@StateDept Extends Evacuation Status of Family Members of USG Employees in Turkey Through September 23

Posted: 3:49 am ET

The State Department has issued an updated Travel Warning for Turkey. The warning dated August 29 announced the extension of the authorized departure status for family members of employees at US  Embassy Ankara and USCG Istanbul through September 23. It also extends the ordered departure status of family members of U.S. Consulate Adana employees and family members of U.S. Government civilians in Izmir province until September 23, 2016. Below via state.gov

The U.S. Department of State continues to warn U.S. citizens of increased threats from terrorist groups throughout Turkey and to avoid travel to southeastern Turkey. On August 23, 2016, the Department of State extended voluntary departure of family members assigned to the U.S. Embassy in Ankara and U.S. Consulate General in Istanbul through September 23, 2016.  The decision to authorize departure followed an attempted coup and the subsequent declaration of a 90-day state of emergency by the Turkish Government.  The decision to approve voluntary departure status was taken, in part, to allow the Department of State to monitor the effects of the July 15 coup attempt and subsequent declaration of a state of emergency on the security situation in the country.  The Department continues to monitor the effect of these developments as well as recent terrorist incidents in Ankara, Istanbul, and Gaziantep, recurring threats, a visible increase in police or military activities, and the potential for restrictions on movements.  U.S. citizens should carefully consider the need to travel to Turkey at this time.  In addition, we have recently experienced delays securing consular access to U.S. citizens, some of whom also possess Turkish citizenship, detained or arrested by security forces.

Foreign and U.S. tourists have been explicitly targeted by international and indigenous terrorist organizations in Turkey. As stated in the Worldwide Caution dated March 3, 2016, extremists throughout Europe have targeted large sporting events, theatres, open markets, aviation services, transportation systems, and public venues where people congregate as well as religious sites and high-profile events. Most recently, they have threatened to kidnap Westerners and U.S. citizens. U.S. citizens are reminded to review personal security plans, monitor local news for breaking events, and remain vigilant at all times.

U.S. Government personnel in Turkey remain subject to travel restrictions in the southeastern provinces of Hatay, Kilis, Gaziantep, Sanliurfa, Sirnak, Diyarbakir, Van, Siirt, Mus, Mardin, Batman, Bingol, Tunceli, Hakkari, Bitlis, and Elazig.  U.S. citizens should avoid areas in close proximity to the Syrian border.

The Department of State is also extending its March 29, 2016, ordered departure of family members of U.S. Government personnel posted to the U.S. Consulate in Adana and family members of U.S. Government civilians in Izmir province until September 23, 2016. The U.S. Consulate in Adana remains open and will continue to provide all routine consular services.

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Nine Latin American Countries Request Review of U.S. “Wet Foot/Dry Foot” Policy For Cuban Migrants

Posted: 3:14 am ET

 

WaPo has a quick explainer on the “wet-foot/dry-foot” policy,  the informal name given to a 1995 agreement under which Cuban migrants seeking passage to the United States who are intercepted at sea (“wet feet”) are sent back to Cuba or to a third country, while those who make it to U.S. soil (“dry feet”) are allowed to remain in the United States. The policy, formally known as the U.S.-Cuba Immigration Accord, has been written into law as an amendment to the 1966 Cuban Adjustment Act. Read more here. Last year, the Miami Herald reported that in FY2015 (Oct. 1, 2014, and Sept. 30, 2015), the U.S. Coast Guard stopped 4,462 Cubans who attempted to illegally enter the United States by sea.  In FY2014 (before normalization) , 2,059 Cubans were apparently caught at sea, according to WaPo citing Coast Guard data. The traffic has more than doubled probably due to fears that with normalization, the policy will soon end.  An ongoing petition to Congress to End Wet foot, Dry Foot Policy currently has 1,682 letters sent to-date.  

Yesterday, the Ecuadoran Embassy in Washington, D.C. delivered a letter signed by nine Latin American countries “expressing their deep concern about the negative effects of U.S. immigration policy across the region.”  The letter sent to Secretary John Kerry was signed by Colombia, Costa Rica, Ecuador, El Salvador, Guatemala, Mexico, Nicaragua, Panama and Peru.  The joint letter also ends with the Foreign Ministers calling on Secretary Kerry to attend a High Level meeting to review this issue.

Below is from the Ecuadoran Embassy’s statement online:

The 1966 U.S. Public Law 89-732, known as the “Cuban Adjustment Act”, and the policy commonly known as “wet foot, dry foot” have encouraged a disorderly, irregular and unsafe flow of Cubans who, risking their lives, pass through our countries in order to reach the US.” 

They add that this is creating a serious humanitarian crisis for Cuban citizens, with the nine Foreign ministers stating that:

“Cuban citizens risk their lives, on a daily basis, seeking to reach the United States. These people, often facing situations of extreme vulnerability, fall victim to mafias dedicated to people trafficking, sexual exploitation and collective assaults. This situation has generated a migratory crisis that is affecting our countries.”

The signatories believe that to reduce the threats faced by Cuban migrants, it is necessary to address “the main cause of the current situation”. Revising the Cuban Adjustment Act and the ‘wet foot, dry foot’ policy “would be a first step to stop the worsening of this complex situation and would form part of a final agreement to ensure orderly and regular migration in our region.”

Addressing the initiative, the Ecuadorian Foreign Minister, Guillaume Long, said:

“The fact that nine foreign ministers have signed this letter shows the strength of feeling in Latin America about how US policy is creating an immigration crisis in our region.

Encouraged by the US “wet foot, dry foot” policy, Cuban migrants often become victims of trafficking, sexual exploitation and violence. It is time for the United States to change its outdated policy for Cuban migrants, which is undermining regular and safe migration in our continent.

This policy is also discriminatory. Ecuadorian migrants often have to live for decades with the threat of deportation, whereas Cuban citizens arriving in the US have the opportunity of residency after living there for a year and after five-years of residency they can apply for obtain citizenship. 

This injustice must end for everyone’s benefit.”

The State Department’s spokesperson was asked about this in Tuesday’s Daily Press Briefing, and here is the unexciting response:

QUESTION: Cuba. Nine Latin American countries have sent a letter to the Administration saying that U.S. policy, its wet foot/dry foot policy which guarantees citizenship to Cubans who make it to U.S. soil, is creating an immigration crisis for those countries through which they pass, and asked the Administration to review that policy. Do you have a response to that, and is there any review likely to be made?

MR KIRBY: Well, I’ll tell you a couple things. So we did receive the letter that you’re referring to signed by nine foreign ministers from Latin America about what is known as the Cuban Adjustment Act. Obviously, we are concerned for the safety of all migrants throughout the region, including migrants seeking to journey northward through South and Central America and Mexico. Irregular migration often involves dangerous journeys that illustrate the inherent risks and uncertainties of involvement with organized crime, including human smugglers and trafficklers – traffickers, excuse me, in attempts to reach the United States.

We continue to encourage all countries to respect the human rights of migrants and asylum seekers, and to ensure that they are treated humanely. And we’re going to continue to, obviously, engage governments in the region on this issue going forward. So we did receive the letter. I’d refer you to the authors of the letter for any more specific information on its content. I have no meetings to announce at this time, and the Cuban Adjustment Act remains in place and wet foot/dry foot remains U.S. policy regarding Cuban migration.

 

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Quote: “I’m not talking about guillotining somebody, or hanging, or boil them in oil.”

Posted: 2:30 am ET

 

Via ADST/Oral History – Sherman Funk, Former State/OIG:

When I first came Shultz asked me my initial impressions of the Department. I had been here about six weeks. And I told him that I never in my life had encountered such an absolutely superb bunch of people. And he sort of smiled at me, and I said, “But what bothers me is that on the other hand I’d never in my life encountered such a thoroughly screwed up organization, and what I don’t understand is how you can have both. How the people could be so God damned good, and the organization be so thoroughly screwed up.” And I’m still bothered by that, because I don’t know any other place where you find such high caliber persons, where you also find things so badly run. And I still find it. I happened to think the world of many of the people in PER now. Yet they went ahead and they gave an award of $100,000, more than $100,000 U.S. dollars, to somebody to get that person to stop suing the State Department. A clear case of blackmail. And their rationale was, “We have so many class action suits for women, and class action suits for blacks, we don’t want to get involved in other class action suits on a religious basis.” And that was totally ___. There was ample information, they could have fought this one. It was a lack of will, and people sensed that. I’ve seen again and again that we make a recommendation for disciplinary action and unless the thing is so heinous that they’re afraid to say no — afraid the newspapers would find out about it — the chances are they’ll dick around and try to knock it down. We don’t want to be that harsh on the person. I’m not talking about guillotining somebody, or hanging, or boil them in oil. I’m talking about a few weeks suspension for something that is very serious — misuse of a lot of money, millions of dollars. It was like pulling teeth because nobody wants to be responsible for it.

Read in full here.

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US Embassy Kyiv: Ambassador Marie Yovanovitch Presents Her Credentials in Ukraine

Posted: 1:22 am ET

 

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Photo of the Day: Staffers Smile and Carry Signs Bearing Secretary Kerry’s Face

Posted: 12:21 am ET

 

Staffers from U.S. Embassy Abuja Carry Signs Bearing the Face of Secretary Kerry Staffers from U.S. Embassy Abuja carry signs bearing the face of U.S. Secretary of State John Kerry before he addresses them and their family members on August 24, 2016, at the U.S. Embassy in Abuja, Nigeria. [State Department Photo/ Public Domain]


Staffers from U.S. Embassy Abuja carry signs bearing the face of U.S. Secretary of State John Kerry before he addresses them and their family members on August 24, 2016, at the U.S. Embassy in Abuja, Nigeria. [State Department Photo/ Public Domain]

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FBI Employee Pleads Guilty to Acting in the United States as an Agent of the Chinese Government

Posted: 12:15 am ET

 

Via DOJ | Defendant Collected and Caused Sensitive FBI Information to be Provided to the Chinese Government

Kun Shan Chun, a native of the People’s Republic of China and a naturalized U.S. citizen, pleaded guilty today to a criminal information charging him with acting in the United States as an agent of China without providing prior notice to the Attorney General.

Assistant Attorney General for National Security John P. Carlin, U.S. Attorney Preet Bharara of the Southern District of New York and Assistant Director in Charge Diego P. Rodriguez of the FBI’s New York Field Office made the announcement.

Chun, aka Joey Chun, 46, pleaded guilty before U.S. Magistrate Judge James C. Francis IV of the Southern District of New York.  He was an employee of the FBI until his arrest on March 16, 2016.

“Kun Shan Chun violated our nation’s trust by exploiting his official U.S. Government position to provide restricted and sensitive FBI information to the Chinese Government,” said Assistant Attorney General Carlin.  “Holding accountable those who work as illegal foreign agents to the detriment of the United States is among the highest priorities of the National Security Division.”

“Americans who act as unauthorized foreign agents commit a federal offense that betrays our nation and threatens our security,” said U.S. Attorney Bharara.  “And when the perpetrator is an FBI employee, like Kun Shan Chun, the threat is all the more serious and the betrayal all the more duplicitous.  Thanks to the excellent investigative work of the FBI’s Counterintelligence Division, the FBI succeeded in identifying and rooting out this criminal misconduct from within its own ranks.”

“No one is above the law, to include employees of the FBI,” said Assistant Director in Charge Rodriguez.  “We understand as an agency we are trusted by the public to protect our nation’s most sensitive information, and we have to do everything in our power to uphold that trust.”

According to the complaint, the information and statements made during today’s court proceeding:

In approximately 1997, Chun began working at the FBI’s New York Field Office as an electronics technician assigned to the Computerized Central Monitoring Facility of the FBI’s Technical Branch.  In approximately 1998, and in connection with his employment, the FBI granted Chun a Top Secret security clearance and his duties included accessing sensitive, and in some instances classified, information.  In connection with a progressive recruitment process, Chun received and responded to taskings from Chinese nationals and at least one Chinese government official (Chinese Official-1), some, if not all, of whom were aware that Chun worked at the FBI.  On multiple occasions prior to his arrest in March 2016, at the direction of Chinese government officials, Chun collected sensitive FBI information and caused it to be transmitted to Chinese Official-1 and others, while at the same time engaging in a prolonged and concerted effort to conceal from the FBI his illicit relationships with these individuals.

Beginning in 2006, Chun and some of his relatives maintained relationships with Chinese nationals purporting to be affiliated with a company in China named Zhuhai Kolion Technology Company Ltd. (Kolion).  Chun maintained an indirect financial interest in Kolion, including through a previous investment by one of his parents.  In connection with these relationships, Chinese nationals asked Chun to perform research and consulting tasks in the United States, purportedly for the benefit of Kolion, in exchange for financial benefits, including partial compensation for international trips.

Between 2006 and 2010, Chun’s communications and other evidence reflect inquiries from purported employees of Kolion to Chun while he was in the United States, as well as efforts by the defendant to collect, among other things, information regarding solid-state hard drives.

In approximately 2011, during a trip to Italy and France partially paid for by the Chinese nationals, Chun was introduced to Chinese Official-1, who indicated that he worked for the Chinese government and that he knew Chun worked for the FBI.  During subsequent private meetings conducted abroad between the two, Chinese Official-1 asked questions regarding sensitive, non-public FBI information.  During those meetings, Chun disclosed, among other things, the identity and potential travel patterns of an FBI Special Agent.

In approximately 2012, the FBI conducted a routine investigation relating to Chun’s Top Secret security clearance.  In an effort to conceal his relationships with Chinese Official-1 and the other Chinese nationals purporting to be affiliated with Kolion, Chun made a series of false statements on a standardized FBI form related to the investigation.  Between 2000 and March 16, 2016, Chun was required by FBI policy to disclose anticipated and actual contact with foreign nationals during his international travel, but he lied on numerous pre- and post-trip FBI debriefing forms by omitting his contacts with Chinese Official-1, other Chinese nationals and Kolion.

On multiple occasions, Chinese Official-1 asked Chun for information regarding the FBI’s internal structure.  In approximately March 2013, Chun downloaded an FBI organizational chart from his FBI computer in Manhattan.  Chun later admitted to the FBI that, after editing the chart to remove the names of FBI personnel, he saved the document on a piece of digital media and caused it to be transported to Chinese Official-1 in China.

Chinese Official-1 also asked Chun for information regarding technology used by the FBI.  In approximately January 2015, Chun took photos of documents displayed in a restricted area of the FBI’s New York Field Office, which summarized sensitive details regarding multiple surveillance technologies used by the FBI.  Chun sent the photographs to his personal cell phone and later admitted to the FBI that he caused the photographs to be transported to Chinese Official-1 in China.

In approximately February 2015, the FBI caused an undercover employee (UCE) to be introduced to Chun.  The UCE purported to be a U.S. citizen who was born in China and working as a consultant to several firms, including an independent contractor for the Department of Defense, among other entities.

During a recorded meeting in March 2015, Chun told the UCE about his relationship with Kolion and Chinese nationals and later explained to the UCE that Kolion had “government backing,” and that approximately five years prior a relative met a “section chief” whom Chun believed was associated with the Chinese government.

In another recorded meeting in June 2015, Chun told the UCE that he had informed his Chinese associates that the UCE was a consultant who might be in a position to assist them.  Chun said that he wished to act as a “sub-consultant” to the UCE and wanted the UCE to “pay” him “a little bit.”   In July 2015, after coordinating travel to meet Chun’s Chinese associates, Chun met with the UCE in Hungary twice.  During one of the meetings, Chun stated that he knew “firsthand” that the Chinese government was actively recruiting individuals who could provide assistance and that the Chinese government was willing to provide immigration benefits and other compensation in exchange for such assistance.  The UCE told Chun that he had access to sensitive information from the U.S. government.  Chun responded that his Chinese associates would be interested in that type of information and that Chun expected a “cut” of any payment that the UCE received for providing information to the Chinese government.

The count of acting in the United States as an agent of China without providing notice to the Attorney General carries a maximum sentence of 10 years in prison.  The maximum potential sentence is prescribed by Congress and is provided here for informational purposes only, as any sentencing of the defendant will be determined by the judge.

The FBI’s Counterintelligence Division investigated the case.  The prosecution is being handled by Assistant U.S. Attorneys Emil J. Bove III and Andrea L. Surratt of the Southern District of New York’s Terrorism and International Narcotics Unit, with assistance provided by Trial Attorneys Thea D. R. Kendler and David C. Recker of the National Security Division’s Counterintelligence and Export Control Section.

Related files:

Presidential Delegation to the Dominican Republic For President Medina’s Inauguration

Posted: 3:12 am ET

 

President Obama designated Labor Secretary Thomas E. Perez as lead in the Presidential Delegation to the Dominican Republic to attend the inauguration of  President Danilo Medina on August 16, 2016 in Santo Domingo, Dominican Republic.  The other members of the delegation include, Ambassador James W. Brewster Jr., U.S. Ambassador to the Dominican Republic, and AA/S Mari Carmen Aponte, the Acting Assistant Secretary of State for Western Hemisphere Affairs.

Hoy la delegación encabezada por el Secretario de Trabajo de los Estados Unidos, Tomás Pérez, también conformada por la secretaria de Estado adjunta para Latinoamérica, Mari Carmen Aponte y por el Embajador James W. Brewster, está en la #JuramentaciónDanilo2016 en representación del Presidente de los Estados Unidos de América, Barack Obama. (Via FB)

Hoy la delegación encabezada por el Secretario de Trabajo de los Estados Unidos, Tomás Pérez, también conformada por la secretaria de Estado adjunta para Latinoamérica, Mari Carmen Aponte y por el Embajador James W. Brewster, está en la #JuramentaciónDanilo2016 en representación del Presidente de los Estados Unidos de América, Barack Obama. (Via FB)

 

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List of Presidential Appointee Positions at @StateDept Requiring Senate Confirmation

Posted: 12:05 am ET

 

Via CRS, August 23, 2016

The following list of State Department positions is extracted from CRS Report RL30959 which indicates that the information provided in the report was compiled from the Senate nominations database of the Legislative Information System which spans the 97th Congress (1981-1982) to the present; data on departmental and agency websites; telephone conversations with agency officials; and the United States Code. Note the two (2)) positions at State and one (1) at USAID that no longer require Senate confirmations due to the Presidential Appointment Efficiency and Streamlining Act of 2011.

Senate Committee on Foreign Relations Full-Time Positions

Department of State 109
Secretary
Deputy Secretary
Deputy Secretary—Management and Resources
Under Secretary—Arms Control and International Security
Under Secretary—Economic, Energy and Agricultural Affairs
Under Secretary—Civilian Security, Democracy, and Human Rights
Under Secretary—Management
Under Secretary—Political Affairs
Under Secretary—Public Diplomacy and Public Affairs
Assistant Secretary—African Affairs 110
Assistant Secretary—Arms Control, Verification and Compliance
Assistant Secretary—Budget and Planning/*Chief Financial Officer 111
Assistant Secretary—Conflict and Stabilization Operations
Assistant Secretary—Consular Affairs
Assistant Secretary—Democracy, Human Rights and Labor
Assistant Secretary—Diplomatic Security/Director—Office of Foreign Missions112
Assistant Secretary—East Asian and Pacific Affairs
Assistant Secretary—Economic, Energy and Business Affairs
Assistant Secretary—Educational and Cultural Affairs
Assistant Secretary—European and Eurasian Affairs
Assistant Secretary—International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs
Assistant Secretary—International Organization Affairs
Assistant Secretary—International Security and Nonproliferation
*Assistant Secretary—Legislative Affairs
Assistant Secretary—Near Eastern Affairs
Assistant Secretary—Oceans and International Environmental and Scientific
Affairs Assistant Secretary—Political-Military Affairs
Assistant Secretary—Population, Refugees and Migration
Assistant Secretary—South and Central Asian Affairs
Assistant Secretary—Western Hemisphere Affairs
Ambassador-at-Large—Coordinator—Counterterrorism
Ambassador-at-Large—Global Women’s Issues
Ambassador-at-Large—Director—Office to Monitor and Combat Trafficking in Persons
Ambassador-at-Large—International Religious Freedom
Ambassador-at-Large—War Crimes Issues
U.S. Permanent Representative to the Organization of American States
U.S. Permanent Representative to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization
Coordinator—Reconstruction and Stabilization
Coordinator—U.S. Global AIDS
Director General—Foreign Service
*Chief Financial Officer113
Inspector General 114
Legal Adviser
Chief of Protocol 115

Ambassadors

Foreign Service Officers (numerous commissions and promotions)

U.S. Mission to the United Nations

U.S. Permanent Representative and Chief of Mission—United Nations
U.S. Deputy Permanent Representative—United Nations
U.S. Representative—United Nations Economic and Social Council
U.S. Alternate Representative—Special Political Affairs in the United Nations
U.S. Representative—United Nations Management and Reform
U.S. Representative—European Office of the United Nations (Geneva)
U.S. Representative—Vienna Office of the United Nations (also serves as a representative to the International Atomic Energy Agency)
U.S. Representative—International Atomic Energy Agency
U.S. Deputy Representative—International Atomic Energy Agency
U.S. Representative and Alternate Representatives to sessions of the General Assembly and other United Nations Bodies—numerous positions (terms of office depends on length of session)

U.S. Agency for International Development 116

Administrator
Deputy Administrator
Assistant Administrator—Sub-Saharan Africa
Assistant Administrator—Asia
Assistant Administrator—Europe and Eurasia
Assistant Administrator—Food Safety Assistant
Administrator—Global Health
Assistant Administrator—Democracy, Conflict, and Humanitarian Assistance
Assistant Administrator—Latin America and Caribbean
Assistant Administrator—Middle East
*Assistant Administrator—Legislative and Public Affairs
Assistant Administrator—Policy, Planning and Learning
Assistant Administrator—Economic Growth, Agriculture, and Trade
Inspector General117

European Bank for Reconstruction and Development
U.S. Executive Director

International Broadcasting Bureau, Broadcasting Board of Governors
Director

International Joint Commission, United States and Canada
Commissioner—three positions

International Monetary Fund
U.S. Executive Director (two-year term of office)
U.S. Alternate Executive Director (two-year term of office)

Inter-American Development Bank
U.S. Executive Director (three-year term of office—The incumbent of this position also serves as U.S. Executive Director for the Inter-American Investment Corporation.)

U.S. Alternate Executive Director (three-year term of office—The incumbent of this position also serves as U.S. Alternate Executive Director for the Inter-American Investment Corporation.)

U.S. Trade and Development Agency
Director

Organizations with Full- and Part-Time Positions 118

African Development Bank
U.S. Executive Director (five-year term of office; full-time)
Governor and Alternate Governor (five-year terms of office; part-time)

Asian Development Bank
U.S. Executive Director (full-time)
Governor and Alternate Governor (part-time)

International Bank for Reconstruction and Development
U.S. Executive Director (two-year term of office; full-time—The incumbent also serves as U.S.
Executive Director for the International Finance Corporation and the International Development Association.)

U.S. Alternate Executive Director (two-year term of office; full-time—The incumbent also serves as U.S. Alternate Executive Director for the International Finance Corporation and the International Development Association.)

Governor (same individual as the International Monetary Fund Governor; five-year term of office; part-time—The incumbent also serves as Governor for the International Finance Corporation and the International Development Association.)

Alternate Governor (five-year term of office; part-time—The incumbent also serves as Alternate Governor for the International Finance Corporation and the International Development Association.)

Millennium Challenge Corporation

Chief Executive Officer (full-time)
*Member, Board of Directors—four (of nine total) positions (part-time; three-year terms of office)

Overseas Private Investment Corporation

President/Chief Executive Officer (full-time)
Executive Vice President (full-time)
*Member, Board of Directors—8 (of 15 total) positions (part-time; three-year terms of office)

Peace Corps

Director (full-time)
Deputy Director (full-time)
*Member, National Peace Corps Advisory Council—15 positions (part-time; political balance required; two-year terms of office)

Part-Time Positions

Advisory Board for Cuba Broadcasting (political balance required)119
*Member—eight positions (three-year terms of office)

African Development Foundation, Board of Directors (political balance required)
*Member—seven positions (six-year terms of office)120

African Development Fund
Governor and Alternate Governor

Broadcasting Board of Governors (political balance required)
Member—eight (of nine total) positions (three-year terms of office)

Inter-American Foundation, Board of Directors (political balance required)
*Member—nine positions (six-year terms of office)

U.S. Advisory Commission on Public Diplomacy (political balance required)
*Commissioner—seven positions (three-year terms of office)

Presidential Appointee Positions That No Longer Required Senate Confirmation Per P.L. 112-166, the Presidential Appointment Efficiency and Streamlining Act of 2011

Assistant Secretary for Public Affairs, Department of State

Assistant Secretary for Administration, Department of State

Assistant Administrator for Management, U.S. Agency for International Development

 

Notes:

109 For other positions within the department, see also Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs (for inspector general position), and Select Committee on Intelligence.

110 Although not guaranteed, most recent Assistant Secretaries—African Affairs also held the advice and consent part- time position as a member of the Board of Directors of the African Development Foundation.

111 The chief financial officer (CFO) may be appointed by the President, with the advice and consent of the Senate, or may be designated by the President from among agency officials who have been confirmed by the Senate for other positions (31 U.S.C. §901(a)(1)).

* Nomination covered by S.Res. 116 with privileged status under a standing order of the Senate. See “Standing Order on ‘Privileged’ Nominations” for further explanation.

112 Nomination must be made and confirmed for both positions.

113 This chief financial officer (CFO) is one of the CFO positions covered by the Chief Financial Officers Act of 1990 (P.L. 101-576), as amended, that may be filled through appointment by the President, with the advice and consent of the Senate, or through designation by the President from among agency officials who have been confirmed by the Senate for other positions (31 U.S.C. §901(a)(1)).

114 Pursuant to a UC agreement, most IG nominations are referred sequentially to the committee with predominant jurisdiction over the particular IG’s agency and then the Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs. For more information, see footnote 6.

115 According to the State Department, “Since 1961, the Chief of Protocol has been commissioned an Ambassador, requiring the President’s nominee to be confirmed by the Senate.” Quote from the State Department website, available at http://www.state.gov/s/cpr/c15634.htm.

* Nomination covered by S.Res. 116 with privileged status under a standing order of the Senate. See “Standing Order on “Privileged” Nominations” for further explanation.

116 See also Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs (for inspector general position).

117 Pursuant to a UC agreement, most IG nominations are referred sequentially to the committee with predominant jurisdiction over the particular IG’s agency and then the Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs. For more information, see footnote 6.

* Nomination covered by S.Res. 116 with privileged status under a standing order of the Senate. See “Standing Order on “Privileged” Nominations” for further explanation.

118 Because several organizations under this committee have both full- and part-time advice and consent positions, they were listed under this heading for succinctness.

* Nomination covered by S.Res. 116 with privileged status under a standing order of the Senate. See “Standing Order on “Privileged” Nominations” for further explanation.

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Security Assistance to Egypt: End-Use Monitoring and Leahy Vetting

Posted: 12:03 am ET

Via gao.gov:

U.S. agencies allocated approximately $6.5 billion for security-related assistance to Egypt in fiscal years 2011 through 2015. As of September 30, 2015, over $6.4 billion of the $6.5 billion total had been committed or disbursed. The majority of the funding (99.5 percent) was provided to Egypt through the Department of State’s (State) Foreign Military Financing (FMF) account. The funds from this account were used to purchase and sustain a wide variety of military systems, including F-16 aircraft, Apache helicopters, and M1A1 tanks.

Screen Shot

via goa.gov

via gao.gov

The Departments of Defense (DOD) and State implemented end-use monitoring for equipment transferred to Egyptian security forces, but challenges including obtaining Egyptian government cooperation hindered some efforts. DOD completed all required end-use monitoring inventories and physical security inspections of storage sites for missiles and night vision devices (NVD) in fiscal year 2015, but DOD lacked documentation showing that it completed physical security inspections for these sensitive items in prior years. Despite agreeing to give access, the Egyptian government prevented DOD officials from accessing a storage site to verify the physical security of some NVDs prior to 2015, according to DOD officials and documents. State conducted 12 end-use checks of U.S. equipment exported to Egypt in fiscal years 2011 to 2015, but State data indicate that the Egyptian government’s incomplete and slow responses to some inquiries limited U.S. efforts to verify the use and security of certain equipment, including NVDs and riot-control items. Despite this lack of cooperation, since 2008, State has not used outreach programs in Egypt that are intended to facilitate host country cooperation and compliance with State’s monitoring program. According to State officials, this was due to the small number of end-use checks conducted in Egypt and the lower priority assigned to Egypt than to other countries.

The U.S. government completed some, but not all, human rights vetting required by State policy before providing training or equipment to Egyptian security forces. State deemed GAO’s estimate of the percentage of Egyptian security forces that were not vetted to be sensitive but unclassified information, which is excluded from this public report. Moreover, State has not established specific policies and procedures for vetting Egyptian security forces receiving equipment. Although State concurred with a 2011 GAO recommendation to implement equipment vetting, it has not established a time frame for such action. State currently attests in memos that it is in compliance with the Leahy law. However, without vetting policies and procedures, the U.S. government risks providing U.S. equipment to recipients in Egypt in violation of the Leahy laws.

Read in full here.

 

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Another Concerned DS Agent Pens Response to Diplomatic Security’s Broadcast Message on Sexual Harassment

Posted: 3:42 am ET

 

We received the following via email from “Another Concerned DS Agent” in response to our post: PDAS Miller Issues Sexual Harassment Message to Diplomatic Security Employees, What’s Missing?:

After DSS* Director Bill Miller felt the need on Friday afternoon to defend the agency in a DS Broadcast message against your post titled, “Inbox: Female Diplomatic Security Agent Pens a Note on Sexual Harassment and Career Suicide”, I decided I had seen enough when it came to empty lip service within the department, and specifically DS.

Director Miller’s DS Broadcast reiterated Department policy and stated “as a law enforcement organization, we are held to the highest standard of ethical conduct.” While I commend Director Miller for sending these words, this is not something that actually happens on a day-to-day basis within both State, and specifically DS. Director Miller either doesn’t know what happens within his own bureau or turns a blind eye – like much of DS leadership. The anonymous female agent hit the nail on the head – complaining leads to career suicide!

Last year I watched as a colleague of mine blew the whistle on a hostile work environment and a bullying supervisor. Numerous previous supervisors of the bully supervisor were aware of the bullying actions (which included screaming at subordinate employees and threatening them with written reprimands) and none of them did anything about it – they just passed the problem on to the next guy. And when the highest ranking person in the office refused to deal with my colleague’s issue, it was elevated to the Office Director. When the Office Director refused to deal with the issue, it was elevated to the DAS level. And what was the DAS’ resolution? Reassigning the whistleblower! What kind of message does that send to employees?

I commend the anonymous female agent’s courage for speaking up, as whistleblower retaliation — for any offense, sexual or otherwise — is a real problem within the Department. And so long as OSI** is the only recourse we have (since State OIG refuses to investigate employee misconduct) employees are left without protection.

 

*DSS stands for Diplomatic Security Service.  OSI** stands for the Diplomatic Security’s Office of Special Investigations, apparently also known sometimes as Professional Responsibility (PR) or the Special Investigation Division (SID).  Within Diplomatic Security, it is the  primary office that investigates employee misconduct. A separate source informed us there is a concern out there about conflicts of interest. OSI reports internally to the bureau which results in something like this: State Dept Security Officer Alleged Sexual Misconduct: Spans 10 Years, 7 Posts. OSI employees also rotate/bid/lobby for future assignments like the rest of the Foreign Service. For more on this, read State/OIG on Diplomatic Security’s Special Investigations Division – The Missing Firewall.

As to the OIG — the OIG’s latest semi-annual report to the Congress indicates that 9% of the cases it closed between 10/1/2015–3/31/2016 were categorized as employee misconduct. So we know that State/OIG investigates employee misconduct. However, an overwhelming majority of cases it closed are related to contract and procurement fraud which constitutes 50% of the cases.  We don’t know what happens if somebody brings in an allegation of sexual harassment to the Inspector General, so we asked.

If somebody from DS complains to OIG about sexual harassment, what is the OIG’s response? Does it hand off the case to the Office of Civil Rights (OCR) or back to Diplomatic Security (DS), or to the Director General/Human Resources (DGHR)?
We also wanted to know if there’s an instance when OIG would take on a sexual harassment complaint for further investigation? And if not, would it make a difference if there are multiple allegations?

 

Here is the OIG’s full response to our questions:

 

The OIG takes allegations of sexual harassment very seriously. As a general matter, OIG refers allegations of sexual harassment, equal employment opportunity, and/or potential hostile work environment to the Department’s Office of Civil Rights (S/OCR), consistent with the FAM. However if such matters appear systemic, then OIG may investigate. Indeed, in its report “Review of Selected Internal Investigations Conducted by the Bureau of Diplomatic Security” (ESP-15-01) OIG examined the case of a Diplomatic Security manager with a long history of sexual harassment and misconduct allegations dating back 10 years.

Additionally, Department employees who believe they have been subjected to whistleblower retaliation may contact OIG or the Office of Special Counsel (OSC). OIG can help the individual in understanding their rights and may investigate the retaliation, as well as alert the Department to any illegal reprisal.

 

The Office of Civil Rights (S/OCR) . Which can’t be bothered to answer a simple question. Ugh! The OIG’s Whistleblower Protection page is here.  Click here for the OIG Hotline.  The Office of Special Counsel (OSC) is here.

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