On March 16, WaPo reported that the same employee was arrested in the District and charged with taking videos of women through the windows of their homes. According to the same report, Daniel Rosen’s security clearance had been revoked. Before it was taken down, he indicated on his LinkedIn profile that he was the Director of Counterterrorism Plans, Programs and Policy at the State Department for over six years. As of February 25, the State Department telephone directly lists the Bureau of Counterterrorism’s Director for the Office of Programs and Policy located at 2509 as “vacant.”
Daniel Rosen, 45, pleaded guilty to 11 charges of stalking and voyeurism on Wednesday in the Superior Court of the District of Columbia for incidents that happened between 2012 and 2014. According to law enforcement, he used his cell phone to record women in various stages of undress by aiming his cellular phone through their apartment windows in the areas of Mount Pleasant, the U Street Corridor, and Adams Morgan in Northwest D.C.
His attorney Bernard Grimm says Rosen is undergoing therapy and showed police the locations after they discovered the videos.
“Beyond shame, talk about a fall from grace here’s a guy who used to work at the State Department has a master’s degree and his life just spiraled out of control,” he said.
Rosen faces up to 11 years or a $11,000 fine when he is sentenced on October 9. Each of the counts of voyeurism and stalking carries a maximum penalty of one year and potential fines. He will be released and under home confinement, which will be very restricted, until his sentencing date.
WaPo citing an assistant U.S. attorney reports that Rosen’s filming stretched over a nearly three-year period, from early 2012 to late 2014, and that “he returned to some women’s homes as many as five times to film videos that, in some cases, lasted minutes.”
His case on soliciting a minor, a separate charge, continues in September.
In December 2008, then Illinois Gov. Rod Blagojevich and his chief of staff, John Harris, were arrested for what U.S. Atty. Patrick Fitzgerald called a “political corruption crime spree” that included attempts to sell the U.S. Senate seat vacated by President-elect Barack Obama. He was accused of talking on FBI recordings about plotting to extract a $1.5 million campaign contribution from U.S. Rep. Jesse Jackson Jr.—in exchange for appointing Jackson to Obama’s vacated seat. Via Politico:
A federal criminal complaint detailed Blagojevich’s attempt to cash in on his power to appoint Obama’s replacement by first attempting to arrange a presidential cabinet appointment. When that failed, Blagojevich hoped for an ambassadorship.
Specifically, India or South Africa …er, no, India.
Via Lapham’s Quarterly
Just to show how little Blago and his chief of staff knew about the diplomatic service. Blagojevich in one recording says, “How much would you think a position like that would pay? I mean, again, this requires a lot of travel, it’s a lot of work. A reasonable…” The chief of staff responds, “Well, I mean you’d get an expense account. So it’s not all in pay.”
In 2015, the caps for Senior Foreign Service pay is between $172,074 – $183,300. He would have received hardship and COLA differentials. They’re currently 20% + 10% respectively of basic pay for FS employees assigned in New Delhi. The ambassador’s expense account? Teh-heh! Best read Bloomberg’s The Economics of Being a U.S. Ambassador.
Poor sod probably did not realize that the Indian monsoon would also ruin his properly combed hat.
In any case, for those who were hoping that Blago’s case would temper similar arrangements in the future will be disappointed. On June 22, the United States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois dismissed five of the 18 counts and ordered that the former governor be resentenced. Below is an excerpt from the Appeals Court ruling dated July 21, 2015.
Blagojevich now asks us to hold that the evidence is insufficient to convict him on any count. The argument is frivolous. The evidence, much of it from Blagojevich’s own mouth, is overwhelming. To the extent there are factual disputes, the jury was entitled to credit the prosecution’s evidence and to find that Blagojevich acted with the knowledge required for conviction.
But a problem in the way the instructions told the jury to consider the evidence requires us to vacate the convictions on counts that concern Blagojevich’s proposal to appoint Valerie Jarrett to the Senate in exchange for an appointment to the Cabinet. A jury could have found that Blagojevich asked the President-‐‑elect for a private-sector job, or for funds that he could control, but the instructions permitted the jury to convict even if it found that his only request of Sen. Obama was for a position in the Cabinet. The instructions treated all proposals alike. We conclude, however, that they are legally different: a proposal to trade one public act for another, a form of logrolling, is fundamentally unlike the swap of an official act for a private payment.
Because the instructions do not enable us to be sure that the jury found that Blagojevich offered to trade the appointment for a private salary after leaving the Governorship, these convictions cannot stand. Compare Yates v. United States, 354 U.S. 298 (1957), and United States v. Rivera Borrero, 771 F.3d 973 (7th Cir. 2014), with Griffin v. United States, 502 U.S. 46 (1991). (Perhaps because the jury deadlocked at the first trial, the United States does not seriously contend that any error was harmless; a one-line statement in the brief differs from an argument. Cf. Hedgpeth v. Pulido, 555 U.S. 57, 60–62 (2008) (an error of this kind is not “structural”).)
McCormick describes the offense as a quid pro quo: a public official performs an official act (or promises to do so) in exchange for a private benefit, such as money. See also United States v. Sun-Diamond Growers of California, 526 U.S. 398, 404– 05 (1999); United States v. McDonnell, 2015 U.S. App. LEXIS 11889 (4th Cir. July 10, 2015). A political logroll, by contrast, is the swap of one official act for another. Representative A agrees with Representative B to vote for milk price supports, if B agrees to vote for tighter controls on air pollution. A President appoints C as an ambassador, which Senator D asked the President to do, in exchange for D’s promise to vote to confirm E as a member of the National Labor Relations Board. Governance would hardly be possible without these accommodations, which allow each public official to achieve more of his principal objective while surrendering something about which he cares less, but the other politician cares more strongly.
A proposal to appoint a particular person to one office (say, the Cabinet) in exchange for someone else’s promise to appoint a different person to a different office (say, the Senate), is a common exercise in logrolling. We asked the prosecutor at oral argument if, before this case, logrolling had been the basis of a criminal conviction in the history of the United States. Counsel was unaware of any earlier conviction for an exchange of political favors. Our own research did not turn one up. It would be more than a little surprising to Members of Congress if the judiciary found in the Hobbs Act, or the mail fraud statute, a rule making everyday politics criminal.
Let’s work this through statute by statute. Section 1951, the Hobbs Act, which underlies Counts 21 and 22, forbids interference with commerce by robbery or extortion. Blagojevich did not rob anyone, and extortion, a defined term, “means the obtaining of property from another, with his consent, induced by wrongful use of actual or threatened force, violence, or fear, or under color of official right” (§1951(b)(2)). The indictment charged Blagojevich with the “color of official right” version of extortion, but none of the evidence suggests that Blagojevich claimed to have an “official right” to a job in the Cabinet. He did have an “official right” to appoint a new Senator, but unless a position in the Cabinet is “property” from the President’s perspective, then seeking it does not amount to extortion. Yet a political office belongs to the people, not to the incumbent (or to someone hankering after the position). Cleveland v. United States, 531 U.S. 12 (2000), holds that state and municipal licenses, and similar documents, are not “property” in the hands of a public agency. That’s equally true of public positions. The President-elect did not have a property interest in any Cabinet job, so an attempt to get him to appoint a particular person to the Cabinet is not an attempt to secure “property” from the President (or the citizenry at large).
Sekhar v. United States, 133 S. Ct. 2720 (2013), shows that the phrase “obtaining of property” in the Hobbs Act must not be extended just to penalize shady dealings. Sekhar holds that a recommendation about investments is not “property” under §1951(b)(2) for two principal reasons: first, in the long history of extortion law it had never before been so understood (similarly, political logrolling has never before been condemned as extortion); second, the making of a recommendation is not transferrable. The Court restricted “property” to what one owner can transfer to another. By that standard a job in the Cabinet (or any other public job) is not “property” from the employer’s perspective. It is not owned by the person with appointing power, and it cannot be deeded over. The position may be filled by different people, but the position itself is not a transferrable property interest. A position is “held” or “occupied” but not “obtained,” and under Sekhar something that cannot be “obtained” also cannot be the subject of extortion.
Section 666, the basis (through a conspiracy charge) of Count 23, forbids theft or bribery in publicly funded programs (of which the State of Illinois is one). Count 23 relies on §666(a)(1)(B), which makes it a crime for an agent of a covered organization to solicit “corruptly … anything of value” in connection with a transaction worth $5,000 or more. “Corruptly” refers to the recipient’s state of mind and indicates that he understands the payment as a bribe or gratuity. United States v. Hawkins, 777 F.3d 880, 882 (7th Cir. 2015). It would not be plausible to describe a political trade of favors as an offer or attempt to bribe the other side.
So if a Governor appoints someone to a public commission and proclaims the appointee “the best person for the job,” while the real reason is that some state legislator had asked for a friend’s appointment as a favor, then the Governor has committed wire fraud because the Governor does not actually believe that the appointee is the best person for the job. That’s not a plausible understanding of §1346, even if (as is unlikely) it would be valid under the First Amendment as a criminal penalty for misleading political speech. And no matter what one makes of the subject, the holding of Skilling v. United States, 561 U.S. 358 (2010), prevents resort to §1346 to penalize political horse-trading. Skilling holds that only bribery and kickbacks violate §1346. So unless political logrolling is a form of bribery, which it is not, §1346 drops out.
The prosecutor insists, however, that Blagojevich’s situation is different and uncommon because he sought a post in the Cabinet for himself. It isn’t clear to us that this is unusual. The current Secretary of State was appointed to that position from a seat in the Senate, and it wouldn’t surprise us if this happened at least in part because he had performed a political service for the President. Ambassadors, too, come from the House or Senate (or from state politics) as part of political deals.
Some historians say that this is how Earl Warren came to be Chief Justice of the United States: he delivered the California delegation at the 1952 Republican convention to Eisenhower (rather than Senator Taft) in exchange for a commitment to appoint him to the next vacancy on the Supreme Court.
If the prosecutor is right, and a swap of political favors involving a job for one of the politicians is a felony, then if the standard account is true both the President of the United States and the Chief Justice of the United States should have gone to prison. Yet although historians and political scientists have debated whether this deal was made, or whether if made was ethical (or politically unwise), no one to our knowledge has suggested that it violated the statutes involved in this case. (Whether it might have violated 18 U.S.C. §599, and whether that statute is compatible with the First Amendment, are issues we do not address.)
The largest federal employee union, the American Federation of Government Employees, filed a class action lawsuit today against the Office of Personnel Management, its director, Katherine Archuleta, its chief information officer, Donna Seymour and Keypoint Government Solutions, an OPM contractor.
We are presuming that the notice below to U.S. passport applicants regarding compromised personal information is related to the case in Houston since it refers passport applicants to DOJ for further details. We do not think this is related to the current technical problems with visa/passport issuances.
Letter Regarding Compromised Personal Information | JUNE 5, 2015
The U.S. Department of State mailed letters on June 9 to a limited number of U.S. passport customers whose personal information may have been compromised. The letter provides specific details regarding the breach of personal information, how to contact us for further assistance, and guidance on how to protect yourself from identity theft.
The Department has taken immediate action to help protect you. The letter mentions an offer from the Department to sign-up for one year of free credit monitoring services. This service monitors your credit records at all 3 credit reporting agencies and notifies you when there are certain changes to your credit bureau file(s). In addition, the identity theft insurance policy will reimburse you for certain out-of-pocket expenses and lost wages in the event you are a victim of identity theft. We have also flagged your U.S. passport record in our databases to prevent others from using your identity to renew or replace your passport. Your U.S. passport is still valid for international travel.
We apologize for any inconvenience and concern this incident may cause you. We are thoroughly examining our information security systems and procedures to safeguard against unauthorized access of passport records.
Customers requesting more details on this case should contact the U.S. Department of Justice at the number or website address provided in their notification letter.
The case USA v. McClendon et al, criminal case #: 4:15-cr-00233-1 is set for jury selection and trial on October 13, 2015 in the U.S. District Court of the Southern District of Texas (Houston).
Excerpt from the SCOTUS 6-3 decision from ZIVOTOFSKY, BY HIS PARENTS AND GUARDIANS, ZIVOTOFSKY ET UX. v. KERRY, SECRETARY OF STATE (pdf):
Petitioner Zivotofsky was born to United States citizens living in Jerusalem. Pursuant to §214(d) of the Foreign Relations Authorization Act, Fiscal Year 2003, his mother asked American Embassy officials to list his place of birth as “Israel” on, inter alia, his passport. Section 214(d) states for “purposes of the registration of birth, certification of nationality, or issuance of a passport of a United States citizen born in the city of Jerusalem, the Secretary shall, upon the request of the citizen or the citizen’s legal guardian, record the place of birth as Israel.” The Embassy officials refused to list Zivotofsky’s place of birth as “Israel” on his passport, citing the Executive Branch’s longstanding position that the United States does not recognize any country as having sovereignty over Jerusalem. Zivotofsky’s parents brought suit on his behalf in federal court, seeking to enforce §214(d). Ultimately, the D. C. Circuit held the statute unconstitutional, con- cluding that it contradicts the Executive Branch’s exclusive power to recognize foreign sovereigns.
Quick background of this long-standing practice: Place of birth was first added to the U.S. passport designed in 1917. An October 4, 1963 staff study by the Passport Office on “Place of Birth” information in the United States Passport reflects “the passport used during World War I was the first in which including the place of birth of the passport holder was mandatory as part of the identification of the bearer, probably was a wartime travel control measure. The item was included in all subsequent revisions of the passport format, down to and including the present issuances.”
For United States passport purposes, the Department of State has defined the term “bearer’s origin” to be the bearer’s place of birth as it is presently recognized. That entry is included to assist in identifying the individual, not the individual’s nationality. The passport very clearly states that the bearer is a United States national or citizen.
For a person born in Jerusalem, write JERUSALEM as the place of birth in the passport. Do not write Israel, Jordan or West Bank for a person born within the current municipal borders of Jerusalem. For applicants born before May 14, 1948 in a place that was within the municipal borders of Jerusalem, enter JERUSALEM as their place of birth. For persons born before May 14, 1948 in a location that was outside Jerusalem’s municipal limits and later was annexed by the city, enter either PALESTINE or the name of the location (area/city) as it was known prior to annexation. For persons born after May 14, 1948 in a location that was outside Jerusalem’s municipal limits and later was annexed by the city, it is acceptable to enter the name of the location (area/city) as it was known prior to annexation.
This is excerpted from the Opinion from the Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit, filed on May 27, 2015 concerning a case of a U.S. citizen found guilty of abusing his own children who are also U.S. citizens. News reports are often loud when things go wrong, but never as loud when things go right. We don’t often hear about these cases until they go to court and we almost never hear the role played by our consular officials when assisting the victims. An RSO was also involved in this case, but was unnamed in court documents. We understand that this official will be DCM at one of our embassies in the Middle East this summer.
The vice consul in this case is FSO Mark Goldrup. His name appeared on the Congressional Record in June 2009 for his consular officer appointment. We suspect but could not confirmed that he was on his first overseas assignment at US Embassy Damascus when he assisted these victims find safe shelter in Syria back in 2010. The prosecutor said that Mr. Goldrup “took the extraordinary step of keeping an American citizen away from his two citizen sons because he felt that he posed a danger to them.” The State Department’s recruitment slogan last year was Change the World, Join the Foreign Service. Not sure about the world, but here is proof of one FSO who helped changed three lives, forever.
Malek M. Al Maliki was sentenced to 292 months on each of counts 1 & 2, to be served concurrently last year. He was remanded to the custody of the US Marshal. Supervised Release 10 years. This term consists of 10 years on each of counts 1 & 2, all such terms to run concurrently, with several conditions including Firearms and Dangerous Weapons Prohibition; DNA Collection; Mental Health Treatment; Minor Protection and Restriction Program; Sex Offender Registration and Notification Act. (United States of America v. Al Maliki; 1:13-cr-00121-SL-1). The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth District affirmed the lower courts decision on May 27, 2015 (Case No. 14-3386). Excerpt below:
McKEAGUE, Circuit Judge. A jury of his peers found Malek al-Maliki guilty of a heinous crime: sexually abusing his own two children, ages twelve and three. Al-Maliki challenges several aspects of his conviction and sentence. His constitutional challenge to his conviction is a close call, but it ultimately fails under plain-error review. The rest of his challenges fail as well. We affirm.
Iraq native Malek al-Maliki had his first child, John Doe #1, with Hinda al-Rhannai in 1998. Two years later, the couple had a civil marriage and al-Maliki (but not his wife) became a United States citizen. Their physical union did not last long. Although they remained legally married, the couple has been separated since 2000 or 2002. Despite the separation, they had one more child, John Doe #2, in 2007. Since around 2000, al-Maliki has lived alone on the west side of Cleveland, Ohio, and al-Rhannai has lived in Morocco and then Syria with the two sons.
Al-Maliki visited his family on a few occasions over the years. The United States claims that during one trip from August to November 2010, he sexually abused his two children (then ages twelve and three), violating 18 U.S.C. §§ 2423(c) and (e). A grand jury indicted him under that statute, which at the time punished any United States citizen “ who travels in foreign commerce, and  engages in any illicit sexual conduct,” which includes noncommercial sexual acts with a minor, or any attempts to do the same.
Al-Maliki denied all of the charges, and a trial began. The jury heard from Mark Goldrup, a vice consul at the U.S. Embassy in Damascus, Syria. He testified that he put al- Rhannai and her children in a safe shelter after al-Rhannai came to the embassy seeking assistance for injuries consistent with domestic abuse. The jury also heard from Department of Homeland Security Special Agent Gabriel Hagan. She testified that she observed the sons’ open affection toward their mother, but that al-Maliki insisted his wife abused the sons. She also testified about a live interview she saw of John Doe #1, where the boy cried and hid his face while struggling to recount the sexual abuse (the “sin,” he called it) that he suffered.
Al-Maliki next challenges the admissibility of Goldrup’s testimony on two grounds: that his testimony included an improper hearsay statement, and that it included prejudicial statements about domestic violence. Nothing improper occurred.
Hearsay. Goldrup’s challenged testimony included this out-of-court statement: “[Al- Rhannai] stated that she had been abused by [al-]Maliki.” R. 97 at 15. But that statement was not offered to prove the truth of the matter asserted (that al-Maliki had in fact abused his wife); it was offered “for the limited purpose of explaining why [Goldrup’s] government[al] investigation” began. United States v. Martin, 897 F.2d 1368, 1371 (6th Cir. 1990) (collecting cases). Two conclusions follow: It is not hearsay, Fed. R. Evid. 801(c), and the government did not violate the Confrontation Clause, Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 59–60 n.9 (2004).
Middle Eastern stereotype. Goldrup’s testimony also included this statement: “You wouldn’t expect a law enforcement response” for spousal abuse in Syria because “it’s culturally understood [there] that a man has a right to beat his wife.” R. 97 at 53. That statement, taken in context, was both relevant and not unduly prejudicial. It was relevant because it rebutted al- Maliki’s attack on Goldrup’s credibility for not reporting the spousal abuse to Syrian authorities. United States v. Chance, 306 F.3d 356, 385 (6th Cir. 2002); see United States v. Segines, 17 F.3d 847, 856 (6th Cir. 1994).
Read in full here(pdf). Warning: Some graphic entries.
On February 6, 2012, the U.S. Embassy Damascus suspended operations and is not open for normal consular services.
A State Department employee based at the U.S. Embassy in London was arrested at Hartsfield-Jackson Atlanta International Airport and is now facing charges of interstate threats, computer fraud, wire fraud, and cyberstalking. The employee identified by news reports and court documents as Michael C. Ford reportedly has a home in Alpharetta, Georgia but has worked at the U.S. Embassy in London since 2009. Typical State Department assignments are normally 3 years, sometimes with one-year extensions. The complaint does not say what work Ford has done at Embassy London or his category of employment.
During the Daily Press Briefing of May 21st, the deputy spokesperson for the State Department informed the press that the individual named in this case was a locally hired administrative support employee who was not a member of the Foreign Service. She also said that as of May 18th, the individual is no longer working at the embassy.
The Affidavit (pdf) executed by Eric J. Kasik, Special Agent of the Department of State Diplomatic Security Service (DSS) says that on or about April 2015, DSS began investigating a target, later determined to be a U.S. Embassy London employee, Michael C. Ford (“FORD”), for allegedly engaging in a computer hacking, cyber stalking, and extortion. We should note that the affidavit is intended to show that there is sufficient probable cause to support the complaint.
According to the affidavit supporting the criminal complaint, Diplomatic Security “identified the specific State Department computer that is located at a workstation cubicle located in the U.S. Embassy in London. Personnel from the U.S. Embassy in London told me that the only person who sits at that workstation cubicle and uses that computer is Michael C. Ford. FORD is a U.S. citizen who has worked as an Embassy employee in London since 2009.”
Item #25 on the complaint reiterates what folks already know — that there is no reasonable expectation of privacy in any communications or data transiting or stored on the information system of the State Department.
DSS computer specialists have apparently obtained copies of specific documents or files that were allegedly stored on the employee’s computer in London. Court documents cited one document as example: “a spreadsheet that appears to summarize some of FORD’s more recent criminal activities. Along the far left hand column of the spreadsheet is a list of account names for approximately 250 e-mail addresses.” Special Agent Kasik says that “DSS agents have determined that several of the accountholders appear to attend the same college in Indiana, where they belong to the same sorority. One is a 17-year-old. This leads me to believe that FORD may be targeting college-aged women throughout the U.S.”
The alleged MO is described in item #16 of the Kasik affidavit:
16. The target initially sent Jane Doe Two an e-mail message to her Google e-mail account, posing as a Google representative and claiming that Jane Doe Two’s Google e-mail account was going to be deleted unless she provided her password. Jane Doe Two provided her password, as directed. The target then apparently hacked into Jane Doe Two’s Google account, presumably using the stolen password. He then obtained, presumably from Jane Doe Two’s hacked accounts, two or more private photographs of Jane Doe Two of a sexual nature. He also obtained other PII about Jane Doe Two, including her first and last name, her address, where she worked and went to school, and her parent’s first and last names and e-mail addresses. The target then sent Jane Doe Two several threatening e-mail messages to her Google e-mail account. He admitted that he had obtained sexual photographs of Jane Doe Two and sent her the photographs as proof. He then demanded that she provide her current home address and her parents’ contact information and other PII. He warned her that, if she refused, he would e-mail the photographs of her to a list of others, listing the first and last names of several of her acquaintances. The target also threatened to post her photographs online.
The affidavit is available here (pdf) via patch.com/georgia.
WSB-TV2 Atlanta reports that Ford will be in federal court in Atlanta today for a bond hearing and that his attorneys declined to comment at this point in the case. Click her to read the report via AP.
The case is USA v. Ford, CRIMINAL DOCKET FOR CASE #: 1:15-mj-00386-ECS-1 in the U.S. District Court in the Northern District of Georgia (Atlanta).
Twin brothers Muneeb and Sohaib Akhter, 23, of Springfield, Virginia, were indicted by a federal grand jury today on charges of aggravated identity theft, conspiracy to commit wire fraud, conspiracy to access a protected computer without authorization, access of a protected computer without authorization, conspiracy to access a government computer without authorization, false statements, and obstruction of justice.
According to the indictment, beginning in or about March 2014, the Akhter brothers and coconspirators hacked into the website of a cosmetics company and stole its customers’ credit card and personal information. They used the stolen information to purchase goods and services, including flights, hotel reservations, and attendance at professional conferences. In addition, the brothers and coconspirators devised a scheme to hack into computer systems at the U.S. Department of State to access network traffic and to obtain passport information.
Related court documents and information may be found on the website of the District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia or on PACER by searching for Case No. 1:15-cr-124.
A Grand Jury in the Southern District of Texas indicted three women charged with nine counts of wire fraud, conspiracy to commit wire fraud and aggravated identity theft in connection with the alleged use of U.S. passport information in Houston. One of the women has been identified by media reports as a contractor working for the State Department. Both the AP and local news say that the Houston and Atlanta passport offices were targeted.
Beginning on or about the year 2010 until on or about March 2, 2015, in the Houston Division of Southern District of Texas and elsewhere,
CHLOE ALYSE MCCLENDON, DOMONIQUE RASHAD THOMAS, A/K/A DOMINIQUE RASHAD THOMAS, A/K/A “TEEN” A/K/A “NIQUE”, and ALICIA LENA MYLES,
defendants herein, did knowingly combine, conspire, confederate, and agree with others known and unknown to the Grand Jury to devise and intend to devise a scheme and artiﬁce to defraud and to obtain money and property by means of false and fraudulent pretenses, representations, and promises, and in execution of said scheme and artiﬁce, transmit or cause to be transmitted by means of wire in interstate commerce, writings, signs, signals, pictures and sounds for the purpose of executing said scheme or artiﬁce to defraud in Violation of Title 18, United States Code, Section 1343.
According to charging documents, the accused were alleged to have done the following: 1) obtain personal identifying information (PII) of others from the Department of State, Passport Administration; 2) transmit the stolen PII to and from each other, 3) use the stolen PII to create counterfeit identiﬁcation documents, 4) recruit accomplices to assume the stolen identities and use the counterfeit documents to obtain commercial lines of credit and to purchase iPhones, iPads, and other electronic merchandise, 5) cause commercial entities to transmit the stolen PII to assist in the establishment of commercial lines of credit.
An AP report citing authorities identifies McClendon as the contract employee for the State Department passport office. A quick social media search indicates that the accused is a Senior Customer Service Tech for a federal contractor.
Initial appearance hearing for Chloe Alyse McClendon and Domonique Rashad Thomas was set for today, 5/7/2015 at 02:00 PM before Magistrate Judge Frances H. Stacy. Prosecutors told the AP that Alicia Myles remains a fugitive but Click2Houston reports that all three appeared before the judge on Thursday afternoon and were released on bond. Clip below from click2houston.com:
Click here if you are unable to view the embedded video.
The case is USA v. McClendon et. al. criminal case #: 4:15-cr-00233-1.
In related news, the Passport Office will reportedly start banning cell phone usage for PPT in SA-17. We’re told that the apparent hold up is due to storage facilities for cellphones outside the workspace. Our source says he/she can’t see how they will let the rest of SA-17 bring cell phones in, since they look at the same PII information, like passsport applications. Keep us posted.
Excerpt from Civil Action No. 14-727 (JDB) by Judge John D. Bates of the United States District Court of the District of Columbia:
Kerry Howard, a former Community Liaison Officer at the American consulate in Naples, did not enjoy her working environment. That is an understatement, to be fair: she refers to it as a “cesspool.” Pl.’s Opp’n [ECF No. 21] at 3. In this suit, Howard asserts that she suffered from a hostile work environment that was discriminatory to women, and from discrete instances of retaliation for her attempts to aid fellow employees. But these claims do not match precisely with those she raised during the administrative process. As a result, some must be dismissed, based on the defendant’s motion to do so.
Here, Howard filed administrative charges alleging only two discrete retaliatory acts: her poor evaluation on April 19, 2012, and being placed on a performance improvement plan that same day. See Notice of Dismissed Allegations [ECF No. 13-2] at 5. Both were dismissed administratively for failure to contact an EEO counselor within forty-five days, as required by the first step of the exhaustion process. See id. Since then, however, it has become clear to both parties that Howard did timely request an EEO counselor on May 7, 2012—regarding her performance improvement plan. See Pl.’s Supp. at 2; Def.’s Resp. at 3. This claim was therefore appropriately exhausted. The Court will accordingly deny defendant’s motion to dismiss as to the retaliation claim regarding that performance improvement plan.1
Odious the allegations may be—but Title VII “does not set forth a general civility code for the American workplace.” Burlington, 548 U.S. at 68 (internal quotation marks and citations omitted) (citing precedent that courts “must filter out complaints attacking the ordinary tribulations of the workplace, such as the sporadic use of abusive language” (internal quotation marks omitted)). Thus, the Court will grant the government’s motion to dismiss the remainder of Count I.
More straightforward is the government’s assertion that Howard failed to exhaust her hostile work environment claim. In the hostile work environment context—as opposed to discrete instances of retaliation—it is settled that claims “like or reasonably related to the allegations of the administrative charge may be pursued in a Title VII civil action, notwithstanding the failure to otherwise exhaust administrative remedies.” Bell, 724 F. Supp. 2d at 8 (internal quotation marks, citation, and alteration omitted); see also Morgan, 536 U.S. at 115 (“Hostile environment claims are different in kind from discrete acts.”). “A new claim is ‘like or reasonably related’ to the original claim if it ‘could have reasonably been expected to grow out of the original complaint.’” Bell, 724 F. Supp. 2d at 8–9 (quoting Weber v. Battista, 494 F.3d 179, 183 (D.C. Cir. 2007)).
“Claims of ideologically distinct categories of discrimination and retaliation, however, are not ‘related’ simply because they arise out of the same incident.” Id. at 9 (internal quotation marks omitted). As this Court has pointed out before, “[t]he EEOC charge form makes it easy for an employee to identify the nature of the alleged wrongdoing by simply checking the labeled boxes that are provided. When an employee is uncertain which type of discrimination has occurred, she need only describe it in the text of the charge form.” Williams v. Spencer, 883 F. Supp. 2d 165, 174 (D.D.C. 2012) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). In Howard’s formal complaint, she checked the box for reprisal—not for sex discrimination. See Formal Compl. of Discrimination [ECF No. 13-1] at 2. And the explanation she attached to the form similarly focuses on reprisal alone. See id. at 3–4. Thus, “[t]o the extent that [Howard] is attempting to claim that [the hostile work environment] was discriminatory based on [sex], as opposed to retaliatory, [the government] is correct that [Howard] did not exhaust her administrative remedies.” Williams, 883 F. Supp. 2d at 174. As a result, the Court will grant the government’s motion to dismiss as to Count II (hostile work environment based on discrimination).