Category Archives: Training

Ambassador Bleich’s Close Encounter with the Croc Kind in Australia’s Northern Territory

The last time we featured our man in Australia in this blog was in our election night round up last November. (see Election Night 2012 Roundup — What a Party!).  This week, Ambassador Bleich made quite a stir in cyberverse with an FB post on Stopping the Game of Clones timed for the 17th annual UN World Book and Copyright Day.

Wired.com wades in with “Tyrion Lannister would not give a shit” (of course!) in U.S. Ambassador Calls for End to Game of Thrones Torrenting: ‘Tyrion Will Thank You’.  Over in the ambo’s FB page, there is an ongoing vigorous discussion whether it should be called stealing or not. It looks like a bunch of people there are real serious about their GOT.

Anyhow, we thought we’d check what else Ambassador Bleich is doing.  Don’t you think this photo below is just pretty wild?  That’s Ambassador Jeffrey Bleich who posted that “the cage of death is actually pretty fun.” Compared to his Facebook page, this looks almost peaceful, despite that gigantic snout.

Ambassador Bleich in a face-to-face croc encounter from the “Cage of Death” at Crocosaurus Cove, Darwin, Australia (photo via Amb Bleich/FB)

The encounter with the croc kind occurred in Darwin, in the Northern Territory of Australia earlier this week during  a trip to welcome the arrival of  Lima Company 3rd Regiment, 3rd Marine battalion from Hawaii for training in country.

Quick excerpt from Ambassador Bleich’s FB post:

I spent the past several days in the Northern Territory preparing for the next rotation of U.S. Marines to arrive in Darwin to train with their Australian mates. Each time, I come back to Darwin, I’m reminded of the genuine kindness and hospitality of Territorians. Part of the Marines’ reason for training in Darwin is the ability of our combined forces to practice expeditionary exercises in a large uninhabited training area. But a big part of the attraction is about the people. Our Marines feel truly welcome in Darwin. 
[...] 
By the time I welcomed the Marines onto the tarmac in Darwin last night, I was able to give them three pieces of practical advice: 1) don’t step in any water deeper than your ankle; 2) never pass up a conversation with a Darwinian; and 3) the “cage of death” is actually pretty fun. (See photos!) Welcome Lima Company 3rd Regiment, 3rd Marine. We’re all glad you’re here. 

Read in full here.  Sky News covered the military rotation here: http://goo.gl/Orz8g and says that the 200 Marines on training in Darwin is the second rotation in a five year program.  Next year there will be 1100 Marines and  eventually 2500 on six month rotations.
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Consular Work Enters 21st Century: US Citizen John McAfee Blogs from Guatemala Jail

Perhaps you’ve heard by now about the anti-virus software tycoon John McAfee who fled Belize to seek asylum in Guatemala. If not,  read Wired magazine’s piece, John McAfee, Unhinged: His Bizarre Breaks From Reality.

Anyway, Mr. McAfee has now been arrested in Guate, was refused asylum and will reportedly be sent back to Belize where authorities were looking to question him about the shooting death of American expatriate Greg Faull.

But because the Internet is the now public space, Mr. McAfee has an official blog (The Hinterland, the official blog of John McAfee) which is updated often.  He is on Facebook, YouTube and Twitter.  His tweets @officialmcafee has over 11,000 followers, about the same number of followers as @usembassyguate, the official Twitter feed of US Embassy Guatemala.

mcafee
And he’s blogging even in jail! About this being a “groundbreaking” activity and about speaking to a Duty Officer at the US Embassy in Guatemala.

Blogging from jail
Date: December 6, 2012 at 5:24 am- by John McAfee- Comment(s): 84    

I am in jail in Guatemala.  Vastly superior to Belize jails.  I asked for a computer and one magically appeared.  The coffee is also excellent. Only time will tell what will happen.  No one has a crystal ball.  However, I would be truly shocked if I did not conduct the press conference tomorrow as I had originally planned. Stay tuned. I believe, by the way, that blogging from a jail cell might be a groundbreaking activity.

The American Embassy Guatemala
Date: December 6, 2012 at 6:11 am- by John McAfee- Comment(s): 30    

I just spoke with the duty officer at the Embassy who said there is nothing that they can do.  I asked to be returned to the States, and again … nothing they can do.  So I will wait and see. P.S.  Anybody have friends in the State Department?

Late afternoon of December 6, Mr. McAfee made a plea to his supporters to email or tweet the President of Guatemala to “beg him to allow the court system to proceed, to determine my status in Guatemala, and please support the political asylum that I am asking for.”

Shortly after that, reports says he was taken to a hospital. But it was not a heart attack, just high stress.  ABC News who has a reporter in Guate writes that John McAfee has been returned to an immigration detention cell in Guatemala after being rushed to a Guatemala City hospital via ambulance and that he may soon be deported back to Belize.

We can’t remember a case of a US citizen arrested overseas who is, in the words of one journalist covering the State Department, “a walking television show.” And this one has a Twitter and blog account and is actively using them.  ABC News details the reported heart attack:

McAfee, 67 [...] was reportedly found prostrate on the floor of his cell and unresponsive.  He was wheeled into the hospital on a gurney. Photographers followed in pursuit right into the emergency room, but as emergency workers eased McAfee’s limp body from the gurney and onto a bed and began to remove his suit, he suddenly spoke up, saying, “Please, not in front of the press.”

Please don’t laugh, this is actually quite sad.

* * *

If you are the American Citizen Services Officer in Guate or Belize, our thoughts are also with you.  We’ve never seen any training material or murder boards for a walking/talking teevee show. But you’ll do fine, take a deep breath and swim, don’t sink.

If you are a Consular Officer somewhere in the Western Hemisphere, get ready; if he gets out of Guate, he may show up at your window.  If you follow him on Twitter, he might give a heads up.

If you are the Bureau of Consular Affairs, this is potentially, as Mr. McAfee says, “groundbreaking.” How should your Consular Officers deal with a detained citizen blogging/tweeting from jail?  This is the first one, but this may not be the last.  Is it time to update your ConGen training on the Republic of Z?

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Filed under Americans Abroad, Consular Work, People, Social Media, State Department, Technology and Work, Training, U.S. Missions

Photo of the Day: Now Showing Rubber AK-47 Assault Rifles in Afghanistan

Given the continuing number of casualties from the ‘green-on-blue’ attacks in Afghanistan and the recent directive that all Coalition troops carry a loaded weapon at all times, we find this photo of Afghan police trainees with their rubber AK-47 assault rifles more than interesting.

The Threat Matrix blog reports that Taliban leader Mullah Omar claims that the Taliban “cleverly infiltrated in the ranks of the enemy according to the plan given to them last year.” He urges government officials and security personnel to defect and join the Taliban as it is their religious duty to do so, and then warns that “the day is not far away that the invading enemy will flee Afghanistan.”

Obviously Mullah Omar is glossing over the fact about 2024. But this guy is more crafty than we thought. He probably learned somewhere that our politicians who hold the purse strings for all spending hate the idea of the US “fleeing” Afghanistan. Raising the specter of “fleeing” troops would help make sure that Congress will continue funding this nutty war, and in the process, the Taliban get their cut to fund their fight of a lifetime. A win-win situation except for the dead and the broken soldiers.

And so here we are with rubber assault rifles.

Two Afghan Uniform Police recruits practice aiming their rubber AK-47 assault rifles during a handcuff training exercise at Forward Operating Base Shank, Logar province, Afghanistan, July 5, 2012. (U.S. Army photo by Sgt. Austin Berner/Released)

Domani Spero

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Filed under Afghanistan, Photo of the Day, Training, War

State Dept’s Antiterrorism Assistance Program Costs Approx $1,800/Student Per Day of Training

The State Department’s OIG recently released its Evaluation of the Antiterrorism Assistance (ATA) Program for Countries Under the Bureaus of Near Eastern Affairs and South and Central Asian Affairs (Report Number AUD/MERO-12-29, April 2012).

How much and where it went?

  • From FYs 2002 through 2010, the Bureau of Diplomatic Security’s Office of Antiterrorism Assistance (DS/T/ATA) and the Bureau of Counterterrorism (CT) have been provided nearly $1.4 billion for ATA programs worldwide, with approximately 65 percent of that assistance ($873.3 million) going to programs in North Africa, the Middle East, South Asia, and Central Asia.
  • In FY 2011, the ATA program’s budget request was $205 million, with approximately $125 million designated for the 22 North Africa, Middle East, Central Asia, and South Asia countries.
  • In FY 2010 (or FY2009?), the ATA program expended approximately $62 million  trained nearly 2,700 participants from countries in North Africa, the Middle East, South Asia, and Central Asia at a cost of approximately $1,800 per student per day of training.
  • The average training course lasted 13 days and was attended by 21 students, which equates to approximately $23,000 per student per class, or $1,800 per student per day of training.

The OIG report did not say where the training sessions were held but seriously — how do you rack up $1800 a day for training per trainee? Oops, sorry, how quickly we forget.  That’s almost as bad as the GSA scandal which cost federal taxpayers nearly $2750 per person.

 

Something about objectives, indicators and lots of strategeries:

  • OIG found that for 20 of the 22 countries, CT and DS/T/ATA did not develop specific or measurable strategic or performance objectives in the Country Assistance Plans.
  • OIG found that for eight of the 22 countries, CT provided broad strategic objectives that were vague or included an inordinate number of goals.
  • OIG found that nearly all of the performance indicators and targets used to define success or failure of a country program were ambiguous, were not measurable, or lacked meaning.

Let’s have some examples:

Lebanon: The strategic objectives for Lebanon directed the ATA program to help modernize and professionalize security forces “through basic and advanced training and equipment and operation upgrades.”

India: The strategic objectives for India directed the program to emphasize critical incident response; post-incident investigation; human rights; border security; international threat finance; extradition and prosecution; and the protection of critical infrastructure, including port, rail, and airport security.

Bahrain and Morocco: A performance objective for both Bahrain and Morocco is to enhance the country’s “capability in investigating, and responding to terrorism.”

Nepal: The two program objectives for Nepal are “to enhance the capabilities of Nepalese police to utilize ATA training” and to “improve capabilities of the Nepalese police to counter and respond to terrorism.”

And the Success Measurement Award goes to ATA Bangladesh where one performance indicator for measuring the success of the increasing protection capabilities for Bangladeshi leaders was regular updates from U.S. Embassy, ATA program visits, and feedback from Bangladesh’s law enforcement community on enhanced institutional management and procedures developed through ATA training to protect national leaders.”

If that’s a measure of success, we’d hate to see what failure is like.

So, cmon- is this program effective?

“Since 1983, DS/T/ATA has provided ATA program training to participants from North Africa, the Middle East, Central Asia, and South Asia. However, DS/T/ATA could not determine the program’s effectiveness because it had not developed specific, measurable, and outcome-oriented program objectives or implemented a mechanism for program evaluation. In addition, DS/T/ATA and CT were not consulting with DRL when selecting partner countries or when determining the assistance to be provided to those countries because DS/T/ATA and CT officials stated they were unaware of the requirement. As a result, the Department has no assurance that the ATA program is achieving its intended statutory purposes or that the overall or individual programs are successful. Further, DS/T/ATA has no basis for determining when partner countries are capable of sustaining their own ATA program without U.S. support.”

Bottom line answer is – since 1983

Who the heck knows?

But you’d be pleased to know that this has not kept State from pouring more money into a program that has not been proven to be effective since it has no idea how to measure its effectiveness.

Why don’t we just add the disbursement of funds as an indicator of success and make it easy on everyone?

Domani Spero

 

 

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Filed under State Department, Training, Terrorism, Foreign Assistance, Functional Bureaus, Follow the Money, Regional Bureaus

Afghanistan SmackDown: El Snarkistani v. O’Hanlon, Unfuzzy Math and Creative No More Problemo

So we were watching Brooking’s Michael O’Hanlon on teevee one night talking about Afghanistan. These network folks should really invite our blog pal, El Snarkistani to talk about our pretend 51st state, because he talks more sense. But we were not disappointed because El Snarkistani later blogged about. Excerpt below:

I admit that I don’t know a whole lot about Michael E. O’Hanlon or Ian Livingston, but they wrote a piece for the New York Times: basically, things in Afghanistan are going just fine (By the way, Stephen Saideman did a short post on this. He raises some interesting questions.):

Here is what we know: Afghans are wealthier, healthier and better educated than ever before. Unquestionably, Afghan security forces are bigger and better. Despite the occasional spectacular attack, Kabul is relatively safe, accounting for less than 1 percent of violent episodes nationwide, thanks largely to the efforts of these troops. The security situation in the more dangerous south is also much improved, after two years of efforts by foreign and Afghan forces. The north and west are at least no longer deteriorating and collectively account for less than 10 percent of violence nationwide.

And now I know all I need to know about O’Hanlon/Livingston.

Oh, for those of you following along? This post is the one I talked about yesterday.

Allow me to retort, and I’m only going to limit myself to one line in that paragraph, as much as it physically pains me to do so.

Unquestionably, Afghan security forces are bigger and better.

That’s a great word: unquestionably. That means you have “facts” that are likely “irrefutable” which is another big word for “we are experts,” and can therefore “do math.”

That last shot across the bow will make sense shortly.

I’m not going to debate the quantity of ANSF. The force is definitely bigger: every year, there are more of them.

Better? No.

Then he went down the bottom of that dark bucket and looked at the bigger and better Afghan security forces. It turns out that “after nearly 10 years of ISAF intervention, and nearly two years of concerted effort by NATO Training Mission – Afghanistan (NTM-A) personnel, no unit at any level had achieved an “independent rating.” And he got the numbers and can do unfuzzy maths, too.

“So they changed the definition,” El Snarkistani writes.

They changed the definition of … Holy Mother of God and All Her Wacky Nephews! 

Via It’s All Sunny in Kabul: From page 43 of the 1230 report in October of 2011:

Prior to the spring campaign, IJC reviewed the definition of an Independent unit and concluded that the definition was too restrictive and would be difficult for any ANSF element to attain. As a result, IJC rewrote the definition of an Independent unit to reflect the reality that most ANSF force enablers will likely require long-term coalition assistance.

[...]

In a war that offers relatively few metrics by which to measure success, being run by an organization that shifts those metrics randomly to fit their message, it’s unusual to find solid numbers to demonstrate anything. In this case, it’s simple math.

The interwebs is hard.

I’m off to break the news to my wife: in honor of the genius that walks among us mere mortals, we’re naming our first child “O’Hanlon.” And he shall be great. And able to do the maths.

O’Hanlon El Snarkistani, tee-hee!  You really should read El Snarkistani’s stuff here and reader comment round 2 is here.

This reminds us of the large staffing gap at the State Department once, must have been during the tenure of Warren Christopher in the last century. (Yeah, I’m ancient, but no Botox!) Anyway, since it became a really bad problem, somebody decided to solve it surgically and quickly — by eliminating all the positions with a dash of a pen. So, no more staffing gap problem although the work still had to be done.

Eliminating the gap  and  redefinition are just a couple of tricks in your creative problem solving toolbox.  In some places, I bet that creative problem solving can get you a Superior Honor Award or if you are really, really lucky, even a Presidential Rank Award.

Anyway, El Snarkistani is not the only one who has issues with the notion that Afghanistan is fine.  “Mobutu Sese Seko”, the founder of the blog Et tu, Mr. Destructo has this piece, Winning the War Against Yesterday: Mike O’Hanlon’s Afghan Mad Libs with the following quip:

“What’s frustrating is how expected this all is. The Brookings Institution—still billed as the “left-wing” think tank by conservative media—is just as much a corporatized centrist disappointment as every other major Washington institution. It’s in the imperialism business: selling it, cheerleading it and then excusing it. (Just look at that donor list flush with arms contractors.)”

Now that’s enough to ruin your midnight snacks, isn’t it?

Domani Spero

 

 

 

 

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Filed under Training, Defense Department, War, Afghanistan, Foreign Assistance, Blogs of Note

Foreign Service Overseas Crisis Readiness Online Course

FSI’s Transition Center and the Leadership and Management School have put together this short course intended to help U.S Government families and members of household prepare for a crisis overseas. It covers preparations to be done prior to departure for post, and upon arrival at post. It also describes the responsibilities of post personnel who have roles during crisis response and have audio clips from recent evacuees.

The online course includes five modules, a summary and review questions in each module. I find the review quiz pretty tame with softball questions but it may still be useful to take them. (Example: You’re going to Kingston, Jamaica, an island with a warm climate, should you pack sweaters and a warm coat?) 

The course is not embeddable so you have to check it out here: 
http://www.state.gov/m/fsi/tc/ocr/

Introduction

Planning Ahead Overview
A Post
You and the Mission
Evacuations: What They Mean for You
Resilience

Planning Ahead: Your Personal Plan

At the conclusion of the brief course, there is a useful template for creating a Personal Crisis Preparedness Plan (see pdf below).  There is also an option to print out the materials. Make sure you check out the “Resources” tab at the bottom of the screen. 

Personal Crisis Preparedness Aid (pdf)

Go-Bag List (pdf)

You never know when a crisis might strike, especially overseas. Preparedness is half the battle, so check this out when you can.

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Filed under Evacuations, Foreign Service, Learning, Spouses/Partners, Training

Project Unsustainable: Why the Afghan National Security Forces Need to be On Reality Teevee Now

Well, just about everything is reality teevee now, why not our reconstruction project centered on the Afghan National Security Forces?  The United States and donor countries are paying for it and it’s kind of like the hollywoody equivalent of army and police training. There are well meaning good guys, and bad meaning bad guys, insurmountable challenges, military toys, guys learning to shoot straight, contractor reps on near heart attacks, and gazillions of money floating around for this or that. There’s gotta be drama in all that, don’t ya think?

And the best part is, this reality show may have better longevity prospects as teevee show goes, because hey, we might actually be in Afghanistan beyond 2014 (when we’re supposed to leave).  If rumors are true that negotiations are underway for the United States to stay in Afghanistan until 2024, that would fit perfectly with the IMF’s prediction that the Afghan government will be incapable of paying ANSF costs until at least 2023.

Afghanistan is in fact, playing a double game to suit its interest — badmouthing the United States when it suits it’s need and negotiating behind the lime lights to get the United States to stay to protect its interest.   If we’re asked to stay beyond 2014, don’t mistake it for true love; we have the juice, that’s all (even if that juice was bought on credit); we’re like the deep pocket sugar person that the dysfunctional individual with a sweet habit can’t live with and can’t live without – a very messy relationship.

DynCorp trainer with Afghan National Police recruits.
(U.S.Air Force photo cited by CWC)

In any case, the Commission on Wartime Contracting (CWC) cited Project Unsustainable above as a formidable example of potential waste in the U.S.-funded contracting for training of, and facilities construction for, the Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF), comprising the Army, Border Police, and National Police. Excerpt below:

Between FY 2006 and FY 2011, Congress appropriated nearly $39 billion to set up and maintain the ANSF; the fiscal year 2012 budget request would add almost $13 billion to that total. Nearly half of the FY 2012 request—over $5 billion—would go toward clothing, equipping, and paying the ANSF.22

Prospects for the Afghan government’s sustaining the ANSF are dubious. The entire country’s gross domestic product (GDP) for FY 2011 is about $16 billion at the official exchange rate, and the national government’s domestic revenues are about $2 billion.23 The Afghan Ministry of Finance budget proposal for 2011-2012 indicates that given the increased security costs from the increase in size of the ANSF, the Afghan government is expected to continue to depend on donor grants for up to 30% of its operating budget.24

The outlook for sustaining the Afghan army and national police is complicated by several factors:

▪▪The ANSF, currently numbering about 305,000 personnel, is growing toward a newly authorized strength of 352,000, which will increase sustainment costs.

▪▪The Commission has received a preliminary U.S. military estimate of ANSF sustainment costs for just the period 2014-2017 in the neighborhood of $30 billion.

▪▪The International Monetary Fund has concluded that the Afghan government will be incapable of paying ANSF costs until at least 2023.25

▪▪Donor-community support depends upon unpredictable political decisions that may be heavily influenced by severe fiscal pressure on most developed countries’ budgets.

In a similar vein, the Acting Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction told the Commission, “The Government of Afghanistan has never had the financial resources to sustain ANP [Afghan National Police] salaries at either the current or projected levels.”

Besides spending billions on contracts to train, clothe, and equip the ANSF, the United States has also committed $11.4 billion since 2005 to build bases, police stations, border outposts, and other facilities for the ANSF. In addition, the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers awarded two contracts in 2010 for ITT Corporation to provide $800 million in operation-and-maintenance services for 663 ANSF facilities over a five-year period.

The Afghan government has already indicated that it cannot pay such costs from its resources.29 The Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction told the Commission at its January 24, 2011, construction hearing that “the entire $11.4 billion [in construction spending] is at risk,” and “both contracts are expected to exhaust their funding well before [the end of ] their five-year performance period.”30

Anyway, if we end up spending the next 12-13 years in Afghanistan training its armed forces, I only have one request.  Please, please, please — can we please have this on teevee 24/7, 365 days a year so we can watch this project continue to unfold in real time?  And if SIGAR needs to make arrests, can we do that with cameras rolling, too? Because why not?

Pardon me? Why do we need to see this 24/7, 365 days until the 2024 season? Um, silly — so we can see on teevee just how stoopid we’ve all been in allowing a sugar old baby with a bad habit to play us this well.

Michele Bachmann’s Soviet Union must be laughing its head off right now.

Related posts:
On to 2024: Our Pretend 51st State of Afghanistan — Not/Not a Laughing Matter | Aug 22, 2011

Cops Kabul Edition: Building Afghanistan’s National Police at $1.26 Billion | Jul 29, 2011

US Mission Afghanistan: Ambassador Crocker returns, assures everyone “There will be no rush for the exits…” and that’s okay since our soldiers for 2023 will start kindergarten this fall | Tuesday, July 26, 2011 |

$6 Billion Later, Afghan Cops Aren’t Ready to Serve | Diplopundit | Mar 22, 2010

Weapons Accountability in Afghanistan | Diplopundit | Feb 16, 2009

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Filed under Afghanistan, Budget, Contractors, Foreign Assistance, Foreign Policy, Huh? News, Training, War

State Dept Seeks A-100 Team Building Contractor

FSI has put out a solicitation for the development and presentation of a two-day experiential education-based teambuilding and leadership offsite for new Foreign Service Officers taking part in their new employee orientation program at the Foreign Service Institute. The two-day program is held at a facility outside the immediate Washington, D.C. area. Below is an excerpt from the published solicitation at FedBiz:

SFSIAQ10R0024_ A-100 Team Building
Solicitation Number: SFSIAQ10R0024
Agency: U.S. Department of State
Office: Foreign Service Institute
Location: Office of Acquisitions, M/FSI/EX/GSACQ

Foreign Service Officer (FSO) Orientation is a five-week program. The course is devoted to helping new FSOs better understand the overall organization in which they work, the terms of their employment, and the competencies needed for success in the organization. Class members will be assigned to U.S. embassies and consulates around the world shortly after completing training; they will not work together as a team beyond
orientation. However, all will work in highly team-focused environments during their Foreign Service careers. All FSOs, regardless of their position, must work effectively with colleagues at all levels of the organization to succeed as individuals and contribute to group accomplishment. The leadership and teambuilding program helps participants assess skills and develop strategies to work most effectively within diverse groups, both as leaders and team members. The program normally takes place during the third week of Orientation.

The contractor is required among other things to:

  • Develop a two-day teambuilding program using experiential education techniques and exercises requiring elementary levels of physical ability but with increasing levels of cognitive difficulty, that address the Foreign Service Core Precepts of leadership, communication, interpersonal and management skills as defined in the attached document (see Fedbiz for attachments).
  • Facilitate a general opening session and a closing wrap-up session with all participants (on average the total number of participants for each session is between 80-89 students). At other times during the program, students will be divided into small groups of approximately 12- 17 people, with each team having one facilitator. Team size and number of teams may vary depending on overall class size.
  • Utilize various teambuilding theories and tools as appropriate to discuss exercises and how group members can apply what they have learned to the workplace in order to better model the Foreign Service Core Precepts listed above. These theories and tools should include one or more of the following: Myers-Briggs Type Indicator (MBTI), the Three-Circle leadership model, Tuckman’s stages of team development, Situational Leadership, and other tools identified by FSI staff.

Folks waiting for the call may want to know that this solicitation says FSI anticipate eight (8) orientation courses for FY11 (October 1, 2010-September 30, 2011). That’s between 640-712 new employees in the next fiscal year.

Click here to read more.

Be sure to also check out the Foreign Service Core Precepts (in Word Doc),  the guidelines by which Selection Boards determine the tenure and promotability of U.S. Foreign Service employees.  These Precepts will be in effect for the 2008-2009, 2009-2010 and 2010-2011 rating cycles. The Precepts define the specific skills to be considered and the level of accomplishment expected at different grades.  They distinguish between apprentice, journeyman and master level – the junior, mid-level and senior ranks.

 

 


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TSA’s $200M Spot a Terrorist Program Never Caught One?

Metal detectors at an airportImage via Wikipedia

CBS News’ Armen Keteyian reports that “Times Square bombing suspect Faisal Shahzad was arrested after he boarded a plane headed for Dubai, though the government is spending millions each year on a program that’s supposed to spot terrorists before they reach the gate.[...] There’s a hidden layer of airport security most people don’t know about. It’s called “behavior detection,” and involves specially trained Transportation Security Administration employees whose primary mission is to spot terrorists. They look for unique facial expressions and body language that may identify a potential threat. About 3,000 of these officers work at 161 U.S. airports — costing taxpayers nearly $200 million in 2009. This year, the TSA asked Congress for $20 million more to expand the program. But CBS News has learned that the program is failing to catch terrorists. It’s never even caught one.”

Also that “The GAO uncovered at least 16 individuals later accused of involvement in terrorist plots flew 23 different times through U.S. airports since 2004. Yet none were stopped by TSA behavior detection officers working at those airports.”

So that would be $220M and change? No terrorists were caught with $200M spent in this program; you think $20M more would do the job?

We went digging for that GAO report and finally found it available online today.

Quick excerpts below:

To enhance aviation security, the Transportation Security Administration (TSA) began initial testing in October 2003 of its Screening of Passengers by Observation Techniques (SPOT) program. Behavior Detection Officers (BDO) carry out SPOT’s mission to identify persons who pose a risk to aviation security by focusing on behavioral and appearance indicators. GAO was asked to review the SPOT program. GAO analyzed (1) the extent to which TSA validated the SPOT program before deployment, (2) implementation challenges, and (3) the extent to which TSA measures SPOT’s effect on aviation security. GAO analyzed TSA documents, such as strategic plans and operating procedures; interviewed agency personnel and subject matter experts; and visited 15 SPOT airports, among other things. Although the results from these visits are not generalizable, they provided insights into SPOT operations.
[...]
Beginning in fiscal year 2007, TSA created separate Behavior Detection Officer (BDO) positions as part of the Screening of Passengers by Observation Techniques (SPOT) program.1 According to TSA, the SPOT program is a derivative of other behavioral analysis programs that have been successfully employed by law enforcement and security personnel both in the United States and around the world, particularly that of Israel’s airline, El Al.
[...]
As of March 2010, TSA deployed about 3,000 BDOs at an annual cost of about $212 million; this force increased almost fifteen-fold between March 2007 and July 2009. BDOs have been selectively deployed to 161 of the 457 TSA-regulated airports in the United States at which passengers and their property are subject to TSA-mandated screening procedures.5 The administration has requested $232 million for SPOT for fiscal year 2011, a $20.2 million (9.5 percent) increase over the current funding level. This increase would support a workforce increase from about 3,000 to 3,350 BDOs. If this funding request is approved and maintained, SPOT would cost about $1.2 billion over the next 5 years.
[...]
Although the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) is in the process of validating some aspects of the SPOT program, TSA deployed SPOT nationwide without first validating the scientific basis for identifying suspicious passengers in an airport environment. A scientific consensus does not exist on whether behavior detection principles can be reliably used for counterterrorism purposes, according to the National Research Council of the National Academy of Sciences.

So — what do you need to do to become a BDO or a Behavior Detection Officer? Here’s what GAO says:

BDO eligibility is restricted to TSOs with at least 12 months of TSO experience, or others with related security experience. Applicants must apply and be accepted into the BDO training program. The training includes 4 days of classroom courses, followed by 3 days of on-the-job training. Expert BDOs [...] received an additional week of training on SPOT behaviors and mentoring skills.

We’re pinning our $200M and hopes on catching the bad guys on folks with 7-days training?  I’m starting to get a headache, sorry.

So how many terrorists have been caught?  I know you want to know that. Here’s what GAO says:

Using CBP and Department of Justice information, we examined the travel of key individuals allegedly involved in six terrorist plots that have been uncovered by law enforcement agencies. We determined that at least 16 of the individuals allegedly involved in these plots moved through 8 different airports where the SPOT program had been implemented. Six of the 8 airports were among the 10 highest risk airports, as rated by TSA in its Current Airport Threat Assessment. In total, these individuals moved through SPOT airports on at least 23 different occasions.
[...]
SPOT officials told the GAO that it is not known if the SPOT program has ever resulted in the arrest of anyone who is a terrorist, or who was planning to engage in terrorist-related activity.

GAO tried to help TSA on this by suggesting that studying airport video recordings of the behaviors exhibited by persons waiting in line and moving through airport checkpoints and who were later charged with or pleaded guilty to terrorism-related offenses could provide insights about behaviors that may be common among terrorists or could demonstrate that terrorists do not generally display any identifying behaviors. 

The GAO report says:

TSA officials agreed that examining video recordings of individuals who were later charged with or pleaded guilty to terrorism-related offenses, as they used the aviation system to travel to overseas locations allegedly to receive terrorist training or to execute attacks, may help inform the SPOT program’s identification of behavioral indicators.

I don’t know about you.  But I’m thinking — does TSA really need GAO to suggest this, given that it is in the business of behavior detection?

As to the requested bump on that program money — the fear factor is always there, of course. I can understand that.  I, myself am afraid that TSA will get its additional $20M to expand the program simply because none of our elected representatives would like to go down in history as the one who shut down a program that is set up to net some real bad guys. But, would it be asking too much for Congress to tell TSA to bring in some verifiable results and not just anecdotal evidence before they write the next check?

I actually had a similar experience. One time, I was convinced that a giant rat was nesting in my attic. I called the exterminator and he put down his traps and promised to check back regularly. At $150 every three months. 6 months went. Nothing. Now, had I kept the contract for 3 years despite an empty trap, would you have called me prudent, or dumb?

Here are some trick questions: Does the fact that the trap has never netted the giant rat means that the rat doesn’t exist? Does it simply mean, that the rat just has not been caught? Or could it be that a mouse trap was the most inefficient means of catching that giant rat?

I did think of that exterminator and his traps when I read this report today.         

I do not care so much about the  money since I have none. But as a taxpayer, it seems wasteful to give more money to some program that has zero results. In the meantime, I think of the 1 in 4 kids that go to bed hungry at night. Not at some distant third world country. But right here.  In the United States of America. In 2007, 12.4 million children in the United States were hungry. Now, that number has grown to nearly 17 million kids.  Let’s think about that for a moment when we think of that $20 million.

Related Item:
GAO-10-763 | AVIATION SECURITY: Efforts to Validate TSA’s Passenger Screening Behavior Detection Program Underway, but Opportunities Exist to Strengthen Validation and Address Operational Challenges | PDF


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Filed under Federal Agencies, Govt Reports/Documents, Security, Terrorism, Training

Quickie: Senators Call for Changes to Troubled, Costly Afghan Police Training Program

We could not cover the congressional hearing on the Afghan Police Training in Congress last week but ProPublica did.  I am republishing below Ryan Knutson’s piece under Creative Commons with additional active links.  You can read the testimonies from the four officials in my prior post here:

Senators Call for Changes to Troubled, Costly Afghan Police Training Program
by Ryan Knutson, ProPublica – April 15, 2010 6:54 pm EDT

State and Defense department officials took a tongue-lashing today, trying to explain to a Senate subcommittee how the government has poured $6 billion since 2002 into building an effective Afghan police force with disastrous results.

ProPublica and Newsweek examined the problems [1] with police training in Afghanistan in a story published last month. The program, managed under a contract with DynCorp International, has faced challenges on every front, from recruitment to inadequate training periods to corruption to poor officer retention.

“Everything that could go wrong here, has gone wrong,” Gordon S. Heddell, the inspector general of the Department of Defense, acknowledged to an ad hoc subcommittee [2] of the Senate Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs. Heddell’s office, along with the State Department’s Inspector General, completed a six-month audit in January of the program that found significant lapses.

Sen. Claire McCaskill, D-Mo., the subcommittee chair, and others on the panel were less interested in rehashing the program’s well-known shortcomings and more interested in hearing about solutions. “What you laid out was a problem we knew in 2001,” said Sen. Edward Kaufman, D-Del., in response to comments from Heddell. “What are the two or three things you can spend $6 billion on and not end up with essentially nothing?”

Defense and State Department officials agreed that clearer guidelines for the contractor and more oversight are needed to improve the program. Currently, the State Department has just seven contract overseers in Afghanistan, said David T. Johnson, an assistant secretary for the State Department. The agency hopes to have 22 in place by September, Johnson said.

Another key would be to make training ongoing, rather than just the six weeks that police recruits are getting now, said David S. Sedney, a deputy assistant secretary with the Defense Department. “This is not a weeks- or months-long [process] — it’s a years-long process,” he said, adding that police need to be partnered with American military and more experienced Afghan troops on whom they can model their behavior.

Even if the program makes headway, some senators questioned whether it would be sustainable without a massive ongoing commitment from U.S. taxpayers. The Afghan police and army are slated to receive $11.6 billion to fund their operations for 2011, with just over half going to the police, Sedney said. McCaskill pointed out that’s only $2 billion less than the entire country’s Gross Domestic Product.

“It’s obvious that Afghanistan is not going to be able to afford what we’re building for them,” she said. The U.S. has made a “billion-dollar commitment for years to come.”

The government is already exploring whether a change in contractors might benefit the police-training program. DynCorp’s contract has been extended for several months, but the State Department has issued a call for new bids, hoping an array of companies will step up to compete for the job, Johnson said. McCaskill was skeptical, however.

“I will be shocked — like winning the lottery — if we end up with anybody other than DynCorp,” she said.

Write to Ryan Knutson at Ryan.Knutson@propublica.org [3].


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Filed under Afghanistan, Congress, Contractors, Defense Department, Hearings, State Department, Training