State Dept to Renovate Kabul’s Pol-i-Charkhi (PIC) Prison. Again.

Posted: 2:52 am EDT


The State Department has issued a Pre-Solicitation Notice of the Government’s intent to issue a solicitation for the renovation of Pol-i-Charkhi (PIC) Prison in Kabul, Afghanistan.  The project includes renovations in Blocks 1, 2 & 3 and extensive infrastructure and satellite structure improvements to the facility.  Actual solicitation documents are only accessible using the restricted portion of, so we have not been able to read the details of this renovation.

This is, however, the same prison which is the subject of an October 2014 SIGAR report, Pol-i-Charkhi Prison: After 5 Years and $18.5 Million, Renovation Project Remains Incomplete (pdf) This is Afghanistan’s largest correctional facility, funded in its initial construction by the Soviet Union in 1973.  It is designed for approximately 5,000 prisoners but housed nearly 7,400 during SIGAR’s inspection last year. Extract below from the SIGAR report:

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  • In June 2009, in response to damage caused by 35 years of neglect, Soviet occupation, and warfare, the Department of State’s Regional Procurement Support Office (RPSO) awarded an INL-funded renovation contract to W (AWCC)—an Afghan firm—for $16.1 million. Following two modifications, the contract’s overall value increased to $20.2 million.
  • In November 2010, the RPSO terminated AWCC’s INL-funded renovation contract at the government’s convenience based on unsatisfactory performance.4 Following contract termination, INL awarded Batoor Construction Company—an Afghan company—a $250,000 contract to document AWCC’s work completed under the renovation contract.
  • More than 5 years after work began, renovation of Pol-i-Charkhi prison has not been completed, and the contract has been terminated for convenience. Following the RPSO’s termination of the INL-funded contract in November 2010, Batoor Construction Company reviewed and documented AWCC’s work completed under the renovation contract. In March 2011, Batoor reported that AWCC completed approximately 50 percent of the required renovation work. Batoor’s report also noted multiple instances of defective workmanship including the lack of backfilling of trenches, not repairing/replacing broken fixtures, lack of proper roof flashing and gutters, and soil settlement issues. For example, the report noted that there were no metal flashing or gutters installed on one of the prison blocks resulting in damage to surface paint and moisture penetration in supporting walls.
  • We conducted our prison inspection on April 19, 2014, but were limited by the fact that the renovation work had been completed more than 3 years prior to our site visit. We found that the prison holding areas had been reconfigured into maximum, medium, and minimum security cells, and the cells contained the required sinks and toilets. Our inspection of the renovated industries building and kitchen facilities did not disclose any major deficiencies. We also found that AWCC procured and installed the six back-up power diesel generators, as required by the contract. However, the generators cannot be used because they were not hooked-up to the prison’s electric power grid before the renovation contract was terminated. INL officials told us that the work necessary to make the generators operational—primarily installing paired transformers—will be done under the planned follow-on renovation contract, which they hope to begin in late 2014 or early 2015.
  • INL officials told us they anticipated an award of a follow-on contract by the spring of 2015 to complete the renovation work initiated in 2009 and a separate contract to construct a wastewater treatment plant. They estimated the renovation work would cost $11 million; the wastewater treatment plant, $5 million.
  • On November 5, 2010, the contracting officer issued a Stop Work Order which noted that AWCC’s performance was deemed unsatisfactory due to its lack of progress on the project, labor unrest at the work site, and a lack of supplies to maintain efficient progress. Then, on November 26, 2012, the RPSO contracting officer issued AWCC a termination for convenience letter.
  • After a 2-year negotiation that concluded in December 2012, RPSO agreed to an $18.5 million settlement with AWCC—92 percent of the $20.2 million contract value. RPSO agreed to the settlement despite INL and Batoor reports showing that AWCC only completed about 50 percent of the work required under the contract. The contracting officer who negotiated the settlement for the U.S. government told us that the final award amount reflected actual incurred costs and not any specific completion rate. The contracting officer noted that an RPSO contract specialist and an Afghan COR10 assisted her in lengthy negotiations with AWCC and joined her for the final round of discussions in Istanbul, Turkey, which concluded with the signed settlement agreement.
  • Although the contracting officer was able to execute some oversight and issue clear warnings to AWCC regarding its performance, INL’s oversight efforts were compromised by a U.S. employee who served as the COR for the AWCC renovation contract as well as the Basirat design and project monitoring contract. The COR served in this capacity until May 2010, when he was suspended after INL and State’s Office of Inspector General found that he had accepted money from Basirat to promote the company’s interests. The COR was convicted and sentenced by a U.S. District Court for accepting illegal gratuities from Basirat.9 As a result, in August 2010, State suspended Basirat from receiving any government contracts. In August 2010, State also suspended AWCC from receiving government contracts based on receiving confidential proposal information from Basirat concerning State solicitations.
  • The contracting officer added that during these final negotiations the COR [contracting officer’s representative] concurred with many of the contractor’s assertions. In June 2013, just 6 months later, the COR’s designation was suspended amid concerns that he may have colluded with another INL contractor, an issue discussed in our May 2014 inspection report on Baghlan prison.11 As noted in that report, INL suspected this COR of enabling a contractor to substitute inferior products and materials, failing to discover substandard construction, approving questionable invoices, and certifying that all contract terms had been met at the time of project turnover to INL even though construction deficiencies remained. The COR resigned in August 2013. SIGAR investigators are currently conducting an inquiry to determine whether the contractor or other U.S. government officials were complicit in these alleged activities.

So  —  the previous contractor collected an $18.5 million settlement,  92 percent of the $20.2 million contract? But it only did 50 percent of the work required under the contract? Maybe we should all move to Kabul and be contractors?

And now, there will be a new $16M contract?  Which will have modifications, of course, and will not really top off at $16M.


Related items:

Here’s what it looks like in Afghanistan’s largest — and still incomplete — prison (WaPo)

America’s Unfinished Prison in Afghanistan Is a Filthy Nightmare (Medium)



State/OIG Inspections Coming Your Way in FY2016

Posted: 1:05 am EDT


Extracted from State/OIG Work Plan FY2016-2017:

In FY 2015, OIG began a project to refine the way it prioritizes, scopes, and conducts inspections, with the overarching goal of improving the efficiency and effectiveness of the inspection process and enhancing the integrity of reports. As part of this project, ISP will be pilot testing new inspection models during FY 2016. The results of this project and the associated pilot tests will influence OIG’s FY 2017 inspection planning and scheduling. At this time, bureaus and posts being considered for inspection in FY 2017 include the Office of Management Policy, Rightsizing, and Innovation; Office of the U.S. Global AIDS Coordinator; Bureau of Consular Affairs, Office of Fraud Prevention Programs; and embassies in China, Kenya, South Africa, Sudan, and South Sudan. Once finalized, the FY 2017 inspections schedule will be added to this planning document.

In addition to the FY 2016 inspections listed below, ISP conducts two to four compliance follow-up reviews each year. The subject inspections for these reviews will be identified 30 to 60 days prior to the initiation of the review. ISP’s schedule is contingent upon availability of funds, budget decisions, and changes in inspection priorities, and is, therefore, subject to revision.

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The Work Plan is available here.

Alaina Teplitz Sworn In as Next U.S. Ambassador to Nepal

Posted: 12:49 am EDT



Certificate of Competency – Teplitz Alaina B – Federal Democratic Republic of Nepal – April 2015

The WH released the following brief bio when it announced the nomination  in March 2015:

Alaina B. Teplitz, a career member of the Foreign Service, class of Minister-Counselor, currently serves as the Director of the Office of Management Policy, Rightsizing, and Innovation at the Department of State, a position she has held since 2012.  Previously, Ms. Teplitz served as the Management Minister Counselor at the U.S. Mission in Kabul, Afghanistan from 2011 to 2012, Deputy Executive Director in the Department’s Bureau of Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs from 2009 to 2011, and Director of Management Tradecraft Training at the Department’s Foreign Service Institute from 2007 to 2009.  Prior to that, she was the Deputy Director of Joint Administrative Services at the U.S. Embassy in Brussels, Belgium from 2004 to 2007, Management Officer at the U.S. Embassy in Dhaka, Bangladesh from 2002 to 2004, and Program Analyst at the Center for Administrative Innovation at the Department from 2001 to 2002.  After joining the Foreign Service in 1991, she served in the State Department’s Bureau of Administration, as well as in posts in Australia, Albania, and Mongolia.

Ms. Teplitz received a B.A. from Georgetown University.


Eyes Watching: Real Foreign Service Officers and Puzzle Pieces

Posted: 2:09 am EDT


Jonathan Haslam is the author of “Near and Distant Neighbors: A New History of Soviet Intelligence,” which was just published.He is the George F. Kennan Professor at the Institute for Advanced Study, Princeton. He was a visiting professor at Harvard, Yale and Stanford, and is a member of the society of scholars at the Johns Hopkins University. He pens the following piece via Salon:


Other indicators of a more trivial nature could be detected in the field by a vigilant foreign counterintelligence operative but not uniformly so: the fact that CIA officers replacing one another tended to take on the same post within the embassy hierarchy, drive the same make of vehicle, rent the same apartment and so on. Why? Because the personnel office in Langley shuffled and dealt overseas postings with as little effort as required. The invariable indicators took further research, however, based on U.S. government practices long established as a result of the ambivalence with which the State Department treated its cousins in intelligence.

Thus one productive line of inquiry quickly yielded evidence: the differences in the way agency officers undercover as diplomats were treated from genuine foreign service officers (FSOs). The pay scale at entry was much higher for a CIA officer; after three to four years abroad a genuine FSO could return home, whereas an agency employee could not; real FSOs had to be recruited between the ages of 21 and 31, whereas this did not apply to an agency officer; only real FSOs had to attend the Institute of Foreign Service for three months before entering the service; naturalized Americans could not become FSOs for at least nine years but they could become agency employees; when agency officers returned home, they did not normally appear in State Department listings; should they appear they were classified as research and planning, research and intelligence, consular or chancery for security affairs; unlike FSOs, agency officers could change their place of work for no apparent reason; their published biographies contained obvious gaps; agency officers could be relocated within the country to which they were posted, FSOs were not; agency officers usually had more than one working foreign language; their cover was usually as a “political” or “consular” official (often vice-consul); internal embassy reorganizations usually left agency personnel untouched, whether their rank, their office space or their telephones; their offices were located in restricted zones within the embassy; they would appear on the streets during the working day using public telephone boxes; they would arrange meetings for the evening, out of town, usually around 7.30 p.m. or 8.00 p.m.; and whereas FSOs had to observe strict rules about attending dinner, agency officers could come and go as they pleased.

Read in full here. Sounds like his book is an excellent addition to a gift list for OGA friends.


US Embassy Dhaka Restricts Movement of USG Staff/Families in Bangladesh

Posted: 1:39 am EDT





Excerpt from the Security Message issued by Embassy Dhaka on September 28:

There is reliable new information to suggest that militants may be planning to target Australian interests in Bangladesh.  Such attacks, should they occur, could likely affect other foreigners, including U.S. citizens.

In light of the increased threat, U.S. citizens should consider limiting their attendance at events where foreigners may gather, including events at international hotels.  U.S. citizens should maintain a high level of vigilance and situational awareness and should exercise caution in public places including restaurants, hotels and other places frequented by foreigners.

The U.S. government continues to receive information that terrorist groups in South Asia may also be planning attacks in the region, possibly against U.S. government facilities, U.S. citizens, or U.S. interests.  Terrorists have demonstrated their willingness and ability to attack locations where U.S. citizens or Westerners are known to congregate or visit.

Until further notice, all official U.S. government personnel are prohibited from attending large gatherings in Bangladesh, including events at international hotels, unless they have obtained Regional Security Office permission.

The Embassy advises U.S. citizens residing in or visiting Bangladesh to remain vigilant regarding their personal security and to be alert to local security developments.

A follow-up message notes that following the fatal attack on an Italian national in Gulshan September 28, the U.S. Embassy instructed its personnel to shelter in place until Tuesday morning September 29. American International School in Dhaka (AISD) will be closed on September 29. The Embassy will be open on September 29, including providing consular services. U.S. government personnel and their families will be limiting their movements.


Related posts:

US Embassy Bangui: Escalating Violence, Continue to Shelter in Place

Posted: 1:15 am EDT





Excerpt from the Warden Message:

Violence and looting continued on September 27 and into September 28 in Bangui. We are receiving reports that many roads remain blocked, including the road to the airport; weapons continue to be discharged by armed persons; and large crowds are forming in several locations in the city of Bangui. U.S. citizens should continue to shelter in place and avoid any non-essential movements. The U.S. Embassy in Yaounde has been designated to provide consular services for U.S. citizens currently remaining in CAR. U.S. citizens who are in Bangui should contact Embassy Yaounde at (237) 22220-1500 to report their location. If you are working for an NGO or international organization, please include that information.

U.S. citizens who have decided to stay in CAR despite the travel warning should regularly review their personal security situation. Embassy Bangui cannot provide consular services to U.S. citizens in CAR at this time. U.S. citizens in need of assistance should contact the U.S. Embassy in Yaounde, Cameroon.

Secretary Kerry announced the resumption of limited operations at the U.S. Embassy in Bangui on September 15, 2014.  U.S. citizens in need of routine assistance are advised to contact the U.S. Embassy in Yaounde, Cameroon by email to


Related posts:

Burn Bag: Get a Portable Career, Bake Cupcakes! Geez Louise!

Via Burn Bag:

Quote from FLO at spouse orientation: “You should consider a portable career – you could bake cupcakes and sell them to the embassy staff”. I am a C-suite executive. Cupcakes.


FLO -Family Liaison Office. FLO’s mission is “to improve the quality of life of all demographics we serve by identifying issues and advocating for programs and solutions, providing a variety of client services, and extending services to overseas communities through the management of the worldwide Community Liaison Office (CLO) program.”

On Family Member Employment, says: “The Family Liaison Office understands that when most family members join the Foreign Service community, they have already established personal and professional lives. Finding meaningful employment overseas is challenging given limited positions inside U.S. missions, language requirements, lower salaries, and work permit barriers on the local economy. The Family Liaison Office (FLO) has a dedicated team of professionals working to expand employment options and information resources to internationally mobile family members, both at home and abroad. FLO’s employment program team will advise individual family members on overseas employment issues, either in person, via email or phone.”


Secretary Kerry Swears-in Hans Klemm as U.S. Ambassador to Romania

Posted: 10:58 am EDT


Secretary Kerry Congratulates Ambassador Klemm After Swearing Him in as the Next U.S. Ambassador to Romania U.S. Secretary of State John Kerry congratulates the next U.S. Ambassador to Romania, Hans Klemm, after swearing him in during a ceremony at the U.S. Department of State in Washington, D.C., on September 16, 2015. [State Department photo/ Public Domain]

Secretary Kerry Congratulates Ambassador Klemm After Swearing Him in as the Next U.S. Ambassador to Romania
U.S. Secretary of State John Kerry congratulates the next U.S. Ambassador to Romania, Hans Klemm, after swearing him in during a ceremony at the U.S. Department of State in Washington, D.C., on September 16, 2015. [State Department photo/ Public Domain]

Certificate of Competency – Klemm, Hans – Romania – April 2015

The WH release the following brief bio when it announced the nomination on March 24, 2015

Hans G. Klemm, a career member of the Foreign Service, class of Minister-Counselor, is a Senior Advisor to the Under Secretary for Management at the Department of State, a position he has held since January 2015.  Previously, Ambassador Klemm served as Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary in the Department’s Bureau of Human Resources from 2012 to 2015.  Before that, he was Senior Coordinator for the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation forum in the Bureau of East Asian and Pacific Affairs in 2012, and Senior Coordinator for Rule of Law and Law Enforcement at the U.S. Embassy in Kabul, Afghanistan from 2010 to 2012.  He also served as the U.S. Ambassador to Timor-Leste from 2007 to 2010.  Prior to that, Ambassador Klemm served as Minister-Counselor for Economic Affairs at the U.S. Embassy in Tokyo, Japan from 2006 to 2007, and as Director and Deputy Director of the Office of Career Development in the Bureau of Human Resources from 2004 to 2006.  He was a participant in the Senior Seminar at the Department’s Foreign Service Institute from 2003 to 2004, Director of the Office of Agriculture, Biotechnology, and Textile Trade Affairs in the Bureau of Economic and Business Affairs from 2001 to 2003, and Deputy Director of the Office of European Union and Regional Affairs in the Bureau of European and Eurasian Affairs from 2000 to 2001.  Ambassador Klemm’s earlier assignments with the Department of State included postings in Germany, Japan, South Korea, and Trinidad and Tobago.

Ambassador Klemm received a B.A. from Indiana University and an M.A. from Stanford University.


State Department Dedicates Diplomatic Security (DS) Memorial

Posted: 12:06 am EDT


The Diplomatic Security (DS) Memorial was dedicated on September 18, 2015, to honor the many individuals who have given their lives to support the mission of the U.S. Department of State’s Bureau of Diplomatic Security. Assistant Secretary of State for Diplomatic Security Gregory B. Starr hosted the event with Antony J. Blinken, Deputy Secretary of State; Lt. Gen. Ronald Bailey, Deputy Commandant of the United States Marine Corps, Plans, Policies, and Operations; and Bill Miller, Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary and Director of the Diplomatic Security Service, in attendance. See D/Secretary Blinken’s remarks here.

Before the installation of the Diplomatic Security Memorial, DS was the only federal law enforcement agency without its own memorial. Many of those who gave their lives in service to DS were not eligible for inclusion on the American Foreign Service Association (AFSA) Memorial, which primarily honors members of the Foreign Service who died while serving abroad.

On the date of its unveiling, the DS Memorial contained the names of 137 individuals from diverse backgrounds and countries throughout the world. They include:

27 U.S. Government Personnel

  • 4 Diplomatic Security Service Special Agents
  • 6 Diplomatic Couriers
  • 12 U.S. Military—Marine Security Guards
  • 5 Other U.S. Military—Embassy Security Operations

36 Private Security Contractors

74 Local Security Personnel

  • 31 Local Guard Force
  • 31 Local Law Enforcement
  • 6 Foreign Service Nationals
  • 6 Locally Employed Staff

The DS Memorial consists of the 1) DS Memorial Wall–A Visual Tribute, located inside the main lobby of Diplomatic Security headquarters in Rosslyn, Virginia; 2) Memorial Kiosk, installed with the DS Memorial Wall, the kiosk displays information about Diplomatic Security and its personnel who lost their lives in the line of duty. The information is searchable by name, year of death, country of death, and job position at time of death; 3) Memorial Website at ( with the names of the fallen personnel hosted in a special portion of the Diplomatic Security website, the online DS Memorial displays all names of the fallen and provides a search tool for locating individuals.




The memorial goes back to 1943 and includes James N. Wright, a Diplomatic Courier who died on February 22, 1943,
in Lisbon, Portugal, in the line of duty in an airplane crash. Two years later, another Diplomatic Courier, Homer C. White, died on December 4, 1945, in Lagos, Nigeria, in the line of duty in an airplane crash.

The largest number of casualties is suffered by the local security personnel.  At least 31 local law enforcement personnel (working for the host government) were lost protecting USG facilities and personnel overseas. As many local guard force employed/contracted by the USG were also killed in the line of duty.  In 2014, Shyef, Moa’ath Farhan, a Yemeni Local Law Enforcement employee, died in Yemen, while protecting a checkpoint near U.S. Embassy Sanaa during a suicide attack. In fact, 7 of the 31 law enforcement personnel killed were all lost in Yemen.   That same year, Abdul Rahman, a locally employed staff was killed while performing his duties near the traffic circle at the main entrance to Kabul International Airport in Afghanistan. He was one of several individuals killed by a lone suicide bomber. In 2013, Mustafa Akarsu, a member of the local guard force was killed during a suicide attack at the U.S. Embassy in Turkey.  That same year, eight members of the local guard force died on September 13, during the attack on U.S. Consulate Herat in Afghanistan.

Note that this memorial only includes FSNs/locally employed staff who supported the mission of  the Bureau of Diplomatic Security (DS) and not all FSNs who lost their lives while working for the USG overseas.


U.S. Embassy Ouagadougou Now on Authorized Departure

Posted: 11:51 pm EDT


On September 16, the U.S. Embassy in Ouagadougou issued a “shelter in place” order for its staff during a military coup that occurred less than a year after the former president, Blaise Compaoré was driven out of power (see US Embassy Burkina Faso Orders Staff to Shelter in Place Amidst Coup Attempt).

On September 21, the State Department issued a Travel Warning for Burkina Faso recommending that U.S. citizens in the country depart “as soon as it is feasible to do so.” It also notified the public that the State Department has authorized the voluntary departure of eligible family members and non-emergency personnel from the U.S. Embassy in Ouagadougou.

The Department of State warns U.S. citizens of the risks of travel to Burkina Faso and recommends that U.S. citizens currently in Burkina Faso depart as soon as it is feasible to do so.

This Travel Warning is being issued to notify U.S. citizens that on September 21, the Department of State authorized the voluntary departure of eligible family members and non-emergency personnel from the U.S. Embassy in Ouagadougou.  U.S. citizens are urged to carefully consider the risks of travel to Burkina Faso and, if already in Burkina Faso, encouraged to review their and their families’ personal safety and security plans to determine whether they and their family members, should depart.  U.S. citizens are responsible for making their own travel arrangements.  Citizens who decide to remain in Burkina Faso despite this travel warning should maintain situational awareness at all times and register their presence within Burkina Faso with the Embassy by enrolling in STEP.  This Travel Warning supersedes and replaces the Travel Alert issued on September 4, 2015.

Embassy staff remaining in Burkina Faso continues to shelter in place.  The U.S. Embassy in Ouagadougou will operate at reduced staffing levels and will continue to provide emergency consular services to U.S. citizens.

Elements of the Presidential Security Regiment (RSP) took control of the presidential palace during the weekly council of ministers meeting the afternoon of September 16, detaining President Kafando, Prime Minister Zida, and two additional members of the cabinet of ministers.  President Kafando and others have since been released, but Kafando remains under house arrest.  Prime Minister Zida remains in detention.  Former special chief of staff responsible for the RSP General Gilbert Diendere was declared to be in charge of Burkina Faso following the establishment of a “Conseil national pour la democratie” (CND, the National Council for Democracy).

The security environment in Ouagadougou remains fluid.  Gunfire continues to be reported in locations throughout Ouagadougou.  Elements of the RSP have set road blocks and have engaged in crowd control measures. Civilians have also established roadblocks around the city.  The level of activity on the street has diminished, and many businesses providing essential services—including food, gasoline and cooking fuel—remain closed.  Local electricity and water utility providers have declared a strike, which could further decrease the level of services provided to residents.  A nationwide curfew remains in place from 7:00 p.m. to 6:00 a.m.

Outside of Ouagadougou, the security situation varies, but remains dynamic and susceptible to change at any moment.  There have been reports of demonstrations in Bobo-Dioulasso, Gaoua, Fada N’Gourma, and Ouahigouya.  Due to reports that roadways between major cities may be impassable, U.S. citizens in Burkina Faso may find that at times sheltering in place may be the only and best security option.

Read in full here.