What happens when you contravene the worldwide nonimmigrant visa referral policy? It depends.

Posted: 4:08  am EDT
Updated: 2:29 pm EDT

 

Our State Department friends have a favorite response to most questions. “It depends.”

About 10 years ago, State/OIG conducted a review of the Visa Referral Process in Nonimmigrant Visa Adjudication.

By law neither an ambassador nor a DCM can direct a consular officer to issue a particular visa. Even the Secretary of State has no authority to override a consular officer’s deci­ sion, pursuant to the Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 USC 1104. Recognizing the importance of the visa process both as a bilateral diplomatic issue and as a legitimate diplomatic tool for achieving U.S. aims, and considering the importance of providing as much information as possible to consular officers, the Department has long understood the need for a policy and system to allow all elements of the mission to benefit from the visa system and to protect consular officers from inappropriate pressure. After September 11, 2001, this system has been signifi­ cantly strengthened.
[…]
Based on the results of the survey, observations in the field, and discussions in Washington, OIG concluded that most ambassadors and DCMs appear to under­ stand the importance of their personal oversight of the referral system and that there are serious repercussions, including removal from post, in the most egregious cases of abuse. While Department oversight of referral systems is important, entrusting chiefs of mission with local supervision and responsibility is still appro­ priate and necessary, just as the Department entrusts chiefs of mission with the lives of all employees and dependents in their missions, the management of top secret information, and the conduct of key bilateral relations with the host country.
[…]
Clearly most missions’ front offices are overseeing the referral system as intended by the Department, sometimes after a little persuasion. For example, an officer at a post that was having problems said, “Our recent OIG inspection was helpful in making the front office realize the impact of their interventions with us and the appearance of undue influence. Despite our education of the front office, they have been incredulous that their good causes may pose us problems under the law.” One of the areas of emphasis for OIG inspection teams is border security readiness, which includes oversight of the referral program.

The survey, however, did reveal some disillusionment with the available recourses in those instances when the front office was itself exerting undue influ­ence. One officer at a post in the Near East said, “In general the consular section feels pressure to act simply as a rubber stamp to visa referrals by chiefs of section and above.” Another stated,“The front office is the only section that has ever tried to influence decisions in referral cases. If I were to refuse the case, then I would be hurt in the employee evaluation report (EER) process as my rater is the DCM and the Ambassador is the reviewing officer.”

It’s an instructive read from 2005, see in full here (PDF).

Let’s fast forward to two cases in 2015 specifically mentioned by State/OIG. The following is from the State/OIG inspection report of the U.S. Embassy in Tajikistan (PDF). The IG report lists Susan M. Elliott as COM, and Robert G. Burgess as DCM.

The Offices of Visa Services and Fraud Prevention Programs, the Consular Integrity Division, and the front office of the Bureau of Consular Affairs all expressed concern about the embassy’s contravention of the worldwide visa referral policy. In the latter half of 2013, the Ambassador in seven cases and the DCM in two cases contravened the worldwide nonimmigrant visa referral policy by submitting noncompliant referrals and improperly advocating for issuance.

Complications arising from noncompliance with the policy led to deteriorating relations between the consular officer and other embassy offices, perceptions of intimidation and isolation, and increased involvement of and intervention by various offices in the Bureau of Consular Affairs. In response to revised guidance from the Bureau of Consular Affairs on referral policy, dated January 13, 2014, Embassy Dushanbe issued a management notice on January 17, 2014. On October 15 and 17, 2014, the embassy conducted briefings for referring officers and obtained current compliance agreements reflecting the revised policy guidance. The OIG team met with the front office and the consular officer, and they confirm that they understand and are committed to continuing to comply with the policy going forward.

How is it that this consular officer did not get the Barbara Watson Award for demonstrating courage?

C’mon!

The “Worldwide Visa Referral Policy Problems” below is from the State/OIG report of the U.S. Embassy in Armenia (see PDF). According to the IG report, the ambassador at that time was John Heffern:

In at least 15 documented cases, the Ambassador contravened the worldwide nonimmigrant visa referral policy (9 FAM Appendix K, Exhibit I) by contacting the consular chief to communicate information about visa applicants instead of providing referral forms for the applicants. The referral policy states, “Referrals are the only allowed mechanism to advocate for or assist visa applicants prior to visa adjudication.” Some of the cases involved previously refused applicants. Referral policy permits requesting assistance via referral on behalf of previously refused applicants only in extremely limited circumstances. Few, if any, of the violations involved applicants who would have been eligible for visa referrals. The consular chief did not take adequate steps to stop the Ambassador’s inappropriate communications or to report them to the Department, as required by Department referral polices.
[…]
The embassy provides no formal, detailed briefing (“referral school”) as recommended in the worldwide policy. The consular chief gives informal referral briefings on an individual basis to new arrivals at the embassy. Lack of a formal understanding of the referral policy and process can cause misunderstanding or abuse.

Wow! And the consular section chief got harshly treated by the … the um alphabet, which did not quite line up to say he/she was at fault but you get the idea.

It is not clear what kind of repercussions are suffered by chiefs of mission who contraven the worldwide nonimmigrant visa referral policy.   According to a FAM update last November 2015, Consular Affairs has now added a NIV Referral Program Ombudsman (see 9 FAM 601.8-8(C).

Oh, wait, there’s more.

There’s an FSGB case where an FP-03 Diplomatic Security (DS) Special Agent (SA) with the Department of State (Department) was warned that there were strict prohibitions against anyone attempting to influence the visa process. The State Department later proposed to suspend him for four days on a charge of Misuse of Position. The proposal was sustained by the Grievance Board on March 3, 2015.

On October 5, 2010, a family friend of his (REDACTED), a (REDACTED) national, applied for a B1/B2 non-immigrant visa at the U.S. Embassy in REDACTED. His stated purpose for the visa request was to visit with grievant in the U.S.  When the application was denied, grievant sent an email on that same date from his State Department account to REDACTED, the Deputy Consular Section Chief in REDACTED voicing his disappointment that his friend’s visa application had been turned down. In the email, grievant asked for assistance, provided additional information on behalf of his friend and cited his own experience as a DS officer who had collaborated with consular officials investigating fraud cases. All of grievant’s emails contained his electronic signature and identified him as “Special Agent, REDACTED, U.S. Department of State, Bureau of Diplomatic Security.” In response to this email, re-interviewed and approved his visa application. REDACTED subsequently visited grievant in the US.

To make the long story short, grievant was investigated (PDF) by DS for his efforts to procure visa approvals for his friend.

The Department reviewed the DS report of investigation (ROI) and determined that between 2010 and 2012, grievant used official communication channels to contact consular officials in the U.S. Embassy in and identified himself as a DS Special Agent in order to influence favorable decisions on visa applications submitted by his friend. On December 2, 2014, grievant received notice of the Department’s proposal to suspend him for four days on a charge of Misuse of Position. The proposal was sustained on March 3, 2015.

So. Right.

It depends.

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Did We Ship Anyone Off to Timbuktu? Who at Senior Levels Knew What and When About HRC’s Communications

Posted: 2:52 am EDT

 

The WSJ called the oldest executive agency in the union, the Department of Hillary, and accused  the entire State Department of “vigorously protecting Hillary Clinton.” It asks, “how it is that the nation’s diplomatic corps has become an arm of the Clinton presidential campaign?”

That is a sweeping accusation and we do not believe that to be true, but whether it’s true or not is immaterial. The perception is widely shared, even by reporters covering the State Department.  Our interest on HRC primarily relates to her tenure at State. We think that her management of the department — whether it relates to her email server, having a deputy chief of staff holding four jobs, special access to certain groups, operation in a bubble of mostly yes-people — was galling and distressing.  We do agree with Prof. Jonathan Turley when he writes that he “consider the decision to use exclusively an unsecure server for “convenience” to be a breathtakingly reckless act for one of the top officials in our government.”

Last month HRC was also quoted as saying, “I’m not willing to say it was an error in judgment.”

Folks will have to make up their own minds whether they agree with her or not, but the State Department is still paying a price for it. And the way this mess has been handled places at risk the institution’s deeply held tradition that the career service stay above the political fray.

The National Security Archive bluntly writes:

[T]he Federal Records Act, federal regulations on the books at the time (36 CFR 1263.22)[Official as of October 2, 2009], and NARA guidance which the State Department received (NARA Bulletin 2011-03), should have prevented Clinton’s actions, requiring her to provide “effective controls over the creation and over the maintenance and use of records in the conduct of current business”. (Read here for our analysis of why Clinton, and hundreds of others at State, including its FOIA shop and IT department, were in the wrong for not blowing the whistle on her personal email usage.) Read more here.

At some point in the near future, there will need to be a reckoning about what the senior officials, the career senior officials in Foggy Bottom knew about what during the Clinton tenure.

On Saturday, January 24, 2009 8:26 p.m. Lewis Lukens sent an email to M/Patrick Kennedy (email released via FOIA lawsuit by Judicial Watch (PDF). Lukens who was then the Executive Secretary (he was subsequently appointed US Ambassador to Senegal and Guinea-Bissau), writes, “I talked to cheryl about this. She says problem is hrc does not know how to use a computer to do email  only bb. But I said would not take much training to get her up to speed.” The email chain talks about setting up “a stand alone PC in the Secretary’s office, connected to the internet” but apparently a separate system not through the State Department system that would allow HRC to “check her emails from her desk.”

What’s the difference between using a State Department system and a stand alone system for somebody who doesn’t know how to use a computer? But more that that, we want to understand why it was necessary to set up a stand alone system. Did previous secretaries of state have their own stand alone systems? Did they have their own private email servers? Can somebody please explain why that was necessary?

This email was sent three days after HRC took the oath of office of Secretary of State (see starting page 6 below or see PDF here).

So, if they were considering setting up a stand alone PC on the 7th Floor and that did not happen, how could anyone in the top ranks of the career service not know when HRC’s people set up a private server away from the building? If they did not know, they were not doing their jobs. But if they did know, what does that mean?  Did anyone speak up and consequently suffer career purgatory? Please help us  understand how this happened. Email us, happy to chat with anyone in the know because this is giving us ulcers.

A related item about communications — in March 2009, the then Assistant Secretary for Diplomatic Security, Eric Boswell sent a memo to HRC’s Chief of Staff Cheryl Mills concerning the use of Blackberries in Mahogany Row. In that memo, also released via FOIA litigation with Judicial Watch, Boswell writes that “Our review reaffirms our belief that the vulnerabilities and risks associated with the use of Blackberries in Mahogany Row [redacted] considerably outweighs the convenience their use can add to staff that have access to the unclassified OpenNet system on their desktops. [redacted] We also worry about the example that using Blackberries in Mahogany Row might set as we strive to promote crucial security practices and enforce important security standards among State Department staff.”

The last paragraph of the memo says “If, after considering the vulnerabilities that I describe above and the alternatives that I propose, the Secretary determines that she wants  a limited number of staff to use Blackberries in Mahogany Row …. [redacted].” (See below or see PDF here)

What the  career professionals proposed can, of course, be ignored or dismissed by the political leadership. How much of it can one tolerate? Some of it, all of it?

Below is an August 30, 2011 email between then HRC deputy chief of staff Huma Abedin and Steve Mull, who we believed succeeded Lukens as Executive Secretary of the State Department. Following that assignment, he was appointed U.S. Ambassador to Poland, and last year, he was appointed Lead Coordinator for Iran Nuclear Implementation.  The Daily Caller obtained the emails through a Freedom of Information Act lawsuit filed on its behalf by Cause of Action and has reported about the emails here.  It shows the top officials who were loop in on the secretary’s communications setup, but it also points to what we suspect has always been the rationale on the server and email setup that now has consequential repercussions for the agency.  In one part of the email, the executive secretary writes, “We’re working with …. to hammer out the details of what will best meet the Secretary’s need.” (See below or see ScribD file here).

It is not surprising that the career folks worked to accommodate the needs of their principals.  We doubt anyone would last long in any assignment if they simply tell their boss blah, blah, blah can’t be done.

But — no individual in the upper ranks, career or noncareer, has so far been shown to stand up to a principal by saying “no, this is not allowed” or “this is not acceptable,” or even something like  — “this is not against the rules but it looks bad.” 

Does one draw a line between public service and service to a political leadership? Are they one and the same? What would you do?

Last September 2015, WaPo reported this:

But State Department officials provided new information Tuesday that undercuts Clinton’s characterization. They said the request was not simply about general rec­ord-keeping but was prompted entirely by the discovery that Clinton had exclusively used a private e-mail system. They also said they first contacted her in the summer of 2014, at least three months before the agency asked Clinton and three of her predecessors to provide their e-mails.
[…]
But the early call from the State Department is a sign that, at the least, officials in the agency she led from 2009 to 2013 were concerned by the practice — and that they had been caught off guard upon discovering her exclusive use of a private account.

Well, we’re sure the rank and file was caught off guard but which State Department officials were actually caught off guard? At least according to the Mull-Mills email exchange of August 2011, S/ES and M were aware of the existence of Secretary Clinton’s personal email server.

So when unnamed State Department officials talked to the Washington Post journalists last year, dammit, who did they say were actually caught off guard?

If anyone at M who has oversight over IT, Diplomatic Security, FOIA and federal records cited the Federal Records Act between 2009-2013 was shipped to Timbuktu for bringing up an inconvenient regulation, we’d like to hear about it.

Make no mistake, the perception that the Service had picked a side will have repercussions for the Foreign Service and the State Department.  If there is an HRC White House, we may see old familiar faces come back, or those still in Foggy Bottom, may stay on and on and just never leave like Hotel California.

But if there is a Trump or a Whoever GOP White House, we imagine the top ranks, and who knows how many levels down the bureaus will be slashed gleefully by the incoming administration. And it will not be by accident.

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Secretary of State’s Security Detail Who Asserted He Was Drugged, Robbed, and Kidnapped Gets 14 Day Suspension

Posted: 2:31 am EDT

 

This case is about a member of the security detail of then Secretary of State Hillary Clinton who asserted that he was drugged, kidnapped and robbed during a trip overseas in June 2012. The State Department says that “the grievant consumed nine alcoholic beverages the night before the meeting and the flight, left his hotel alone at 2:30 a.m. the morning of the meeting and flight, and remembers nothing after that until he allegedly awoke at 10:15 a.m. in a car with three strangers in a wooded area 25 km. from his hotel.”  

Public records indicate that the then secretary of state was on foreign travel to Oslo and Tromso, Norway from June 1-2, 2012.

The following is excerpted from the Record of Proceeding from FSGB No. 2014-043:

Grievant joined the Department in 2011. The instant grievance arises from events on the evening of June 1 and morning of June 2, 2012, in and around (REDACTED), while grievant was assigned to temporary duty (TDY) as a member of then-Secretary of State Hillary Clinton’s Security Detail (SD) during the Secretary’s official visits to (REDACTED) and (REDACTED).
[…]
Grievant, an untenured Special Agent in the Bureau of Diplomatic Security, grieved the Department’s Decision to suspend him for 14 days without pay and place a discipline letter in his Official Personnel Folder for Failure to Report for Duty. The Department charged him with failure to report for a morning meeting and missing a flight from REDACTED to REDACTED on June 2, 2012, while a member of Secretary Clinton’s Security Detail. As aggravating factors, the Department cited the fact that grievant consumed nine alcoholic beverages the night before the meeting and the flight, left his hotel alone at 2:30 a.m. the morning of the meeting and flight, and remembers nothing after that until he allegedly awoke at 10:15 a.m. in a car with three strangers in a wooded area 25 km. from his hotel. Grievant was removed from the Security Detail and sent home from REDACTED, with other members of the Detail picking up his assignments in REDACTED. Grievant asserted the affirmative defense that he was drugged, kidnapped, and robbed, making it impossible for him to report for scheduled duty. He further complained that the Department’s investigation of the incident was biased and procedurally flawed, that he has been improperly harmed by the Report of Investigation, that the Department mischarged him, that his “off-duty” conduct should not constitute an aggravating factor, and that the penalty was unreasonably harsh and inconsistent with penalties meted out for similar or lesser offenses in recent years.
[…]
Grievant states that at approximately 10:15 a.m. on June 2, he awoke in the rear passenger seat of a car parked in a wooded area with three other sleeping men whom he could not identify but who looked “vaguely familiar.” He exited without waking the others and followed a path to a road. At approximately 11:00 a.m., grievant contacted an SD team member and was instructed to flag down a public bus and proceed to the nearest railway station. After being picked up by the ASAIC, the Assistant Regional Security Officer, and a local national, grievant stated that he felt very groggy, “more than just hung over.” They took him to a local medical center for evaluation, and then to a police station, where grievant filed a report of the incident, noting that $80 and a credit card were missing from his wallet (though other credit cards and grievant’s BlackBerry were still in his possession).

As the circumstances of grievant’s disappearance were unclear, and his report of feeling groggy raised questions about his neurocognitive condition, the Department removed him from the SD and ordered him to return to the U.S. Blood and urine tests from the medical center came back negative for the substances screened (so-called “date-rape drugs” Oxazepam, Benzodiazepine, and Creatine), and the (REDACTED) police ultimately dismissed grievant’s complaint that he had been robbed “by unknown perpetrator” for lack of evidence.  (Note: Grievant argues in the FSGB case that “although tests at the medical center detected no drugs in his system, the tests did not screen for common “date rape” drugs GHB, Ketamine, and Rohypnol and thus do not disprove that he was drugged.)”
[…]
On the other hand, the Department asserts that grievant has produced no evidence in support of his affirmative defense (i.e., that he was “likely” the victim of a crime that prevented him from reporting for duty). There is no witness testimony establishing that he was kidnapped, drugged, and robbed. The tests performed at the medical center produced no evidence that grievant was drugged, and grievant’s complaint that the screening was not comprehensive for all common “date rape” drugs, even if true, in no way establishes that he was in fact drugged (italics added).

Wait, but if he was tested for all common date drugs, and it shows, wouldn’t that have provided some evidence that something happened to him beyond just the alcoholic drinks?

The Foreign Service Grievance Board says that “consistent with its obligation to promote the efficiency of the Service, the Department must have latitude to determine how best to conduct an investigation and frame an ROI. We are not persuaded by the evidence or arguments submitted by grievant that the Department abused its discretion or violated applicable law or regulation in carrying out its investigation of grievant’s failure to report for duty or in formulating its conclusions in the ROI.”

It held that “the Department has met its burden of proving that the charged misconduct (Failure to Report for Duty) occurred, that a nexus exists between grievant’s misconduct and the efficiency of the Service, and that the proposed punishment is proportionate to the offense. Grievant has failed to meet his burden of proof with respect to the affirmative defense he asserted” and denied the  grievance appeal by the special agent.

Read in full here:

If the document embed does not display in full, the FSGB file is accessible here as PDF.

 

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Visa Fraudster With 25 Fraudulent H-1B Visa Petitions Gets 3 Years Probation and $400,000 Forfeiture

Posted: 12:01 am EDT

 

Via state.gov/ds:

OAKLAND, Calif. – A federal judge has sentenced a British man to three years of probation and the forfeiture of $400,000 for his role in a visa-fraud scheme, announced Special Agent In-Charge David Zebley of the U.S. Department of State’s Diplomatic Security Service (DSS) San Francisco Field Office.

Madhu Santhanam, 41, was sentenced on January 7, 2016, by U.S. District Judge Yvonne Gonzalez Rogers in the Northern District of California following Santhanam’s guilty plea to a count of conspiracy to commit visa fraud.

In his December 10, 2014, plea agreement, Santhanam, owner of Maan Systems of Union City, California, admitted that he had submitted at least 25 fraudulent I-129 petitions between September 2009 and June 2013. Employers must submit these documents to obtain H-1B visas for highly skilled immigrant applicants seeking to work in the United States.

In many of his fraudulent I-129 applications, Santhanam falsely indicated that the applicants would be working at his company or placed at Fortune 500 companies, but instead he placed the workers at unapproved worksites. As part of his plea agreement, Santhanam paid a forfeiture judgment totaling $400,000.

The successful prosecution was the result of an investigation led by the DSS special agent assigned to the Document and Benefit Fraud Task Force (DBFTF), an interagency investigative body overseen by the Homeland Security Investigations Directorate of the U.S. Department of Homeland Security’s Immigration and Customs Enforcement.

So no jail time, only probation, and he forfeited $400K to USG, which is about $16K per fraudulent H1-B visa petition. A high risk, high return enterprise.

When the guilty plea was announced in December 2014, DOJ says that the maximum statutory penalty for conspiracy to commit visa fraud, in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 371 and 1546, is a maximum term of 5 years in prison, a fine of $250,000, and 3 years of supervised release.

Wow! All that work for the feds, and over 12 months after the guilty plea, and not a single day in jail. What does it take before fraud like this gets taken seriously enough that we actually put people in jail?

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Coalition of Civil Rights Groups Seek State/OIG Investigation Into US Embassy Yemen’s Passport Revocations

Posted: 1:01 am EDT

 

The Asian Americans Advancing Justice-Asian Law Caucus and  Creating Law Enforcement Accountability & Responsibility (CLEAR) Project of CUNY School of Law have submitted Stranded Abroad: Americans Stripped of Their Passports in Yemen to the State Department Office of Inspector General requesting that the OIG investigate the State Department and U.S. Embassy Yemen “for confiscating and revoking U.S. passports contrary to regulations, policies, and guidelines.” 

The groups alleged confiscation and revocation without notice, failure to provide direct return passports upon confiscation, collateral attacks on citizenship/proxy denaturalization, coercive interrogations and inadequate investigations prior to passport revocation.  The complaint named seven officials who were then assigned to the US Embassy Yemen and at the State Department who the groups say are aware of the pattern of revocation and “likely to have information that can assist the OIG’s investigation.” The complaint says that the  “inclusion of their names in this report is not intended to imply that they have engaged in any wrongdoing.” (see appendices)

The letter  (PDF) addressed to IG Steve Linick was sent by civil rights and civil liberties groups that include the American Arab Anti-Discrimination Committee,  American Civil Liberties Union, Arab American Institute, Arab Resource & Organizing Center, Asian Americans Advancing Justice, Center for Constitutional Rights, Council on American-Islamic Relations, Creating Law Enforcement Accountability and Responsibility at CUNY Law School, Muslim Advocates, and the Northwest Immigrant Rights Project.

 

 

Read the 44-page complaint below:

 

A related note, we must have missed this one, Al Jazeera did a piece on this back in January 2014 (See Yemeni-Americans cry foul over passport revocations). Below is an excerpt from that piece with an unnamed State Department official:

State Department official familiar with the issue — and who spoke on condition of anonymity — told Al Jazeera that a majority of the passport revocations in Sana’a follow a similar pattern. “Virtually all of the statements say that the individual naturalized under a false identity,” he said. “They appear to be involuntary.”

According to the official, an internal investigation determined that the statements those revocations were based on were obtained under “confrontational” circumstances, with individuals alone in an interview room with an investigative officer and an interpreter who, the official said, treated their subjects “aggressively.”

“We’re talking about an inherently coercive and intimidating environment, without any independent supervision of the interrogator and his translator,” said the official.

A sample of the alleged involuntary statement is included in the complaint (see Appendix B). If the voluntary statements in these revocation cases are anything like those exhibited in Mosed Shaye Omar v. John Kerry, et.al. this would be a great mess.

Back in November, following the federal court decision in Omar v. Kerry ordering the State Department to return the passport improperly revoked by the State Department, we asked State/OIG about this trend and we were told that the OIG does not have “anything on this issue on which it can comment.” It was suggested that we check with Consular Affairs. And of course, we have previously asked the bureau about this, but we do not really expect them to address this in terms of oversight.

The court documents in the Omar case suggest that Consular Affairs is revoking U.S. passports contrary to the rules in the Foreign Affairs Manual. But this is not the only case. If all similar cases have the same threshold as the Omar case, it is deeply troubling not only because the revocation appears not to follow State Department’s written guidance, State also never seek to denaturalized the plaintiff.  Which basically leaves the plaintiff still a citizen of this country  but unable to travel anywhere.

We have been troubled by this practice but particularly by the allegations of coercion. We have had a difficult time understanding why Yemeni-Americans would incriminate themselves voluntarily and admit to something that obviously is detrimental not only to their welfare but also their future.  That defies human nature.

And no, we don’t believe that Consular Affairs is the right entity to review its own practices when it comes to these allegations. We’re hoping that State/OIG will look into this as part of its oversight responsibility of the State Department.

 

Related posts:

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There are over 24,000 diplomats working for @StateDept?

Posted: 5:24 pm EDT

 

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“There are over 24,000 diplomats working for the State Department in the U.S. and around the world. Of that number some are diplomats and some are civil servants serving mostly domestically.”

— Ambassador Nancy McEldowney, director of the Foreign Service Institute. As the Chief Learning Officer for the U.S. government’s foreign affairs community, she is focused on preparing America’s diplomats for the challenges of tomorrow. Born and raised in Clearwater Florida, her State Department career has taken her to Egypt, Germany, Azerbaijan, Turkey and Bulgaria. (Via Parade).

Note: The Parade article was updated sometime after January 24 to say, “There are over 24,000 Americans working for the State Department in the U.S. and around the world.”  The Wayback Machine dated January 24 has the original line that says, “There are over 24,000 diplomats working for the State Department in the U.S. and around the world.”

 

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Burn Bag: Expectant Parents Still Waiting For Foggy Bottom to Deliver 2015 Pregnancy Cable

Via Burn Bag:

“Dear Ms. Higginbottom: It is now 2016. On behalf of all of the working mothers and fathers out there expecting babies or going through the obstetric medevac process, please release the 2015 pregnancy ALDAC.”

 

Ms. Higginbottom called out in this Burn Bag entry is the State Department’s Deputy Secretary for Management and Resources, the agency’s 3rd highest ranking official.  For readers who are not in the FS (Hi, FSOs’ moms!), an ALDAC is an acronym for “All Diplomatic and Consular Posts.” They are cables (electronic telegrams) sent by the Department of State to every U.S. Government outpost around the world. Read more here.

It looks like the State Department last sent a comprehensive guide for Foreign Service employees and family members who have questions about leave, medical evacuation to the United States and to locations abroad, and other pregnancy-related issues in 13 STATE 101508, an ALDAC dated 7/10/2013.

Don’t know why the 2015 ALDAC is reportedly held up at the 7th Floor. The FAM sections have been updated in July last year, and most recently in November 2015. The changes include  a series of updates on the Family and Medical Leave Act of 1993 and a slew of changes on use of leave. But it does not look like there are many changes on medical travel particularly 16 FAM 315.2 which covers Travel for Obstetrical Care which has not been updated since July 2012.

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This Kind of Language Can Get One Suspended Without Pay in the Foreign Service

Posted: 1:25 am EDT

 

In FSGB Nos. 2014-041, the grievant, an FS-02 Foreign Service Officer with the Department of State, appealed the agency-level grievance decision upholding her three-day suspension without pay for improper personal conduct and poor judgment.  While the FSGB reduced the penalty to a Letter of Reprimand, the FSO had to grieved the case before the reduction of penalty:

While grievant was serving as Public Affairs Officer (PAO) at a U.S. Embassy, the Assistant Public Affairs Officer (APAO) filed an Equal Employment Opportunity (EEO) complaint alleging that grievant made numerous inappropriate and insensitive comments (many of which she overheard) – including several references to the national origin of some local and American employees; that she used harsh and profane language that made others uncomfortable in the workplace; and that she exhibited behavior that lacked professionalism, cultural sensitivity and good judgment. The EEO complaint triggered an Office of Civil Rights (S/OCR) investigation during which about a dozen local and American employees of the embassy were interviewed and signed affidavits. The S/OCR report was forwarded to the Office of Human Resources (HR/ER). The Department proposed to suspend grievant for five days without pay based on charges of improper personal conduct (seven specifications) and poor judgment (four specifications). The Deciding Official did not sustain three of the four poor judgment specifications and mitigated the penalty to three days. Grievant filed an agency-level appeal, which was denied.

Here are the things the FSO said which made the Department charged the employee with improper personal conduct and poor judgment:

Specification 1 – Grievant asked the APAO: “What’s the name of the Chinese guy who came to borrow a recorder, who speaks bad English?”

Specification 2 – After a telephone conference with State Department staff in Washington, grievant said to the APAO: “What the hell is that woman doing in that position! She’s not even a real American!” On the following day, grievant allegedly said again: “but this woman is not a real American!”

Specification 3 – In describing to the APAO an event at a previous post involving a naturalized U.S. citizen, grievant stated: “. . . she has a U.S. passport, but she is not a true American. She was Asian. In fact, I think she was Vietnamese.”

Specification 4 – The APAO overheard grievant say – in responding to a question from an  REDACTED employee of the Embassy about the children born to immigrants to the U.S.: “[T]hose immigrants are coming to the U.S. and having babies. Even though they grow up in the States, they are not culturally American.” Her comment in the workplace where she could be overheard was inappropriate.

Specification 5 – In the presence of an American colleague, the APAO, and other local embassy employees grievant shouted into her cell phone, “You f—ing c–t! You already ate?! You didn’t wait for me!” Her use of profanity was inappropriate.

Specification 6 – An American colleague stated that at a social event hosted by a senior Embassy official he had asked what the hostess meant in saying that as a college student she had been a “little sister” in a fraternity. Grievant explained to him – in earshot of several expatriates — that “it means you don’t have a gag reflex.” The American colleague interpreted this to mean that the “little sister” was obliged to perform oral sex on members of the fraternity. In this situation grievant’s comment was inappropriate.

Specification 7 – An English Language Fellow (ELF) reported that in a conversation with the ELF in an embassy vehicle driven by an  REDACTED employee of the embassy, grievant referred to REDACTED as “stupid” and “slow.”

The FSGB in this case finds that “the Department has not proved seven of eight specifications, included in two charges that were the bases for its decision to suspend Grievant for three days. With respect to the penalty, the Board finds that it has inappropriately applied the charge of Discriminatory Harassment as an aggravating factor with respect to the sole specification that has been sustained. The Department is directed to reduce the penalty to no more than a Letter of Reprimand, and to advise the Board of its actions within 30 days of receipt of this Decision.”

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