State/OIG Reviews Former FSO’s Allegation of Improper Denial of Promotion

Posted: 3:48  am EDT
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On July 31st, State/OIG posted online its review on an FSO’s allegation of improper denial of promotion:

The Office of Inspector General (OIG) conducted this review to assess a former Department of State (Department) employee’s (complainant) allegations of an improper denial of promotion. Specifically, in September 2013, the complainant alleged that (1) the Department’s Bureau of Human Resources (HR) fraudulently tampered with or manipulated six reconstituted promotion boards conducted in 2010 and 2011 and (2) HR fraudulently altered documents generated by these six boards to prevent the complainant from being ranked for promotion. OIG interviewed former board members and consulted with a forensics expert, and found that the evidence does not support the complainant’s allegations.

According to the footnote in this report, on August 18, 2011, the FSGB issued its final decision, concluding that the Department fulfilled its responsibility of proving that the complainant would not have been promoted during the years at issue even if the alleged procedural errors had not occurred. The complainant appealed to the Federal District Court and challenged both the FSGB interim decision (which resulted from its order to conduct the six final boards), and the FSGB final decision. The complainant filed a Federal appeal in U.S. District Court on January 7, 2011, which has now been temporarily suspended at the complainant’s request.

This case does not include the name of the foreign service officer but we think this is the Joan Wadelton’s case that has been through the Foreign Service Grievance Board and is the subject of a litigation in the U.S. District Court of the District of Columbia.

Reading through this report, we are struck by OIG being “unable to review any notes or score sheets generated by the 2006 boards because Department policy required treating them as working files; as such, they were destroyed once the rankings were finalized.” Although it appears State/OIG reviewed other scoresheets and consulted with a DHS expert to conduct forensic analysis. The report says that the review could not substantiate the complainant’s allegation that HR fraudulently altered documents associated with her 2010 to 2011 reconstituted promotion boards.

We don’t understand this policy of destroying working files, particularly on cases such as promotions. What’s the rationale for doing so? Anyone want to school me on this?

Read it here: ESP-15-06_Improper Denial of Promotion Allegation.

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Related posts:

What Information Is Collected on OPM’s Background Investigation Forms?

Posted: 2:44  am EDT
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Via
CRS Insight

The information collected will depend on the applicant’s position and the type of background investigation required. OPM uses three standard forms for background investigations: SF-85, SF-85P, or SF-86 form. The forms are typically submitted electronically using OPM’s Electronic Questionnaires for Investigations Processing (e-QIP) system. OPM had suspended use of e-QIP “for security enhancements,” but re-enabled the system on July 23, 2015.

Data Collected for Non-Sensitive Positions

The eight-page SF-85 is required for applicants to non-sensitive positions (e.g., positions that do not require a security clearance) who require physical access to government facilities and who are in positions with a “low risk” to cause damage to the federal government or national security. The responsibilities of these positions are limited and there is little opportunity to use such positions for personal gain. For this reason, the information collected is relatively limited in scope and includes

  • full name, aliases, and SSN;
  • citizenship information;
  • employment information and addresses for the past five years; and
  • information on use or possession of illegal drugs (including marijuana) in the previous year.

Data Collected for “Positions of Public Trust”

The 11-page SF-85P is required for applicants in “Positions of Public Trust,” (i.e., positions that do not involve access to classified information, but that demand a “significant degree of public trust” due to the level of policymaking or other responsibilities). These positions may involve a “significant risk for causing damage [to the federal government] or realizing personal gain.” In addition to the information listed above, the SF-85P requires

  • identifying information (e.g., height, weight, eye and hair color);
  • military service information;
  • employment information and addresses for the past seven years; schools, if any, attended during the past seven years;
  • name, address, and telephone number of three personal references and immediate family members;
  • criminal arrests and/or convictions for the past seven years (excluding incidents prior to the applicant’s 16th birthday or traffic fines under $150);
  • financial information, including bankruptcies during the past seven years and any delinquent financial obligations;
  • foreign travel during the past seven years; and
  • information on use or possession of illegal drugs (including marijuana) in the previous year and any illegal purchase, sale, or transport of drugs in the previous seven years.

Data Collected for Security Clearances and Other National Security Positions

The 127-page SF-86 form is required for applicants to national security sensitive positions, which includes (but is not limited to) positions that require a security clearance. In addition to the information listed above, the SF-86 requires

  • employment information and home addresses for the past 10 years;
  • schools attended for the past 10 years, including a reference at each school attended;
  • personal information (including SSN) for current spouse or cohabitant;
  • foreign contacts, travels, and/or activities;
  • associations with individuals or groups dedicated to terrorism or the violent overthrow of the U.S. government;
  • details on applicant’s “psychological and emotional health,” including, with certain exceptions, details on treatments during the past seven years;
  • additional information on criminal activities, including convictions or charges involving firearms or explosives;
  • alcohol use in the past seven years that has negatively impacted the applicant’s work, personal relationships, finances, or resulted in “intervention by law enforcement/public safety personnel”;
  • use, possession, or other involvement with illegal drugs (including marijuana) in the past seven years or at any time while holding a clearance;
  • details on the applicant’s financial condition and civil court actions; and improper use of information technology systems.

What Other Records Are Contained in OPM’s Personnel Security Background Investigation Files?

OPM’s systems also include information gathered by investigators during the background investigation process, such as summaries of interviews with the applicant’s family members, co-workers, friends, and neighbors. Additionally, investigators may run credit checks, pull civil and criminal court records, and run checks of state and federal agency records to verify information that the applicant provided on the application.

According to OPM’s most recent Privacy Act Notice, personnel investigation records may also include information provided by other agencies, such as:

  • Internal Revenue Service income tax returns;
  • prior security clearance investigative records; and
  • clearance adjudicative records, including polygraph results, if applicable.

It is unclear from OPM’s news release if these types of investigative records were compromised in the breach.

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Burn Bag: Not Yet Nominee Jumps the Gun, er … Confirmation Jet Pack?

Via Burn Bag:

“Who is the as yet unnominated Civil Service member who is SO certain of her ambassadorship that she is already tasking the desk and her prospective post with confirmation prep? Is Congress as certain of her ambassadorship as she is?”

lftoff

liftoff via reactiongifs.com

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