Tag Archives: High Threat Missions

GAO: State Dept Management of Security Training May Increase Risk to U.S. Personnel

– Domani Spero

The State Department has established a mandatory requirement that specified U.S. executive branch personnel under chief-of-mission authority and on assignments or short-term TDY complete the Foreign Affairs Counter Threat (FACT) security training before arrival in a high-threat environment.

Who falls under chief-of-mission authority?

Chiefs of mission are the principal officers in charge of U.S. diplomatic missions and certain U.S. offices abroad that the Secretary of State designates as diplomatic in nature. Usually, the U.S. ambassador to a foreign country is the chief of mission in that country. According to the law, the chief of mission’s authority encompasses all employees of U.S. executive branch agencies, excluding personnel under the command of a U.S. area military commander and Voice of America correspondents on official assignment (22 U.S.C. § 3927). According to the President’s letter of instruction to chiefs of mission, members of the staff of an international organization are also excluded from chief
-of-mission authority. The President’s letter of instruction further states that the chief of mission’s security responsibility extends to all government personnel on official duty abroad other than those under the protection of a U.S. area military commander or on the staff of an international organization.

The Government Accountability Office (GAO) recently released its report which examines (1) State and USAID personnel’s compliance with the FACT training requirement and (2) State’s and USAID’s oversight of their personnel’s compliance. GAO also reviewed agencies’ policy guidance; analyzed State and USAID personnel data from March 2013 and training data for 2008 through 2013; reviewed agency documents; and interviewed agency officials in Washington, D.C., and at various overseas locations.

High Threat Countries: 9 to 18

The June 2013 State memorandum identifying the nine additional countries noted that personnel deploying to three additional countries will also be required to complete FACT training but are reportedly exempt from the requirement until further notice. State Diplomatic Security officials informed the GAO that these countries were granted temporary exceptions based on the estimated student training capacity at the facility where FACT training is currently conducted. We know from the report that the number of countries that now requires FACT training increased from 9 to 18, but they are not identified in the GAO report.

“Lower Priority” Security Training for Eligible Family Members

One section of the report notes that according to State officials, of the 22 noncompliant individuals in one country, 18 were State personnel’s employed eligible family members who were required to take the training; State officials explained that these individuals were not aware of the requirement at the time. The officials noted that enrollment of family members in the course is given lower priority than enrollment of direct-hire U.S. government employees but that space is typically available.

Typically, family members shipped to high-threat posts are those who have found employment at post. So they are not just there accompanying their employed spouses for the fun of it, they’re at post to perform the specific jobs they’re hired for. Why the State Department continue to give them “lower priority” in security training is perplexing. You know, the family members employed at post will be riding exactly the same boat the direct-hire government employees will be riding in.

Working Group Reviews

This report includes the State Department’s response to the GAO. A working group under “M” reportedly is mandated to “discover where improvements can be made in notification, enrollment and tracking regarding FACT training.” The group is also “reviewing the conditions under which eligible family members can and should be required to complete FACT training as well as the requirements related to personnel on temporary duty assignment.”

Excerpt below from the public version of a February 2014 report:

Using data from multiple sources, GAO determined that 675 of 708 Department of State (State) personnel and all 143 U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) personnel on assignments longer than 6 months (assigned personnel) in the designated high-threat countries on March 31, 2013, were in compliance with the Foreign Affairs Counter Threat (FACT) training requirement. GAO found that the remaining 33 State assigned personnel on such assignments had not complied with the mandatory requirement. For State and USAID personnel on temporary duty of 6 months or less (short-term TDY personnel), GAO was unable to assess compliance because of gaps in State’s data. State does not systematically maintain data on the universe of U.S. personnel on short-term TDY status to designated high-threat countries who were required to complete FACT training. This is because State lacks a mechanism for identifying those who are subject to the training requirement. These data gaps prevent State or an independent reviewer from assessing compliance with the FACT training requirement among short-term TDY personnel. According to Standards for Internal Control in the Federal Government , program managers need operating information to determine whether they are meeting compliance requirements.

State’s guidance and management oversight of personnel’s compliance with the FACT training requirement have weaknesses that limit State’s ability to ensure that personnel are prepared for service in designated high-threat countries. These weaknesses include the following:

  • State’s policy and guidance related to FACT training—including its Foreign Affairs Manual , eCountry Clearance instructions for short-term TDY personnel, and guidance on the required frequency of FACT training—are outdated, inconsistent, or unclear. For example, although State informed other agencies of June 2013 policy changes to the FACT training requirement, State had not yet updated its Foreign Affairs Manual to reflect those changes as of January 2014. The changes included an increase in the number of high-threat countries requiring FACT training from 9 to 18.
  • State and USAID do not consistently verify that U.S. personnel complete FACT training before arriving in designated high-threat countries. For example, State does not verify compliance for 4 of the 9 countries for which it required FACT training before June 2013.
  • State does not monitor or evaluate overall levels of compliance with the FACT training requirement.
  • State’s Foreign Affairs Manual notes that it is the responsibility of employees to ensure their own compliance with the FACT training requirement. However, the manual and Standards for Internal Control in the Federal Government also note that management is responsible for putting in place adequate controls to help ensure that agency directives are carried out.

The GAO notes that the gaps in State oversight may increase the risk that personnel assigned to high-threat countries do not complete FACT training, potentially placing their own and others’ safety in jeopardy.

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State Dept’s New High Threat Posts Are Not All Danger Posts

We posted yesterday about a brand new office within Diplomatic Security with a new Deputy Assistant Secretary responsible for “evaluating, managing, and mitigating the security threats, as well as the direction of resource requirements at high threat diplomatic missions.”

The news report from the National Review dated Nov 30 listed the 17 high threat missions as the diplomatic facilities in Afghanistan, Azerbaijan, Egypt, Indonesia, Iraq, Jordan, Kenya, Libya, Mauritania, Nigeria, Pakistan, Somalia, South Sudan, Sudan, Syria, Tunisia, Yemen. The list of posts includes Syria but not Algeria. It also includes Nigeria, not Niger.  The more recent CBS News report dated December 8 includes 17 diplomatic missions with Algeria, but not Syria; and Niger not Nigeria. The same CBS report cited a senior State Department official saying that “no congressional approval was required for the bureaucratic shift and no new funds were involved.”

We were curious how these new list of high threat posts square with posts currently receiving danger pay designation. Danger pay is additional compensation given to State employees above basic compensation for service at designated danger pay posts “where civil insurrection, terrorism, or war conditions threaten physical harm or imminent danger to all U.S. Government civilian employees.”

As of December 2, six of the 17 reported new high threat posts have zero danger pay: Azerbaijan, Egypt, Indonesia, Kenya, Mauritania, Niger.  We’re listing Niger below since that’s from the later report dated December 8. If the list does include Nigeria as mentioned in the National Review report, then that’s the only mission on the list designated at 10% danger pay.

Hi-Threat Posts - Diplopundit.net

Data extracted from

http://aoprals.state.gov/Web920/danger_pay_all.asp
Diplopundit.net

Also several posts with comparable danger pay are not on this reported high threat list.

Syria is a 25% danger post. It is not on the list presumably since the U.S. Embassy in Damascus suspended its operations in February 2012.

Algiers, which is on one list but not the other is a 15% danger post with posts outside the capital city designated at 25%.

Lebanon is a 20% danger post as well as a Monterrey and Nuevo Laredo, both in Mexico. The West Bank in Jerusalem and Karmi’el in Israel both also get 20% danger pay.

Other posts designated danger pay posts at the 5, 10, 15% differential level are listed here.

The question we have is — if these 17 posts are considered high threat missions, how come six of these missions are not even designated danger pay posts?

Is it possible to be a high threat mission and not be a dangerous mission? How does that work?

On the other hand, how is it that 20% danger posts in Lebanon, Mexico, Jerusalem and Israel are not included on this high threat list?

And while Jordan, a 15% danger pay post made it to the high threat list, there are a good number of 15% danger posts that did not make the list. For instance, Colombia, Saudi Arabia, a couple posts in Mexico and several posts in Africa.

What then are the basis for the high threat designation?  Are there secret factors not identified in the Danger Pay Factors Form (FS-578) that are required prior to the high threat designation?   Are these two totally unrelated? And if they are, does that make sense?

domani spero sig

Updated 8:06 PST:  Added distinction between Niger and Nigeria from the available reports.

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