Category Archives: Functional Bureaus

London Civil Service Excursion Tour Opens — Oh Wait, It’s Gone, Then It’s Back, Ah Forgetaboutit?

—By Domani Spero

As you may or may not know, Civil Service employees sometimes get opportunities to apply for hard-to-fill posts overseas.  These are called “excursion tours.”  These are positions overseas that do not get many Foreign Service bidders and are then opened to CS employees. Careers.state.gov calls these tours “invaluable as a way to experience the ups and downs of Foreign Service life.”

Generally, these are positions in hardship and danger posts or hard-to-fill posts.

We understand that an excursion tour “mysteriously opened” early this year for an assignment that starts this summer in London.  The position is not language designated. And the estimated arrival time in London is early July 2013.

There’s a reason why this is a mystery. London is not/not a danger post.  Despite Buzzfeed’s 31 Most Enraging Things About Living In London, the city is not/not a hardship post.  It is a mighty expensive place though. In fact, the State Department grants a 70% cost of living allowance (COLA) for employees living there.

Photo via diplomacy.state.gov

Photo via diplomacy.state.gov

Which begs the question, how come the EUR bureau and the US Embassy in London is unable to fill this position with an FSO?

Lack of FSO bidders.  For London. Go ahead and digest that thought.

Now, we heard that a zillion Civil Service officers jumped at the opportunity to go to London.  Understandable. And who can blame them?  Some folks “poured their hearts and soul” into applying for this job.

And just as mysteriously as it appeared, the job was pulled down. The job was later re-reposted as a different job announcement requiring submission of new applications. Apparently, some of those who were interviewed and made the cut following the first announcement did not make the cut in the second announcement.

La-la-dee-da ….sounds fiiiishhhhy!!!

We’ve been able to dig up the original and reposted job announcements and compare them (via http://www.textdiff.com).  Note:  The  strikethru below indicates deleted text that was in the original announcement no longer present in the reposted announcement  (original announcement dated January 16, 2013 with closing date of January 30, 2013).  The highlighted underlined text below indicates additional text that is new in the reposted announcement (reposted announcement dated February 26, 2013 with closing date of March 4, 2013).  The purported reason for the reposting was that “a portion of the announcement” was “dropped off” when this position was originally posted online.

OverseasREPOSTING Overseas Civil Service Development Program FOREIGN AFFAIRS OFFICER LONDON, UNITED KINGDOM (GS-0130 – 14)
REPOSTING
Overseas Civil Service Development Program
FOREIGN AFFAIRS OFFICER
LONDON, UNITED KINGDOM
(GS-0130
 – 14)

The Director General is pleasedDue to announce that applications are nowa portion of the announcement beingaccepted fordropped off when this position was originally posted to USAJOBS, the following two-year position is being re-advertised. NOTE: You will need to reapply if you had applied when the position was initially announced. This will be a two-year assignment under the Overseas Development Program (ODP):

Position: Foreign Affairs Officer GS-0130-14

Location: Washington DC (overseas duty location: London, United Kingdom)

USA Jobs Vacancy Announcement # HRSC/ODP-2013-0004HRSC/ODP-2013-0007
Announcement closes on January 30,March 4, 2013

Program Summary: This position is a part of the Overseas Development Program (ODP) located in the Bureau of Human Resources, Office of Career Development and Assignments, Mid-Level Division, Office of Overseas Civil Service Assignments.

The purpose of the ODP is to expand Civil Service Deployment opportunities. Selectees will participate in an informational program and any job related training. Once program requirements are met, the selectees will be placed on a limited Foreign Service non-career appointment (LNA) for a two-year overseas assignment. Upon completion of the overseas assignment at London, the selectee will be reassigned or detailed to a position in the Department unless they have chosen to apply for and been selected for a second overseas ODP assignment.

Job Summary:

Serves as a Political Officer responsible for a broad set of political-military issues, including the United States (US) – United Kingdom (UK) coordination on bilateral and multilateral defense cooperation issues. Serves as a part of a 5-member political/military team, which reports on bilateral US-UK political-military cooperation and matters related to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), the European Union’s (EU) European Security and Defense Policy (ESDP), the Organization for Security and Co-Operation in Europe (OSCE), and other relevant multilateral fora. Serves as the Political Section’s lead action officer for coordinating US-UK and interagency Embassy approaches to top 21st century security challenges, including cyber security, civilian-military cooperation and stabilization activities, and non-proliferation, arms control, and disarmament efforts. Leads Section support for the Office of the Coordinator for Cyber Issues (S/CCI), the Bureau of Conflict and Stabilization Operations (CSO), and the family bureaus that support the Under Secretary for Arms Control and International Security. This position is not language designated. Estimated time of arrival at post is early July 2013.

Eligibility: In order to be eligible for consideration for the ODP, an applicant must:

- Be a current Civil Service career employee of the Department of State with at least 3 years of service in a permanent Department position;

- Or a career Civil Service Department of State Employee serving on a FS LNA with a tenure code of 7 with no more than three months remaining on their present LNA.

- Have completed all probationary periods;

- Not be serving in another long-term development program;

- Be able to obtain the appropriate medical and security clearance for the post of assignment prior to receiving travel authorization;

- Sign a Mobility Agreement and a Continued Service Agreement; and

- Cannot serve beyond the mandatory 65 year old Foreign Service retirement age.

How to apply for consideration: All interested applicants should apply for consideration through USAJOBS at the vacancy announcement noted above. You can link to USAJOBS from the CS Abroad communities site under the Overseas Opportunities tab: http://cas.state.gov/csoverseas/

Please ensure all proper documentation is submitted in accordance with the vacancy announcement (e.g., performance appraisal, SF-50 indicating tenure, grade, step, salary, etc,).

Note: Education may only be substituted in accordance with the Office of Personnel Management (OM) Qualification Standards Handbook. Education must be accredited by an accrediting institution recognized by the U.S. Department of Education.

Please be advised that applicants that do not provide the proper documentation in accordance with the vacancy announcement will be determined to be disqualified.

NOTE: If your present grade is higher than the GS-14 level and you apply and are selected for this position, you will have to sign a Notice of Change to Lower Grade memo as the position is classified at the GS-14.

How is it possible that an FSO job in London does not have any bidders that post had to turn it into an excursion tour?

As an aside, do you know that US Embassy Port-Au-Spain in Haiti had 108 bidders for one RSO position? Seriously.

An FSO is a generalist and the RSO is a specialist but both are in the FS system.   If this specific London position were located in NEA , SCA or AF, we could understand it, but this one is tricky. After all, London is London. It is not/not a hard-to-fill post.

London in fact, according to the IG is considered a popular bid for officers completing duty in Iraq or Afghanistan, and it is not uncommon for the short list of qualified bidders for the highly sought London vacancies to contain only officers rotating out of these two countries.  On linked onward assignments, the OIG notes that the “gradual accretion of tied assignments in London’s staffing pattern has had the unintended impact of putting many positions in London out of reach for virtually all bidders, regardless of how qualified, except for returnees.”

So –

Just between us, was this GS-14 job (FS-02 equivalent) in London created for somebody in particular?  If it was, then clearly it had to be for somebody who is in the Civil Service or a CS on a Limited Non-Career Appointment (LNA). Is this for somebody already in London who does not want to leave?  And pray tell, who is the main official who engineered the creation of this job?

The  stated reason for the reposting of this job (something “dropped off”) is crap.  If the job requires a CS with at least 3 years experience, why mention the probationary period?  It looks like there’s one “dropped” item when comparing the two job announcement.  It’s the line that says “You can link to USAJOBS from the CS Abroad communities site under the Overseas Opportunities tab: http://cas.state.gov/csoverseas/.”  Curious thing, that “dropped off” item is in the middle of the announcement and did not occur elsewhere.  The announcement also says that the selectee who can only be a CS employee “cannot serve beyond the mandatory 65 year old Foreign Service.” As if your brain turns off when the birthday candle burns 65.  Contrary to the job reposting, CS applicants for hard-to-fill posts must be career employees with a tenure code of 21 (not 7 as in this London announcement) according to state.gov.  We take it, this specific London assignment is not considered a hard-to-fill post?  For examples of hard-to-fill positions announced in 2012, click here.

This is indeed one of those bureaucratic mysteries … though not an isolated mystery.

Pardon me?

Noooooo, it’s not so the job description can be rewritten to better fit a specific person, silly.  Absolutely not.  What a preposterous suggestion!

But hey, who pulled this off and how did the re-write come to be?  No, re-advertised because there were “too many applicants” is not a legitimate reason.

Call your friends in London about the job up for bid, and see what they tell you (pick one):

  1. don’t bother applying for the job
  2. don’t waste your time on this one
  3. forgetaboutit, selection already done
  4. all of the above

Now, it’s not that we don’t want CS employees to go on excursion tours to nicer places. We just don’t like jobs advertised for all but tailored for one.

P.S. Please send us the job creator’s email and phone number via Contactify; we’d love a job in France this summer.

 

Updated on June 17 @6:47 am:  So we’re told that  this is *not* a hard-to-fill position and is apparently part of a new program to promote civil service career development by providing opportunities for excursion tours.  This new program is under a new unit at State called the Overseas Civil Service Assignments (OCSA) located at HR/CDA/ML.  Since early this year, this has been headed by a new chief, Joann G. Alba at (202) 663-0461. “The purpose of this unit is to expand opportunities for Civil Service employees to serve overseas.  Tenured State Department Civil Service employees will be able to apply through USA Jobs for positions at selected posts overseas.   Selectees will be placed on Foreign Service Limited Non-career Appointments for the duration of their two year overseas tours.”  (Thanks J!)

London friends reportedly did say, “don’t bother.”

(?_?)

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Filed under Americans Abroad, Career Employees, Foreign Service, Functional Bureaus, Huh? News, Realities of the FS, Regional Bureaus, State Department, U.S. Missions

HFAC to @StateOIG: What happened to keeping the Congress “fully and currently informed”?

—By Domani Spero

U.S. Rep. Ed Royce (R-CA), Chairman of the House Foreign Affairs Committee recently wrote to Secretary of State John Kerry regarding allegations of misconduct within the State Department and interference by senior State Department officials in the subsequent investigations. (See HFAC Chairman Ed Royce Demands Explanation Over Alleged Misconduct and Interference of DSS Investigations).

He has now called on the State Department’s Office of Inspector General (OIG) to explain in detail how it produced the February 2013 OIG report on misconduct within the State Department and reported interference by senior State Department officials to stymie the subsequent investigations.

Basically, he told the OIG/D Harry Geisel that 1) he was troubled by reports that senior State Department officials may have prevented the Diplomatic Security Service (DSS) from investigating instances of administrative and criminal misconduct within the Department; and 2)   he was concerned that the Office of Inspector General (OIG) was reportedly aware of eight separate instances in which senior political appointees within the Department “influenced, manipulated, or simply called off” these cases, yet it failed to disclose this information to Congress.

Wait, what? Oh, paper trail!  A memorandum, two drafts, a final and sanitized version of OIG report ISP-I-13-18.

  • October 23, 2012 Memorandum: Among the cases reportedly investigated by DSS described in this memo is a Department security official in Beirut was alleged to have sexually assaulted foreign nationals hired as embassy guards; members of the Secretary’s security detail allegedly “engaged prostitutes while on official trips in foreign countries”; an “underground drug ring” may have supplied security contractors at Embassy Baghdad with drugs; and a U.S. Ambassador at a “sensitive diplomatic post” was “suspected of patronizing prostitutes in a public park.”
  •  Draft report dated November 20, 2012: This draft included many of the details contained in the October memorandum, in addition to referencing the attempts to block the investigations.
  • Draft report dated December 4, 2012: This draft reportedly “watered down the language,” focusing more on the need for investigative independence.
  • Final Report dated February 28, 2013:  Inspection of the Bureau of Diplomatic Security, Office of Investigations and Counterintelligence, Divisions of Special Investigations, Criminal Investigations, and Computer Investigations and Forensics (ISP-I-13-18).  This was apparently submitted to Congress in February 2013 but “was bereft of any reference to these specific cases” according to Mr. Royce.

Why Congressman Royce might be pissed?

Apparently on March 14, 2013, OIG representatives briefed Committee staff on a final version of the report but did not mention any of these alleged cases.

At no time during this meeting did OIG personnel explain the basis of this finding or provide details concerning “undue influence” on DSS investigations.  When asked, officials declined to comment on specific examples.  While the Department and OIG deny any wrongdoing, the lack of detail appears to be inconsistent with the OIG’s mission to keep the Congress “fully and currently informed.”

So the congressman is asking for the “immediate production of both the October 23, 2012 memorandum and the draft Inspection report(s), as well as all documents and communications referring or relating to the February 2013 Inspection of the Bureau of Diplomatic Security, Office of Investigations and Counterintelligence, Divisions of Special Investigations, Divisions of Special Criminal Investigations, and Computer Investigations and Forensics (ISP-I-13-18).  Further, he wants an OIG briefing to discuss the OIG’s “knowledge of this entire matter” and a clarification in writing  “whether, and on what basis, OIG agreed to omit information from this final report pursuant to any State Department official’s request.”

The request was for all requested documents and information “as soon as possible” but no later than 5:00 p.m. on June 27, 2013.

The full letter is here.

🙈

 

 

 

 

 

 

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Filed under Congress, Diplomatic Security, Foreign Service, Functional Bureaus, Govt Reports/Documents, Leadership and Management, Leaks|Controversies, State Department

Jen Psaki’s June 10 Press Briefing: No Sex, No Drugs n’ Too Much Rock n’ Roll

— By Domani Spero

By now you’ve seen the CBS News report about a State Department memo that reveals possible cover-ups and halted investigations. (See CBS News: Possible State Dept Cover-Ups on Sex, Drugs, Hookers — Why the “Missing Firewall” Was a Big Deal).

So, of course, it was a central piece during the June 10 Daily Press Briefing with State Department spokesperson Jen Psaki.  That portion of the DPB is lengthy (because lots of running around the room) but we have republished it below for your enjoyment. Basically Ms. Psaki’s made the following points from the podium:

  • All cases mentioned in the CBS report were thoroughly investigated or under investigation,” but she could not say how many were completed and how many are ongoing.
  • She also said that “Diplomatic Security has taken the further step of requesting an additional review by outside experienced law enforcement officers” and that the “investigation [is] being done by the Inspector General’s Office working with outside law enforcement officers.”  Wow! Lots of outside law enforcement officers, but can’t say if these outsiders are Will Smith’s Men in Black.
  • She made sure it’s clear, “I’m not suggesting that the IG is uniting with DOJ or the FBI. We would refer any criminal case, of course, to DOJ, as would be standard. But this is not that.”
  • About that firewall, she said, “we’ve disputed the notion of the issue of the firewall with the OIG office.” For good measure, she also added, “The Department would never condone any undue influence on any report or investigation.”
  • Oh you foolish people — wait she actually did not say that, but she did say, “I can say broadly that the notion that we would not vigorously pursue criminal misconduct in a case – in any case is preposterous.”
  • Asked if there’s anything in the CBS News report that she would dispute, she answered, “I don’t think I’m going to get into parsing this CBS story here.” The reporter who asked the question got the record to reflect that “I didn’t ask you to parse anything, I just asked if you had any problems with the accuracy of the report.”
  • The record did not reflect if Ms Psaki blinked when one of the reporters asked a Gotcha! question about an ambassador at the end of the press briefing.

One of the allegations in the CBS News report is that a State Department security official in Beirut “engaged in sexual assaults” on foreign nationals hired as embassy guards. The OIG inspected US Embassy Beirut in 2011 and on February 29, 2012 released a severely  redacted  report (see Inspection of Embassy Beirut, Lebanon (ISP-I-12-10A). This report as indicated by its title has an accompanying security annex not available to the public.  The compliance follow-up review (CFR) was conducted on the first quarter of 2013 and on May 31, 2013, the OIG released its CFR similarly with redactions (see  Compliance Follow-Up Review of Embassy Beirut, Lebanon (ISP-C-13-27A). This also contains a classified security annex.

The May 2013 CFR has as one of its key judgments this line: “The acting regional security officer (RSO) is proactive and widely respected.” There’s gotta be a reason why this merit special mention. What is it?

And because our readers enjoy giving us puzzles, we heard that this alleged Beirut “sex scandal” has a US Mission Egypt connection.  What is it?

Hey, to rephrase the DHS campaign — if you saw something, say something!

While waiting for these “outside law enforcement officers” to find out what really, really happened, please enjoy Ms. Psaki’s ‘no sex, no drugs, and too much rock n’ roll’ word cloud and awesome briefing below:

Made with WordItOut

Made with WordItOut

QUESTION: First, what – I guess we can begin most broadly simply by asking what comments you have about the report that aired on CBS News this morning concerning State Department OIG Office.

MS. PSAKI: Mm-hmm. Well, the Department of State employs more than 70,000 dedicated men and women serving in some of the most challenging environments working on behalf of the American people at 275 posts around the world. We hold all employees to the highest standards. We take allegations of misconduct seriously and we investigate thoroughly. All cases mentioned in the CBS report were thoroughly investigated or under investigation, and the Department continues to take action.

Finally, the Department has responded to the recommendations in the OIG report regarding the Bureau of Diplomatic Security’s Office of Investigations and Counterintelligence. Diplomatic Security has taken the further step of requesting an additional review by outside experienced law enforcement officers on top of the OIG inspection so that officers with law enforcement experience can make expert assessments about our current procedures.

QUESTION: Okay. There was a lot in there. And let me see if I can untangle it –

MS. PSAKI: Okay. Let’s see. We can go back and forth untangling.

QUESTION: – to borrow a phrase. You stated at one point early in your answer just now that all cases mentioned in the CBS News report were thoroughly investigated but that the State Department continues to take action on them. Did I understand you correctly?

MS. PSAKI: Yes. I did not mean to imply they were – the investigations were completed. Some are in process.

QUESTION: And when you talk about those cases being in process or in progress and action continuing to be taken on them, is that separate from the hiring of outside personnel that you also just referenced?

MS. PSAKI: Well, it’s not a hiring. It’s – it would be an investigation being done by the Inspector General’s Office working with outside law enforcement officers. So I would refer you them for any more specifics on that or how that would work. That’s a decision, of course, they make.

QUESTION: So you don’t have any further details you can share about who these outside investigators are or what they’re expected to accomplish?

MS. PSAKI: Well, the IG’s Office, which is as you know is independent, would be conducting this investigation, something we thoroughly support. But for any questions about that, I would naturally refer you to them.

QUESTION: So when you say that not all of these cases have been completed, some are still in progress, and that the State Department continues to take action, you’re saying that those pending cases are unfolding underneath the aegis of the State Department, not with respect to OIG?

MS. PSAKI: Correct. And there would be taking a look – and again, I don’t want to parse what their investigation is for them – but looking into current procedures, which is something that we fully support them doing.

QUESTION: As you know, one of the allegations in this story concerns a United States Ambassador who is still in that post said to have engaged in inappropriate conduct with minors as well as prostitutes. And I think you could understand the concerns that all Americans would have if one of our top diplomats overseas were engaged in that kind of activity and what that would do for the United States image abroad if credible allegations to that effect were, in essence, covered up. Can you assure the American people that no U.S. Ambassadors are engaged in that kind of inappropriate conduct, or that where there have been such credible allegations they have been fully investigated?

MS. PSAKI: Yes, I can confirm they would be fully investigated. I’m not going to talk about specific cases, but I can say broadly that the notion that we would not vigorously pursue criminal misconduct in a case – in any case is preposterous. And we’ve put individuals behind bars for criminal behavior. There is record of that. Ambassadors would be no exception. But of course, we would be – we are conducting investigations of all of these cases, and I don’t have anything further to speak to the process or status or anything along those lines.

QUESTION: Can I just – I want to clarify something, because there seem to be three different things going on here. One is the memo that the story reports on, which has to do with Diplomatic Security special investigations. You’re saying – and you said in answer to James’ question – all the cases that were mentioned in that story, which presumably is most of the ones or at least those are ones that are in this document, this memo, have either been investigated and they’re over or they’re still in the process of being investigated by DS.

MS. PSAKI: Correct.

QUESTION: Okay. Now, secondly, you have an IG report or audit or inspection of the investigatory department, that – of all of DS, I guess, but including that agency or that branch of it, which said that there is the perception, at least among some in DS, that investigations have been or can be influenced. Are you aware – because the IG report doesn’t actually come out and say that there has been any of this undue influence or improper influence. Is that still the case?

MS. PSAKI: Well, I don’t – am I aware personally? No.

QUESTION: Well, is the building – does the building think that this is a significant enough concern that the procedures should be changed, or is this something that is purely going to be done by the third strand of this, which is this outside review of the DS chain-of-command or the DS process?

MS. PSAKI: Well, let me see if I can explain this a little further. In the memo – there was an original memo that CBS was referring – there’s another IG memo that is public from February. And one of the issues that was raised in there was the lack of a firewall, which is what you’re referring to, I believe, if I’m understanding your question. And we have disputed this finding in a number of engagements with the OIG. The Department would never condone any undue influence on any report or investigation. But again, we took the extra precaution of asking – or I should say DS did – of asking or supporting – IG makes their own decisions – an investigation to look into the processes. And that’s what they’re doing so.

QUESTION: Okay. So in fact, there was a response to the OIG report, which said that there was this potential problem in the way that the structure in DS – that’s the process – there was a potential problem with the way it was structured and the investigatory process. And you said no, you don’t think that there is, but we’re going to go and bring in these outside people to look at it to make sure; is that –

MS. PSAKI: Correct.

QUESTION: Okay. And when was that outside – there was some suggestion that it was as a result of questions being asked about this that the outside investigation or the outside review was commissioned. How long ago was that?

MS. PSAKI: No, I can’t – I don’t know the exact timing, but I can assure you it was long before we were contacted by CBS.

QUESTION: Can I – there’s something I don’t understand here, Jen. First of all, the outside people who are being brought in, they’re –

MS. PSAKI: And just to be clear, sorry to interrupt you –

QUESTION: Yeah.

MS. PSAKI: — they’re not being brought in here.

QUESTION: Right.

MS. PSAKI: This is an independent IG process.

QUESTION: Right, so that’s the first thing I want to understand. So in other words, the State Department Inspector General has made a decision to bring in outside people to look into that issue?

MS. PSAKI: The process, mm-hmm.

QUESTION: The process, good.

MS. PSAKI: And procedures, mm-hmm.

QUESTION: Second, it’s not clear to me, and maybe you said it precisely, but I thought I heard it both ways – are those outside people who are being brought in by the IG to look at the process – are they current law enforcement officials, or are they people simply with law enforcement backgrounds?

MS. PSAKI: I don’t have that level of detail. Experienced law enforcement officials – the IG would be able to – office would be able to define them more clearly for you.

QUESTION: Since you mentioned it, though, I think it’s an important distinction to make, and ideally for you to clarify. Because if they are law enforcement officers working for another agency, right, like the Department of Justice or the FBI, whose jobs it is to investigate criminal malfeasance, then –

MS. PSAKI: Well, again, I don’t want you to combine a DOJ or FBI investigation with this independent IG investigation.

QUESTION: But that’s exactly why I’m asking, because if you’re not explaining who these people are – and I’m not looking for details, but I do think it’s important to understand whether these are people who have brought in – been brought in from other arms of the government whose job it is to investigate alleged malfeasance, or whether it – I don’t know, there may be consultants, there are lots of them that exist, that happen to have had law enforcement background, but are independent consultants who don’t work for the U.S. Government formally now.

So can you clarify that one point for us?

MS. PSAKI: Sure. I don’t have that level of detail, but I also just want to be very clear: I’m not suggesting that the IG is uniting with DOJ or the FBI. We would refer any criminal case, of course, to DOJ, as would be standard. But this is not that. So –

QUESTION: Okay. I think it’s important to understand, are these contractors with law enforcement experience, or are these law enforcement officials who have been brought over by the Inspector General? So if you can clarify that for all of us, I would appreciate it.

MS. PSAKI: Again, the IG’s office is the best place, but I understand your need for clarification.

QUESTION: Well, I’m confused now. Is the IG office – whose process are these outside investigators looking at? DS’s, right?

MS. PSAKI: The OIG, the Office of the Inspector General, is working with law enforcement.

QUESTION: The IG has hired these outside people to come in and look, or whatever?

MS. PSAKI: Again, I don’t have the level of detail of how they’re working together.

QUESTION: It’s the IG and not DS that’s done that?

MS. PSAKI: Correct.

QUESTION: All right. DS prides itself on being a federal law enforcement department. How is it that they can’t figure out what the proper way to structure these things is?

MS. PSAKI: Well, they’ve also – they’re also conducting investigations, as would be standard in any case of misconduct, on these cases as well. So this is just a separate investigation by an independent body looking into the processes, something we fully support.

QUESTION: Do you know, of the cases mentioned in the memo or the CBS report, how many have been resolved –

MS. PSAKI: I don’t, and I also would –

QUESTION: — and how many are still under investigation?

MS. PSAKI: I don’t think I would be able to provide that information.

QUESTION: Well, surely you could say that if any criminal activity was uncovered, do you know how many of them resulted in – because there are such things as allegations that turn out not to be proven, not to be true.

MS. PSAKI: There are. There certainly are.

QUESTION: So do you know how many were – turned out not to be true, or how many –

MS. PSAKI: I don’t have that level of information.

QUESTION: Well, I think that it would be quite nice if we could figure out exactly –

MS. PSAKI: If there’s something we can share on that, I’m happy to.

QUESTION: Because if all of these cases have been thoroughly investigated and there was no indication of criminal activity or that they were handled administratively, there was something short of criminal activity, it would be good to know. Because the impression from the report left out there is that the State Department is just ignoring really serious violations of the law.

MS. PSAKI: I think I made clear that’s not the case.

QUESTION: Well, that is the impression.

QUESTION: Can you address one particular allegation that’s in this original memo, which is the effect that the use of prostitutes by members of the Secretary of State’s detail, security detail, has been endemic over the years? That’s the word that was used, endemic.

MS. PSAKI: Again –

QUESTION: Is that something you can assure the American people, that the Secretary of State’s protective detail hasn’t been out cavorting with prostitutes in every port of call?

MS. PSAKI: Well, I started off by talking about how many people work for the Department of State around the world. Last year alone, the detail accompanied then-Secretary Clinton to 69 countries with more than 10,000 person-nights spent in hotels abroad. So I’m not going to speak to specific cases, as I said at the onset, for obvious reasons. But it is hardly endemic. Any case we would take seriously and we would investigate, and that’s exactly what we’re doing.

QUESTION: What is (inaudible)?

MS. PSAKI: He asked me if the incidents of a couple of individuals soliciting prostitutes would be – would show that it was endemic.

QUESTION: No, I thought he asked – and maybe I’m wrong, but I thought he asked, is the use of prostitutes by the Secretary’s detail endemic.

MS. PSAKI: I think we just said the same thing, and I just said –

QUESTION: And – well, no, you said he asked whether a few instances suggested that it was endemic, whereas I think his question was, “Is it endemic?” And is your –

MS. PSAKI: Absolutely not.

QUESTION: Okay, great. Thank you.

QUESTION: Okay. Well, are you saying that there are a few instances of this?

MS. PSAKI: I’m not at all.

QUESTION: Well, you just said that.

MS. PSAKI: He was asking me about a report that is being investigated.

QUESTION: Okay. So –

MS. PSAKI: And I don’t have anything further on that specific report. So he –

QUESTION: All right. So that is one of the ones that is still being looked at?

MS. PSAKI: Again, I don’t have anything specific for you on the status of any of these cases.

QUESTION: Well, I think you – but you opened the door to this line because you said – you hardly – you think that a few isolated – or whatever you said – a few –

MS. PSAKI: Alleged, Matt, alleged.

QUESTION: Okay. Alleged, all right, so it is still – it is alleged.

MS. PSAKI: I’m not going to get into, again, just to repeat, the specific incidents or the specific cases. But I did think it was worth making the point of how broad the Diplomatic Security issue – office is, how many men and women serve proudly and bravely every day.

QUESTION: Can I just ask you just one more thing on this?

MS. PSAKI: Sure.

QUESTION: Are you comfortable speaking – declaring something not to be true for 70,000 people?

MS. PSAKI: Well, I think –

QUESTION: I mean, are you comfortable, when you’re asked, can you assure the American people that something, whatever it is, is not endemic, you’re pretty confident when you say no, it’s not –

MS. PSAKI: I do feel comfortable –

QUESTION: — even though you’re talking about a large, large universe of people?

MS. PSAKI: — and after I said we have 70,000 employees, I said we take – we hold every employee to the highest standard. We take every allegation of misconduct seriously and we look into it.

QUESTION: Okay.

QUESTION: Jen, can I ask you, do you take issue with any of the instances that were mentioned in the CBS report that are being or have been examined by the Diplomatic Service and the IG? There was – the one we’ve mentioned, we talked about the prostitutes, there was always – also an issue about drugs being sold at the Baghdad Embassy. Do you – does the Department take issue with any of those cases that were mentioned?

MS. PSAKI: Again, I just – I understand the desire to know more about each case, but I just can’t go into specifics for ongoing cases. I just made a broad point for the purpose of talking about Diplomatic Security as a whole, but I’m not going to go into specific cases.

QUESTION: So you can’t tell us whether each of those cases mentioned in the CBS is actually something that has been looked into by the IG?

MS. PSAKI: I did say at the beginning that they’re all being investigated or have been investigated, but I’m not going to go into specifics of the status of what they –

QUESTION: No, but you could confirm if those cases are factually correct, as in the CBS report.

MS. PSAKI: It is not at all confirming they’re factually correct. These are allegations in a memo. So obviously, as I stated at the beginning, they have been – all these cases are being looked into. They were already in the process of being looked into prior to the memo, and again, I don’t have any update on status, or I don’t want to break down what is happening internally.

QUESTION: And can you tell us how they came to the notice of the IG? What triggered –

MS. PSAKI: I can’t. You’d have to ask the IG office that question. It was an IG memo.

QUESTION: So then just for clarification, none of these cases have been resolved, then? Because you said they’re all –

MS. PSAKI: Again, I didn’t –

QUESTION: You said you can’t comment on cases that are in an ongoing process. So –

MS. PSAKI: Just to alleviate all confusion, these – all these cases have been looked into or are being looked into. I’m not breaking down which have been concluded, which haven’t. That’s not something –

QUESTION: Can you – I mean, you said you’re –

MS. PSAKI: I cannot.

QUESTION: — not allowed to talk – I’m just clarifying –

MS. PSAKI: I cannot.

QUESTION: — you’re not allowed to talk about cases that are in process, but –

MS. PSAKI: I didn’t mean –

QUESTION: — are you able to talk about cases that are resolved?

MS. PSAKI: I don’t have anything for you on any of the specific cases.

QUESTION: And you would dispute the notion that any of these cases that have been – that are being looked into, that there was any kind of political pressure or other kind of pressure put on the investigators? You would say that that is not correct, correct?

MS. PSAKI: Correct. This is obviously – we’ve taken –

QUESTION: So the memo, the allegations in the memo, according to this building, are wrong?

MS. PSAKI: Again, we’ve taken the extra step. The DS office has taken the extra step –

QUESTION: But the allegation in the memo that –

MS. PSAKI: We will let that process unwind.

QUESTION: Because if someone – fair enough, but I mean, the whole idea is that the investigations – that people might be being pressured into terminating an investigation or dropping it just because they’re told to improperly. So, you could say –

MS. PSAKI: Well, we’ve – well, what I said –

QUESTION: — that all the cases are being investigated, and –

MS. PSAKI: — earlier, so let me point back to this, Matt –

QUESTION: — both could be true.

MS. PSAKI: — is that we’ve disputed the notion of the issue of the firewall with the OIG office.

QUESTION: Right.

MS. PSAKI: We would never condone this. As an extra step, the DS has asked them to look into this.

QUESTION: I understand, but I just –

MS. PSAKI: We’ll let this play out.

QUESTION: I just want to make sure and clear that you deny the allegation in the memo that there was political or some kind of pressure put on investigators to drop cases or to –

QUESTION: Undue pressure.

QUESTION: — undue pressure to –

MS. PSAKI: Again, I don’t have anything –

QUESTION: That’s not correct.

MS. PSAKI: — more to add than what I’ve already added on this case.

QUESTION: Can I ask just two sort of housekeeping questions on this? Number one: Is there anything in CBS News reporting this morning, either on TV or online, that the Department of State disputes?

MS. PSAKI: I don’t think I’m going to get into parsing this CBS story here. I think I’ve laid out what our position is, the steps we’ve taken. Some of that wasn’t included in the report, so I would – in the report this morning, so I would point you to that.

QUESTION: Let the record reflect I didn’t ask you to parse anything, I just asked if you had any problems with the accuracy of the report. As you know, your colleague, Mr. Ventrell, seated to the side of the podium today, has on certain occasions – and all spokesmen from time to time find it within their rights to say when they think something has been inaccurately reported. I wasn’t asking you to parse anything, but let the record also reflect you have nothing that you want to raise as an issue with the CBS News reporting on this subject, unless you interrupt me to the contrary.

MS. PSAKI: Well, I think what I just said, to answer your question, is that there was information, including the fact that we have been looking into these cases, what we’ve asked the IG to do and to undertake, that are important, relevant components of that. I’d have to look back closely at the story, but those are important pieces for everybody to note in their reporting moving forward.

QUESTION: Lastly, you stated earlier that the decision to retain these outside law enforcement types was one that was taken officially long before the Department of State was contacted by CBS News.

MS. PSAKI: That’s not what I said. What I said – and sorry, I know this is – there’s a lot of details here in that the Department – Diplomatic Security had been looking into these cases. Separately, they had also asked – has taken the further step of asking for an additional review by outside, experienced law enforcement officers on top of the OIG investigation, so working with the OIG investigation –

QUESTION: And that latter –

QUESTION: This is what –

QUESTION: Excuse me. Excuse me. That latter decision to retain those outside types, you stated earlier in this briefing, was made, quote, “long before we were contacted by CBS News.” That’s what you said.

MS. PSAKI: Correct.

QUESTION: When were you contacted by CBS News?

MS. PSAKI: I don’t think I’m going to get into that from here.

QUESTION: Hold on a second.

MS. PSAKI: Mm-hmm.

QUESTION: This is why I wanted to clarify this right after Arshad’s last question. It is not the OIG that is contracted or otherwise arranged with this law enforcement – outside law enforcement to do this review. It is DS itself. Is that correct?

MS. PSAKI: No, I believe it’s the IG is working with these –

QUESTION: All right. Because that’s not what you just said.

MS. PSAKI: It was perhaps phrased in a confusing way. So I apologize for that.

QUESTION: So it is –

MS. PSAKI: But the IG is doing the independent report on this. They are working with outside law enforcement folks.

QUESTION: So if – so in other words, DS still thinks there’s no problem?

MS. PSAKI: DS continues to look into these cases where relevant.

QUESTION: Right, but they think there’s no problem. As you said, they dispute the finding of the IG.

MS. PSAKI: They support the effort –

QUESTION: So they –

MS. PSAKI: — to do the additional investigation.

QUESTION: Does the fact that the Ambassador in Belgium is still in place speak to where the case is and what progress?

MS. PSAKI: I don’t have anything for you on that.

(*-*)

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Officially In: Daniel Sepulveda to EB/CIP (DAS with Ambassador Rank)

— By Domani Spero

On May 23, President Obama announced his intent to nominate Daniel Sepulveda – with rank of Ambassador during his tenure of service as Deputy Assistant Secretary for International Communications and Information Policy in the Economic and Business Affairs Bureau. The WH released the following brief bio:

Daniel Sepulveda is the Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for International Communications and Information Policy, a position he has held since April 2013.  From 2009 to 2013, he was a Senior Advisor in the Office of U.S. Senator John Kerry.  Previously, he was Assistant U.S. Trade Representative for Congressional Affairs in the Office of the United States Trade Representative from January 2009 to November 2009.  Before serving in the Obama Administration, he was a Legislative Assistant for U.S. Senator Barack Obama from 2005 to 2008 and U.S. Senator Barbara Boxer from 2001 to 2005.  He served as Special Assistant to the Assistant Secretary for Public Affairs from 2000 to 2001 and Special Assistant to the Assistant Secretary for Policy from 1999 to 2000 at the U.S. Department of Labor.  From 1997 to 1999, he was a Policy Analyst with the National Council of La Raza.

Mr. Sepulveda received a B.A. from Emory University and an M.P.A. from the University of Texas in Austin where he studied as a Woodrow Wilson Fellow in Public Policy and International Affairs.

http://www.youtube.com/watch?feature=player_embedded&v=DQTq8mKf4Yg

The Deputy Assistant Secretary of State normally would not require a Senate confirmation, but since this one carries an ambassador rank, it does. Longer bio here.

Al Kamen’s In the Loop on this appointment:

The Clinton State Department had Washington power couple Phil and Melanne Verveer in senior positions: she as ambassador-at-large for global women’s issues and he as coordinator of international communications and information policy.

Sepulveda is the long-time (some 14 years) boyfriend of Heather Higginbottom, former deputy director of the Office of Management and Budget who Kerry tapped as his counselor.

Active links added above.  The Orlando Sentinel also has a recent article on Mr. Sepulveda including his bout with testicular cancer at age 23 and the couple’s upcoming  wedding this month.   Read it here.

(‘_’)

Related item:

President Obama Announces More Key Administration Posts | May 23, 2013

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Congress Seeks Details on Status of Four State Dept Employees ‘Fired’ Over Benghazi

— By Domani Spero

Express mail has been terribly busy between the Hill and Foggy Bottom. On May 28, the House Oversight Committee issued a subpoena for “documents and communications referring or relating to the Benghazi talking points” from ten current and former State Department officials.

The very next day, U.S. Rep. Ed Royce (R-CA), Chairman of the House Foreign Affairs Committee, along with 14 other Members of the Committee, also called on Secretary Kerry to detail what personnel actions the State Department has taken regarding the four Department employees who were cited by the Accountability Review Board (ARB) for displaying “leadership and management deficiencies” that led to the grossly inadequate security at the diplomatic facility in Benghazi last year.

In December last year, State Spokesperson, Victoria Nuland said: ”The ARB identified the performance of four officials, three in the Bureau of the Diplomatic Security and one in the Bureau of Near East Asia Affairs….The Secretary has accepted Eric Boswell’s decision to resign as Assistant Secretary for Diplomatic Security, effective immediately. The other three individuals have been relieved of their current duties. All four individuals have been placed on administrative leave pending further action.”

You might want to read WaPo’s The Fact Checker – Has anyone been ‘fired’ because of the Benghazi attacks?

Below is an excerpt of Mr. Royce’s letter to Secretary Kerry:

As part of our inquiry, Committee Members have repeatedly asked the State Department to explain the employment status of certain Department personnel who were cited by the Accountability Review Board (ARB) for displaying “leadership and management deficiencies” that led to the inadequate security in Benghazi.

Initial reports indicated that these officials were “relieved of their duties,” thus implying their employment had been terminated.  However, by all accounts, these individuals have instead been placed on administrative leave and may or may not be returning to work.  Moreover, at least one of these individuals has stated that he has still not been informed of why he was removed from his position within the Department, or been allowed to view the ARB’s conclusions with respect to his job performance.  The Department’s handling of these matters is of great concern to the Committee, other Members of Congress, and the public.

When appearing before the Committee on April 17, 2013, you testified that you would soon be weighing in on an “internal review and analysis” of the performance of these individuals with respect to their handling of security issues.  Now that over one month has passed since your testimony, and over a full five months have passed since the ARB issued its report, we expect an immediate update on this process, and confirmation as to whether the referenced personnel are still employed by the Department.

Additionally, if these officials are still employed but on administrative leave, please describe what steps the Department has taken to resolve the issue of their employment status.  Please also provide a detailed account of any action taken by these officials to challenge the findings of the ARB report, including their basis for doing so.  Lastly, if any of these individuals are no longer employed by the Department, please provide a detailed explanation of the circumstances leading to the termination of their employment.

The full text of the letter is here.

The “at least one of these individuals” referred to in the letter above is without a doubt, Raymond Maxwell who told The Daily Beast that “nobody from the State Department has ever told him why he was singled out for discipline and that he has never had access to the classified portion of the ARB report.”

So now Congress wants details on what the State Department did to Diplomatic Security Assistant Secretary Eric J. Boswell, PDAS Scott P Bultrowicz, DAS Charlene R. Lamb and  NEA DAS Raymond Maxwell.

Ahnd, so do we!!

Obviously since there was no leadership and management deficiencies at the top … well, we need to see what the bureaucracy actually does to officials below who are deemed deficient in leadership and management.

But — hey, do you know why this is taking so long?  Are they still researching the Foreign Affairs Manual (FAM) so they can break the um … administrative gridlock?  Or are they updating the FAM so they can have a citation to cite?

Waiting bored until somebody translates this bureaucratic puzzle into something understandable for Congress and the neighbors …

(-__-)

Update: On May 30, the State Department was specifically asked about this during the Daily Press Brief, and here is the official word from the podium:

QUESTION: Okay. You’re aware of this letter that Congressman – also Chairman – Royce has sent inquiring as to the status of the four individuals who the ARB singled out in their classified version. Do you have an answer to – well, one, have you responded to him, and two, can you – if you have or if you haven’t, can you give us any update on what those – on what their status is –

MS. PSAKI: Well, we just received the letter yesterday, so I’m not aware of a formal response at this time, although that is something that we do do in response to letters, of course. I have seen the content of the letter. There’s no real mystery here. We talk – we’ve talked about this. I have talked about this from the podium, so let me walk you through a couple of status issues. One is the Secretary is briefed regularly by his senior staff and is focused on not only continuing the ongoing cooperation with Congress, but on implementing the ARB recommendations and coming to a conclusion on the status of these four individuals. He has publicly made that clear that he considers – and that he’s considering a number of factors.

As we’ve talked about a little bit before, career Foreign Service employees are entitled to due process and legal protections under the Foreign Service Act with respect to any potential disciplinary action, and Secretary Kerry, as he said in his budget testimony, there are a set of rules and standards that govern personnel actions such as these, and any actions must be considered with a full understanding of options.

So in terms of what the status is, he continues to review with all those factors –

QUESTION: Okay. Still pending?

MS. PSAKI: — and will make a decision soon.

In short, still pending.

(-__-)

 

 

 

 

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Snapshot: Bureau of Diplomatic Security Direct-Hire Staffing, 2000-2012

 

Extracted from CRS report: Securing U.S. Diplomatic Facilities and Personnel Abroad: Background and Policy Issues, May 7, 2013 via Secrecy News:

Screen Shot 2013-05-22

–DS

 

 

 

 

 

 

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37 Former Ambassadors Urge Appointment of a Career Diplomat to State Dept’s Public Diplomacy Bureau

A group of 51 retired senior foreign affairs professionals including 37 former ambassadors recently wrote a letter to the Secretary of State urging that  ”a career foreign affairs professional be appointed as the next Under Secretary of State for Public Diplomacy and Public Affairs.” Below is an excerpt from the letter.  The full text of the letter is at the end of this post:

A career foreign affairs professional, with years of overseas and Washington experience, is more likely to understand the larger world context and how public diplomacy can help achieve America’s policy goals.   
[...]
The President’s and your public engagements are among our country’s greatest diplomatic assets.  You have over a thousand skilled, culturally-aware, and language-trained public diplomacy officers ready to leverage advanced technology and person-to-person communications skills in order to change foreign outcomes in America’s favor.  All they need is truly professional, experienced leadership.

 

Tara Sonenshine, the incumbent of what is known as the “R” bureau  was appointed on April 5, 2012 and reported to be leaving post early this summer. This position was created on October 1, 1999 after the abolishment of the United States Information Agency. The Under Secretary oversees three bureaus at the Department of State: Educational and Cultural Affairs, Public Affairs, and International Information Programs.

Matt Armstrong’s Mountainrunner posted a backgrounder on this position: R we there yet? A look at the Under Secretary for Public Diplomacy (and Public Affairs) in January 2012.

No career diplomat has ever been appointed to this position (via history.state.gov):

  1. Evelyn Simonowitz Lieberman (1999-2001)
  2. Charlotte L. Beers (2001-2003)
  3. Margaret DeBardeleben Tutwiler (2003-2004)
  4. Karen P. Hughes (2005-2007)
  5. James K. Glassman (2008-2009)
  6. Judith A. McHale (2009-2011)
  7. Tara D. Sonenshine (2012-)

The ambassadors’ letter and the reportedly forthcoming “scathing” OIG report on the IIP Bureau might just be the nudge to move this bureau under a career professional. But that remains to be seen.

If you haven’t read that OIG report, that’s because it has apparently been floating around for months but has yet to be released to the public.  Somebody got tired of waiting, of course, and leaked a portion of it to WaPo’s Al Kamen:

“The unredacted version of a new IG report on the state of the Bureau of International Information Programs the modern successor to the USIA and a part of the underscretary’s portfolio, says that “leadership fostered an atmosphere of secrecy, suspicion and uncertainty” and where staff “describe the . . . atmosphere as toxic and leadership’s tolerance of dissenting views as non-existent.”

There’s a “pervasive perception of cronyism,” the 50-page draft report says, “aggravating the serious morale problem.” But before you think the place needs a good old-fashioned reorganization, staffers already talk about what the report calls “reorganization fatigue,” for the constant prior reorganizations.”

Below is the text of the letter sent to Secretary Kerry.  The signatories include John R. Beyrle, Director, U.S. Russia Foundation, and former Ambassador to Russia and Bulgaria; Barbara K. Bodine, former Ambassador to Yemen; Edward Brynn, former Ambassador to Burkina Faso and Ghana, and Acting Historian of the Department of State;  Brian Carlson, former Ambassador to Latvia and Public Affairs Officer (PAO) in Spain, Norway, and Bulgaria; John Campbell, Ambassador (Retired), Ralph Bunche Senior Fellow for Africa Policy Studies, Council on Foreign Relations; Walter L. Cutler, former Ambassador to Saudi Arabia, Tunisia, and Zaire; John Evans, former Ambassador to Armenia; Linda Jewell, former Ambassador to Ecuador;  Robert Finn, former Ambassador to Afghanistan and Tajikistan.

It also includes Richard LeBaron, former Ambassador to Kuwait and Founding Coordinator of the Center for Strategic Counterterrorism Communications and Thomas R. Pickering, former Ambassador to Nigeria, Jordan, El Salvador, Israel, the United Nations, India, and Russia, and Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs. Full text below:

We urge that a career foreign affairs professional be appointed as the next Under Secretary of State for Public Diplomacy and Public Affairs.  Such an appointment would support your efforts fully to integrate public diplomacy into U.S. foreign affairs.

No career professional has served as Under Secretary for Public Diplomacy and Public Affairs.  Coincidentally or not, today there is a wide consensus that U.S. perspectives are less well understood abroad, and people-to-people exchanges are less robust than they should be.  In today’s globalizing but still threatening world, and as our military forces abroad are drawn down, it is more important than ever that America strengthen its “soft power.”  For this, public diplomacy is an essential and powerful tool.

A career foreign affairs professional, with years of overseas and Washington experience, is more likely to understand the larger world context and how public diplomacy can help achieve America’s policy goals.  And it is challenging to direct and energize public diplomacy if the leadership  has brief tours or vacancies are lengthy.  Prior to the incumbent Under Secretary for Public Diplomacy and Public Affairs, leaving after just over a year in office, the previous four served, on average, nearly two years.  By comparison, the previous four Under Secretaries for Political Affairs, all career professionals, served, on average, nearly three-and-one-half years.  The U.S. Advisory Commission on Public Diplomacy reports that the position of Under Secretary for Public Diplomacy and Public Affairs has been vacant more than 30% of the time since it was created in 1999.  The position of Under Secretary for Political Affairs has been vacant only 5% of that time.

Studies by the Defense Science Board, RAND, and other independent groups have found that America’s engagement with foreign publics succeeds best when led by experienced officials having the authority to establish priorities, assign responsibilities, transfer funds, and concur in senior appointments.  Leaders must have direct access to you and the President on critical communication issues as policies are formulated and implemented.

When done well, public diplomacy works.  Large numbers of foreign heads of government, legislators, and social, economic, and political leaders — many of them America’s staunch allies and stalwart friends — have participated in U.S. public diplomacy programs.  The University of Southern California recently reported that of individuals exposed to U.S. public diplomacy, 79 percent have used what they learned to bring about positive change in their own communities by running for political office, organizing a civil society group, doing volunteer work, and starting a new business or other projects.  Fully 94 percent say the exposure has increased their understanding of U.S. foreign policy, and America’s people, society, and values.

The President’s and your public engagements are among our country’s greatest diplomatic assets.  You have over a thousand skilled, culturally-aware, and language-trained public diplomacy officers ready to leverage advanced technology and person-to-person communications skills in order to change foreign outcomes in America’s favor.  All they need is truly professional, experienced leadership.

End text/

 

We’ll see if anything happens.  In the meantime, we’re looking forward to reading that IG report.  We hope it comes out before the end of summer.

sig4

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

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State Dept Seeks Drug/Steroid Testing of Security Personnel in Afghanistan and Jerusalem

The State Department is looking for a contractor to provide drug and steroid screening of all Diplomatic Security employees in Afghanistan and Jerusalem. The announcement was posted on FedBiz on Apr 29, 2013  per Solicitation Number: RFI(04292013):

Via FedBiz

The Department of State (DoS) Office of Diplomatic Security (DS) is concerned with the well-being of its employees, the successful accomplishment of agency missions, and the need to maintain employee productivity. Many of the DS-hired U.S. Citizen (USC) and Third Country National (TCN) direct hire and/or contract positions in Afghanistan and Jerusalem involve the use of weapons and access to highly sensitive information that must not be compromised. It is critically important that such armed employees, or those employees exposed to extreme conditions, be reliable, stable, and show good use of judgment. Illegal drug and steroid use creates the possibility of coercion, influence, and irresponsible action under pressure, all of which may pose a serious risk to national defense, public safety, and security. Prior to deployment, all employees certify that drug testing and steroid screening is a nonnegotiable condition of employment.

This performance work statement defines the drug and steroid testing requirements (hereinafter referred to as “Substance Screening”) applicable to DS-hired USC and TCN direct hires and/or contract positions in Afghanistan and Jerusalem. In this document, DS will be referred to as the DS who will receive support from the Contractor. Employee will be the all-encompassing term for DS direct hires, personal services contractors, or third party contractors.

Below is part of the Scope of Work posted with the solicitation:

The Contractor shall be licensed to operate through the Government of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan (GIRoA) and Government of Israel, and shall be in full compliance with host country business requirements. The Contractor will be self-sufficient and required to provide all life support, travel and security needs for staff. In addition, the Contractor shall support all shipping, maintenance, and housing of equipment necessary to perform services. The Contractor will provide all resources to perform random and non-random Substance Screening, preferably at the following locations, with the corresponding number of estimated employees:

• Kabul: 1300
• Mazar e-Sharif: 150
• Herat: 175
• Jerusalem: 55

Random screening will be on a semiannual basis (every six months) as well as non-random substance testing. All random and non-random substance testing performed shall comply with Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act of 1996 (HIPAA) Privacy and Security Rules (http://www.hhs.gov/ocr/privacy/hipaa/understanding/summary/i

[...]

The Contractor shall be prepared to test for the following drugs utilizing a rapid urine test in Afghanistan and/or Israel, except for Steroid:

  • Amphetamine
  • Opiate
  • Benzodiazepine
  • Barbituates
  • Cocaine
  • Marijuana
  • Steroid: Refer to the following commonly abused steroids on the National Institute on Drug Abuse’s (NISA) website or at Steroidabuse.gov.

Security contractors in Afghanistan, particularly those in Kabul  have a um… colorful history (see POGO writes to Secretary Clinton about US Embassy Kabul Guards) so it’s only surprising that it took this long.  But it is  curious about Jerusalem though, isn’t it? Anyone knows what prompted this?

Update:  We understand from a blog pal that this may not be anything new as apparently drug screening is routinely done for “high threat protection” contractors.  Jerusalem has protection contractors that predates both Iraq and Afghanistan as it covers all official travel to Gaza and the West Bank.  But according to a Q&A posted online on FedBiz, these drug tests have not been performed in Israel in the past.

 

– DS

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

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The Sad Saga of US Consulate Jeddah’s New Consulate Compound via USASpending.gov

We previously blogged about USCG Jeddah  (see 2005 Jeddah ARB Recommended “Remote Safe Areas” for Embassies – Upgrades Coming … Or Maybe Not and New US Consulate in Jeddah – Under Construction Since 2007?)

There was a December 6, 2004 terrorist attack on USCG Jeddah where gunmen killed four locally employed staff members and injured nine others working outside the consulate building. At least six months before that, a $319,197 contract was awarded for the Jeddah facility upgrade.

Screen Shot 2013-04-20

On May 12, 2006, there was another attack on USCG Jeddah.  A number of shots were fired at the consulate compound but no casualties were reported.  Sixteen months after this attack and almost three years after the deadly 2004 attack, a $122,292,510 contract was awarded to Grunley Walsh for the design/build project in Jeddah.

Screen Shot 2013-04-20

Ten months later, a $390,000 contract was also awarded to Grunley Walsh for the design/build project in Jeddah. The reason for the modification was for “funding only action” whatever that means.

Screen Shot 2013-04-20
On February 11, 2009, the $122,205,676 contract with the Grunley Walsh Limited Liability Company was again modified. The reason indicated for modification was “change order.” USASpending data indicates that the current contract value at the time of modification was $19,000 with $122,205,676 obligated.

Grunley-Walsh was renamed Aurora-LLC after it was sold.  At least, by April 29, 2010, Grunley-Walsh had become Aurora-LLC because according to McClatchy News, Aurora-LLC lawyers at that time were then dealing with the State Department’s Bureau of Overseas Building Operations on its subcontractor issue with First Kuwaiti.

On May 10, 2010, Aurora was terminated from the Jeddah contract according to McClatchy News citing a State Department official, “after 90 percent of the contract period had expired, with only 54 percent of the work done.”

On November 18, 2010, Aurora LLC was mentioned in a letter from the Project on Government Oversight (POGO) to the White House questioning the independence of the State Department’s Inspector General.

As an aside — the website grunley-walsh.com is currently an online parking lot. Aurora-LLC is now a “page not found” although you can still find the cache version of the website here.  Findthecompany.com has an online snapshot of Aurora-LLC here showing $240 million in revenue in 2011.

The planned USCG Jeddah (image from state.gov/obo)

The planned USCG Jeddah (image from state.gov/obo)

We are unable to locate information on what happened to this project after the contract was reportedly terminated on May 10, 2010. We presumed incorrectly that there was another contractor after the contract was terminated in 2010; there does not appear to be one.  But two years and four months after that May 10, 2010 termination, there is a new contract and a new contractor.

On September 27, 2012, a $100,543,000 contract was awarded to American International Contractors, Inc.  While the USASpending page only states that this is for the construction of a New Consulate Compound in Saudi Arabia, the publicly available document on FDCD 2012 Fiscal Year OBO Capital Project Awards does indicate that SAQMMA-12-C-0221 for $100,543,000 is for the Jeddah NCC with an expected completion date of 24 months.

Screen Shot 2013-04-20

So excluding the facility upgrade in 2004, it looks like the Jeddah NCC which has been on the planning/construction/hold/construction/delivery phase since 2007 now amounts to $233,225,510. We’re terrible at math, but it looks like this project is now years delayed and almost double the original contract.

In addition, this project has now spanned the tenures of three secretaries of state – Rice, Clinton, and Kerry. Neither the State Department’s Inspector General Office nor the oversight people in Congress appears terribly bothered by the delay or the expanded cost of this project.

If anyone has the stories beyond the paper trail, we’d like to hear about it.

Meanwhile, a trip down memory lane —

In 2005, then Secretary Condoleeza Rice said this:

[W]e will also make sure that the tremendous charge that we have to lead the diplomatic effort, to support those diplomatic efforts, to train people well, to make sure that people are safe and secure in the embassies, to make sure that our nationals abroad have access to us so that they can be secure in dangerous times, that those will be very high priorities. I know they are very high priorities for me. They are high priorities for the President, as well. We will do everything we can to make sure that we’ve got the resources that we need.

Then there’s Secretary Hillary Clinton who said this:

[P]lease know that nothing is more important to us than your safety, and making sure you have secure places to live and work is our top priority.

Current Secretary of State John Kerry said this not too long ago:

I guarantee you that, beginning this morning when I report for duty upstairs, everything I do will be focused on the security and safety of our people. 

 

Somebody please put Jeddah on his agenda.  Of course, we can’t expect the secretary of state to be hammering nails at wherever place, but all that talk  and years on this … it’s sad to see that  USCG Jeddah is still missing a new secure building and no one seems to be upset about it.

– DS

Correction: USASpending.gov not/not USASpending.com

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Filed under Construction, Consul Generals, Diplomatic Attacks, Foreign Service, Functional Bureaus, Govt Reports/Documents, Secretary of State, State Department, U.S. Missions, Uncategorized

New US Consulate in Jeddah – Under Construction Since 2007?

We recently blogged about the US Consulate General in Jeddah, Saudi Arabia (see 2005 Jeddah ARB Recommended “Remote Safe Areas” for Embassies – Upgrades Coming … Or Maybe Not).  Then, as often the case, a reader writes; this time with a question  –  hey, do you know that we have constructed the shell of a new consulate in Jeddah on a big compound that just sits empty?

Nope, didn’t know that. We’ve been looking around and saw this:

The planned USCG Jeddah (image from state.gov/obo)

The planned USCG Jeddah (image from state.gov/obo)

The OBO website has few details about the Jeddah New Consulate Compound (NCC):

Estimated Construction Completion:  February 29, 2012
General Construction Contractor:  TBD
Architectural Firm: [blank]

Back in 2007, Arab News actually covered this new site. The NCC according to the news, citing a statement from USCG Jeddah, was supposed to  start construction in late 2007, and be completed in 2009:

JEDDAH, 13 August 2007 — The US Consulate in Jeddah is to be relocated within two to three years at a new site on the corner of King Road (Al-Malik Road) and Sari Street. Work is currently under way to prepare the new location, which will also serve as the consul general’s residence.

According to a press release posted on the consulate’s website, the newly appointed US Ambassador to Saudi Arabia Ford M. Fraker visited the new site on May 20 accompanied by Consul General Tatiana C. Gfoeller. The press release, however, did not identify the location.

“The visit follows a recent agreement approved by the Government of Saudi Arabia to purchase land for the new Consulate General compound. Construction for the new facilities will begin later in 2007 and is expected to be completed in 2009,” the statement said.

Then on June 10, 2010, in an article titled, Did the State Dept go to bat for First Kuwaiti? McClatchy News added a piece to the Jeddah puzzle:

“The official noted that Aurora was terminated from the Jeddah contract on May 10 this year, after 90 percent of the contract period had expired, with only 54 percent of the work done. (Aurora, according to other letters we obtained, is demanding $10.5 million in breach damages from the government, as well as $5.7 million for work it performed).”

If First Kuwaiti sounds familiar, that’s because in August 2011, the Project on Government Oversight (POGO) also reported about this in Contractor Behind Bungled Embassy Construction Sends State Dept. List of Claims Totaling $375 Million.  

The State Department official who spoke to McClatchy News in June 2010 confirmed that the  Jeddah contract was terminated in May 2010 with only 54% of the work done.

The Bureau of Overseas Buildings Bureau of Overseas Building  Operations’ Design and Construction Program for FEDCon 2013 – The Market Outlook on Federal Construction dated January 9, 2013 listed the Jeddah NCC (see slide 24) as one of the recently awarded projects.  The contractor listed for the project is the American International Contractors (AIC). According to its website, in 2012 AICI-SP was awarded contracts for construction of Department of State facilities in Jeddah, Saudi Arabia and Taipei, Taiwan. It looks like the Jeddah NCC contract was for $100,543,000.00 awarded on 28 Sep 2012 for  a 24 month duration.

If the Jeddah NCC originally started construction in 2007 with a 2009 completion date, and the original contractor was terminated in 2010, the termination happened when it was already behind schedule. We presumed though cannot confirmed  that a new contractor was selected after that with an expected delivery date of February 29, 2012. If that worked out, there would not have been a reason to re-award this contact in 2012.  But there it is.

If anyone has a clearer and more straight-forward timeline for this project, please feel free to leave a comment or drop a line via contactify.  This new consulate is supposed to replace the old consulate which was attacked by terrorists on Dec. 6, 2004 and again on May 12, 2006.  We’d like to understand how this NCC can be 3-5 years behind schedule.  And if the 2012 contract is for $100,543,000.00, how much would be the total cost of Jeddah NCC when you add all the previous contracts for this facility alone? Is this phase whatever of one contract?

We don’t know anything more than what we’ve written here, which is not a lot, but — if this facility has been under construction since 2007 and in 2013 you can walk around in there and not a creature is stirring, something is the matter. And not knowing the answers to the what and whys are nagging us, um, literally to death!!

Now on the off chance that you’re reading this from Jeddah and doing your visa and ACS interviews from inside this new NCC, please send us a note and tell us when you moved in.

– DS

 

 

 

 

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Filed under Construction, Consul Generals, Foreign Service, Functional Bureaus, State Department, U.S. Missions