Ambassador Richard Olson will succeed Dan Feldman, who concluded his tenure September 18, as U.S. Special Representative for Afghanistan and Pakistan (SRAP). Ambassador Olson will assume his responsibilities as SRAP on November 17, after concluding his service as the U.S. Ambassador to Pakistan. As were his predecessors, Ambassador Olson will be responsible for developing and implementing policies and programs that support U.S. national security interests in promoting stability and increasing prosperity in Afghanistan and Pakistan.
Ambassador Olson brings extraordinary experience in Afghanistan and Pakistan, as well as elsewhere, to his new position. He has served as U.S. Ambassador to the Islamic Republic of Pakistan for the last three years. Prior to his experience in Islamabad, Ambassador Olson served as the Coordinating Director for Development and Economic Affairs at U.S. Embassy Kabul, Afghanistan, from 2011 to 2012, during which time he oversaw all U.S. non-military assistance programs and support for the Afghan government. He also served as U.S. Ambassador to the United Arab Emirates from 2008 to 2011. He is a member of the Senior Foreign Service, and has served at the U.S. Department of State since 1982.
The State Department has issued a Pre-Solicitation Notice of the Government’s intent to issue a solicitation for the renovation of Pol-i-Charkhi (PIC) Prison in Kabul, Afghanistan. The project includes renovations in Blocks 1, 2 & 3 and extensive infrastructure and satellite structure improvements to the facility. Actual solicitation documents are only accessible using the restricted portion of http://www.fbo.gov, so we have not been able to read the details of this renovation.
This is, however, the same prison which is the subject of an October 2014 SIGAR report, Pol-i-Charkhi Prison: After 5 Years and $18.5 Million, Renovation Project Remains Incomplete (pdf). This is Afghanistan’s largest correctional facility, funded in its initial construction by the Soviet Union in 1973. It is designed for approximately 5,000 prisoners but housed nearly 7,400 during SIGAR’s inspection last year. Extract below from the SIGAR report:
In June 2009, in response to damage caused by 35 years of neglect, Soviet occupation, and warfare, the Department of State’s Regional Procurement Support Office (RPSO) awarded an INL-funded renovation contract to W (AWCC)—an Afghan firm—for $16.1 million. Following two modifications, the contract’s overall value increased to $20.2 million.
In November 2010, the RPSO terminated AWCC’s INL-funded renovation contract at the government’s convenience based on unsatisfactory performance.4 Following contract termination, INL awarded Batoor Construction Company—an Afghan company—a $250,000 contract to document AWCC’s work completed under the renovation contract.
More than 5 years after work began, renovation of Pol-i-Charkhi prison has not been completed, and the contract has been terminated for convenience. Following the RPSO’s termination of the INL-funded contract in November 2010, Batoor Construction Company reviewed and documented AWCC’s work completed under the renovation contract. In March 2011, Batoor reported that AWCC completed approximately 50 percent of the required renovation work. Batoor’s report also noted multiple instances of defective workmanship including the lack of backfilling of trenches, not repairing/replacing broken fixtures, lack of proper roof flashing and gutters, and soil settlement issues. For example, the report noted that there were no metal flashing or gutters installed on one of the prison blocks resulting in damage to surface paint and moisture penetration in supporting walls.
We conducted our prison inspection on April 19, 2014, but were limited by the fact that the renovation work had been completed more than 3 years prior to our site visit. We found that the prison holding areas had been reconfigured into maximum, medium, and minimum security cells, and the cells contained the required sinks and toilets. Our inspection of the renovated industries building and kitchen facilities did not disclose any major deficiencies. We also found that AWCC procured and installed the six back-up power diesel generators, as required by the contract. However, the generators cannot be used because they were not hooked-up to the prison’s electric power grid before the renovation contract was terminated. INL officials told us that the work necessary to make the generators operational—primarily installing paired transformers—will be done under the planned follow-on renovation contract, which they hope to begin in late 2014 or early 2015.
INL officials told us they anticipated an award of a follow-on contract by the spring of 2015 to complete the renovation work initiated in 2009 and a separate contract to construct a wastewater treatment plant. They estimated the renovation work would cost $11 million; the wastewater treatment plant, $5 million.
On November 5, 2010, the contracting officer issued a Stop Work Order which noted that AWCC’s performance was deemed unsatisfactory due to its lack of progress on the project, labor unrest at the work site, and a lack of supplies to maintain efficient progress. Then, on November 26, 2012, the RPSO contracting officer issued AWCC a termination for convenience letter.
After a 2-year negotiation that concluded in December 2012, RPSO agreed to an $18.5 million settlement with AWCC—92 percent of the $20.2 million contract value. RPSO agreed to the settlement despite INL and Batoor reports showing that AWCC only completed about 50 percent of the work required under the contract. The contracting officer who negotiated the settlement for the U.S. government told us that the final award amount reflected actual incurred costs and not any specific completion rate. The contracting officer noted that an RPSO contract specialist and an Afghan COR10 assisted her in lengthy negotiations with AWCC and joined her for the final round of discussions in Istanbul, Turkey, which concluded with the signed settlement agreement.
Although the contracting officer was able to execute some oversight and issue clear warnings to AWCC regarding its performance, INL’s oversight efforts were compromised by a U.S. employee who served as the COR for the AWCC renovation contract as well as the Basirat design and project monitoring contract. The COR served in this capacity until May 2010, when he was suspended after INL and State’s Office of Inspector General found that he had accepted money from Basirat to promote the company’s interests. The COR was convicted and sentenced by a U.S. District Court for accepting illegal gratuities from Basirat.9 As a result, in August 2010, State suspended Basirat from receiving any government contracts. In August 2010, State also suspended AWCC from receiving government contracts based on receiving confidential proposal information from Basirat concerning State solicitations.
The contracting officer added that during these final negotiations the COR [contracting officer’s representative] concurred with many of the contractor’s assertions. In June 2013, just 6 months later, the COR’s designation was suspended amid concerns that he may have colluded with another INL contractor, an issue discussed in our May 2014 inspection report on Baghlan prison.11 As noted in that report, INL suspected this COR of enabling a contractor to substitute inferior products and materials, failing to discover substandard construction, approving questionable invoices, and certifying that all contract terms had been met at the time of project turnover to INL even though construction deficiencies remained. The COR resigned in August 2013. SIGAR investigators are currently conducting an inquiry to determine whether the contractor or other U.S. government officials were complicit in these alleged activities.
So — the previous contractor collected an $18.5 million settlement, 92 percent of the $20.2 million contract? But it only did 50 percent of the work required under the contract? Maybe we should all move to Kabul and be contractors?
And now, there will be a new $16M contract? Which will have modifications, of course, and will not really top off at $16M.
… I am so pleased to announce the appointment of Ambassador Stephen D. Mull as Lead Coordinator for Iran Nuclear Implementation. As we move past the 60-day Congressional review period, it is vitally important that we now have the right team with the right leader in place to ensure the successful implementation of the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA), which will make the United States, our friends and allies in the Middle East, and the entire world safer.
From his position at the State Department, reporting directly to Deputy Secretary Blinken and me, Steve will lead the interagency effort to ensure that the nuclear steps Iran committed to in the JCPOA are fully implemented and verified, and that we and our partners are taking reciprocal action on sanctions, following the nuclear steps. His immediate team at the State Department will consist of experts with a variety of experience relevant to his task of coordinating inter-agency implementation of the JCPOA, and within State his team will rely on support from the bureaus with lead responsibilities in relevant policy areas, such as our support of the IAEA and sanctions issues. Interagency coordination will involve the Departments of State, Treasury, Energy, Homeland Security, Commerce, Justice, and Defense, as well as others in the intelligence and law enforcement communities.
Steve will draw on the entire range of his 33 years of government service for this critical task. Prior to his most recent position as our Ambassador to Poland, Steve served from 2010 to 2012 as Executive Secretary of the State Department, coordinating responses to a wide range of crises and managing the Department’s support for the Secretary of State. From 2008 to 2010, Steve served as Senior Advisor to then-Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs William Burns, working on the range of issues related to Iran’s nuclear program and supporting Under Secretary Burns in his capacity as U.S. Political Director in the P5+1 negotiating process. In particular, Steve played a key role in designing United Nations Security Council Resolution 1929, which imposed additional nuclear-related sanctions on Iran, and marshalling support for its adoption by the Council. He also worked closely with the U.S. Mission to the IAEA in pressing for full accountability in Iran’s nuclear program. Steve traveled frequently to engage with foreign partners and worked across the U.S. government in support of our Iran-related efforts, an effort he takes up once again in his new role.
The Department of State urges U.S. citizens who travel to Algeria to evaluate carefully the risks posed to their personal safety. There is a high threat of terrorism and kidnappings in Algeria, as noted in the Department of State’s latest Worldwide Caution. Although the major cities are heavily policed, attacks are still possible. The majority of terrorist attacks, including bombings, false roadblocks, kidnappings, and ambushes occur in the mountainous areas to the east of Algiers (Kabylie region and eastern wilayas) and in the expansive Saharan desert regions of the south and southeast. In September, the ISIL-affiliated Jund al-Khalifa (Soldiers of the Caliphate) abducted and beheaded a French citizen, in the Kabylie region.
The U.S. government considers the potential threat to U.S. Embassy personnel assigned to Algiers sufficiently serious to require them to live and work under security restrictions. The U.S. Department of State permits U.S. diplomats in Algeria to be accompanied only by adult family members, and children under age 12. Embassy travel restrictions limit and occasionally prevent the movement of U.S. Embassy officials and the provision of consular services in certain areas of the country. Likewise, the Government of Algeria requires U.S. Embassy personnel to seek permission to travel outside the wilaya of Algiers and provides police escorts. Travel to the military zone established around the Hassi Messaoud oil center requires Government of Algeria authorization.
The U.S. Embassy in Islamabad and the U.S. Consulate General in Karachi continue to provide consular services for all U.S. citizens in Pakistan. The U.S. Consulate General in Peshawar no longer offers consular services and the U.S. Consulate General in Lahore remains temporarily closed for public services.
The presence of several foreign and indigenous terrorist groups poses a danger to U.S. citizens throughout Pakistan. Across the country, terrorist attacks frequently occur against civilian, government, and foreign targets.
U.S. government personnel travel within Pakistan is often restricted based on security or other reasons. Movements by U.S. government personnel assigned to the Consulates General are severely restricted, and consulate staff cannot drive personally-owned vehicles. Embassy staff is permitted at times to drive personally-owned vehicles in the greater Islamabad area.
U.S. officials in Islamabad are instructed to limit the frequency of travel and minimize the duration of trips to public markets, restaurants, and other locations. Official visitors are not authorized to stay overnight in local hotels. Depending on ongoing security assessments, the U.S. Mission sometimes places areas such as hotels, markets, and restaurants off-limits to official personnel. U.S. officials are not authorized to use public transportation.
The Department of State urges U.S. citizens to carefully consider the risks of traveling to Saudi Arabia. There have been recent attacks on U.S. citizens and other Western expatriates, an attack on Shi’ite Muslims outside a community center in the Eastern Province on November 3, 2014, and continuing reports of threats against U.S. citizens and other Westerners in the Kingdom.
Security threats are increasing and terrorist groups, some affiliated with the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL) or Al-Qaida in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP), have targeted both Saudi and Western interests. Possible targets include housing compounds, hotels, shopping areas, international schools, and other facilities where Westerners congregate, as well as Saudi government facilities and economic/commercial targets within the Kingdom.
On January 30, 2015, two U.S. citizens were fired upon and injured in Hofuf in Al Hasa Governorate (Eastern Province). The U.S. Embassy has instructed U.S. government personnel and their families to avoid all travel to Al Hasa Governorate, and advises all U.S. citizens to do the same. On October 14, 2014, two U.S. citizens were shot at a gas station in Riyadh. One was killed and the other wounded.
In related news — yesterday, the U.S. Embassy in Kabul also issued an Emergency Message concerning threats to American citizens in what is still a war zone.
“As of late February 2015, militants planned to conduct multiple imminent attacks against an unspecified target or targets in Kabul City, Afghanistan. There was no further information regarding the timing, target, location, or method of any planned attacks.”
Meanwhile, Afghanistan is the first overseas destination of the new defense secretary, Ashton B. Carter. According to the NYT, he arrived in Afghanistan over the weekend and opened up the possibility of “slowing the withdrawal of the last American troops in the country to help keep the Taliban at bay.” Most of the remaining troops in the country are scheduled to be withdrawn by the end of 2016.
On December 19, the State Department issued a Worldwide Travel Alert concerning potential threats during the holiday period.
The lone wolf attack in Sydney, Australia on December 15, 2014, resulting in the deaths of two hostages, is a reminder that U.S. citizens should be extra cautious, maintain a very high level of vigilance, and take appropriate steps to enhance their personal security. This Travel Alert expires on March 19, 2015.
An analysis of past attacks and threat reporting strongly suggests a focus by terrorists not only on the targeting of U.S. government facilities but also on hotels, shopping areas, places of worship, and schools, among other targets, during or coinciding with this holiday period. U.S. citizens abroad should be mindful that terrorist groups and those inspired by them can pose unpredictable threats in public venues. U.S. citizens should remain alert to local conditions and for signs of danger.
Meanwhile the U.S. Embassy in Pakistan on December 19 is also warning of terrorist threats to American residences by groups that may be purporting to be service providers to gain access to the properties:
The Embassy has been informed of plans by terror groups to gain access to U.S. citizen residences through visits by construction, maintenance, or utility companies, as well as other technical service providers. U.S. citizens should be extremely cautious about granting access to their residences, even to established companies, for the immediate future. Recent terror attacks in Peshawar and the resulting Pakistan Government response may raise the possibility for future threats.[…] The U.S. Embassy in Pakistan urges U.S. citizens to vary their times and routes when traveling anywhere in Pakistan, and to avoid travel patterns to such locations that would allow other persons to predict when and where they will be. Depending on ongoing security assessments, and as part of routine operational security measures, the U.S. Mission occasionally places areas such as hotels, markets, airports, and/or restaurants off limits to official personnel.
The U.S. Embassy in Kabul, meanwhile is warning of potential attacks on western NGOs in Kabul:
As of early December 2014, militants were planning to attack a Western, possibly American, non-government organization (NGO) in Kabul City, Afghanistan. Surveillance had been completed and the attack was likely to take place within 2-4 weeks. The NGO office was possibly located close to the Ministry of Interior and the Afghan Passport Authority in Kabul City. There was no further information regarding the timing, targets, or methods of the attack.
The U.S. Embassy in Bamako, Mali issued a security message for places typically visited by Westerners:
The U.S. Embassy in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia also issued a security reminder for U.S. citizens to be vigilant during the season and of the continued threat of potential terrorist attacks in the country. The targets for these attacks, according to the message, could include large gatherings at hotels, restaurants, nightclubs, shopping malls, and places of worship.
On December 9, the U.S. Senate slowly winding its business in town, confirmed the ambassadorial nominees for Afghanistan and India. There’s still a long list of nominees awaiting confirmation, but the candle is growing short here; we don’t think many more will make it through this Congress. But here are the nominees who made it through the confirmation obstacle course on December 9:
The Senate confirmed Peter McKinley to be Ambassador to Afghanistan by a voice vote.
Deputy Ambassador Michael McKinley traveled to Bagram Airfield today to help administer the Oath of Citizenship to 11 Service Members in the United States Armed Forces. (Via US Embassy Kabul/FB)
Ambassador McKinley is a career member of the Senior Foreign Service, class of Minister-Counselor, currently serves as Deputy Ambassador, U.S. Embassy Kabul, Afghanistan. A two-time Ambassador and four-time Deputy Chief of Mission, he is known for his gifted leadership and management abilities. A consensus builder with demonstrated interpersonal skills, broad expertise in high-level foreign policy negotiations and detailed knowledge of the region, he will bring essential skills to the task of furthering bilateral relations with the Government of Afghanistan, a nation of unsurpassed foreign policy importance to the United States Government in a critical region of the world.
Previously, Mr. McKinley served in the Department of State as Ambassador, U.S. Embassy Bogota, Colombia (2010-2013), Ambassador, U.S. Embassy Lima, Peru (2007-2010), Deputy Chief of Mission, United States Mission to the European Union, Brussels, Belgium (2004-2007), Deputy Assistant Secretary, Bureau of Population, Refugees and Migration, Washington, D.C. (2001-2004), Deputy Chief of Mission, U.S. Embassy Brussels, Belgium (2000-2001), Deputy Chief of Mission, U.S. Embassy Kampala, Uganda (1997-2000), Deputy Chief of Mission, U.S. Embassy Maputo, Mozambique (1994-1997), Political Officer, U.S. Embassy London, United Kingdom (1990-1994), Special Assistant, Office of the Under Secretary for Political Affairs, Washington, D.C. (1989-1990), Political Officer, Office of Southern African Affairs, Washington, D.C. (1987-1989), Political Officer, Bureau of Intelligence and Research, Washington, D.C. (1985-1987) and Consular and General Services Officer, U.S. Embassy La Paz, Bolivia (1983-1985).
Mr. McKinley earned a MPhil and DPhil from Oxford University, Oxford, United Kingdom (1975-1982), and a B.A. from Southampton University, South Hampton, United Kingdom (1971-1975). He is the recipient of numerous awards from the Department of State, including a Presidential Meritorious Service Award (2011), 12 Senior Foreign Service Performance Awards, six Superior Honor Awards and two Meritorious Honor Awards. He speaks Spanish, Portuguese and French. via state.gov-McKinley, Michael P. – Islamic Republic of Afghanistan – September 2014
* * *
The Senate confirmed Richard Verma to be Ambassador to India by a voice vote.
Richard Rahul Verma serves as Senior Counselor to the global law firm of Steptoe & Johnson LLP, as well as to the Albright Stonebridge Group in Washington, DC. His practice focuses on international law and regulatory issues, with a specialization in Asia and emerging markets. Mr. Verma also serves as a Senior National Security Fellow at the Center for American Progress, where he directs their “India 2020” initiative. Known as a talented leader and manager, he is recognized for his many years of experience working on high-level policy in the federal government, in the private sector and with non-governmental organizations, especially on matters relating to the affairs of South Asia and India, including political-military relations. His knowledge and ability to set the agenda will enable him to strengthen bilateral relations with India, a pivotal nation of critical global importance to the U.S.
Previously, in Washington, D.C., he served as Assistant Secretary of State (Legislative Affairs), Department of State (2009-2011), Partner, Steptoe and Johnson LLP (2007-2009), Senior National Security Advisor, Office of the Senate Majority Leader (2006-2007), Senior National Security Advisor, Office of the Senate Minority Leader (2004-2006), Senior Counsel, Office of the Senate Democratic Whip (2003-2004), Foreign Policy Advisor, Office of Senator Reid (2002-2003) and Associate, Steptoe and Johnson (1998-2002). Mr. Verma served on active duty as a First Lieutenant and Captain in the U.S. Air Force at Holloman, Air Force Base, New Mexico and Fort Meade, Maryland (1994-1998). He was also Field Representative, National Democratic Institute for International Affairs, Bucharest, Romania (1993-1994) and Staff Assistant, Congressman John P. Murtha (1991-1992).
Mr. Verma earned a B.S. at Lehigh University, Bethlehem, Pennsylvania in 1990, a J.D., cum laude, at American University in 1993 and a LL.M, with distinction, at Georgetown University Law Center in 1998. He is the recipient of a Distinguished Service Medal from the Department of State, the International Affairs Fellowship from the Council on Foreign Relations and a Meritorious Service Medal, a Commendation Medal and a National Defense Service Medal from the U.S. Air Force. via state.gov–Verma, Richard R. – Republic of India – September 2014
U.S. citizens in Afghanistan should be aware that release of declassified versions of the executive summary, findings, and conclusions of the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence’s study on the CIA’s Rendition, Detention, and Interrogation program could prompt anti-U.S. protests and violence against U.S. interests, including private U.S. citizens. U.S. citizens should pay attention to their surroundings and take appropriate safety precautions, including avoiding demonstrations or confrontational situations.
The U.S. Embassy in Bangkok has now released a similar message:
U.S. citizens in Thailand should be aware that release of declassified versions of the executive summary, findings, and conclusions of the U.S. Senate Select Committee on Intelligence’s report of the CIA’s Rendition, Detention and Interrogation program could prompt anti-U.S. protests and violence against U.S. interests, including private U.S. citizens. U.S. citizens should pay attention to their surroundings and take appropriate safety precautions, including avoiding demonstrations or confrontational situations.
Migrants, such as foreign workers, from many countries seek employment in the Gulf region. In 2013, the top five source countries of international migrants to Gulf countries were India, Bangladesh, Pakistan, Egypt, and the Philippines (see table 5). Growing labor forces in source countries provide an increasing supply of low-cost workers for employers in the Gulf and other host countries where, according to the International Labour Organization (ILO), demand for foreign labor is high.
Economic conditions and disparities in per capita income between source and host countries encourage foreign workers to leave their countries to seek employment. In 2012, average per capita income in the six Gulf countries was nearly 25 times higher than average income per capita in the top five source countries, and some differences between individual countries were even more dramatic, according to the World Bank. For example, in 2012, annual per capita income in Qatar was more than $58,000, nearly 100 times higher than in Bangladesh, where per capita income was almost $600. Foreign workers in Gulf countries send billions of dollars in remittances to their home countries annually. For example, in 2012 the World Bank estimated that migrant workers from the top five source countries sent home almost $60 billion from the Gulf countries, including nearly $33 billion to India, nearly $10 billion to Egypt, and nearly $7 billion to Pakistan.
Late breaking news today concerns Robin Raphel, a retired Foreign Service officer, former ambassador, and most recently, a senior coordinator at the State Department’s Af/Pak shop as being under federal investigation as part of a counterintelligence probe.
A veteran State Department diplomat and longtime Pakistan expert is under federal investigation as part of a counterintelligence probe and has had her security clearances withdrawn, according to U.S. officials.
The FBI searched the Northwest Washington home of Robin L. Raphel last month, and her State Department office was also examined and sealed, officials said. Raphel, a fixture in Washington’s diplomatic and think-tank circles, was placed on administrative leave last month, and her contract with the State Department was allowed to expire this week.
Details of federal counterintelligence investigations are typically closely held and the cases can span years. Although Raphel has spent much of her career on Pakistan issues, it was unknown whether the investigation, being run by the FBI’s Washington Field Office, was related to her work with that country.
“We are aware of this law enforcement matter,” State Department spokeswoman Jen Psaki said. “The State Department has been cooperating with our law enforcement colleagues.”
“She is no longer employed by the State Department,” Psaki said.
Ms. Raphel was sworn in as the first Assistant Secretary of State for South Asian Affairs on August 6,1993.
Ms. Raphel was born in Vancouver, Washington, and spent all of her childhood on the West Coast. Graduating from high school in Longview, Washington in 1965, she went on to the University of Washington to study history and economics. She spent her junior year at the University of London studying history. She returned to England after graduating for a year at Cambridge University before taking a teaching job at a woman’s college in Tehran, Iran. After leaving Iran in 1972, Ms. Raphel returned to the U.S. to study economics at the University of Maryland. After finishing her Masters of Arts degree, she first went to work for the federal government as an economic analyst at the CIA. From there she went to Islamabad, Pakistan, where she joined the Foreign Service and worked on detail to USAID as an economic/financial analyst.
Upon returning to Washington in 1978, Ms. Raphel worked in the State Department in several capacities — Economist in the Office of Investment Affairs, Economic Officer on the Israel Desk, Staff Aide for the Assistant Secretary for the Near East and South Asian Affairs, and Special Assistant to the Under Secretary for Political Affairs. In 1984 she was posted to London where she served in the U.S. Embassy as a Political Officer covering Middle East, South Asia, African and East Asian issues. She moved to South Africa in 1988 as Counselor for Political-Affairs at the U.S. Embassy. From August 1991 until August 1993, Ms. Raphel was the Counselor for Political Affairs at the U.S. Embassy in New Delhi, India.
Ms. Raphel is married to Leonard Ashton. They have two young daughters.
The WaPo report cites the FBI’s Washington Field Office as the entity running the investigation. Makes one wonder what is Diplomatic Security’s Office of Investigations and Counterintelligence role in this investigation. It is the State Department office tasks with conducting “a robust counterintelligence program designed to deter, detect, and neutralize the efforts of foreign intelligence services targeting Department of State personnel, facilities, and diplomatic missions worldwide.”
We should also note that two U.S. officials described the federal investigation to WaPo as a counterintelligence matter, which typically involves allegations of spying on behalf of foreign governments. The report, however, also says that “the exact nature of the investigation involving Raphel remains unclear” and that “she has not been charged.”
We’ll have to wait and see how this investigation ends.
In response to WaPo’s Oct. 23 article “USAID watchdog said to alter reports,” USAID/OIG has released a two-page statement dated October 24 citing its “extensive track record of providing independent, robust oversight.” It has tweeted that October 24 statement multiple times since it was first linked to on Twitter on October 27.
@USAID_OIG Are you supposed to tweet this every day?
Yesterday, WaPo published a letter to the editor from Joseph Farinella, a senior FSO who was USAID/OIG director in Pakistan:
The Oct. 23 front-page article “USAID watchdog said to alter reports” cited a Sept. 30, 2012, inspector general’s report on an audit of a U.S. Agency for International Development assistance program in Pakistan. I was the inspector general director in Pakistan whose office conducted the audit. The article cited a draft audit finding placed in a confidential “management letter” rather than in the final published report. The inspector general’s chief of staff said that this was done because our work was not supported by evidence and more time was needed to develop information for a final report.
I recently retired as a senior Foreign Service officer with more than 40 years of worldwide audit experience in several organizations. Our finding on the program not operating efficiently and effectively was fully developed for inclusion in the final report. We provided examples of funds not used for main program goals, why this happened and the negative effect on the program.
Instead of a fully developed finding with recommendations in a published audit report, information was provided to the mission director in a letter. Sen. Tom Coburn (R-Okla.) said it all: “That’s ridiculous. The finding shouldn’t have been removed.”
Okay, maybe the USAID/OIG or his chief of staff would like to take a stab at this again?
Once more with feelings.
It seems to us that there is an easy remedy here for USAID/OIG if it really wishes to put these allegations to rest.
First, release all the draft audit reports as a companion to each of the final reports that are the subject of these allegations. It will give us, the paying public, a way to gauge just how much sanitation work were or were not done with these reports.
Second, USAID/OIG can release all the confidential “management letters” or “management alerts” it issued to USAID management, and all follow-up actions. The October 24, 2014 USAID/OIG statement says that “OIG’s current policy and practice is to post all management letters on its public Web site. This policy has been applied to management letters issued from April 2014 forward.” Okay, but that’s not any help with these allegations as there’s no way to tell how many “management letters” have actually been issued by USAID/OIG previous to April 2014. The allegation is that audit findings were placed on management letters that are not accessible to the public. So let’s see those management letters online and see which audit findings were not supported by evidence.
These allegations go to the heart of USAID/OIG’s mandate as an independent overseer of the people’s money. Here now, we have an ex-auditor for a specific program publicly contradicting USAID/OIG’s official spin, not to mention the multiple whistleblowers who also came forward. Sorry, but a two-page statement touting the office’s “independent and robust oversight” will not be good enough to shut this down.