No Comparator Case For DS Agent With PTSD — Failure to Follow Regs, Lack of Candor Charges Came 2 1⁄2 Years Late

Posted: 3:12 am  EDT

 

This is a case of a DS Agent charged with lack of candor and failure to follow regulations for incidents that took place in 2010 related to his PTSD.   The State Department issued a final decision to  suspend the agent for 12 days.  According to the ROI, the deciding official at the agency level grievance “also considered the mitigating factors and gave grievant credit for having no past formal disciplinary record and a satisfactory work history. The deciding official also noted grievant’s potential for rehabilitation, while recognizing that grievant clearly was embarrassed by his diagnosis of PTSD, and feared that he might be stigmatized by the label, or that he might even lose his job with the Department.”

A couple things striking about this case.  Following grievant’s military service in Iraq in 2006, he started having panic attacks and severe anxiety, for which he was prescribed several medications – none of which he says worked very well. His symptoms became worse over time. In 2009 he was diagnosed as having Post Traumatic Stress Disorder (PTSD).  The incidents that ultimately led to the two charges occurred in November 2010; yet the Department did not propose disciplinary action until April 24, 2013 – a span of 29 months. The ROI does not explain the delay.

Grievant reportedly denied during the interviews with that he had been diagnosed with PTSD, saying instead that he had been treated for anxiety and panic attacks. And yet, according to the ROI, grievant avers that “he discussed his PTSD diagnosis in considerable detail with the DS investigators, and authorized release of his medical records.”

Grievant admits he did not comply with Department regulations requiring him to report that he had been prescribed psychiatric medications, but claims he was unaware of the policy requiring him to do so. He claims that he was not alone in being unaware of this requirement, as many other DS officers to his knowledge were also unaware of the regulation.

Since grievant is a DS agent, the Department has also cited 12 FAM Exhibit 023 2.5, its Deadly Force and Firearms Policy (which we can no longer read online, as it’s now behind the firewall). 12 FAM Exhibit 023 section 2.5 12 FAH-9 H-030 appears specific to prescription medication.  The State Department showed, and the FSGB agreed that there are no similar cases that presented the same set of circumstances as in this grievant’s case.

The Board held that grievance be granted in part and denied in part. The Board remanded the case to the Department to consider an appropriate penalty in view of their decision not to sustain two specifications of one of the two charges.

Summary:

Grievant faces two charges – Lack of Candor and Failure to Follow Regulations – that were leveled against him because of statements he made during a Department investigation about incidents that took place while he was in the U.S. on leave in 2010. He is a Diplomatic Security Special Agent who was admitted to the hospital on two occasions (on consecutive days) after he drank alcohol heavily and took an unknown quantity of prescription medications after he became upset about the breakup of his engagement to be married. The investigation revealed discrepancies between the information grievant gave to investigators and that found in his medical records. Records show that grievant suffers from PTSD and that he had not reported this fact to the Department. The investigation report claims that grievant denied during interviews that he had ever been diagnosed with PTSD or that he was ever in a treatment program to address the condition. His records also show that he had been prescribed several psychiatric medications, and contained no evidence that grievant had reported to the Department either the PTSD diagnosis, or the prescription medicines which are required to be reported under the agency’s Deadly Force and Firearms policy. The Department’s final decision provided for a 12-day suspension without pay.

Grievant denies the majority of the specifications cited in the charges. He claims to have discussed his PTSD diagnosis in detail with the investigators and avers that he responded candidly to all of the questions posed to him during two DS interviews. He admits that he did not report the prescription medicines, but argues that he was unaware he needed to do so. Grievant also claims that the charges are untimely, having been brought after a very long delay – nearly 2 1⁄2 years after the incidents, and that the delay has prejudiced his ability to present his case. He claims to have been particularly disadvantaged in that he is unable to find witnesses who could corroborate his positions or shed light on the quantity of medications he took prior to the 2010 incidents. He also argues that the proposed penalty, in any case, is overly harsh in light of penalties the Department has imposed for like offenses. He requests that those charges/specifications the Department is unable to establish should be overturned, and the 12-day suspension should be mitigated.

Click on the image or the link below to read ROI in pdf file. The file is redacted and originally published online by the Foreign Service Grievance Board.

2014-020 - 04-29-2015 - B - Interim Decision_Redacted-2-02

FSGB Case 2014-020 – 04-29-2015 – B |DS Agent – PTSD Case                         (click image to read in pdf)

2014-020 – 04-29-2015 – B – Interim Decision_Redacted-2

The regs apparently say that “a DSS Special Agent who is taking prescription medication to notify his supervisor and submit a medical certificate or other administratively acceptable documentation of the prescription … to the Domestic Programs Division of the Office of Medical Services immediately after beginning the medication.” We don’t know what happens to DS agents who self report as required by regulations.  Are their USG-issued weapons removed? Are they subject to reassignment? Is there a perception that this is an embarrassment?

Given that many Diplomatic Security personnel have now done multiple tours to war zones and high threat posts, is this really an isolated case of not self-reporting both the PTSD diagnosis and the use of prescription medication?

We sent this individual to Iraq in 2006. He came back with unseen wounds. And here he is in 2015, still fighting his battle.   What can the State Department do to make employees with potential PTSD less fearful of being stigmatized in coming forward and acknowledging they need help? What can the Bureau of Diplomatic Security do more for its agents? How can this be made into a less lonely fight?

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Senators Perdue and Kaine Sponsor Improving Department of State Oversight Act of 2015

Posted: 12:27 am  EDT

 

Last month, Sen. Perdue, David [R-GA] and Sen. Kaine, Tim [D-VA] introduced S.1527 – Improving Department of State Oversight Act of 2015.  Read the full text of the bill here.  Here is a summary via CRS:

This bill grants competitive status for appointment to a position in the competitive service for which the employee is qualified to any employee of the Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction (SIGIR) who was not terminated for cause, and who completes at least 12 months of service at any time before the termination of the SIGIR on October 5, 2013.

The Secretary of State shall certify to Congress that the Department of State has made reasonable efforts to ensure the integrity and independence of the Office of the Inspector General Information Technology systems.

Each Department entity under the Foreign Service Act of 1980 shall report within five business days to the Inspector General (IG) any allegations of:

  • program waste, fraud, or abuse;
  • criminal or serious misconduct on the part of a Department employee at the FS-1, GS-15, GM-15 level or higher;
  • criminal misconduct on the part of any Department employee; and
  • serious, noncriminal misconduct on the part of any individual who is authorized to carry a weapon, make arrests, or conduct searches (such as conduct that would constitute perjury or material dishonesty, warrant suspension as discipline for a first offense, or result in loss of law enforcement authority).

The IG may investigate such matters.

No Department entity with concurrent jurisdiction over such matters, including the Bureau of Diplomatic Security, may initiate an investigation without first reporting the allegations to the IG.

A Department entity that initiates an investigation of such a matter must fully cooperate with the IG, unless the IG authorizes an exception.

Temporary relaxation of such restrictions may occur in exigent circumstances.

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This bill was referred to the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations which will consider it before sending it to the Senate floor for consideration.  According to govtrack.us, there are 5,343 bills and resolutions currently before the United States Congress. Of those, only about 5% will become law. They must be enacted before the end of the 2015-2017 session (the “114th Congress”).

 

Burn Bag: Ding! Ding! Ding! This Is Your ‘More Than Just Stupid’ Warning!

Via Burn Bag:

“A director of a regional diplomatic courier office has openly expressed he does not want to hire “women of childbearing age”. He achieves this by carefully examining candidates’ resumes when hiring to fill an EFM position. BBag, can you stop this stupidity, considering it’s from an FS-1?”

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EFM – eligible family member
FS01 – the highest rank in the regular Foreign Service, last step before the Senior Foreign Service; equivalent to a full Colonel in the military

Why this is more than just stupid? SCOTUS:

The Supreme Court decides International Union, UAW v. Johnson Controls and addresses the issue of fetal hazards. In this case, the employer barred women of childbearing age from certain jobs due to potential harm that could occur to a fetus. The Court rules that the employer’s restriction against fertile women performing “dangerous jobs” constitutes sex discrimination under Title VII. The Court further rules that the employer’s fetal protection policy could be justified only if being able to bear children was a bona fide occupational qualification (BFOQ) for the job. The fact that the job posed risk to fertile women does not justify barring all fertile women from the position.

The Supreme Court in Phillips v. Martin Marietta Corp. holds that Title VII’s prohibition against sex discrimination means that employers cannot discriminate on the basis of sex plus other factors such as having school age children. In practical terms, EEOC’s policy forbids employers from using one hiring policy for women with small children and a different policy for males with children of a similar age.

In Gibson v. West, the Supreme Court endorses EEOC’s position that it has the legal authority to require that federal agencies pay compensatory damages when EEOC has ruled during the administrative process that the federal agency has unlawfully discriminated in violation of Title VII.

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Terrorist Attacks Rock France, Tunisia, Kuwait: Three Countries. Three Continents. All Soft Targets.

Posted: 4:41  pm EDT

 

Terrorists attacked sites in France, Tunisia and Kuwait today. At least 37 people including British, Belgian and German nationals were killed by gunmen at a beach resort in Tunisia, one person was reportedly decapitated in France at a US-owned factory, and at least 25 people were killed at a suicide bombing at a mosque in Kuwait. Three countries, three continents and  all soft targets.
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The US Embassy Paris released the following security message on 

The U.S. Embassy in Paris informs U.S. citizens that a terrorist attack took place at approximately 10 AM today at a U.S.-owned factory in Saint-Quentin-Fallavier, Isere, France, southeast of Lyon, at a large industrial park. One person was killed and two others were reported injured. None of the deceased or injured was a U.S. citizen. The motivation for the attack is unknown, and one suspect is in French government custody.   The Government of France maintains a threat rating system, known locally as “Vigipirate,” similar to the U.S. Department of Homeland Security Advisory System. Following the January 2015 terrorist attacks, the Government of France raised the “Vigipirate” level and continues to evaluate its security posture on a regular basis. Up-to-date information is available on the “Vigipirate” website in French.

 

Under this system, the government routinely augments police with armed forces and increases visibility at airports, train and metro stations, and other high-profile locations such as schools, major tourist attractions, and government installations. Over the last few years, there have been arrests of suspected militant extremists allegedly involved in terrorist plots. French authorities have spoken publicly about the heightened threat conditions for terrorist attacks in Europe.

 

U.S. citizens in France are encouraged to remain vigilant. Immediately report unattended packages observed in public places, or any other suspicious activities, to French law enforcement authorities. French authorities are proactive and will respond immediately. If there is a security incident or suspicious package, do not linger in the area to observe.

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The  US Embassy in Tunis released the following  message:

The U.S. Embassy wishes to alert U.S. citizens to a terrorist attack in Tunisia around the Kantaoui area at the Imperial Riu Marhaba and Soviva hotels in Sousse.   The U.S. Embassy urges U.S. citizens to avoid the Kantaoui area and surrounding vicinity. The U.S. Embassy reiterates our standing guidance that U.S. citizens in Tunisia should exercise caution when frequenting public venues that are visited by large numbers of foreigners, such as hotels, shopping centers, and tourist sites and restaurants.

U.S. citizens should also be alert to the possibility of kidnapping.  U.S. citizens are reminded to exercise caution and avoid areas where large gatherings may occur.  Even demonstrations or events intended to be peaceful can turn confrontational and possibly escalate into violence.  U.S. citizens should monitor local events, report suspicious activity to the local police, and take appropriate steps to bolster their own security.

Travelers contemplating trips to the interior of the country should assess local conditions and routes when making travel plans.  In particular, all travel south of the designated military zone in the south must be coordinated in advance with Tunisian authorities.  Also, travel to either border should be avoided if possible given the periodic security incidents along the border regions.

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The US Embassy in Kuwait issued this: Explosion at Mosque in Al-Sawaber neighborhood of Kuwait City – Security Notice for U.S. Citizens 2015

There has been an explosion at a mosque in the Al Sawaber neighborhood of Kuwait.  There have been reports of deaths and injuries.  U.S. citizens should avoid the area.  Please stay current with media coverage of local and regional events. U.S. Mission personnel have been advised to continue to practice personal security awareness and we advise the U.S. citizen community to do the same.

The embassy also released a statement calling the explosion “a senseless terrorist attack on worshipers in the Al-Imam Al-Sadiq Mosque”, condemning the attack and says that “the United States stands ready to assist our friend and ally Kuwait in any way possible.”
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Below is the WH statement on the three attacks:

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Social Media Security Screening Is Here: OPM to Make Sole Source Award For Use in Background Investigation

Posted: 1:01 am  PDT

 

Last September, Mike Kelly, the Republican Representative for Pennsylvania’s 3rd congressional district introduced the Enhanced Security Clearance Act of 2014 (HR 5482) aimed at the implementation of enhanced personnel security programs which requires agency programs to “integrate information from government, publicly available, and commercial data sources, consumer reporting agencies, and social media.”

Mr. Kelly told ZDNet, “In particular, the bill will update government background checks to include an applicants’ publicly available electronic data including social media accounts such as Facebook and Twitter.” This bill was introduced on September 16, 2014, in a previous session of Congress, but was not enacted.

Well, the bill may have died but it was only a matter of time before social media content becomes part of the federal background investigation.

The Federal Investigative Services (OPM-FIS) provides investigative products and services for over 100 Federal agencies to use as the basis for suitability and security clearance determinations. OPM provides over 90% of the Government’s background investigations, conducting over two million investigations a year.

On June 17, the Office of Personnel Management, Federal Investigative Service (FIS), PIC Acquisitions Team, published a “Notice of Intent to Sole Source – PAEI Reports” to Social Intelligence, a company headquartered in California.  Social media content is now officially called Publicly Available Electronic Information (PAEI). If we’re reading this correctly, it looks like there already are pilot projects with the same company conducted with the U.S. Army, the Office of Director of National Intelligence (ODNI), the Department of State and the National Reconnaissance Office.

Below is the published notice via fedbiz:

It is the intention of the agency to award a firm-fixed price agreement to Social Intelligence for publicly available electronic information (PAEI) reports. This is not a solicitation for quotations, but rather a notice of the agency’s intent to make a sole source award to Social Intelligence.

The U.S. Office of Personnel Management (OPM) Federal Investigative Services (FIS) seeks to award a firm-fixed price agreement to Social Intelligence who will conduct searches of multiple sources of PAEI in an automated manner and provide complete, accurate, standardized reports to OPM-FIS when searches result in information pertinent to Subjects of Investigation.

OPM-FIS is participating in a set of pilot projects with other federal investigative service providers to evaluate the use of PAEI in the background investigative process. This acquisition will provide 400 PAEI reports over a period of approximately 6-9 months for a sample population of investigations to assess the OPM-FIS operational end-to-end process and relevancy to the investigation along with the effects of quality, costs and timeliness. The vendor must also provide high level training on how to review and analyze the PAEI reports and also provide customer and technical support 24×7 until 400 PAEI reports have been provided to OPM-FIS.

Social Intelligence is the only source that possesses knowledge and expertise obtained through participation in other high level government PAEI pilot projects, to include pilots with the U.S. Army, the Office of Director of National Intelligence (ODNI), the Department of State and the National Reconnaissance Office. Social Intelligence is the only one available whose product will result in a consistent and accurate comparative analysis between results of the OPM-FIS pilot and other government agencies’ pilots. This vendor’s personnel have experience with and have received training on the personnel security process and the thirteen adjudicative guidelines due to participation in previous government pilots. Such experience is required in order to appropriately identify issues containing relevant adjudicative information. Only data that meets the adjudicative guidelines will be collected and retained by OPM-FIS.

This vendor was deemed a consumer reporting agency (CRA) by the Federal Trade Commission, as defined by the Fair Credit Reporting Act. As of January 2013, the vendor was the only social media background screening company designated as a CRA. This designation is important as the FTC has ruled that CRAs must take reasonable steps to ensure the maximum possible accuracy of the information reported from social media sites. All of the above make Social Intelligence a unique source that would provide the best solution with the least risk to the government for this pilot.

According to its website, Social Intelligence (http://www.socialintel.com) “provides social media data, tools, and reports to commercial and Government organizations. Headquartered in Santa Barbara, Calif., the company has developed a unique suite of products including employment background screenings, insurance claims investigations, corporate due diligence, and Government services. … Social Intelligence was created to provide companies and governmental organizations publicly available online information, while ensuring this data is used appropriately and legally.” It provides the following services:

  • Social Intelligence’s Social Monitoring & Evaluation solutions provide a powerful and cost-effective way to monitor and evaluate an individual’s ongoing online activity across the deep web.
  • Social Intelligence’s groundbreaking research into online identity science and its implications allows companies to confidently rely on social media and internet data. A fully automated capability, Social Intelligence’s proven, proprietary Identity Resolution algorithm identifies, matches, and scores aggregated publicly available online information, the first of multiple steps to solidify data veracity.

On it’s website, the company talks about “the opportunity at hand”  — apparently 64 million people are unscorable by traditional credit scores and 55% of millennials are willing to share their data in exchange for discounts.

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US Embassy N’Djamena Imposes Travel Restrictions on Embassy Staff After Suicide Bombings in Chad

Posted: 2:40 am  EDT

 

On June 15, the U.S. Embassy in Chad temporarily closed to the public due to reported explosions in the capital city.  All American citizens and their families were advised to shelter in place and not to travel around town.

 

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Late Monday, Embassy  N’Djamena released the following security message informing American citizens in the country of travel restrictions imposed on embassy personnel following the suicide attacks in the capital city:

Security Message for U.S. Citizens: U.S. Embassy Travel Restrictions and Security Review – June 15, 2015

Due to the bombings in N’Djamena on Monday, June 15, U.S. Embassy personnel are required to travel in armored vehicles and are restricted from traveling after dark to public places such as bars, restaurants, and markets. U.S. citizens are encouraged to review the Travel Warning for Chad, and to remain alert for potentially dangerous situations. U.S. citizens should avoid locations frequented by foreigners, including shops, restaurants, bars, and places of worship.

U.S. citizens are reminded to exercise caution throughout the country, and maintain vigilance in daily affairs, even when visiting familiar locations.

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US Embassy Cairo: Local Guard Arrested on Terrorism Charges Without Prior USG Alert

Posted: 12:10 am EDT

 

 

The Daily Beast:

“An embassy official confirmed to The Daily Beast that 42-year-old Ahmed Ali, accused by the Egyptians of helping to plan or taking part in more than a dozen attacks on security forces, was an employee in the security service at the mission in downtown Cairo. Egyptian authorities are claiming he is a commander in the militant Helwan Brigades.

Both the lack of any forewarning by the Egyptian authorities and the apparent security failure by the U.S. State Department, which failed to unearth Ali’s membership in the brigades, is likely to prompt outrage on Capitol Hill.”

 Additional details from Daily New Egypt:

The reports claim that State Security prosecution accuse Ali of being a commander with a militant group, the Helwan Brigades, and participating in 13 attacks, including the bombing and burning of a Helwan court.

However, activists who have been documenting a wave of forced disappearances by the Egyptian security authorities in the past two weeks shared an account of a man named ‘Ahmed Amin Suleyman’, 44, who is claimed to be a staff member at the embassy. Suleyman reportedly had his house raided on 25 May, but he was not at home. The following day, Suleyman fell out of contact – 12 days before the reported arrest of ‘Ahmed Ali’.

Following his disappearance, his wife received a phone call informing her that her husband had been arrested. Family members went to the local Helwan police station, but were informed that Suleyman was not there. The family submitted a 1 June telegram to report his disappearance and request support, a copy of which was seen by Daily News Egypt.

VOA reported on June 10 that Egyptian security forces have arrested dozens of activists ahead of a general strike planned for June 11, part of what the activists describe as an unrelenting crackdown on dissent. There are also reports of forced disappearance cases believed to be abductions by security forces.

Local nationals working for our embassies overseas are often targets, especially in repressive countries.  We can’t know this early if these are real charges or if this is a case of a targeted arrest for some other reason.  There’s a lot we don’t know here.  We just hope our congressional reps would refrain from running around with their hair on fire when they read this news.  We should give our government a chance to verify the basis of these Egyptian charges before we hold one more outrage hearing on security failure.

What should be most concerning is the fact that the Government of Egypt apparently had enough evidence to arrest this individual on terrorism charges, but did not provide prior warning to the U.S. government. Why?

Let’s see — we give Egypt  $1.3bn in annual military funding, and no one bothered to pick up the phone to alert the embassy about this alleged terrorist working at the mission? That’s some kind of partnership we have there.

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New York Times: Tell us about the U.S. embassy in your country

Posted: 12:03 pm EDT

 

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Elected Officials Applaud Land Purchase For State Dept Fort Picket Training Facility

Posted: 12:32 am EDT

 

On May 28, U.S. Rep. Ed Royce (R-CA), Chairman of the House Foreign Affairs Committee (HFAC), issued a subpoena (pdf) to the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) to compel it to provide the Committee with all analyses, documents, and communications related to the State Department’s plan to construct a Foreign Affairs Security Training Center (FASTC) in Virginia (see Uh-oh Dept: Royce Issues Subpoena to OMB Over Diplomatic Security Training Facility Documents).

On June 1, five elected officials announced the land purchase for the FASTC facility at Fort Pickett.

WASHINGTON – Today, U.S. Senators Mark Warner and Tim Kaine, along with U.S. Reps. Randy Forbes and Robert Hurt announced that land has been purchased and construction will begin on a Foreign Affairs Security Training Center (FASTC) at Fort Pickett in Nottoway County, Virginia.

Last week, the Director of the U.S. General Services Administration signed a Record of Decision (ROD), which identified Fort Pickett as the site to construct and operate the FASTC.  This decision was made following a month-long review period of the Final Environmental Impact Statement (FEIS), which considered potential environmental impacts of the site, as well as FASTC’s operations and training needs, and comments from the public.

The ROD and land purchase are major milestones in efforts to provide a facility dedicated to training foreign affairs personnel in security, lifesaving, and emergency techniques necessary for operating in today’s dangerous overseas environments. Building the FASTC at Fort Pickett will enable training collaboration and interagency partnerships between civilian, military, and intelligence agencies in the Washington D.C. area.

The Senate’s Virginia delegation is pleased; here is Senators Mark Warner (D-VA) and Tim Kaine (D-VA):

“This is good news for the State Department and for Virginia,” said Sen. Warner.“The jobs and economic activity created by this project will be welcomed by this community, and the facility will have an important role in training those security officers who protect American diplomats around the world.”

“Today we are one step closer to breaking ground on a Foreign Affairs Security Training Center at Fort Pickett that will play a key role in keeping our diplomatic personnel safe around the world,” said Sen. Kaine. “Nearly three years after the attack on the U.S. Embassy in Benghazi, Libya, a permanent facility to properly train our diplomatic personnel for service in an increasingly dangerous world is long overdue.”

House Armed Services subcommittee chairman Randy Forbes from Virginia’s 4th District says:

“Today marks another major step forward for a project that is not only important to Virginia, but also critical to the men and women who serve our country abroad,” said Rep. Forbes, Chairman of the House Armed Services Seapower and Projection Forces Subcommittee. “Attacks against American missions in Yemen, Afghanistan, and the tragedy in Benghazi, Libya in 2012 serve as powerful reminders of the evolving threats our Diplomatic Corps face on a daily basis.  The construction of this dedicated training facility is essential to ensure that every American supporting our mission overseas is able to successfully promote U.S. interests and return safely home.”

Representative Robert Hurt from Virginia’s 5th District says:

“This is another positive step in bringing this critical, long overdue project to Fort Pickett,” said Rep. Hurt. “We will continue to work together to ensure our American diplomatic personnel have the best security training possible, and I am pleased that once again, that we are one step closer to groundbreaking at Fort Pickett, which has been identified as the site that offers the best resources for this training and the best long-term value for the taxpayer.”

Virginia Governor Terry McAuliffe also praised the announcement:

“I am very pleased that the Record of Decision has been signed by the GSA. This is a big step in moving forward on construction of the U.S. Department of State Foreign Affairs Security Training Center,” said Gov. McAuliffe.  “The GSA and DOS have done their due diligence and have undertaken an extensive process in search for the best possible and most cost effective site for the FASTC. It is no surprise that Virginia emerged as the right home for this important project, which will be an enormous economic driver for the region and our Commonwealth, creating as many as 1,000 jobs.  My team and I were pleased to be a part of the effort that brought the FASTC to Virginia and we will continue to work with the congressional delegation, the various federal agencies and Nottoway County to bring this important project to fruition.”

The announcement notes that the Administration announced the selection of Fort Pickett after a multi-year exhaustive search as the best site to meet the State Department’s operational requirements and take advantage of synergies with the intelligence agencies and military facilities nearby in the Washington D.C. area. Also that Warner, Kaine, Forbes, and Hurt have long-supported the establishment of a Foreign Affairs Security Training Center at Fort Pickett.

We just hope this project does not get stuck in Congress indefinitely while elected representatives continue to squabble over its location.

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Related posts:

FSO Michael Dodman: No use complaining about the “10,000-mile screwdriver”

Posted: 12:02 am EDT

 

Michael Dodman, a Foreign Service officer since 1988, was consul general in Karachi from July 2012 to August 2014. He was the recipient of the 2014 Ryan C. Crocker Award for Outstanding Leadership in Expeditionary Diplomacy for his work there. He is currently director of the entry-level career development and assignments section of the Bureau of Human Resources.

Michael Dodman_karachi

Photo via USCG Karachi

Below is an excerpt from a piece he wrote for the Foreign Service Journal:

The most important thing I learned from my two years leading Consulate General Karachi is this: Successful diplomacy in a high-threat post depends on understanding Washington—and, for a constituent post, the embassy as well.

There is no use complaining about the “10,000-mile screwdriver.” Today’s technology guarantees that no overseas post will ever operate with the sense of autonomy and distance from the flagpole that we once did. The key to managing and succeeding is constantly taking the pulse of Washington, and anticipating information demands—both to avoid surprises and (hopefully) head off directives you disagree with.

I thought I had done a good job meeting the key Washington players during consultations before I went to post. But events in September 2012 and later, particularly the spring 2014 attack on Karachi Airport, made me realize I hadn’t even scratched the surface in terms of everyone who had a say in operations at my post.

Success in navigating the shifting waters of Washington, particularly from a constituent post, required:

  • Regular and open communication with the desk;
  • Understanding the State Department and interagency decision points, and the importance of EAC cables and other channels of communication;
  • Earning the trust of Washington decision-makers; and
  • Building and maintaining a close partnership with the embassy front office and country team, including spending a few days every month in the capital.

Read in full here.

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