Was the Consular Consolidated Database (CCD) the main target of the twin hackers?

Posted: 1:27 am EDT


In May 2015, a federal grand jury indicted twin brothers Muneeb and Sohaib Akhter, 23, of Springfield, Virginia, on charges of aggravated identity theft, conspiracy to commit wire fraud, conspiracy to access a protected computer without authorization, access of a protected computer without authorization, conspiracy to access a government computer without authorization, false statements, and obstruction of justice.  According to USDOJ, the brothers and coconspirators also devised a scheme to hack into computer systems at the U.S.  Department of State to access network traffic and to obtain passport information.  (See Twin Brothers and Co-Conspirators on Alleged Scheme to Hack State Dept to Obtain Passport Information).

The bothers pleaded guilty on June 26, 2015.   On October 2, the USDOJ announced that Muneeb Akhter was sentenced for accessing a protected computer without authorization, making a false statement and obstructing justice.  Muneeb Akhter was sentenced to 39 months in prison and Sohaib Akhter was sentenced to 24 months in prison.  Each man was also sentenced to three years of supervised release. Case title: USA v. Akhter et al.  Below is an excerpt from the announcement:

[T]he Akhter brothers and co-conspirators engaged in a series of computer intrusions and attempted computer intrusions against the U.S. Department of State to obtain sensitive passport and visa information and other related and valuable information about State Department computer systems.  In or around February 2015, Sohaib Akhter used his contract position at the State Department to access sensitive computer systems containing personally identifiable information belonging to dozens of co-workers, acquaintances, a former employer and a federal law enforcement agent investigating his crimes.

Sohaib Akhter later devised a scheme to ensure that he could maintain perpetual access to desired State Department systems.  Sohaib Akhter, with the help of Muneeb Akhter and co-conspirators, attempted to secretly install an electronic collection device inside a State Department building.  Once installed, the device could have enabled Sohaib Akhter and co-conspirators to remotely access and collect data from State Department computer systems.  Sohaib Akhter was forced to abandon the plan during its execution when he broke the device while attempting to install it behind a wall at a State Department facility in Washington, D.C.

Furthermore, beginning in or about November 2013, Muneeb Akhter was performing contract work for a private data aggregation company located in Rockville, Maryland.  He hacked into the company’s database of federal contract information so that he and his brother could use the information to tailor successful bids to win contracts and clients for their own technology company.  Muneeb Akhter also inserted codes onto the victim company’s servers that caused them to vote for Akhter in an online contest and send more than 10,000 mass emails to students at George Mason University, also for the purpose of garnering contest votes.

In or about October 2014, Muneeb Akhter lied about his hacking activities and employment history on a government background investigation form while successfully obtaining a position with a defense contractor.  Furthermore, in or about March 2015, after his arrest and release pending trial, Muneeb Akhter obstructed justice by endeavoring to isolate a key co-conspirator from law enforcement officers investigating the conspirators’ crimes.  Among other acts, Muneeb Akhter drove the co-conspirator to the airport and purchased a boarding pass, which the co-conspirator used to travel out of the country to the Republic of Malta.  When the co-conspirator returned to the United States, Muneeb Akhter continued to encourage the co-conspirator to avoid law enforcement agents.

One of the brothers was profiled by WaPo in 2014. Both brothers started college at 16 and they were George Mason’s youngest graduates in 2011. In 2012, the brothers received a $200,000 grant from the Defense Advanced Research Project Agency, or DARPA.

The details of this case are even more disturbing.  Under Count Eight  (Conspiracy to Access a Government Computer without Authorization).

60. The Bureau of Consular Affairs (hereinafter “Bureau”) is a division of the State Department, which administers laws, formulates regulations, and implements policies relating to consular services and immigration. It has physical offices in Washington, DC.

61. Passport Lockbox (hereinafter “Lockbox”) is a Bureau program that performs payment processing, scarming of applications, and initial data entry for US. passport applications. Lockbox has a computer database containing imaged passport applications associated with real individuals. The imaged passport applications in Lockbox’s database contain, among other things, a photograph of the passport applicant, as well as certain personal information including the applicant’s full name, date and place of birth, current address, telephone numbers, parent information, spouse’s name, and emergency contact information.

62. ActioNet, Inc. (hereinafter “ActioNet”) is a contractor that provided information technology support to the State Department. It has physical offices in Falls Church, Virginia, located in the Eastern District of Virginia.

63. From in or about October 2014 to in or about February 2015, SOHAIB AKHTER was a contract employee at ActioNet assigned to a position at the State Department as a Tier II Application Support Resource in the Data Engineering and Data Management Program within the Bureau.

64. Prior to accessing the Lockbox database, and throughout his tenure as a contractor with the State Department, SOHAIB AKHTER was made aware of and indicated he understood: (a) the confidential nature of the Lockbox database and the confidential personal data contained therein; (b) the information contained in the passport records maintained by the State Department pursuant to Lockbox is protected from unauthorized disclosure by the Privacy Act of 1974, 5 U.S.C. § 552a; and (c) passport applications maintained by the State Department in the Lockbox database should be accessed only in connection with an employee’s official government duties and not the employee’s interest or curiosity.

69. MUNEEB AKHTER and SOHAIB AKHTER, UCC-l, and other coconspirators known and unknown to the Grand Jury, engaged in a series of computer intrusions and attempted computer intrusions against the State Department to obtain sensitive passport and visa information and other related and valuable information about State Department computer systems.

70. SOHAIB AKHTER used his contract position at the State Department to search for and access sensitive passport information belonging to coworkers, acquaintances, a former employer, and federal agents investigating him for crimes alleged in this Indictment. After accessing sensitive passport information from State Department computers, SOHAIB AKHTER copied, saved, and shared this information with coconspirators.

71. SOHAIB AKHTER also attempted to use his access to State Department computer systems to create an unauthorized account that would enable him to access State Department computer systems undetected. SOHAIB AKHTER surreptitiously installed malicious programs onto State Department computer systems in order to execute his plan to create the backdoor login account.

72. SOHAIB AKHTER orchestrated a scheme to secretly install a physical device at a State Department building known as SA-17. Once installed, the device would enable SOHAIB AKHTER and coconspirators to collect data from and remotely access State Department computer systems.

73. SOHAIB AKHTER led the conspiracy, organized the intrusion to install the physical device, recruited coconspirators to assist in execution of the intrusion, and managed the execution of the intrusion.

74. MUNEEB AKHTER provided technical assistance to SOHAIB AKHTER for the unauthorized access. MUNEEB AKHTER programmed the physical device, known as a “gumstix,” so that it would collect data from State Department computers and transmit it wirelessly to computers controlled by MUNEEB AKHTER and SOHAIB AKHTER and coconspirators.

75. On the day the scheme was executed, UCC-1 transported materials, including the gumstix, from MUNEEB AKHTER, located at the AKHTER residence, to SOHAIB AKHTER, located at SA-17.
78. In or about October 2014, SOHAIB AKHTER was hired by ActioNet to perform contract work for the State Department at both ActioNet offices in Falls Church, Virginia, and Bureau offices in Washington, DC.

79. Beginning on or about February 12, 2015, and continuing thereafter until on or about February 19, 2015, in Falls Church, Virginia, in the Eastern District of Virginia, and elsewhere, SOHAIB AKHTER, while employed at ActioNet, accessed the Lockbox database without authorization. .

80. Between on or about February 12, 2015, and on or about February 19, 2015, SOHAIB AKHTER conducted approximately 119 searches for U.S. passport records using the Passport Lockbox Lookup report. He accessed personal passport information for approximately 62 different individuals, including: G.R., a DHS special agent investigating the crimes alleged in this Indictment; UCC-1; A.I.; A.M., the CEO of Victim Company 2; and himself. In addition, SOHAIB AKHTER attempted to access passport information for S.T., a DHS special agent investigating the crimes alleged in this Indictment.

82. In or about February 2015, SOHAIB AKHTER viewed and copied from State Department computer systems the personal passport information associated with several individuals, including DHS Special Agent G.R.

83. In or about March 2015, MUNEEB AKHTER told UCC-1 that he and SOHAIB AKHTER stored the personal passport information that SOHIAB AKHTER removed from State Department systems on an external hard drive. MUNEEB AKHTER told UCC-1 that Special Agent G.R.’s information would be valuable to criminals on the “dark net” and that he was considering selling the information.

84. In or about February 2015, SOHAIB AKHTER downloaded several programs to a State Department computer. These programs included malicious software, or malware, which SOHAIB AKHTER hoped would enable him to access State Department computers remotely.

85. In or about February 2015, SOHAIB AKHTER told UCC-1 that if he was able to gain remote access to State Department computer systems, he could: access information on individuals’ passport applications; access and unilaterally approve visa applications without State Department authorization in exchange for payment; and create passports and visas and sell them on the “dark net.”

86. On or about February 15, 2015, SOHAIB AKHTER called UCC-1 and asked him to buy a drill. UCC-1 purchased the drill and then, pursuant to SOHAIB AKHTER’s request, drove to the AKHTER residence to pick up additional items from MUNEEB AKHTER. At the AKHTER residence, in Springfield, Virginia, in the Eastern District of Virginia, MUNEEB AKHTER told UCC-1 that he was programming a SD card, which was later to be inserted into the gumstix. MUNEEB AKHTER gave UCC-1 a bag containing a screwdriver, tape, glue, and the gumstix. Pursuant to SOHAIB AKHTER’s request, UCC—l drove to SA-17, in Washington, DC, and delivered the bag and items to SOHAIB AKHTER outside SA-17. Later that day, MUNEEB AKHTER drove separately to Washington, DC, and delivered the SD card to SOHAIB AKHTER.

87. On or about the evening of February 15, 2015, SOHAIB AKHTER called MUNEEB AKHTER and told him that he attempted to install the gumstix behind a wall inside SA-17 but was ultimately unsuccessful.

88. On or about February 19, 2015, SOHAIB AKHTER sent an email from his State Department email account to the email address akhters3@vcu.edu containing lines of code and headers for State Department servers.


We’re not sure reading this if the intrusion was done on the State Department’s Travel Document Issuance System (TDIS) which includes information from U.S. citizens and nationals applying for passports, other Department of State computer systems, passport acceptance agents, the Social Security Administration, the lockbox provider (CITIBANK), passport specialists, and fraud prevention managers, or, if the intrusion occurred on the Passport Information Electronic Records Systems (PIERS), or wait … the motherload, the Consular Consolidated Database (CCD) The Passport Lockbox program cited in the indictment is vague; it’s not a system of record according to the State Department’s System of Records Notices.  But the indictment identifies it as a State Department database. Could this be in reference to the Citibank® Lockbox Services? That is a high-speed processing environment and image-based platform for receivables management, advanced reporting and image inquiry used by the State Department to enable the scanning of applications, extraction of applicant photos received at lockbox locations and storing and batching of images.

Note that #69 of the indictment also alleges “a series of computer intrusions and attempted computer intrusions against the State Department to obtain sensitive passport and visa information;” does that mean the targeted system was the CCD?  The CCD provides access to passport data in Travel Document Issuance System (TDIS), Passport Lookout Tracking System (PLOTS), and Passport Information Electronic Records System (PIERS).  As of December 2009, the CCD also contains over 100 million visa cases and 75 million photographs, utilizing billions of rows of data, and has a current growth rate of approximately 35 thousand visa cases every day.

By the way, one of the brothers was a contract employee assigned to a position at the State Department as a Tier II Application Support Resource in the Data Engineering and Data Management Program within the CA Bureau from October 2014 to in or about February 2015 (#63).  In November 2014, the State Department suffered some “technical difficulties.” See State Dept Re-attached to the Internet, and About Those “Unrelated” Embassy Outages; State Department’s “Technical Difficulties” Continue Worldwide, So What About the CCD?

Was it just a coincidence that a master of the universe hacker was working at the State Department at the time when the agency’s systems were having technical difficulties?

Or were the Akhter twins the “technical difficulties”?





US Embassy Dhaka Restricts Movement of USG Staff/Families in Bangladesh

Posted: 1:39 am EDT





Excerpt from the Security Message issued by Embassy Dhaka on September 28:

There is reliable new information to suggest that militants may be planning to target Australian interests in Bangladesh.  Such attacks, should they occur, could likely affect other foreigners, including U.S. citizens.

In light of the increased threat, U.S. citizens should consider limiting their attendance at events where foreigners may gather, including events at international hotels.  U.S. citizens should maintain a high level of vigilance and situational awareness and should exercise caution in public places including restaurants, hotels and other places frequented by foreigners.

The U.S. government continues to receive information that terrorist groups in South Asia may also be planning attacks in the region, possibly against U.S. government facilities, U.S. citizens, or U.S. interests.  Terrorists have demonstrated their willingness and ability to attack locations where U.S. citizens or Westerners are known to congregate or visit.

Until further notice, all official U.S. government personnel are prohibited from attending large gatherings in Bangladesh, including events at international hotels, unless they have obtained Regional Security Office permission.

The Embassy advises U.S. citizens residing in or visiting Bangladesh to remain vigilant regarding their personal security and to be alert to local security developments.

A follow-up message notes that following the fatal attack on an Italian national in Gulshan September 28, the U.S. Embassy instructed its personnel to shelter in place until Tuesday morning September 29. American International School in Dhaka (AISD) will be closed on September 29. The Embassy will be open on September 29, including providing consular services. U.S. government personnel and their families will be limiting their movements.


Related posts:

US Embassy Bangui: Escalating Violence, Continue to Shelter in Place

Posted: 1:15 am EDT





Excerpt from the Warden Message:

Violence and looting continued on September 27 and into September 28 in Bangui. We are receiving reports that many roads remain blocked, including the road to the airport; weapons continue to be discharged by armed persons; and large crowds are forming in several locations in the city of Bangui. U.S. citizens should continue to shelter in place and avoid any non-essential movements. The U.S. Embassy in Yaounde has been designated to provide consular services for U.S. citizens currently remaining in CAR. U.S. citizens who are in Bangui should contact Embassy Yaounde at (237) 22220-1500 to report their location. If you are working for an NGO or international organization, please include that information.

U.S. citizens who have decided to stay in CAR despite the travel warning should regularly review their personal security situation. Embassy Bangui cannot provide consular services to U.S. citizens in CAR at this time. U.S. citizens in need of assistance should contact the U.S. Embassy in Yaounde, Cameroon.

Secretary Kerry announced the resumption of limited operations at the U.S. Embassy in Bangui on September 15, 2014.  U.S. citizens in need of routine assistance are advised to contact the U.S. Embassy in Yaounde, Cameroon by email to YaoundeACS@state.gov.


Related posts:

U.S. Embassy Ouagadougou Now on Authorized Departure

Posted: 11:51 pm EDT


On September 16, the U.S. Embassy in Ouagadougou issued a “shelter in place” order for its staff during a military coup that occurred less than a year after the former president, Blaise Compaoré was driven out of power (see US Embassy Burkina Faso Orders Staff to Shelter in Place Amidst Coup Attempt).

On September 21, the State Department issued a Travel Warning for Burkina Faso recommending that U.S. citizens in the country depart “as soon as it is feasible to do so.” It also notified the public that the State Department has authorized the voluntary departure of eligible family members and non-emergency personnel from the U.S. Embassy in Ouagadougou.

The Department of State warns U.S. citizens of the risks of travel to Burkina Faso and recommends that U.S. citizens currently in Burkina Faso depart as soon as it is feasible to do so.

This Travel Warning is being issued to notify U.S. citizens that on September 21, the Department of State authorized the voluntary departure of eligible family members and non-emergency personnel from the U.S. Embassy in Ouagadougou.  U.S. citizens are urged to carefully consider the risks of travel to Burkina Faso and, if already in Burkina Faso, encouraged to review their and their families’ personal safety and security plans to determine whether they and their family members, should depart.  U.S. citizens are responsible for making their own travel arrangements.  Citizens who decide to remain in Burkina Faso despite this travel warning should maintain situational awareness at all times and register their presence within Burkina Faso with the Embassy by enrolling in STEP.  This Travel Warning supersedes and replaces the Travel Alert issued on September 4, 2015.

Embassy staff remaining in Burkina Faso continues to shelter in place.  The U.S. Embassy in Ouagadougou will operate at reduced staffing levels and will continue to provide emergency consular services to U.S. citizens.

Elements of the Presidential Security Regiment (RSP) took control of the presidential palace during the weekly council of ministers meeting the afternoon of September 16, detaining President Kafando, Prime Minister Zida, and two additional members of the cabinet of ministers.  President Kafando and others have since been released, but Kafando remains under house arrest.  Prime Minister Zida remains in detention.  Former special chief of staff responsible for the RSP General Gilbert Diendere was declared to be in charge of Burkina Faso following the establishment of a “Conseil national pour la democratie” (CND, the National Council for Democracy).

The security environment in Ouagadougou remains fluid.  Gunfire continues to be reported in locations throughout Ouagadougou.  Elements of the RSP have set road blocks and have engaged in crowd control measures. Civilians have also established roadblocks around the city.  The level of activity on the street has diminished, and many businesses providing essential services—including food, gasoline and cooking fuel—remain closed.  Local electricity and water utility providers have declared a strike, which could further decrease the level of services provided to residents.  A nationwide curfew remains in place from 7:00 p.m. to 6:00 a.m.

Outside of Ouagadougou, the security situation varies, but remains dynamic and susceptible to change at any moment.  There have been reports of demonstrations in Bobo-Dioulasso, Gaoua, Fada N’Gourma, and Ouahigouya.  Due to reports that roadways between major cities may be impassable, U.S. citizens in Burkina Faso may find that at times sheltering in place may be the only and best security option.

Read in full here.


Be On The Lookout Alert: State/OIG’s Inspection Reports FY2015 (Corrected)

Posted: 12:43  am EDT
Corrected: 1:19 pm EDT


The Office of Evaluations and Special Projects (ESP) in the Office of Inspector General (OIG) was established in 2014 “to strengthen OIG’s oversight of the Department and BBG, and to improve OIG’s capabilities to meet statutory requirements of the Whistleblower Protection Enhancement Act of 2012.”  ESP is also responsible for special evaluations and reviews, including responses to congressional inquiries. The work of this new office reportedly complements the work of OIG’s audits, investigations, and inspections by developing a capacity to focus on broader, systemic issues.

Note: We are correcting this post to indicate that the following reports are done by OIG’s Office of Inspection (ISP). That directorate is focused on three broad areas set forth in the Foreign Service Act of 1980: policy implementation, resource management and management controls. The following reports fall under OIG/ISP’s Special Projects and Areas of Emphasis. 

With the end of the fiscal year just two weeks away, here is a recap of the scheduled evaluations by OIG’s Office of Inspection for FY2015 (pdf). The start date of these evaluations was this fiscal year but the final reports may not necessarily be released this month.   We don’t know when these reports will be available and if all will be available publicly, but we’re on the lookout for them. State/OIG says that “our folks are committed to posting them and making them public as soon as we can.”

Cross-Functional: Program Evaluation | Inspectors will determine whether Department bureaus and missions have conducted program evaluations of foreign assistance programs, consistent with OMB Memorandum M-11-29 and the Foreign Affairs Manual (FAM), 18 FAM 300.

Executive: Annual Statement of Assurance on Management Controls | Inspectors will determine whether Chiefs of Mission and Assistant Secretaries understand statement-of-assurance guidance; conduct reviews consistent with guidance; and demonstrate their support for controls verbally and through other means, communicating the importance of ethical behavior and management controls.

Political/Economic: Foreign Assistance Oversight  | Inspectors will determine whether oversight responsibilities are clearly reflected in the position descriptions, work requirement statements, and evaluations of grant officer representatives or contracting officer representatives that spend more than 25 percent of their time overseeing foreign assistance programs.

Public Diplomacy: Social Media Guidance and Clearances | Inspectors will determine whether missions have a strategic plan to guide missions’ use of various types of social media and the level of policy content in that media with respect to target audiences.

Consular: Eligible Family Member Employment in Consular Sections  | Inspectors will examine the effectiveness of eligible family member employment in consular sections and its impact on mission morale.

Information Technology: Key-Loggers  | Inspectors will determine if missions and bureaus have controls in place to detect the existence of key-loggers on mobile computing devices used with the fob.

Security: Regional Security Officer Access to Threat Information  | Inspectors will determine whether Regional Security Officers have access to all required sources of threat information, as recommended in the classified Benghazi Accountability Review Board report.

Security: Department of Defense Support for Embassy Personnel Emergencies  | Inspectors will determine whether DoD is complying with Benghazi Accountability Review Board recommendations related to supporting mission personnel in emergencies.


Post Closures, Travel Suspension, 9/11 Security Reminders

Posted: 2:07 am EDT
Updated: 11:11 am EDT


Post closures:



Non-essential travel suspension:


9/11 Anniversary reminders:





All Hands at U.S. Mission UAE to Clear Visa Backlog From CCD Meltdown

Posted: 12:02 am EDT


The US Consulate General Dubai and Ambassador Barbara Leaf opened the Consular Section on “a recent Saturday” to speed the visa process and clear the backlog from a systems crash this past June. The UAE Mission is normally open from Sundays through Thursdays. We’re pleased to see them do this especially with top embassy officials pitching in to help slay the visa backlog.



The U.S. Embassy in Abu Dhabi provides nonimmigrant visa services to Emiratis residing anywhere in the UAE and to third-country nationals residing in the Emirate of Abu Dhabi. The Embassy provides immigrant visa services to the entire United Arab Emirates and for persons residing in Iran.  The U.S. Consulate General in Dubai provides nonimmigrant services to citizens and residents of Dubai, Sharjah, Ras Al Khaimah, Fujairah, Ajman, and Umm al Quwain and certain citizens of Iran.

Post has previously made available another video on July 15, 2015 where post worked to get  travelers their visas after the CCD meltdown in June.
If your front office did this at your post, send us a note and we’ll feature your video or FB post here.


Security Message on Terrorist Threat to U.S. Interests in South Africa

Posted: 1:08 pm EDT


The U.S. Embassy in Pretoria issued a security message today alerting American citizens of a terrorist threat to United States interests in South Africa. Note that the message provides the contact information for the U.S. Consulates General in Johannesburg, Cape Town, or Durban for American citizens requiring assistance.  The U.S. Embassy in Pretoria does not have a consular section and does not provide consular services.  The U.S. Mission to South Africa is currently headed by Ambassador Patrick Gaspard, a political appointee who previously served as the Executive Director of the Democratic National Committee.





The US Mission in South Africa is the second largest in the Bureau of African Affairs in total staff, and the third largest in terms of Department staffing, behind Nigeria and Kenya. With consulates general in Johannesburg, Cape Town, and Durban, it is apparently, the only mission in Africa with three constituent posts. Twenty-eight offices from 12 independent agencies maintain a presence at the mission, the largest being the Department, USAID, and the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC). The 2011 OIG report recommended that USCG Durban “be significantly downsized or closed.”

Diplomatic Security’s 2015 Crime and Safety Report rates South Africa as “critical” in crime and “medium” in terrorism:

South Africa serves as an important transit and facilitation point for global extremists. Though there has been no indication that operational cells are present, a nexus for recruiting, funding, and safe haven for international terrorists does exist.

The last significant domestic terror campaign occurred in the Western Cape. The Western Cape-based group “People against Gangsters and Drugs” (PAGAD) conducted an urban terror campaign of bombings, assassinations, and vigilante murders from 1997 to November 2001. These activities targeted government facilities and personnel, moderate Muslims identified as threats to the radical Islamic movement, and Western-themed businesses (Planet Hollywood, Hooters, and Hard Rock Cafe) seen by PAGAD as symbols of the anti-Islamic West. The successful investigation and subsequent prosecution of PAGAD members by the government was credited with the suspension of further violence. No significant anti-Western attacks have occurred since 2001.

The smallest post in the mission is USCG Durban. It is located in the KwaZulu-Natal (KZN) province, home to sub-Saharan Africa’s largest container port (Durban) and commodity port (Richards Bay), making the province one of the prime commercial centers on the continent. According to the latest crime/safety report, KZN is also a frequent host to ANC political rallies and large gatherings that sometimes disrupt the city. Most protests, marches, and rallies pass in front of the building housing the U.S. Consulate General and end across the street in front of Durban’s City Hall, preventing Consulate staff and visitors from accessing or departing from the building.

The report also notes that while the SA police forces are well intentioned, they have limited effectiveness due to a lack of equipment, resources, training, and personnel to respond to calls for assistance or other emergencies.

As an side, this is one more example where post’s social media arms are not integrated into a whole-mission approach. Its Facebook page features a job vacancy and “20 years after the Beijing Declaration.”  On Twitter, @USEmbassySA makes no mention of the security message and has the following instead:

We’re going to boldly bet that the social media platforms are run by Public Affairs and the security message is run by the Consular Section. And they have not bumped into each other yet.


US Embassy Tajikistan: Orders Shelter in Place and Temporary Closure

Posted: 5:38 pm EDT




US Consulate Adana Now on Authorized Departure, Plus New Turkey Travel Warning

Posted: 11:45 am PDT





On September 2, the U.S. Ambassador to Turkey John Bass was on CNN Turk TV talking about the coalition effort against ISIL:

“We have seen in the last week, Turkey start to fly combat missions against DAESH in Syria as part of the coalition effort; that’s a really important step forward.  And we are already benefiting not only from Turkey’s active participation, but also from the ability to base U.S. and potentially other coalition aircraft and assets in Turkey which greatly reduces the time for those assets to reach targets in Syria, and therefore increases the capability of the coalition to pursue this military campaign.”

Map from travel.state.gov

Map from travel.state.gov

The American Consulate Adana is a very small post located less than 5 kilometers from Incirlik Air Force Base, a Turkish air base and hosts of the US 39th Air Base Wing.  The previous time Adana was placed on “authorized departure” order was in September 2013 (see US Embassy Beirut and US Consulate Adana (Turkey) Now on Departure Orders for Non-Emergency Staff and Family Members). That, too, was done “out of an abundance of caution.”

The State Department has now released its Travel Warning on Turkey dated September 3:

The Department of State warns U.S. citizens traveling to or living in Turkey that the U.S. Consulate in Adana has authorized the voluntary departure of family members out of an abundance of caution following the commencement of military operations out of Incirlik Air Base in southern Turkey.  

On September 2, the Department of State permitted the departure of U.S. government family members from the U.S. Consulate in Adana, Turkey. U.S. citizens seeking to depart southern Turkey are responsible for making their own travel arrangements. There are no plans for charter flights or other U.S. government-sponsored evacuations; however, commercial flights are readily available and airports are functioning normally. The U.S. Consulate in Adana will continue to operate normally and provide consular services to U.S. citizens.

U.S. government employees continue to be subject to travel restrictions in southeastern Turkey. They must obtain advance approval prior to official or unofficial travel to the provinces of Hatay, Kilis, Gaziantep, Sanliurfa, Sirnak, Diyarbakir, Van, Siirt, Mus, Mardin, Batman, Bingol, Tunceli, Hakkari, Bitlis, and Elazig. The Embassy strongly recommends that U.S. citizens avoid areas in close proximity to the Syrian border.