Category Archives: Compensation

US Mission Iraq: War Over, Danger Pay and Hardship Pay Go Down, Oh, But It’s Confusing

According to the State Department’s allowances website, all State Department posts in Iraq have been designated 35% danger pay and 35% post (hardship) differential pay posts.  The US mission in Iraq designation at the top 35% danger/35% hardship pay bracket has been in effect since March 5, 2006.  All of 2004 and 2005 it was at 25%/25%.  All of 2003, it was between 20%-25%.

We recently learned that the State Department has nudged four Iraq regions down for both danger and hardship pay:

Danger/Hardship Pay, February 2012

Danger/Hardship Pay, February 2012

Our understanding is that these new rates are now in effect but the Allowances website has yet to catch up.  This would be the first time in almost 7 years that US Mission Iraq is not at the top danger/hardship differential bracket.  This would also leave just the posts in two countries at the top danger rate bracket of 35%, one officially a war zone, while the other is not:

  •  Afghanistan: Kabul, Others
  •  Pakistan: Islamabad, Karachi, Lahore, Peshawar, Rawalpindi (except Quetta which remains at 25%)

The State Department’s Office of Allowances does say on its website that “since conditions at Danger Pay posts are reviewed periodically to ensure that the Danger Pay continues only during the existence of conditions justifying such payment, it is possible for the Danger Pay designation to be removed or modified at any time.”

The when of that is what is curious.

We have previously blogged about the perplexities with State’s danger pay designation (see Where dangerous conditions are not/not created equal … and  State Dept’s New High Threat Posts Are Not All Danger Posts).

Below is a table of Iraq casualties between 2003-2012

Iraq Body Count (2003-2012)

Iraq Body Count (2003-2012)

Danger Pay Rate

2003   3004  2005   2006   2007   2008   2009   2010   2011   2012

20%     25%     25%     35%     35%       35%     35%     35%      35%     35%

We understand that State has its own danger pay factors and since we have no access to that, we’ll have to make do with publicly available information on just how dangerous Iraq was since 2003 based on casualties.  Note that when casualties in Iraq started going up in 2003, the danger pay rate was between 20-25%.  It remained at 25% the entire year of 2005.  It went up to the maximum rate of 35% in March 2006 and remained at the top bracket until this year. The U.S. military pulled out of Iraq in December 2011.  The casualties that year and 2012 remained above 4,000 but below the 12,000 casualties at the beginning of the war. The danger rate stayed at 35%.

Screen Shot 2013-02-24

While the casualties have gone down, the country remains dangerous.  Here is what the embassy’s  2012 Crime and Security Report had to say about Iraq:

Iraq is rated as a critical threat for terrorism and political violence by the U.S. Department of State Bureau of Diplomatic Security. Despite the general decline in terrorist-related violence, the security situation in Iraq remains fluid. In December 2011, U.S. forces completely withdrew from Iraq. Terrorists and insurgent groups continue to conduct large-scale, lethal attacks that often target personnel and facilities associated with both American organizations and the Government of Iraq.  Insurgents also continue to carry out effective small-scale attacks throughout Iraq that cause fewer casualties but hinder free movement and influence public opinion regarding safety and security.
/snip/
While total attacks against U.S. personnel have decreased over the last three months, the threat of kidnapping, rocket attack, and small arms fire against U.S. interests in Iraq remains high and subject to flux based on domestic political, regional, and international developments.
/snip/
Since the U.S. military has withdrawn from Iraq, the U.S. Embassy and Consulates in Iraq have an extremely limited ability to assist Americans in the event of an emergency. Many services which many existed in the past, such as U.S. military-provided medevacs, transportation, convoy support, lodging, Quick Reaction Forces response to incidents, and monitoring of Personnel Security Details, are not generally available via the U.S. Embassy or Consulates.

In August 2012 IRIN/UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs had this to say about the situation in Iraq:

Assessments of security trends in Iraq vary wildly depending on who you speak to, how you count the statistics, and which period of time you study. But one thing is clear: bomb blasts, targeted killings or improvised explosive devices are still a daily occurrence in Iraq.

Last week’s coordinated attacks – leaving more than 100 people dead – set a record for the highest number of deaths in a single day in more than two years, displaying the continued ability of insurgent groups to strike. A double bombing in the capital yesterday brought July’s death toll to 245, according to a count by Associated Press.

While the US and the Iraqi government insist that security gains have been made in recent years, UN and independent analysts characterize the situation as having stabilized at an unacceptably high level of violence, albeit now concentrated in more specific areas.

One might argue that the departure of the U.S. military has made working in Iraq more challenging, thus justifying keeping the mission at 35% in 2011 and 2012. But the U.S. military has not returned to Iraq in 2013, so what has changed to merit bumping down the rates?

Is the reason the danger rate is a notch lower due to improved security? Really?  Or is this due to the looming sequestration? Whatever it is, it is muddy as heck.

Here is another interesting example — Yemen.

The US Embassy in Sana’a was a 20% danger post in 2006,  2007 and part of 2008.  On September 17, 2008, the embassy was attacked which resulted in 19 deaths and 16 injuries.  According to Wikipedia, six attackers, six Yemeni police and seven civilians were killed.   On October 26, 2008, the embassy’s danger rate went up to 30% where it remained to-date.

We understand that until last year, embassy personnel were driving their own vehicles, traveling around the country, taking taxis, and living in their own apartments.  For security reasons, they now  live in the old Sheraton Hotel Sanaa (apparently also known as the New Green Zone Sanaa) which has been leased by the US Embassy reportedly until January 2018.  The staff is not allowed to travel anywhere with one exception and only with armored vehicles.  Of course, the embassy lost a good number of its armored vehicles during the mob attack.  Unlike the US Embassy Tunisia where there were publicly available photographic evidence of the damages, the US Embassy Sanaa reportedly kept a tight lid on photos of the embassy damages in the aftermath of the attack.  For what reason, we do not know.  Perhaps they did not want to upset the host country?  In the meantime, the U.S. ambassador and American soldiers at post have a bounty on their heads until June 2013 (see US Embassy Yemen: AQAP Offers Gold Bounty for Ambassador Feierstein). And the danger rate remains at 30%.

Can somebody please grab the tail on what’s going on here? People need to understand the whys of this process. Whether they volunteered or were voluntold, they deserve a good explanation. C’mon guys, don’t make this rocket science.

Also we’re hearing that the priority bidding season for Afghanistan/Iraq/Pakistan or AIP is about to expand to include Libya and Yemen. One of our blog sources wondered out loud if the new bidding season might be called iPLAY.

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Filed under Afghanistan, Compensation, Counting Beans, Foreign Service, Iraq, Pakistan, Realities of the FS, Security, State Department, U.S. Missions

"I am a poor diplomat" — Israeli diplomats packing bags over low pay

YNet News is reporting that Israeli diplomats are packing their bags and heading home over low pay. Spouse employment features in the story, too. Is that surprising? Excerpt:

Y. like eight other Israeli diplomats, recently told the Israeli Foreign Ministry that he will be shortening his term of employment – over the low pay.

Three diplomats in the US, two in Latin America, two in Asia and one in Europe are joining him in returning home – they include a spokesman at a large embassy and an important envoy at another embassy.

“My wife was forced to leave her job because of my employment with the diplomatic service, so she works as a secretary with the delegation making $1900 a month,” says Y. who has shortened his contract by over a year.

“Most of her salary pays for our kid’s education and she is frustrated that I’m keeping her here as a secretary.” Y. makes just $4,800 a month – and that includes all the extras. That might sound like a lot when converted into shekels, but life abroad means that his expenses are much higher than they would be in Israel.
[...]
Y. and his colleagues describe a bleak reality where people who are supposed to be representing the country, live in near penury – where expenses often come out of their own pockets and parents are asked to help out.

“I find myself taking the metro to a meeting with the President of the United States Barack Obama, because if I take a car the expense would be crazy,” says Y.

L. will be returning to Israel after only four months in his diplomatic role. “We have $1,500 a month that our parents give us just so that we can make ends meet,” he explained.
[...]
“They don’t receive travel reimbursements and don’t attend diplomatic events,” he stated. “They don’t receive overtime and are expected to work around the clock. We fail to understand why diplomats who serve on behalf of their country need to subsidize Israel.”

According to him, diplomats prefer to go back to Israel and receive the meager salary – but at least their wife/husband can find a normal job in Israel and increase the monthly family income.

Read the whole thing here.

In a related news, Haaretz.com has an item about an interruption at the Ambassador’s conference in Jerusalem this week when the foreign ministry’s workers’ committee launched a protest on Israeli diplomats’ low wages. Apparently, committee representatives arrived at the conference hall wearing shirts with the slogan “I am a poor diplomat” while blowing whistles.

 

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Filed under Compensation, Countries 'n Regions, Diplomatic Life, Spouses/Partners

Quickie: USAID as a “check-writing agency?”

337/365: The Big MoneyImage by DavidDMuir via Flickr

Ken Dilanian of USA Today has an interesting piece on the CEO compensations of American aid groups. (h/t to RL for the tip). These aid groups are for-profit companies and tax-exempt groups paid by USG to deliver foreign assistance programs.

USA TODAY reports that it “examined total CEO compensation of the 10 largest recipients of foreign aid grants and contracts that also derive at least 70% of their revenue from U.S. taxpayers. Each one receives a 501(c)3 charitable exemption from federal taxes.”

Number #1 in the USA TODAY list is American Institutes for Research (AIR); its president was paid $1.1 million in 2007, the highest in the group.

Number #2 is the Academy for Educational Development; its president was paid $879,530 in total compensation in 2007, tax records show, a figure that includes “catch-up retirement restoration payments.”

Number #3 is the Research Triangle International whose 2007 chief executive compensation was $658,844.

The report quoted Sen. Patrick Leahy, D-Vt., who chairs the subcommittee that funds foreign aid: “It conflicts with most people’s notion of what a non-profit organization is about when they’re paying themselves salaries that are several times higher than what a U.S. Cabinet secretary would earn.” This leads the senator to conclude that “an understaffed USAID has become “a check-writing agency.”

To put this in context salary-wise, I’d like to note that the President of the United States earns $400,000 a year. The vice president’s annual salary is $221,100. Secretary of State Clinton earns $186,600. So the top aid CEO’s salary is almost three times that of President Obama; almost five times Vice President Biden’s salary and almost six times that of Secretary Clinton. I don’t know at what level the USAID Administrator is paid, but the top level of the executive schedule in 2009 is paid $196,700 a year.

What might be the compensation of a president of a third world country where these aid groups operate? Philippine President Gloria Arroyo earns about $1,333.33 a month or approximately $16,000 a year. Robert Mugabe of Zimbabwe’s salary was reportedly pegged at US$20,800 for 2009. Oh, wait — I’m not sure it’s wise to mention Fruitcake Bob, given that he has a fondness for expensive parties; remember that $1.2 million birthday bash and his shindig earlier this year? [Oh, frack! too late now!]

Read the whole thing here.

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Filed under Compensation, Contractors, Huh? News, USAID

Top Most Expensive Places to Live in the Foreign Service

The cost-of-living allowances are those allowances that are designed to reimburse employees for certain excess costs that they incur as a result of their employment overseas where the cost of living, exclusive of quarters costs, is substantially higher than in Washington, D.C.

Below are the top most expensive places to live for Foreign Service personnel; alphabetic list based on government COLA rates as of June 2009:


#1. SWITZERLAND [90%]

Geneva, Bern, Other

#2. JAPAN [80%]

Akashi, Nagoya, Sapporo, Osaka-Kobe, Kyoto, Komaki

#3. DENMARK [70%]

Copenhagen, Other

#4. FRANCE [70%]

Garches, Lyon, Marseille, Montpellier, Paris, Sevres, Suresnes, Versailles

#5. ITALY [70%]

Florence, Milan, Turin

#6. NORWAY [70%]

Oslo

#7. ZIMBABWE [70%]

Harare, Other

#8. BERMUDA [60%]

Bermuda

#9. GABON [60%]

Libreville, Other

#10. FRANCE [60%]

Other

#11. HOLY SEE [60%]

Holy See

#12. ITALY [60%]

Rome

#13. JAPAN [60%]

Tokyo

#14. SPAIN [60%]

Barcelona

Post (Cost of Living) Allowance FAQ (Also see DSSR Chapter 220). You can check out the full list of Post Cost of Living rates here.

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Filed under Compensation, Foreign Service, Org Life, Realities of the FS

Report on Pay and Benefits of Deployed Civilians in War Zones

The Government Accountability Office (GAO) recently released its report on compensation and medical benefits extended to Federal civilians during deployment in the war zones. Selected excerpts reprinted below:

Summary:

The Department of Defense (DOD) and other executive agencies increasingly deploy civilians in support of contingency operations in Iraq and Afghanistan. Prior GAO reports show that the use of deployed civilians has raised questions about the potential for differences in policies on compensation and medical benefits. GAO was asked to compare agency policies and to identify any issues in policy or implementation regarding (1) compensation, (2) medical benefits, and (3) identification and tracking of deployed civilians. GAO reviewed laws and agency policies; interviewed officials responsible for governmentwide guidance at the Office of Personnel Management (OPM) and for policy at six selected agencies, including DOD and State; reviewed all workers’ compensation claims filed by deployed civilians from January 1, 2006 through April 30, 2008 at the Department of Labor; and conducted a generalizeable survey of civilians deployed from the six agencies during this same period.

Although policies concerning compensation for deployed civilians are generally comparable across agencies, GAO found some issues that affect the amount of compensation–depending on such things as the agency’s pay system or the employee’s grade/band–and the accuracy, timeliness, and completeness of this compensation. For example, two civilian supervisors with comparable salaries who deploy under different pay systems receive different overtime pay because the overtime rate is determined by the employee’s pay system and grade/band level. While a congressional subcommittee asked OPM to develop a benefits package for all deployed civilians to war zones and to recommend enabling legislation, OPM has not yet developed such a package or provided legislation. Also, implementation of some policies may not always be accurate or timely. For example, GAO estimates that approximately 40 percent of the deployed civilians in its survey reported experiencing problems with compensation–including not receiving danger pay–in part because they did not know where to go for assistance. Moreover, in January 2008, Congress gave agency heads discretion to apply the death gratuity provision retroactively for deaths connected with operations in Iraq or Afghanistan on or after October 7, 2001. At the time of GAO’s review, agencies had not yet issued formal policy to implement this benefit.

Although agency policies on medical benefits are similar, GAO found some issues with medical care following deployment, workers’ compensation, and post deployment medical screenings that affect the benefits of deployed civilians. Specifically, while DOD allows its treatment facilities to care for “non-DOD” civilians following deployment in some cases, the circumstances are not clearly identified in guidance and some agencies were unaware of DOD’s policy. Civilians who deploy also may be eligible for medical benefits through worker’s compensation. GAO’s analysis of 188 such claims filed with Labor revealed some significant processing delays resulting in part from lack of clarity about the documentation required to support claims. Without clear information on what documents to submit to support a claim, applicants may continue to experience delays. Further, while DOD requires medical screening before and following deployment for civilians, State requires medical screenings only before deployment. Prior GAO work found that documenting the medical condition of deployed personnel before and following deployment was critical to identifying conditions that may have resulted from deployment. Each agency provided GAO with a list of deployed civilians, but none had fully implemented policies to identify and track these civilians. DOD, for example, had procedures to identify and track deployed civilians but concluded that its guidance was not consistently implemented. While the other agencies had some ability to identify and track civilians, some had to manually search their systems. Thus, agencies may lack critical information on the location and movement of personnel, which may hamper their ability to intervene promptly to address emerging health issues, as GAO has previously reported.


Death Gratuity:

In addition, Congress provided for a death gratuity under FECA of up to $100,000 to be paid to the survivor of a deployed civilian whose death resulted from injuries incurred while deployed in support of a contingency operation. This statute also provided agency heads with the discretion to apply the death gratuity provision retroactively for survivors of civilians who died, on or after October 7, 2001, from injuries incurred in connection with their service with an armed service in the theater of operations during either Operation Iraqi Freedom or Operation Enduring Freedom. This provision became law on January 28, 2008. However, Labor, which is responsible for implementing regulations under FECA, has yet to issue formal implementing policy—although Labor officials told us that they have been working to finalize a policy for over a year. Further, while some agencies have issued memoranda or conducted briefings concerning the death gratuity, according to officials at the agencies included in our review, none has issued formal policy that incorporates these provisions—including the retroactive provision—because they are waiting for implementing guidance from Labor.

In fact, officials from State and USAID said that they cannot move forward on these provisions until Labor issues its guidance. Labor officials told us that because of the recent change in administration, they could not provide us with an anticipated issue date for the final policy; Labor officials stated that the draft policy is currently being reviewed for approval by the Office of Management and Budget. Despite the lack of formal policy, officials at Labor and DOD stated that, at the time of our review, this $100,000 death gratuity had been paid in one instance Civilians’ Eligibility to Receive Care at DOD Medical Facilities Following Deployment Is Not Clear or Conveyed to Other Agencies Despite DOD’s policy to allow “non-DOD” civilians to receive treatment in DOD facilities following deployment, confusion exists within other agencies and DOD regarding non-DOD civilians’ eligibility for this care. For example, officials at several agencies, including State, USAID, and Justice, were unaware that deployed civilians were eligible for care at DOD facilities following deployment, in part because these agencies did not receive the September 2007 memorandum from DOD. Additionally, confusion exists within DOD regarding non-DOD civilians’ eligibility.

Response from the Department of State:

In its written comments in response to a draft of our report, the Department of State concurred with our three recommendations. Specifically, with respect to our recommendation that it develop post-deployment medical screening requirements, State committed to implementing mandatory medical clearance exams for civilian employees upon completion of their assignment in a combat zone, beginning in 2010. With respect to our recommendation that it establish an ombudsman program to help ensure that deployed civilians receive the compensation and medical benefits to which they are entitled, State committed to designating a formal ombudsman to replace its informal existing mechanisms. Finally, with respect to our recommendation that it establish policies and procedures to identify and track deployed civilians, State committed to consulting and coordinating with DOD and other executive agencies to determine the best way to establish policies and procedures to accurately identify and track standardized information on deployed civilians. If properly designed and implemented, these actions should meet the intent of our recommendations.

Response from United States Agency for International Development:

In its written comments in response to a draft of our report, the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) generally agreed with our conclusions but did not agree with our recommendations. With respect to our recommendation that USAID establish an ombudsman to help ensure that its deployed civilians receive the compensation and medical benefits to which they are entitled, USAID officials pointed out that the agency already has an ombudsman to support its Critical Priority Countries, including Iraq and Afghanistan. According to USAID, this ombudsman, among other things, helps Foreign Service employees deployed to these countries with a variety of issues, including compensation and medical benefits. We contacted the individual who USAID identified as the ombudsman and asked for documentation related to this position and its origin and responsibilities. This official stated that the position was established in 2006 to assist deployed civilians in obtaining the compensation and medical benefits to which they are entitled, but this official did not provide any supporting documentation. In the absence of documentation, it is unclear to us how USAID’s ombudsman ensures that deployed civilians receive the full compensation and benefits to which they are entitled. Accordingly, we continue to believe our recommendation has merit. With respect to our recommendation to establish policies and procedures to accurately identify and track standardized information on deployed civilians, USAID commented that it believed its current systems to be adequate and additional policies and procedures to be unnecessary at this juncture. We disagree; for example, when asked to develop a list of civilians the agency had deployed to Iraq and Afghanistan, USAID officials stated that they had no agencywide system that would provide this information. They relied in part on a manual search of personnel records.

Furthermore, we note that USAID was unable to provide a list of civilians who had deployed for less than 180 days–in part because doing so would have been extremely labor intensive. As we have noted in this report and in prior work, agencies must be able to capture and subsequently retrieve location-specific information on employees, to identify possible exposures to environmental or industrial contaminants during deployment. Such information includes movement within theater and medical treatments while deployed. Without this capability, an agency may be unable to intervene promptly to address any future health problems that employees may develop as a result of deployment in support of contingency operations. USAID’s current capability, which relies in part on manual searches and may require labor intensive efforts to retrieve this information, does not represent a system that meets the intent of our recommendation. Should any deployment-related medical concerns develop in the future, such a system may fail to identify all individuals who may be affected. As a result, we continue to believe that our recommendation is appropriate.

Read the whole thing here including the GAO’s 10-point recommendations.


Related Item:

GAO: Human Capital – Actions Needed to Better Track and Provide Timely and Accurate Compensation and Medical Benefits to Deployed Federal Civilians GAO-09-562 | June 2009 (pdf)


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Filed under Afghanistan, Compensation, Foreign Service, FS Benefits, Govt Reports/Documents, Iraq, State Department, USAID, War

Quickie: Emolument Clause and the Saxbe-fix in the Sauce

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Quickie: The Overseas Pay Gap Once More

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Filed under AFSA, Compensation, Congress, Spouses/Partners

The Overseas Pay Gap – Not Quite on Life-Support But …

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Filed under AFSA, Compensation, Congress, Foreign Service, Pay Gap

Beijing Blues

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Filed under Compensation, People, Realities of the FS, U.S. Missions