The Blame?).

Sometime after that, we were able to read for the first time, the original grievance Ray Maxwell wrote on April 3, 2013 (pdf) addressed to State Department HR official Linda Taglialatela. Maxwell writes:

On December 18, 2012, the ARB Report was released. When I returned to my office after lunch, A/S Beth Jones’ OMS told me to meet with her at 2 pm. At 2:20 A/ S Jones returned to the office and summoned me. She invited me in and closed the door. She told me the ARB report had been released and that it was not complimentary to the Department, to NEA, or to me. She said PDAS Elizabeth Dibble was reading the classified report in the SCIF, and that she had not yet seen it. Then she said she had been instructed by Cheryl Mills to relieve me of the DAS position, that I was fired, and that I should have all my personal belongings out of the office be close of business that same day. She said PDAS Dibble would identify a place where I could keep my belongings, and that I would remain in the Bureau as a senior adviser. She said the Bureau was going to take care of me and that I didn’t need to “lawyer up.”

Just like that.

Former FSO Peter Van Buren wrote about this previously here:

Maxwell impresses as a State Department archetype, dedicated to the insular institution, apolitical to the point of frustration to an outsider, but shocked when he found his loyalty was not returned.

He has revealed what he knows only two years after the fact. People will say he is out for revenge. But I don’t think that’s the case. As a State Department whistleblower who experienced how the Department treats such people, I know it’s not a position anyone wants to be in.
[…]
You don’t just wake up one morning and decide to turn your own life, and that of your family, upside down, risking financial ruin, public shaming, and possibly jail time. It is a process, not an event.

According to NEA officials interviewed by the House Oversight Committee, decisions about security  policy and security resources rested firmly within the Bureau of Diplomatic Security, not  NEA.   PDAS Elizabeth Dibble, told the Committee that Maxwell had no responsibility for security measures and should not have been held accountable by the ARB.  Lee Lohman, the Executive Director for NEA told the Committee, When I looked at Ray Maxwell’s situation, I had a much better sense of how much he was or was not involved in this, and it struck me as being unfair.
Below is an excerpt from the House Oversight Committee majority report:
Therefore, the ARB’s finding that Maxwell lacked “leadership and engagement on staffing and security issues in Benghazi” is puzzling. Maxwell himself denied having any formal role in determining the appropriate security posture or evaluating security requests by the U.S. mission in Libya.


The ARB’s approach to assigning accountability within NEA for the failures that led to 
the Benghazi tragedy is puzzling. The ARB identified “systemic failures and leadership and management deficiencies at senior levels” within NEA. It seems obvious that a “systemic failure” within a large organization such as NEA could only result from a widespread failure throughout the system, either to recognize the challenges posed by the inadequate security  posture of the Benghazi mission in a deteriorating environment, or else to take the appropriate steps to rectify it in order to safeguard American lives. Yet within the entire NEA Bureau, the ARB singled out only Raymond Maxwell, for conduct his own supervisor contended was not “material” to what happened in Benghazi. 

If Ambassador Jones and others are right, and the intelligence Maxwell stopped reading was not material because NEA was essentially powerless to affect the actions of DS in Benghazi, it is unclear why the ARB blamed Maxwell for not reading it. If the intelligence did provide some kind of insight which could have prevented the failures of Benghazi, it is further unclear why Maxwell was held accountable for not reading it, but Ambassador Jones and others within  NEA were not held accountable for having read it and taken no effective steps to remedy the shortcomings of the Benghazi compound’s security posture before it led to a loss of life?

So about 31 35 years working for Uncle Sam, and one day, one is conveniently fired. And expected to lay back and play dead until the Benghazi train passes by.

Playing dead is needed for the proper functioning of the Service?

Excuse me, I need to throw up. Again.

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