Uh-oh Dept: Royce Issues Subpoena to OMB Over Diplomatic Security Training Facility Documents

Posted: 3:01 am EDT

 

On May 28, U.S. Rep. Ed Royce (R-CA), Chairman of the House Foreign Affairs Committee (HFAC), issued a subpoena (pdf) to the Office of Management and Budget (OMB).  The subpoena compels OMB to provide the Committee with critical information he said HFAC has sought for nearly a year concerning the State Department’s plan to construct a Foreign Affairs Security Training Center (FAST-C) in Virginia.

Subpoena to the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) | HFAC

Subpoena to the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) | HFAC

Via HFAC:

The State Department plans to construct the FAST-C facility in Virginia at a cost of $413 million.  However, the project’s initial estimate of $950 million suggests the likelihood of considerable cost escalation over the construction period.  At either amount, the State Department proposal appears far more costly than the Department of Homeland Security’s (DHS) proposal to expand its Federal Law Enforcement Training Center (FLETC) in Glynco, Georgia to provide State Department diplomatic security training, as is currently taking place.

Chairman Royce said:  “In an increasingly dangerous world, the security of U.S. diplomats abroad is paramount.  We must ensure that our diplomats receive improved security training, and a big part of providing that training effectively is making the most of our limited resources.  That is why for nearly a year, I’ve been asking OMB to provide the Committee with its analysis, which according to OMB officials’ statements to Committee staff, recommended using an existing facility — a course that the Administration has apparently chosen to ignore.  I’d like to know the factors considered in this important decision.”

In late 2013, OMB examined the two proposals to determine whether State’s request for funding for FAST-C was justified.  Chairman Royce encouraged OMB to determine which proposal best addresses the State Department’s vital training needs in a fiscally responsible way.  He also requested that the Government Accountability Office perform an independent analysis of the proposals in September 2014.

The Committee is aware that OMB analysts had completed a written analysis recommending that the State Department pursue its diplomatic security training at the DHS’s FLETC facility.

On May 19, 2014, Chairman Royce requested that then-OMB Director Sylvia Burwell provide the Committee with a copy of OMB’s analysis.  On May 1, 2015, Chairman Royce reiterated his request to current OMB-Director Shaun Donovan, expanding it to include all “documents and communications” pertaining to the FASTC and FLETC facilities during OMB’s review period.  OMB has given no indication it will comply fully with these requests.

Chairman Royce said: “I am disappointed that OMB hasn’t provided the Committee its analysis so that the Congress can make informed and responsible policy decisions in this critical area.  The internal documents underlying this analysis should tell us how and why OMB arrived at its decision.  In light of OMB’s continued refusal, I am left with no choice but to issue this subpoena.”

 

Related items:

  • Chairman Royce’s January 9, 2014 letter to then-OMB Director Sylvia M. Burwell encouraging an independent OMB analysis is available here.
  • Royce’s May 19, 2014 letter requesting OMB’s analysis is available here.
  • Royce’s May 1, 2015 letter threatening to compel production of the analysis is available here.
  • In September 2014, Chairman Royce, Homeland Security Committee Chairman Michael McCaul (R-TX), and Homeland Security Subcommittee on Oversight and Management Efficiency Chairman Jeff Duncan (R-SC) requested an independent Government Accountability Office review of the State and DHS proposals. That review is ongoing.

Related posts:

New No. 4 Wanted: Wendy Sherman to Step Down as State Department’s “P” After Iran Talks

Posted: 12:52 am EDT

 

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Via NYT:

Ms. Sherman, the No. 3 official at the State Department, said she did not expect to take another post in the administration, and she has not announced any plans. But she is close to Hillary Rodham Clinton, whose presidential campaign she supported in 2008, and who is running again for the Democratic nomination.

It was Mrs. Clinton who brought Ms. Sherman back into the government to handle Iran and other issues. Previously, she had worked as a social worker in Boston, a Senate campaign aide, and a counselor to Secretary of State Madeleine K. Albright during the Clinton administration, handling North Korea. Her congressional critics often cited that credential in critiquing her negotiations with Iran.

She’s actually No.4 (Kerry, Blinken, Higginbottom) and depending on what happens with the Iran Talks and 2016, we might see her again.  Is this the start of the exodus from the 7th Floor?

We don’t think this position will be too attractive for a political appointee at this point. Counting the vetting, nomination and confirmation, the wait could be anywhere between a couple of months to half a year. If that happens, that’ll give the new “P” barely a year on the job before the 2016 election, and the traditional resignation required when the new administration takes office in January 2017.  That would be like 6 months to transition to the new job, and 6 months looking for a new job.  Any political appointee who takes this on would appear desperate. We could be wrong, of course, but we anticipate that a career diplomat will succeed Ms. Sherman as “P.” This position has traditionally been assigned to a career diplomat, and that’s the most logical step right now.

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USAID’s Arab Spring Challenges in Egypt, Tunisia, Libya, Yemen: The State Department, It’s No.2 Challenge

Posted: 12:10 am EDT

 

USAID’s Office of Inspector General (OIG) conducted a survey (pdf) to identify the challenges USAID faced during the early transition period (December 2010-June 2014) in Egypt, Tunisia, Libya, and Yemen. USAID/OIG identified and interviewed 31 key USAID officials from various parts of the organization who have worked on activities in these countries.It also administered a questionnaire to supplement the information gathered from the interviews. Together, 70 employees from USAID were either interviewed or responded to the questionnaire. It notes that the while the survey collected the perspectives of a number of USAID employees, it is not statistically representative of each office or USAID as a whole.

The highest addressee on this report is USAID/Middle East Bureau Assistant Administrator, Paige Alexander. It includes no State Department official nor congressional entities.

Below is an excerpt:

In 2013 OIG conducted a performance audit of USAID/Egypt’s economic growth project1 and found that the changes of the Arab Spring severely affected the project’s progress. Approximately midway through implementation, the project had not made significant progress in seven of the ten tasks in the original plan mainly because of changes in the Egyptian Government’s counterparts and priorities. To adapt to the environment, the project adjusted its plan and identified three new areas of work to focus on. In another audit that year,2 OIG found similar challenges at USAID/Yemen when one of that mission’s main projects had to adjust its approach after the Arab Spring started (page 16).

Beyond project delays, we found a host of other challenges common to all four countries that revolve around three broad categories:

  1. Security
  2. Increased influence from the State Department
  3. Host-countryreadiness

1. Security.

One of the most commonly cited challenges was the difficulty of operating in a volatile environment. Security dictated many aspects of USAID’s operations after the Arab Spring started, and it was not uncommon for activities to be delayed or cancelled because of security issues.
[…]
In addition to access, security also disrupted operations because employees were evacuated from the different countries. U.S. direct-hire employees at USAID/Egypt were evacuated twice in 3 years. In USAID/Yemen, employees were evacuated twice in 3 years for periods of up to 6 months.3 In our survey, 76 percent of the respondents agreed that evacuations made managing projects more difficult.
[…]
Because of the precarious security situations, strict limits were placed on the number of U.S. direct hires who were allowed to be in each country. Employees said the Agency did not have enough staff to support the number of activities. This problem was particularly pronounced in Tunisia and Libya, where for extended periods, USAID had only one permanent employee in each country

2. Increased Influence From State Department.

According to our survey results, the majority of respondents (87 percent) believed that since the Arab Spring the State Department has increased its influence over USAID programs (Figure 3). While USAID did not have activities in Libya and Tunisia before the Arab Spring, staff working in these countries afterward discussed situations in which the State Department had significant influence over USAID’s work. A respondent from Tunisia wrote, “Everything has been driven by an embassy that does not seem to feel USAID is anything other than an implementer of whatever they want to do.”

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While there is broad interagency guidance on State’s role in politically sensitive environments, the specifics of how USAID should adapt its operations were not entirely clear to Agency employees and presented a number of challenges to USAID’s operations. In Yemen, the department’s influence seemed to be less of an issue (page 17), but for the remaining countries, it was a major concern. As one survey respondent from Egypt wrote:

[State’s control] makes long-term planning incredibly difficult and severely constrains USAID’s ability to design and execute technically sound development projects. A path forward is agreed, steps taken to design activities and select implementation mechanisms, and then we are abruptly asked to change the approach.

State’s involvement introduced a new layer of review and slowed down operations. USAID employees needed to dedicate additional time to build consensus and gain approval from people outside the Agency.

USAID employees also described challenges occurring when State employees, unfamiliar with the Agency and its different types of procurement, made requests that were difficult to accommodate under USAID procedures. One respondent wrote that State “think[s] programs can be stopped and started at will and that we can intervene and direct partners in a manner that goes far beyond the substantial involvement we are allowed as project managers.”

Beyond operational challenges, many people we interviewed expressed frustration over the State Department’s increased role, particularly when State’s direction diverted USAID programming from planned development priorities and goals. This was an especially contentious issue at USAID/Egypt (page 7).

This difference in perspectives caused some to question State’s expertise in development assistance, particularly in transitional situations. A USAID official explained that countries in turmoil presented unique challenges and dynamics, and embassies may not have experts in this area. Others said USAID was taking direction from State advisers who were often political appointees without backgrounds in development.
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State was not the sole source of pressure; employees said other federal entities such as the National Security Council and even the White House had increased their scrutiny of USAID since the start of the Arab Spring. As a result, mission officials had to deal with new levels of bureaucracy and were responding constantly to different requests and demands from outside the Agency.

3. Host-Country Readiness.

In each of the four countries, employees reported problems stemming from award recipients’ ability to implement assistance programs. According to one employee, local capacity in Libya was a major problem because the country did not have a strong workforce. Moreover, local implementers had not developed the necessary technical capacity because development assistance was not a priority in Libya under Muammar Qadhafi’s closed, oil-rich regime. Activities in Tunisia and Yemen encountered similar issues because neither have had long histories of receiving foreign development assistance. In Egypt, employees reported that some of the nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) working on the mission’s democracy and governance program also lacked sufficient capacity.

On Egypt:  More than 85 percent of the employees surveyed who worked on activities related to USAID/Egypt agreed that the State Department had increased its influence over USAID programs since the start of the Arab Spring (Figure 5). A number of respondents said State steered Agency programs to address political rather than development needs. This dynamic had a profound effect on the mission’s ability to follow USAID’s guidance on designing and implementing developmentally sound projects. […] Some mission officials questioned the value of adhering to USAID’s project design procedures when the State Department had already decided a project’s fate. […] In this example, State’s desire to award education scholarships to women in Egypt was difficult to justify because university enrollment data showed that higher education enrollment and graduation rates for women are slightly higher than for men.  […] With so many differing voices and perspectives, USAID employees said they were not getting clear, consistent guidance. They described the situation as having “too many cooks in the kitchen.” One survey respondent wrote:

State (or White House) has had a very difficult time making decisions on USAID programming for Egypt . . . so USAID has been paralyzed and sent through twists and turns. State/White House difficulties in decisions may be expected given the fluid situation, but there has been excessive indecision, and mixed signals to USAID.

On Tunisia: The State Department placed strict restrictions on the number of USAID employees allowed to be in-country. As a result, most Agency activities were managed from Washington, D.C. … [O]ne survey respondent wrote, “I have been working on Tunisia for nearly 3 years now, and have designed programs to be carried out there, but I’ve never been. I don’t feel like I have been able to do my job to the best of my ability without that understanding of the situation on the ground.”

On Libya: The attacks in Benghazi on September 11, 2012, had a profound impact on USAID operations in Libya. According to one interviewee, after the attacks USAID did not want to attract too much political attention and put a number of Agency activities in Libya on hold. The period of inactivity lasted from September 2012 to September 2013. It was not until October 2013, after Prime Minister Ali Zeidan was abducted, that the U.S. Government refocused attention on Libya and funding for activities picked up again.

Before the attacks, USAID had five employees in the country; afterward, only one was allowed to remain. Although his main priority then was to manage USAID/OTI projects in Libya, he also was asked to oversee four to five additional activities managed out of Washington—a stretch for any employee. As one survey respondent wrote, “The lack of people in the field in Libya (small footprint) means that DC overwhelms the field. People in the field are worked ragged.”

On Yemen: USAID/Yemen did not suffer from the challenges of unclear strategy that other USAID missions did in the region; 70 percent of respondents who worked on activities in Yemen believed that the Agency had a clear strategy for its post-Arab Spring activities (Figure 12). This is a stark contrast to responses related to USAID/Egypt, where only 22 percent believed that USAID had a clear strategy. …[O]ur survey also found a strong working relationship between USAID/Yemen and the State Department; the two often agreed on what needed to be done. […] Some respondents said the collaborative atmosphere was due to individual personalities and strong working relationships between USAID and State officials. One employee said because employees of both organizations lived and worked together in the close quarters, communication flowed freely as perspectives could be exchanged easily. …[O]ne senior USAID/Yemen official said, some of what needed to be done was so obvious that it was difficult for the two agencies not to agree.

Lessons Learned

The report offers 15 lessons learned including the development of a USAID transition plan at the country level, even if it may change. USAID/OIG says that by having a short-term transition plan, the Agency “would have a better platform to articulate its strategy, particularly when it disagrees with the decisions of other federal entities.”It also lists the following:

  • Resist the urge to implement large development projects that require the support of host governments immediately after a transition.
  • Prepare mission-level plans with Foreign Service Nationals (FSNs)—locally hired USAID employees who are not U.S. citizens—in case U.S. direct hires are evacuated. Evacuation of U.S. staff can be abrupt with only a few hours’ notice. People we interviewed recommended that U.S. staff develop plans with the mission’s FSN staff ahead of time, outlining roles, responsibilities, and modes of operation to prevent a standstill in operations in the event of an evacuation.
  • Get things in writing. When working in environments where USAID is getting input and instructions from organizations that are not familiar with Agency procedures, decisions made outside of USAID may be documented poorly. In such circumstances, it is important to remember to get things in writing.
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Burn Bag: Dissent Awards — How low can we go?

Via Burn Bag:

 

Well, how about this:  Dissent Awards without any real dissent.  In fact, three out of four don’t have any and it’s a reach for the entry-level one! How low can we go?

via giphy.com

Art in Embassies: Something to Uplift Your Boring Living Room But, What Do We Tell The Martians?

Posted: 3:40 pm EDT

 

I’m not going to pretend to understand this type of contemporary American art; no more than I understand the one million granite sculpture reportedly intended for the new U.S. Embassy in London. I also looked up the artist’s collection of dogs sitting on furniture within elaborate grottos. I’m sorry, my soul has not been lifted. I just don’t get it, okay? But the ambassador’s wife appears to be really taken by this and she’s the one who gets to live with this “breathtaking” creation in her house. At least it’s in her house and not mine.  But — just so you know, some people really, really like this.  The artist has been in many public collections including the Brooklyn Museum, the Museum of Modern Art, New York, the Museum of Fine Arts, Boston, the Museum of Fine Arts, Houston, the Smithsonian Institution, and the San Francisco Museum of Modern Art, among others. The big question is, what do we tell the Martians?

 Martians Visiting Earth: What Is This Creature?

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Via US Embassy Ottawa:

U.S. Embassy Ottawa and the U.S. Department of State’s Office of Art in Embassies, in partnership with the National Gallery of Canada (NGC), will welcome renowned American artist Nick Cave to Ottawa on May 28 for the second lecture in the Contemporary Conversations series.

Contemporary Conversations (#artconvoAIE) features four internationally recognized American artists who will visit Canada over the course of 2015 to speak about their work. Each artist in the series will participate in a public lecture at NGC, stimulating conversation around issues that transcend borders, and topics that inspire, teach, and create connections. As a foundation for the lecture series at the NGC, the participating artist’s work is displayed in a curated exhibition at Lornado, the official residence of U.S. Ambassador to Canada Bruce Heyman and Vicki Heyman, who helped to spearhead the series. Nick Cave’s work Soundsuit (2008) is part of that exhibit.

“For the program, I chose a series of living, contemporary American artists whose art was both visually exciting and also provided a platform for conversation,” said Vicki Heyman. “I think Nick Cave exemplifies those qualities. His exploration of identity, through the lens of race and sexual identity, compounded by the ethereal, whimsical quality of his incredible Soundsuits, just fit perfectly into the overall collection.”

This is part of the Art In Embassies program (AIE) and unlike the $1M piece for US Embassy London, the compensation to the artists and/or lenders come in kind like:   “Artists and lenders receive international exposure through events hosted by the embassy that are attended by prominent political, business, and academic leaders as well as members of the local arts community. AIE acknowledges its partners through bi and tri-lingual exhibition labels, web publications produced by our office, and inclusion on our web site. Many U.S. embassies feature exhibitions on their official websites, extending accessibility to thousands of host country, international, and U.S. citizens annually.”

The Lornado is the official residence of the United States Ambassador to Canada. It sits in a commanding location high above the confluence of the Ottawa and Gatineau Rivers in Rockcliffe Village in Ottawa, Ontario. According to Embassy Ottawa, the U.S. government purchased the property from the Soper family in 1935. From 1935-38, the mansion was slightly modified by the Department of State, but it still maintains many of its Edwardian influences. The official residence has 32 rooms, and is a two-and-a-half story limestone manor sitting on a property that encompasses ten acres of grounds, a greenhouse, maintenance buildings, and a gatehouse.

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Snapshot: State Department Diversity Statistics – Full-time Employees (as of 9/30/2013)

Posted: 2:01 pm EDT

This report is over a year old but still an interesting look into the workforce of the State Department. Thanks A!

DOS Diversity Statistics (2013)

DOS Diversity Statistics (2013) | click for larger view

 

Related post:

Emails Brief as Photos, But Where Are The Interesting Bits? #ClintonEmails

Posted: 9:06 am PDT

 

So the day before the three day Memorial Day weekend, this happened.

 

Where else would State dump these but at the foia.state.gov website, a slow and notoriously difficult to search website:

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But there’s help from the Wall Street Journal, which offers a faster loading site than the FOIA website.  It also allows you to tag any of the 800+ pages of emails.

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Yo! There’s no smoking gun, and everyone’s like whaaat? Teh-heh!

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What are we learning from this first batch of emails?

1) The document dump is not arranged or ordered in any useful way. The emails from 2011 are mixed with 2012. Some of the emails are included more than once. Some of the redactions are rather odd, given that some of these emails were already published via the NYT.  The former secretary of state is not referred to as HRC, only as “H.” The emails show an extremely small number of gatekeepers – Mills, Sullivan, Abedin, plus a couple of folks routinely asked to print this or that.

2) Sid, Sid, Sid — there are a good number of memos from “friend of S” or “HRC’s contact,” Sidney Blumenthal, who apparently had his own classification system. The memos he sent were marked “Confidential” although he was no longer a USG employee at the time he sent them and presumably, no classifying authority. Imagine the COM in Libya and NEA folks chasing down this intel stuff. Right. Instead of “OGA” for other government agency, State got “FOS”or “friend of S” as intel source.

3) “Pls. print” one of the former secretary of state’s favorite response to emails sent to her.

4) When former Secretary Clinton finally addressed the firestorm of her use of private email, she said: “I opted for convenience to use my personal email account, which was allowed by the State Department, because I thought it would be easier to carry just one device for my work and for my personal emails instead of two,” a self-assured Clinton told more than 200 reporters crowded into a U.N. corridor. (via Reuters). It looks like she had more than one email address, and we don’t know how many devices. The email below was sent from an iPad.

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5) HRC gave a speech on September 12, 2012  Remarks on the Deaths of American Personnel in Benghazi, Libya at the Treaty Room of the State Department.

Here is Harold Koh, the State Department Legal Adviser later that day thanking HRC for her “inspirational leadership.”

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6) On September 14, 2012, HRC delivered her  Remarks at the Transfer of Remains Ceremony to Honor Those Lost in Attacks in Benghazi, Libya atAndrews Air Force Base; Joint Base Andrews, MD. Video at: http://bcove.me/r4mkd76v.  Below are some of the ‘thank you’ emails sent to her, but mostly to HRC through Ms. Mills:

From Deputy Secretary Bill Burns to H:

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From State/CSO Rick Barton to Mills:

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From NEA’s Brett McGurk to Mills:

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From NEA/PD “blown away” to somebody to Mills:

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From Protocol to Mills to Protocol:

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7) On October 10, 2012, there was a congressional hearing on the Security Failures of Benghazi. “Did we survive today?” HRC asked.  The “Pat” referenced to in this email is most likely Patrick Kennedy, the Under Secretary for Management who testified at that hearing (see Security Failures of Benghazi: Today’s Hearing).

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8) In November 2012, the House Intelligence Committee had a closed hearing that reportedly had the Director of National Intelligence James Clapper, Matt Olsen, Director of the National Counterterrorism Center, CIA Acting Director Michael Morell and the State Department’s Under Secretary for Management Patrick Kennedy.  Those could be the Matt and Pat in this email:

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9) There was a meeting at the WH Situation Room on Nov 26, 2:35 pm on Benghazi. The invitation was for the Secretary +1, and if she was unable to attend, an invitation for one representative only. The then Executive Secretary John Bass (now US Ambassador to Turkey) asked Mills if she’d prefer “Pat” to attend or “Dan.” Dan is State’s former counterterrorism guy, replied “Pat should go” in reference to Patrick Kennedy. Mills asked HRC if she’s good with Pat going and she replied “I think I should go w Pat.”

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10) On December 17, 2012, then State Department spokesperson Victoria Nuland (now A/S for the EUR bureau) confirmed that the Accountability Review Board on Benghazi had concluded its work, and that the report went to Secretary Clinton that day (see ARB Concludes Work, Unclassified Report May Be Publicly Available on Wednesday).  The following email is between Burns and Mills dated December 18, 2012. It mentions three names, Eric, Pat, and Greg Starr.  We are guessing that the Eric in the email is Eric Boswell, the then Assistant Secretary of Bureau of Diplomatic Security, and Pat is the Under Secretary for Management. The portion referencing Greg Starr was redacted except for Burns’ “I like the Greg Starr idea.”

The ARB report was released the same day this email was sent (see Accountability Review Board Singles Out DS/NEA Bureaus But Cites No Breach of Duty; also see Accountability Review Board Fallout: Who Will be Nudged to Leave, Resign, Retire? Go Draw a Straw. Mr. Boswell was one of the four employees thrown under the bus. On February 1, 2013, Gregory B. Starr was sworn in as Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Diplomatic Security and Director of the Diplomatic Security Service. Mr. Starr also served as Boswell’s successor as acting DS Assistant Secretary until he was formally nominated by President Obama in July 2013.

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11) On December 20, 2012, the State Department’s two deputies, William Burns and Thomas Nides went before Congress instead of Secretary Clinton (see Clinton Recovering, Top Deputies Burns and Nides Expected to Testify Dec.20). Thank yous all around with HRC saying thank you to Burns and Nides. Thereafter, Cheryl Mills sent an email praising HRC’s email as being “so nice.”  This was then followed with more thank yous from Nides and Burns.

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12) So nothing surprising in the emails except the parts that may give some of us toothache. And the missing parts.  This is only the first batch of emails although our understanding is that this constitutes the Benghazi-related emails. If that’s the case, it is striking that we see:

a) No emails here to/from Eric Boswell, the Assistant Secretary for Diplomatic Security.

b) No emails directly related to the other three employees put on administrative leave, Diplomatic Security’s Charlene Lamb and Steve Bultrowicz, and NEA official, Raymond Maxwell (although he is on a few courtesy copy emails) see The Other Benghazi Four: Lengthy Administrative Circus Ended Today; Another Circus Heats Up).

c) No emails to/from Gregory Hicks who was Embassy Tripoli’s DCM at the time of the attack and who would have been attached by phone/email with Foggy Bottom (Hey! Are telephone conversations recorded like Kissinger’s?)

d) Except for an email related to one of the ARB panel member, there are no emails related to setting up the ARB, the process for the selection of ARB members, the assistance requested by the ARB, the support provided by the State Department to the panel, etc.  What happened to those emails?

(By the way, we also have not forgotten that Former State Dept DAS Raymond Maxwell Alleged Benghazi Document Scrub Pre-ARB Investigation).

13) Then Secretary Clinton was using at least two emails from her private server according to these released emails. It does not look like anyone from the State Department could have just sent her an email by looking her up on the State Department’s Global Address List (GAL). But certainly, her most senior advisers including the experienced, career bureaucrats at the State Department must have known that she was using private email.

Seriously, no one thought that was odd? Or did everyone in the know thought it was beyond their pay grade to question the practice? Let’s imagine an entry level consular officer conducting official business using a private email server. How long would that last? Right.

So what happened there? Ugh! Pardon me? You were just doing your job? That CIA briefer also was just doing his job.

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U.S. Embassy Kabul Construction Cost: From $625.4M to $792.9M, and Going Up, Up and Away

Posted: 12:55 am EDT

The Government Accountability Office (GAO) recently released its report on Embassy Kabul Construction. Below is a a quick summary:

Since re-opening in 2002, the U.S. embassy in Kabul, Afghanistan, has experienced a dramatic increase in staffing, followed by a gradual drawdown. State has invested or plans to invest a total of $2.17 billion in U.S. facilities to address current and projected space needs. State awarded two contracts in 2009 and 2010 to construct additional on-compound housing and office facilities. State partially terminated one contract for the convenience of the U.S. government, and expanded the construction requirements of the second, affecting cost and schedule.

Schedule and cost: The Embassy Kabul project was originally scheduled for completion last summer but is now projected to be completed in fall of 2017. The cost has also increased from $625.4 million to $792.9 million.

Where two is better than one: Instead of building one temporary vehicle maintenance facility, the State Department ended up  funding two new, temporary vehicle maintenance facilities—one at Camp Sullivan (built by OBO) and one at Qasemi Lot (to be built by DS). Apparently, post officials reported that there are security concerns with using the Sullivan vehicle maintenance facility. And if that’s the case, one wonders why OBO did not scrub the other one, hey?

Which five overseas posts have hardened trailers? According to DS officials, hardened trailers could be required as part of State’s containerized housing and office unit task orders. State reported to the GAO that the hardened trailer specification has been applied to temporary facilities at five overseas posts.

Temporary facilities: As of February 2015, temporary facilities on the embassy compound provided nearly 1,100 desks and 760 beds.

Permanent facilities: Once the current construction is completed, the Kabul embassy’s permanent facilities—both older and newly constructed office and apartment buildings—will contain 1,487 desks and 819 beds. Those totals do not include the desks or beds in temporary offices and housing facilities.

The never ending story: State planning documents, as well as post and OBO officials, identify a continued need for some of the temporary facilities following completion of the permanent facilities in 2017. That would be 875 temporary desks and 472 to 640 temporary beds.  The GAO notes that even with the permanent construction completion “temporary housing will continue to provide between 37 and 44 percent of the available beds on-compound” at Embassy Kabul.

Image via gao.gov

Image via gao.gov

What the GAO found:

  • Cost and schedule have increased for the Kabul embassy construction project, in part due to incomplete cost and risk assessment. Cost for the 2009 and 2010 contracts has increased by about 27 percent, from $625.4 million to $792.9 million, and is likely to increase further. Projected completion has been delayed over 3 years to fall 2017. The Department of State (State) did not follow its cost containment and risk assessment policies, resulting in lost opportunities to mitigate risks. These risks, such as delays in the sequencing of the two contracts, eventually materialized, increasing cost and extending schedule. Unless State follows its policy, it may be unable to avoid or mitigate risks to cost and schedule on future projects.
  • Since 2002, State has built over $100 million in temporary buildings (intended for no more than 5 years’ use) to meet space needs on-compound but has no security standards tailored to those facilities. On completing the project in 2017, all temporary facilities will be 5 to 10 years old, and their continued use is likely.
  • State does not have a strategic facilities plan for Kabul that documents current and future embassy needs, comprehensively outlines existing facilities, analyzes gaps, provides projected costs, and documents decisions made. Lack of such a plan has inhibited coordination and undermined the continuity necessary to address emergent needs at the Kabul embassy.

Too many cooks and constant personnel turnover:

According to State officials in Kabul and Washington, coordination to address the Kabul embassy’s future needs is particularly difficult due to the large number of stakeholders in Kabul and in Washington. Additionally, the constant personnel turnover caused by the 1-year tours served by most management, facilities, and security staff in Kabul results in lack of continuity in decision making. As far back as January 2006, the State Office of Inspector General also identified “the near total lack of institutional memory” stemming from the lack of staff continuity and a “never-ending” learning curve as the most serious impediment to good executive direction at the U.S. embassy in Kabul.

Post and Inter-Bureau Cooperation: Embassy Kabul, DS, OBO

Without a comprehensive plan that provides a strategic framework to document mission needs, catalog existing facilities, analyze gaps, provide projected costs, and document recommendations, the competing proposals of the post’s many stakeholders are difficult to manage, prioritize, and reconcile. As a result, State officials in Kabul said that these meetings suffer from no common vision and a lack of decision making. Consequently, State has been challenged to efficiently address changing embassy needs in several instances on- and off-compound. For example:

      • Interference with on-compound construction—OBO officials in Kabul expressed frustration that proposals for new projects would often conflict with plans previously agreed to by previous post management staff. For example, during our fieldwork, post management proposed to locate a helicopter landing zone near the embassy warehouse. However, according to OBO officials on-site, they had arranged with the previous management team to reserve that space as a staging area for the contractor to build the warehouse expansion. When asked about this, post management officials stated that they had no continuity document that informed them of this earlier decision.
      • On-compound physical security upgrades—DS first requested changes to the embassy compound’s security perimeter in December 2010 and added more requirements in response to attacks against the compound in September 2011. In February 2013, the post urged OBO to provide a project schedule and expedite the upgrades. However, that was not done and as of March 2015 OBO and DS had not reached agreement on schedules and costs for some security upgrade projects.
      • Camp Seitz—In 2013, DS and post management decided to relocate the Kabul Embassy Guard Force from Camp Sullivan and the Protective Security Detail (movement protection) Guard forces from another camp to sites closer to the embassy compound due to security concerns. To facilitate this, DS initiated the acquisition of the Camp Seitz site through OBO. However, according to State officials, DS then began construction of temporary housing at Camp Seitz without submitting the design to OBO for review or applying for a building permit. After OBO became aware of the completed construction, it identified fire safety deficiencies that DS had to correct.
      • Camp Sullivan, Camp Eggers, Qasemi Lot Vehicle Maintenance Facility—As part of the security contractor relocation, post management and DS proposed removing several support facilities, including a vehicle maintenance facility, from an ongoing construction project at Camp Sullivan and transferring them to Camp Eggers. Post management and DS officials stated that once the temporary vehicle maintenance facility on-compound is demolished to make way for apartment buildings 2 and 3, it would be better for security and logistics to build the replacement vehicle maintenance facility close to the compound rather than at Camp Sullivan. However, OBO proceeded to build the Sullivan vehicle maintenance facility because negotiations for the 30 leases required at Camp Eggers were not complete, and OBO was concerned that if an alternative vehicle maintenance facility was not in place, construction of apartments 2 and 3 could be delayed and their costs increased.56 Discussions continued among OBO, DS, and post management, and the proposed vehicle maintenance facility was shifted to Qasemi Lot, a site adjacent to Camp Seitz. OBO decided not to descope the Camp Sullivan vehicle maintenance facility until plans for a replacement facility at Qasemi Lot were approved by OBO and DS had awarded a construction contract with a scheduled completion date prior to the demolition date for the existing vehicle maintenance facility on- compound. As a result, State is funding two new, temporary vehicle maintenance facilities—one at Camp Sullivan (built by OBO) and one at Qasemi Lot (to be built by DS).57

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U.S. Senate Confirms Two Ambassadors and 6 Foreign Service Lists Before Memorial Day Break

Posted: 2:46 am EDT

 

The U.S. Senate was burning the midnight oil Friday night working on S.1357, the FISA extension and managed to also confirmed by voice vote the nominations of our next ambassadors to Mali and Costa Rica before dawn May 23rd; they were just two of the seven nominees waiting for a full Senate vote.

The Senate now stands adjourned (except for pro forma sessions) until 4:00pm on Sunday, May 31, 2015. Roll call votes are possible after 6:00pm during Sunday’s session but that’s it for now until after the break.  Senate will resume consideration of the motion to proceed to H.R.2048, the USA Freedom Act upon its return.

Here are the two ambassadors lucky enough to make it through the Senate obstacle course and who can now pack their bags and household effects after a wait of 7-10 months.

Paul A. Folmsbee, of Oklahoma, a Career Member of the Senior Foreign Service, Class of Minister-Counselor, to be Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary of the United States of America to the Republic of Mali. (Folmsbee, Paul A. – Republic of Mali – October 2014)

Paul A. Folmsbee, a career member of the Senior Foreign Service, class of Minister-Counselor, currently serves as Executive Director, Bureau of African Affairs in the Department of State. Known as a talented leader and manager, he has served with distinction in many of our nation’s most demanding positions and challenging posts. Mr. Folmsbee’s excellent communication skills and experience building inter-agency teams and will serve him well as Chief of Mission in Mali.

Previously, Mr. Folmsbee served as the Senior Civilian Representative for Regional Command East, Afghanistan (embedded with the 1st Cavalry at Bagram) (2011-2012), Consul General, Consulate Mumbai, India (2008-2011), Provincial Reconstruction Team Leader, Sadr City / Adhamiya in Baghdad, Iraq (embedded with the 2/82 Airborne) (2007-2008), Director of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs, Embassy Islamabad, Pakistan (2006-2007), Management Officer, Embassy Port-au-Prince, Haiti (2003-2006), Management Officer, Embassy Dar es Salaam, Tanzania (2000-2003), General Services Officer, Embassy La Paz, Bolivia (1997-2000), General Services Officer, Embassy Colombo, Sri Lanka (1995-1997), Management Officer, Embassy Libreville, Gabon (1992-1995), Area Management Officer, Bureau of Western Hemisphere Affairs, Department of State, (1990-1992), General Services Officer, Embassy Nairobi, Kenya (1987-1989), and General Services Officer, Mission to the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, Geneva, Switzerland (1985-1987).

Mr. Folmsbee earned a B.A. in Political Science from Tabor College in Hillsboro, Kansas in 1982, a M.A. in Social Anthropology from the University of Oklahoma, Norman, Oklahoma in 1985 and was issued a pilot’s license in 1978 by the FAA after studying aviation at Embry-Riddle Aeronautical University. He is the recipient of five Department of State Superior Honor Awards, five Meritorious Honor Awards and a medal from the Polish Government for service in Afghanistan working with Polish troops. He speaks French and Spanish.

Stafford Fitzgerald Haney, of New Jersey, to be Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary of the United States of America to the Republic of Costa Rica. (Haney, S. Fitzgerald – Republic of Costa Rica – July 2014)

S. Fitzgerald Haney is a Principal and Director of Business Development and Client Service (Europe, Middle East and Africa), Pzena Investment Management, New York, New York. Known as a talented international businessman and manager, he has many years of experience serving in senior-level marketing, financial services and manufacturing positions across Latin America. A proven leader with extensive international experience, Mr. Haney will bring essential skills to the task of furthering bilateral relations with the Government of Costa Rica, a key U.S. partner in Latin America and within the Organization of American States.

Previously, Mr. Haney served as Senior Vice President, Ethnic Consumer Products, International Discount Telecommunications (IDT), Newark, New Jersey (10/2006-02/2007), Director, Strategic Planning, Depository Trust and Clearing Corporation, New York, New York (12/2002- 09/2006), Senior Associate, Israel Seed Partners, Jerusalem (09/1999-06/2001) and Vice President, Marketing and Strategic Planning, Citibank, Mexico City, and Monterrey, Mexico (07/1997-02/1999). He held positions with Pepsico Restaurants International (07/1993-07/1997), including Marketing Director, Sao Paulo, Brazil, Senior Marketing Manager, Mexico and Central America, Mexico City, Mexico and Marketing Manager, San Juan, Puerto Rico. He was Assistant Brand Manager, Procter and Gamble, San Juan, Puerto Rico (07/1991-07/1993). He served as Appointed Member, City of Englewood Planning Board and Board of Adjustment, Englewood, New Jersey (12/2004-12/2008).

Mr. Haney earned a B.S. in international economics and a M.S. with distinction in international business and diplomacy from Georgetown University School of Foreign Service, Washington, D.C., 1986-1991. He was the recipient of the Brunswick-Hanigan Scholarship, the Dean’s Award for Academic Excellence and Distinction in Oral Examination at Georgetown University and is a Member of the National Jesuit Honor Society. He speaks Spanish, Portuguese, Hebrew and Conversational French.

 

The Senate also confirmed six Foreign Service lists which include the names of  about 600 nominees.

2015-05-23 PN72-3 Foreign Service | Nomination for Douglas A. Koneff, which nomination was received by the Senate and appeared in the Congressional Record on January 13, 2015. (It looks like three names have been removed from this list and those FSOs remain stuck in the Senate).

2015-05-23 PN259 Foreign Service | Nomination for Judy R. Reinke, which nomination was received by the Senate and appeared in the Congressional Record on March 4, 2015.

2015-05-23 PN260 Foreign Service | Nominations beginning Brian C. Brisson, and ending Catherine M. Werner, which 56 nominations were received by the Senate and appeared in the Congressional Record on March 4, 2015.

2015-05-23 PN368 Foreign Service | Nominations beginning Peter J. Olson, and ending Nicolas Rubio, which 3 nominations were received by the Senate and appeared in the Congressional Record on April 15, 2015.

2015-05-23 PN369 Foreign Service | Nominations beginning Craig A. Anderson, and ending Henry Kaminski, which 346 nominations were received by the Senate and appeared in the Congressional Record on April 15, 2015.

2015-05-23 PN370 Foreign Service | Nominations beginning Anthony S. Amatos, and ending Elena Zlatnik, which 212 nominations were received by the Senate and appeared in the Congressional Record on April 15, 2015.

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SFRC Clears Five Ambassadorial Nominees and Six Foreign Service Lists

Posted: 1:07 am EDT

 

On May 21st, the Senate Foreign Relations Committee (SFRC) cleared the following nominations:

  • Paul A. Folmsbee, of Oklahoma, a Career Member of the Senior Foreign Service, Class of Minister-Counselor, to be Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary of the United States of America to the Republic of Mali.
  • Cassandra Q. Butts, of the District of Columbia, to be Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary of the United States of America to the Commonwealth of The Bahamas.
  • Stafford Fitzgerald Haney, of New Jersey, to be Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary of the United States of America to the Republic of Costa Rica.
  • Charles C. Adams, Jr., of Maryland, to be Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary of the United States of America to the Republic of Finland.
  • Mary Catherine Phee, of Illinois, a Career Member of the Senior Foreign Service, Class of Minister-Counselor, to be Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary of the United States of America to the Republic of South Sudan

The panel also cleared the nomination of Gentry Smith as Director of the Office of Foreign Mission and and Matthew McGuire for the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development

  • Gentry O. Smith, of North Carolina, a Career Member of the Senior Foreign Service, Class of Minister-Counselor, to be Director of the Office of Foreign Missions, and to have the rank of Ambassador during his tenure of service, vice Eric J. Boswell, resigned.
  • Matthew T. McGuire, of the District of Columbia, to be United States Executive Director of the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development for a term of two years, vice Ian Hoddy Solomon, term expired.

Nominations Placed on Secretary’s Desk

The following FS lists which include 621 nominees were also placed on the Secretary’s Desk. These are routine nomination lists, previously printed in the Congressional Record, placed on the Secretary’s desk for the information of Senators while awaiting floor action.

  • PN72 – 3 FOREIGN SERVICE nomination of Douglas A. Koneff, which was received by the Senate and appeared in the Congressional Record of January 13, 2015.
  • PN259 FOREIGN SERVICE nomination of Judy R. Reinke, which was received by the Senate and appeared in the Congressional Record of March 4, 2015.
  • PN260 FOREIGN SERVICE nominations (56) beginning Brian C. Brisson, and ending Catherine M. Werner, which nominations were received by the Senate and appeared in the Congressional Record of March 4, 2015.
  • PN368 FOREIGN SERVICE nominations (3) beginning Peter J. Olson, and ending Nicolas Rubio, which nominations were received by the Senate and appeared in the Congressional Record of April 15, 2015.
  • PN369 FOREIGN SERVICE nominations (346) beginning Craig A. Anderson, and ending Henry Kaminski, which nominations were received by the Senate and appeared in the Congressional Record of April 15, 2015.
  • PN370 FOREIGN SERVICE nominations (212) beginning Anthony S. Amatos, and ending Elena Zlatnik, which nominations were received by the Senate and appeared in the Congressional Record of April 15, 2015.

All one step closer to confirmation, but not quite there.

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